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ABSTRACT
The question of nation-building has always been a central issue in Malaysian politics.
Whilst the country has been able to sustain a relatively stable politics since the 1969
tragedy, and hence spawn a rapid economic development (at least until the 1997 Asian
economic crisis), the project of nation-building remained a basic national agenda yet
to be fully resolved. This study investigates the delicate process of nation-building in
Malaysia in the post 1970s, especially in the context of the vision of constructing the
Bangsa Malaysia or 'a united Malaysian nation' enshrined in Mahathir's Vision 2020
project which was introduced in 1991. The aim of the study is firstly, to examine the
underlying socio-political parameters that shaped and influenced the politics of
nation-building in the country, and secondly, to explore the viability of the project of
Bangsa Malaysia in the context of the daunting challenges involved in the process of
nation-building. Drawing from a range of theoretical frameworks as well as from
both primary and secondary data, the study contends that, based on the Malaysian
experience, the potent interplay between the forces of ethnicity and nationalism
constitute the crux of the problems in the politics of nation-building in Malaysia. This
dialectic it is argued, stems from the prevalence of the varying perceptions of 'nation-
of-intent' within and across ethnic groups. These phenomena have not only shaped
the pattern of ethnic political mobilisation in the country, but above all, laid the most
complex set of obstacles in the path of the project of nation-building. This study
argues that the project of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia therefore, can be seen as a
significant attempt by the state to reconcile the varying ethnic ideologies of nation-of-
intent. It can also be considered as an attempt to consolidate Malay nationalism and
cultural pluralism, thus, depicting 'the nation' as a 'mosaic of cultures', or reflecting a
creation of 'a supra-ethnic' national identity. However, the viability of the envisaged
project is yet to be tested. The concept itself is still vague to many people and the
challenges ahead are enormous, involving political, economic, socio-cultural and
religious issues. Indeed, the project risks becoming the 'latest' in the series of
competing notions of nation-of-intent circulating in Malaysia. This study contends
that whilst, to some extent, the socio-political landscape of Malaysian society has
been rapidly changing, especially under the eighteen years of Mahathir's reign,
ethnicity still pervades Malaysian political life. This study differs from many
previous studies on nation-building in Malaysia which have mainly focused on either
the historical dimensions or those which have examined the impact of key national
policies. As such, it is hoped that this study would be able to provide an alternative
perspective in the analysis of ethnic relations and nation-building in Malaysia, thus
broadening the understanding of Malaysian politics and society.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The initial idea of this study emerged after Dr. Mahathir Mohamad introduced
Vision 2020 in 1991. However, it was the encouragement from my great teacher and
friend- Professor Shamsul Amri Baharudin in 1993 that prompted me to pursue this
subject as a Ph.D. thesis. This study would not have been successfully completed
without the support and valuable contributions received from a number of individuals
and organisations. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my
supervisors, Dr. Ian Law and Dr. Duncan McCargo, who have guided me throughout
the study. Regular intellectual discussions that I have with both of them have
sharpened my knowledge and academic perspective. Above all, their inexhaustible
advice and constant support throughout my stay in Leeds since October 1995 have
stimulated my motivation in the intellectual pursuit.
Secondly, I would like to extend my appreciation to my employer, Universiti
Utara Malaysia which approved my study leave; and to the Government of Malaysia
which provided me scholarship to carry out this research. I wish to thank the Institute
of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), the Department of National Unity, and
University of Malaya for allowing me to obtain valuable documents and references
from their collection. I am also indebted to six Universiti Utara Malaysia's students
who have acted as my research assistants during field-work interview from March to
May 1997.
I would also like to record my special appreciation to all the respondents who
have been willing to be interviewed for this study. Many of them have been very
cooperative and helpful. The interview experience was a great time for me which had
enabled me to explore their thinking and perceptions on various issue on Malaysian
politics and society. To all my Malaysian and international friends in Leeds, our
interactions and shared life in the UK would certainly be an unforgettable experience.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Ahmad Fawzi Basri, the Deputy
Vice Chancellor of Universiti Utara Malaysia for his constant encouragement and
concern of my study and welfare in Leeds. Many thanks also to my friends Rohana
Yusof, Najib Marzuki, Hamzah Samat, Abu Seman Awang, Dr. Mustafa Hj. Daud,
Azmi Shaari, and all colleague at UUM who have been very helpful throughout my
intellectual pursuit in Leeds and in Malaysia.
Last, but not least, I am truly indebted to my beloved wife Norhayati Na7ri for
her sacrifices, understanding and patiently shared my ups and downs during the period
of my study. To my two adored children- Liyana and Hariz, I want them to know that
they have been so entertaining when I was faced with the tense pressure of completing
the thesis. We have shared a wonderful time together, despite the various constraints
that we faced throughout our stay in Leeds.
iii
For
Norhayati,
Liyana and Hariz
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract	 i
Acknowledgements	 ii
Dedication	 iii
Table of Contents	 iv
List of Tables	 viii
Abbreviations	 ix
PART I : BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Prologue	 1
1.2 Problem statement	 4
1.3 Objectives of the study	 7
1.4 Significance and contribution of the study 	 8
1.5 Theoretical framework	 10
1.6 Research methodology	 11
1.6.1 Methods of data collection 	 12
1.6.2 The respondents 	 13
1.7 Limitation of the study 	 14
1.8 Structure of the thesis	 15
Chapter 2: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Nation-Building:
The Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction	 18
2.2 The dimensions of ethnicity 	 19
2.2.1 The concepts of ethnic, ethnic groups, and
ethnicity	 19
2.2.2 Defining the terms race, nation, and communalism 	 22
2.2.3 Ethnic political mobilisations and the politics of ethnicity 	 23
2.2.4 Managing ethnicity: cultural pluralism and consociational
democracy	 27
2.3 The dimensions of nationalism 	 32
2.3.1 Nation, ethnicity, and nationalism: the theoretical linkages 	 33
2.3.2 Nationalism and 'nation-of-intent' 	 43
2.4 The project of nation-building in plural societies 	 44
2.5 Conclusion	 49
vChapter 3: The State, Political Process, and Managing Ethnicity:
Background to the Malaysian Case
•
3.1 Introduction	 52
3.2 The development and management of ethnicity in colonial
Malaya	 52
3.3 Ethnic mobilisation: the politics of co-operation and confrontation 	 60
3.3.1 From Malayan Union to Independence: constructing the
social contract	 62
3.3.2 From Perikatan to Barisan Nasional: the trials and
tribulations of the social contract 	 73
3.4 Conclusion	 82
Chapter 4: Nation-Building and the Development of the Debate on Identity
Formation in Malaysia
4.1 Introduction	 85
4.2 Nation-building: The Proces, purposes and agencies
	 85
4.3 Identity formation in Malaysia: the development of the debate 	 92
4.3.1 The pre-independence debate 	 93
4.3.2 The post-1969 debate
	
100
4.4 Conclusion	 107
PART II: NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS
OF COMPETING 'NATIONALISMS'
Chapter 5: From State-Building to Nation-Building: A Critique of
National Policies
5.1 Introduction	 108
5.2 The National Education Policy	 109
5.2.1 Education and the politics of nation-building	 122
5.3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) 1970-1990	 125
5.3.1 The NEP and the socio-economic reforms
	
125
5.3.2 The NEP critics 	 131
5.3.3 The NEP and national unity	 137
5.4 The National Cultural Policy	 138
5.4.1 The politics of National Cultural Policy	 139
5.4.2 Resolving the cultural dilemma	 144
5.5 Conclusion	 147
vi
Chapter 6: Imagining the Nation I : The Malays and
the Bumiputeras' Ideas of a Nation
6.1 Introduction	 150
6.2 Exploring the notion of Bangsa Melayu as a 'nation'	 151
6.3 UMNO, Malay nationalism, and 'Malay dominant thesis 	 160
6.4 PAS, Islamic fundamentalism and the notion of 'Islamic nation' 	 169
6.5 The challenge of Kadazanism and Ibanism 	 178
6.5.1 Kadazanism	 180
6.5.2 The Ibans and Dayakism 	 185
6.6 Conclusion	 189
Chapter 7: Imagining the Nation II: The Non-Bumiputeras and the
Notion of Cultural Pluralism
7.1 Introduction	 193
7.2 Exploring the non-Bumiputeras' identity and cultural orientations 	 194
7.3 The Chinese attitude towards nation-building	 205
7.4 Political participation and the politics of identity	 213
7.5 Conclusion	 224
PART III : FROM PLURAL SOCIETY TO BANGSA MALAYSIA:
THE TASK OF MEDIATING IDENTITIES
Chapter 8: Imagining the Nation III: Constructing the
Bangsa Malaysia
8.1 Introduction	 226
8.2 'Reinventing' the nation: Bangsa Malaysia as a political imagined
community	 226
8.2.1 Bangsa Malaysia: Mahathir's perspective 	 229
8.2.2 Bangsa Malaysia: the peoples' perception 	 235
8.3 Mahathir's 'liberalisation' policy: diffusing ethnicity or perpetuating
ambiguity	 244
8.4 Conclusion	 254
Chapter 9: Mediating Identities and Building the
National Consensus
9.1 Introduction	 257
9.2 Mahathirism and the changing landscape of Malaysian polity 	 257
9.3 From economic crisis to political turmoil: the greatest challenge to
Mahathirism or a threat to the project of nation formation 	 269
9.4 Bangsa Malaysia and the prospect for reformulating the national
consensus	 278
9.5 Conclusion
	
283
vii
Chapter 10: Conclusion
10.1 Prologue 287
10.2 Ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia 287
10.3 Nation-building and the competing ethnic ideologies in Malaysia 2,94
10.4 The prospect for Ban gsa Malaysia 297
10.5 The epilogue: agenda for further research 302
Bibliography 304
viii
LIST OF TABLES
•	 Page
Table 1	 Households in poverty by ethnic group in Peninsular	 74
Malaysia 1970
Table 2	 Ownership of share capital of limited company in Malaysia 1969 75
Table 3	 Progress of the New Economic Policy, 1970-85/95 	 129
Table 4	 Classification of Chinese based on their educational background 207
Table 5	 Classification of Chinese based on their attitude towards
nation-building	 208
ix
ABBREVIATIONS
•
ABIIVI	 Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement)
AMCJA	 All-Malaya Council for Joint Action
API	 Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (Youth Awareness Movement)
APU	 Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Umma United Movement)
ASEAN	 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWAS	 Angkatan Wanita Sedar (Women Awareness Movement)
Berjaya	 Parti Berjaya Sabah (Sabah Success Party)
BN	 Barisan Nasional (National Front)
DAP	 Democratic Action Party
EPF	 Employee Provident Fund
FELDA	 Federal Land Development Authority
Gerakan	 Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement Party)
HICOM	 Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia
IMF	 International Monetary Fund
IMP	 Independence of Malaya Party
ISA	 Internal Security Act
ISIS	 Institute of Strategic and International Studies.
KeAdilan	 Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party)
KMM	 Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malays' Association)
MARA	 Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Peoples' Trust Council)
MAPEN	 Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara (see: NECC)
MCA	 Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association
MCP	 Malayan Communist Party
MIC	 Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress
MNP	 Malay Nationalist Party (see PKMM)
MPAJA	 Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
NCC	 National Consultative Council
NDP	 National Development Policy
NEAC	 National Economic Action Council
NECC	 National Economic Consultative Council (see MAPEN)
NEP	 New Economic Policy
NGO	 Non-Governmental Organization
NOC	 National Operation Council
PAP	 Peoples' Action Party
PAS	 Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan Malaysian Islamic Party)
PBB	 Parti Pesaka-Bumiputera Bersatu (Bumiputera's Party)
PBDS	 Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak (Party of the Dayak People of Sarawak)
PBS	 Parti Bersatu Sabah
Petronas	 Petrolium Nasional (National Petroleum)
PPP	 People's Progressive Party
PRM	 Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysia's People Party)
PUTERA	 Pus at Tenaga Ralcyat (Centre of Peoples' Power)
xS46	 Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (Malay Party of the Spirit of 46)
SNAP	 Sarawak National Party
SUPP	 Sarawak United People's Party
UMNO	 United Malays National Party
UN	 United Nations
USNO	 United Sabah National Organization
PART I
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Prologue
The paradox of nation-building in many deeply divided societies is one of
reconciling ethnic allegiance with overarching loyalty to the state. This is because the
forces of ethnicity and nationalism that emerged in these societies tend to be social and
politically salient, thus, making the process of nation-building not only difficult but a
complex task. Broadly speaking, nation-building refers to a process of constructing
national identity that could accommodate ethnic pluralism while simultaneously
inculcating an overarching sense of nationhood. It is usually a process associated with
plural societies. As a plural society, nation-building has always been a great challenge
for Malaysia. Ethnicity characterised the very basis of Malaysian politics. This is
reflected by the fact that political struggles are often fought on an ethnic basis, and the
tendency of most political issues to be perceived in ethnic terms (see: Zalcaria Ahmad,
1989; Crouch, 1996). This is a prevailing phenomenon in Malaysian polity since its
independence in 1957. Amid its relative stability and rapid economic development
especially over the past two decades, Malaysia's nation-building project has not been
fully accomplished, and constantly dominates political agendas.
Malaysian society comprises three major ethnic communities, namely the
Malays, who made up about 50 percent of the population, and two sizeable immigrant
communities, one Chinese (37 per cent) and the other Indian (11 per cent). In the
context of Malaysian politics, the Malays together with other indigenous peoples are
classified as Bumiputera (lit. sons of the soil) - who enjoy certain privileges as
stipulated under the Malaysian constitution. 1 On the other hand, the Chinese and the
I The terms Malay and Bumiputera which are used in Malaysia often in the context of affirmative action
programmes may at times cause confusion. Legally speaking, the term Bumiputera is referred to the indigenous
communities in Sabah and Sarawak, the majority of which are non-Muslim. The term Malay is used to refer to
ethnic Malays in the Peninsular who are Muslim. The small minority of indigenous (aborigine) communities in the
Peninsular are classified as the Orang As/i.. However, during the NEP period (1971-1990), the term Bumiputera has
2Indians are classified as non-Bumiputera. None of these groups are homogeneous,
being made up of peoples with varying languages and religions. Whilst the Malays are
all Muslims and speak Malay, other Bumiputera communities especially in the two
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak practice differing religions and have their
respective ethnic languages. On the other hand, the Indians are mainly Hindus and
speak Tamil, whilst the religious and language backgrounds of the Chinese are much
more complicated. Religion and language divisions in Malaysia therefore occur both
within and across ethnic groups. In spite of the general increase in population, from
about 10 million in 1970 to approximately 22 million in 1999 as indicated in the
censuses of 1970, 1980 and 1990, ethnic composition in Malaysia has not changed
significantly. As far as nation-building is concerned, it is the Bumiputera and non-
Bum iputera ethnic divide that is perceived as most important by many Malaysians as it
illustrates the delicate demographic balance between the two categories, each
constituting about 50 per cent of the population (Shamsul A.B., 1996a:323). Within
this division, it is Sino-Malay relations that are perceived as most crucial as reflected in
the socio-political development of the country and therefore, tends to dominate the
politics of nation-building in Malaysia.
The objective of this study is to examine the delicate process of nation-building
in Malaysia in the post 1970's, especially in the context of the vision of constructing the
Bangsa Malaysia, or 'united Malaysian nation' which was formally introduced in 1991.
The main interest in this study is to investigate the underlying socio-political
parameters that shaped and influenced the politics of nation-building in the country. It
also sought to trace the extent to which a shift was occurring from ethnicism to
Malaysian nationalism facilitated by the notion of Bangsa Malaysia. It is argued that
the crux of the problem lies in the potent interplay of the forces of ethnicity and
nationalism which ultimately characterised Malaysian political life. This is the central
theme of the study.
The politics of nation-building in Malaysia is basically the politics of mediating
identities. Indeed, probably this was the heart of the issue for many countries
struggling with problems and challenges stemming from the politics of ethnicity and
been widely used by the government in policy documents as well as in the idiom of everyday interaction to connote
all the indigenous communities in Malaysia including the Malays.
3nationalism. As Clive J. Christie (1998) asserts, 'At the heart of any discussion of the
nation and nationalism lies the issue of identity' (p. 3). The politics of identity in
Malaysia illustrates the prevailing contradictions of various notions of nation-of-intent2
both inter and intra ethnic groups (Shamsul AB, 1993, 1996a). The key questions here
are, how has the Malaysian political system been coping with competing ethnic
ideologies of a 'nation', and is Malaysia 'a nation' with 'several nationalisms', as each
and every ethnic groups have their own 'imagined communities', (to echo Benedict
Anderson's term) which forms the basis of their political struggle. To which direction
will the ideology of the Bangsa Malaysia seek to take Malaysia in the next millennium?
Why are the questions of ethnicity, nationalism and nation-building made the
central focus of the present study? There are several fundamental reasons for this.
First, ethnicity and nationalism have made an extensive impact in shaping the political
history of the twentieth century. Even as we swiftly move into the next millennium
where there have been far-reaching impacts of globalisation and the spread of
information technology penetrating into every aspect of the collective life of most
societies in the form of interne, cable and satellite TV, we simultaneously saw the
prominent forces of ethnicity and nationalism making headlines throughout the globe.
From North America to Northern Ireland and from the Balkans to East Timor, the
socio-political salience of ethnicity and nationalism have sent shock waves to the world
communities. According to the United Nations report released in 1993, since the
second world war there were 127 conflicts which had occurred world-wide that led to
the outbreak of wars. Ironically, all these conflicts were linked to ethnic confrontations,
in comparison to only 88 conflicts which occurred in the first part of the century (New
Straits Times, 10 November 1993).
In the academic sphere, as in the real world, the past several years have
witnessed an explosion of interest among many scholars within the social sciences
researching the salient phenomena of ethnicity and nationalism. By venturing into this
medley of research, this study attempts to examine the problems of ethnicity and
nationalism in the context of Malaysia's plural society. For Malaysia, nation-building
has been the single most crucial national agenda since its inception as a sovereign state
Nation-of-intent was a concept first employed by Rotberg (1966) in his study of 'African nationalism' and applied
in the Malaysian context by Rustam A. Sani (1975) in his study of the 'Malay Left'. The concept was further
expanded by Shamsul AB (1996a) in debating identity in Malaysia. The full length definition of the concept will be
given in Chapter 2.
4in 1957. Almost all key national policies devised since then have a direct bearing on
the question of nation-building. Nevertheless, in as much as these policies were hoped
to redress the related problems of national integration, new challenges cropped up, and
some emerged with even more delicate issues.
In 1991 Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad unveiled the so-called Vision
2020 which simply means that in the year 2020 the government wants Malaysia to be
an industrialised country in it's own making (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a). Of great
interest within the project 2020 is the list of nine challenges and obstacles that Malaysia
has to overcome to translate Vision 2020 into reality. On top of the list is the creation
of the so-called Bangsa Malaysia, or a united Malaysian nation. Apparently this was
the first time the government officially put forward a clear vision for constructing 'a
nation' or the Bangsa Malaysia. With that, it clearly infers that previous attempts over
the past forty years of constructing national integration has been lacking a coherent
focus and thus has not been fully achieved.
To what extent the vision of Bangsa Malaysia is likely to be achievable is yet to
be seen. But, for the policy-makers and their respective agencies, crafting the right
strategies and measures to embark upon the mission constitute a considerable challenge
ahead. For various ethnic communities within Malaysia the reconciliation of ethnic
interests, vis-a-vis national aspirations, is notably a difficult choice, and does this
constitute the precondition for the vision to materialise? But the relevant question to
ask is, what is the exact meaning of Bangsa Malaysia? Does it connote a new basis for
constructing Malaysian nationalism? And equally important does it provide a viable
framework to reconcile ethnic diversity and the varying perceptions of nation-of-intent
that prevail in the polity?
1.2 Problem Statement
The question of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia concomitant with Vision
2020 has become a much debated issue in Malaysia in recent years (Rustam A. Sani,
1993; Shamsul AB, 1992, 1996a 1996b; M. Mustafa Ishak, 1994; Awang Had Salleh,
1994; Ghazali Shafei, 1995; Heng P.K., 1996; Lee Kam Hing, 1997; Abdul Rahman
5Embong, 1997). While some of these writings have indicated that to a certain extent
the state of national integration in the post NEP era might have improved, in one way or
another as a result of various national policies, especially that of the social engineering
programmes in the twenty years span of the NEP (1970-1990), Malaysia is still largely
grappling with the challenges of nation formation. To Shamsul AB (1992), Malaysia is
still in a situation of 'one state with several nations'. Bearing such a remark does not
mean that Malaysians have no notion of their national identity, but rather, in contrast to
ethnic identities, national identity in Malaysia is yet to be strongly developed. This is
parallel to the observation made by Leo Suryadinata (1997:5) who argues that `...all
Southeast Asian states are multi-ethnic states and their national identity is still weak
and ethnic tension is often very high'. Thus, constant national endeavour aimed at
promoting nation-building is imperative in these countries as it is `...generally believed
that ethnic identity is a divisive force which may lead to political instability and
eventually the disintegration of a state' (Leo Suryadinata, 1997:5).
History has shown that Malaysia has never been short of the nationalist ideals to
form the basis of a nation. Indeed, the country's independence was largely attributed to
the struggle of Malay nationalism. However, within Malay nationalist movements of
the pre-independence era there were clear ideological divisions between the radical and
the conservative groups (W. R. Roff, 1994; Ariffin Omar, 1993; Ikhmal Said, 1992;
Firdaus Abdullah, 1985). Even after the conservative-nationalist group represented by
UMNO (United Malays National Organization) managed to dominate post
independence Malaysian politics, the aspiration of creating a Malay nation-state has not
been materialised. Instead, the nationalists had to compromise to the creation of 'a
plural society nation' when independence was granted in 1957 and shared power with
the non-Malays (Chinese and the Indians) who were mainly immigrant communities
who had settled in colonial Malaya in the 19th century. Nevertheless, despite the
creation of a power sharing mechanisms at the Federal level which illustrates the
formation of a Malaysian's model of consociational democracy, Malay political
supremacy was reconstituted, enshrined in UMNO as the backbone of the Alliance
(1957-1974) and later the BN (Barisan Nasional or National Front) coalition
6government. Thus, the Malay-centric or rather the UMNO-centric government has
been the hallmark of Malaysian politics. Therefore, in contrast to the 'ideal
consociationalism' arrangement (Lipjhart, 1977), the system in Malaysia can be seen
as a system of `hegemonic consociationalism' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:18). Whilst the
Malays are politically dominant, the non-Malays, especially the Chinese are
economically superior. This delicate balance or perhaps an outstanding discrepancy has
further complicated the project of nation formation in the country.
The post-independence era, saw that Malay hegemony has been fiercely
challenged by the non-Malays. They felt that the Malay dominant thesis was an
ideology which served to turn nation-building into an ethnic project which would
ultimately threaten their ethnic identities and the basis of the 'plural society nation'.
Apart from that, post-independence Malay nationalism had to cope with challenges
from other factions within Malay and the Bumiputera's communities, who espoused the
notion of an Islamic state and the notions of Kadazanism and Dayakism as the
definitive identities in the two Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak, respectively.
Nation-building in Malaysia thus could be seen as a struggle of every ethnic group
against the state (a Malay centric state) on one hand, and on the other, against each
other to materialise their respective versions of a 'nation'. But the most obvious contest
however, was between Malay vis-a-vis the non-Malay groups anchored by the Chinese.
This is the most salient struggle which has left several damaging political scars on
Malaysian society, the worst culminated in the 1969 racial riots, and this is also a
struggle which forms the basis of Malaysian political divisions.
Despite the 1969 tragedy, the Malaysian political system has been able to absorb
various threats to its stability. This was attributed to various strategies of
depoliticisation that marked the growing political authoritarianism in Malaysia (see:
Crouch, 1996; Khoo Boo Teik, 1997). Hence, while political violence has not been a
prevailing phenomena, Malaysia is regarded as 'a state in stable tension' (Shamsul AB,
1993). To some extent, this perhaps indicates that the once perceived fragile system of
Malaysia's consociational democracy has been gaining momentum since the 1969
incident. Despite the various criticisms for its democratic practices, the government
7since 1970 has been able to embark upon affirmative action programmes to tackle the
problems of ethnic imbalances in the socio-economic fields especially in rectifying the
Bumiputeras' economic backwardness. While these measures have produced some
positive results, the project of nation formation is still far from being resolved. Ethnic
politics are still a major threat to the systems continued stability and government
leaders have constantly reiterated that managing ethnic conflicts and moving towards
national integration always constitutes a primary national agenda.
That was the backdrop against which the notion of Bangsa Malaysia was
formally introduced in 1991. Whereas the objective of the project may well be easily
understood, Ban gsa Malaysia however, is a problematic concept. On one hand, its
operational definition is still vague to many Malaysians, while on the other, its viability
as a formula to resolve the national predicament in Malaysia's plural society may
arouse as much ambiguity as its meaning. Here lies the most significant dimension of
the present study which focuses on the challenges of nation formation in post 1990's
Malaysia. While the country was enjoying constant economic growth since the late
1980's, in July 1997 what was later known as Asian economic meltdown has severely
disrupted Malaysia's relative stability and thus eclipsed its economic success story.
Malaysia has not only had to grapple with the economic downturn, but worst still, a
year later the country was plunged into a political crisis following the abrupt dismissal
of Anwar Ibrahim, then the country's popular Deputy Prime Minister and still a
'political icon' in Malaysia. Whilst aspects of these twin crises and their implications
have not been the prime focus of the present study, some general consideration of the
events are made towards the end of the thesis.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
1. To examine the perceptions of the major ethnic communities in Malaysia of the ideas
of nation-of-intent or political imagined community.
2. To investigate the underlying factors that shaped the prevailing contestation between
the various notions of nation-of-intent both inter and intra ethnic groups.
3. To examine the impact of key national policies and that of Mahathir's administration
8in the process of nation-building.
5. To examine the vision of Ban gsa Malaysia and its viability to redress the huge
challenges of nation formation in Malaysia
	
.
6. To examine the extent to which the notion of Bangsa Malaysia would provide the
basis for the development of Malaysian nationalism, hence diffusing ethnicism in
Malaysian politics.
1.4 Significance and Contribution of the Study
Although there has been a proliferation in the study of ethnicity and nationalism
in the West in recent years, detailed studies that specifically focus on the politics of
nation-building in post NEP (post 1990's) Malaysia are hardly found. There were
several studies on a similar subject in the past such as that of Ratnam (1965); Ibrahim
Saad (1976); Ongkili (1982); Wan Hashim (1983); and Abraham (1997). However,
these studies were mainly restricted to events that took place in Malaysia over the first
two and a half decades of independence, or between 1957 to the early 1980s. On the
other hand, several contemporary assessments of the questions of Bangsa Malaysia and
identity politics in Malaysia have been made by local observers such as Rustam A. Sani
(1993); Shamsul AB (1992;1996a); Ghazali Shafie (1995); and Abdul Rahman Embong
(1997). Nevertheless, these gave less attention to the politics of nation-building.
Therefore, these observations need to be further scrutinised and deserved a more in-
depth analysis as there have been tremendous socio-economic and political changes
affecting the country particularly under Mahathir's political reign. One observer
perceived that Mahathir's `...ideology, politics and personality have contributed to
reshaping the Malaysian polity...' (Khoo Boo Teik, 1995: x). Is there then a kind of
`Mahathirism' which has significantly affected the politics of nation-building in
Malaysia?
A review of the literature suggests that the NEP and social engineering
programmes have made a significant impact upon the socio-economic landscape of
Malaysian plural society. To what extent this is affecting the short and long term
political parameters of ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia requires investigation.
9Over the past seven or eight years Malaysia was experiencing tremendous economic
growth together with its other Southeast Asian neighbours until the entire world was
shocked with the Asian economic meltdown. The economic crisis of 1997 has then
turned into political turmoil in 1998 in several countries in the region and Malaysia is
no exception. The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim, the popular Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia and the political crisis that erupted following his shocking removal from
office, was the case in point. This occurred at the time Malaysia was steadily moving
towards promoting its' Vision 2020 agenda which embodied the idea of constructing
the Bangsa Malaysia. Although aspects of the twin crises did not constitute the core
focus of the study, it is hoped that it would however, provide insights and perhaps some
new perspectives in assessing the effects and dimensions of the crises on problems of
nation formation, as well as prospects for future trends in Malaysian politics. In this
regard, this study therefore, is very timely and relevant to the problems concerned.
While not neglecting the historical factors that have in many respects shaped
Malaysian contemporary politics, this study uses perspectives drawn from literature on
ethnicity and nationalism in evaluating primary data gathered through in-depth
interviews. With the adoption of these approaches, it is hoped that this study would be
able to break new ground in a number of respects, such as:
a) it explores the dynamic interplay of the forces of ethnicity and
nationalism in the politics of nation-building in Malaysia.
b) it uncovers the basis of identity politics and the competing notions of
nation-of-intent in Malaysia which has shaped and influenced the politics of
nation-building in the country over the past forty years.
c) it examines the impacts of key national policies on the nation-building
project especially the socio-political effects of social engineering
programmes of the NEP as well as that of the impact of Mahathir's
administration.
d) it investigates thoroughly the meaning and the interpretation of the notion
of Bangsa Malaysia through the perspective of the authority and compared it
to that of the people. In so doing, it explores the viability of the concept as
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well as the huge challenges it has to endure in the real-politik of Malaysia's
plural society.
e) it explores the prospect of the development of Malaysian nationalism vis-
a-vis ethnicism, hence the circumstances that might shaped and influenced
the future trends in the politics of nation-building and ethnic relations in
Malaysia.
In other words, all these aspects bring about several fresh dimensions in looking
at the problems of nation-building in Malaysia, problems and challenges which are not
new to the country but have constantly troubled the political life of the society. It is
hoped that this study will contribute to the existing literature on the politics of nation-
building in Malaysia, and add to the existing knowledge on ethnicity and nationalism in
general. Beyond that, it is also hoped that the research findings will encourage more
research in the area to further apprehend the socio-economic and cultural parameters
that prevail in Malaysia's plural society. This could thus contribute towards
formulating ways and means which could effectively accelerate the processes and
programmes towards nation formation in Malaysia.
1.5 Theoretical Framework
Despite the specificity of the present study to the Malaysian context, it is the
assumption of this study that the questions of ethnicity and nationalism are best
understood in the context of broader debates and discourses. The search of the
burgeoning literature in a wide range of disciplines suggests that no general theory of
ethnicity and nationalism is possible, 'for the differences across time-periods and
spaces are too great' (Smith, 1996a, cited in Mcrone, 1998:16). In spite of this, there
was an attempt however by James Kellas (1991) to propose an integrated theory on the
politics of nationalism and ethnicity. While Kellas's contribution was useful as it
presented a framework which can help to provide an answer to some of the related
questions, it was still unable to address all the fundamental issues and perhaps specific
problems in as far as Malaysia is concerned. Therefore, it is vital that some form of
theoretical framework is established based on existing theories and debates on the
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subject to guide the analysis of the present study.
The focus of this study is on the investigation of factors that shaped and
influenced the politics of nation-building in Malaysia. To examine these questions, the
study will lay particular focus on several relevant theories that explored and explained
the outstanding relationship between ethnicity and nationalism in the politics of
mediating identities. The study therefore, will first construct the working definition of
key inter-related concepts. Concepts examined includes ethnic group, and ethnicity;
nation, nationalism, nation-of-intent and nation-building; as well as the notions of
plural society, cultural pluralism and consociational democracy. Consequently,
contributions made by several scholars such as Anthony Smith (1986) on the ethnic
origins of nations; Benedict Anderson's (1983) Imagined Community„ and Ernest
Gellner's (1964; 1983) notion of the relationship of modernity and nationalism are
explored to establish their usefulness in the Malaysian context. This study shall adopt
the view that nationalism is a variant of ethnicity, and will therefore analyse the
primary, and secondary data garnered in the research through this perspective. This is
not to say that other perspectives will not be considered, but rather they shall be
examined against the chosen perspective. A review of the relevant concepts and
theories will be presented in the next chapter.
1.6 Research Methodology
While the social origins of the varying perceptions of nation-of-intent amongst
ethnic groups can be examined through historical perspective (see: Shamsul A.B.
1996a, 1996b), this study attempts to approach this problem by examining primary data
collected through in-depth interviews and documentary evidence as well as current
secondary data obtained through library research. These data then were analysed using
various inter-related concepts and theories on ethnicity and nationalism as analytical
tools. This study is primarily based on qualitative research. Qualitative research is
concerned with individual's own accounts of their attitudes, opinions, motivations and
behaviour. While quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things, the
notion of quality which is essential to the nature of things, instead refers to the what,
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how, when and where of a thing, its essence and ambience. As such qualitative
research is more concerned with aspects of meanings, concepts, definitions,
characteristic, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things.3
1.6.1 Methods of Data Collection
As stated earlier, this study capitalised on two forms of data collection, primary
data collection and secondary data collection. Primary data collection or sources are
those which came into existence in the period under research, whilst secondary data
collection or sources are interpretations of events of that period based on primary
sources. In searching the primary data related to the study, several types of sources
have been looked upon. This includes, in-depth interviews with a number of key
informants, as well as data gathered from documents search, such as policy speeches by
the Prime Minister and other ministers, as well as government's official documents.4
During the fieldwork data collection from 1 March to 21 May 1997 in Malaysia,
a total of 52 respondents have been interviewed (a detailed list of respondents is
attached in the bibliography). Most interviews were conducted as informally as
possible, in order to create an acceptable and more relaxed atmosphere. A set of
important questions was developed to guide the interview. Unlike structured interviews,
unstructured interviews do not use schedules of questions although they have key words
as guidelines. Questions were asked and adapted according to the position and the
response from the respondents and follow-up probes were made where and when it was
appropriate and useful in getting further clarification and extended information. This
method of interview was used because it led to the gathering of additional information
about various aspects, be they historical or contemporary, which are pertinent to this
study.
3 This type of research can offer richly descriptive reports of individual's perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and
feelings. It can give meanings and interpret events and things, as well as behaviour. It can display how these are put
together, more or less coherently and consciously, into a framework which makes sense of their experience. It can
illuminate the motivations that connect attitudes and behaviour and show how conflicting attitudes and motivations
are resolved and particular choices made (Hakim, 1987:26). Bogdan and Taylor (1975) defined qualitative research
methods as research procedures that produce descriptive data, people's own written or spoken words and
observational behaviour. According to them, this approach directs itself at settings and individuals within those
settings holistically, that is, the subject of the study, be it an organisation or an individual. They, however, are not
reduced to an isolated variable or to a hypotheses, but is viewed instead as part of a whole (p.4).
4 As far as in-depth interview is concerned, there are several types of interview, such as structured or standard
interview and unstructured interview or non-standard interview. See M.H. Gopal (1974) for the detailed account of
the usefulness of the interview method in social research.
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Most interviews were tape-recorded with prior consent from the respondent.
Transcripts of each and every interview were then prepared. Not all of the materials
gathered through the interview were incorporated in the thesis, but they have enabled
the researcher to gain valuable insights, ideas and an understanding of the various
issues related to nation-building in Malaysia. Apart from in-depth interviews, primary
data were also obtained from a number of policy speeches by Malaysian Prime Minister
and other Ministers as well as from several relevant government reports, documents,
and laws passed by Parliament. As far as the aspect of gathering a secondary sources
are concerned, theses and dissertations, conferences and seminars papers, journals,
books, magazines and newspapers were examined to harness the related inputs crucial
to the present study.
1.6.2 The Respondents
The selection of the respondents was done according to several criteria such as
position/status, ethnic background, experience, gender and age. Their selection was
based on the assumption that they could provide both specific information as well as a
general perceptions on aspects related to key research questions. The total of 52
respondents interviewed were divided into four main categories according to their
social background, namely:
1. The political and bureaucratic category
This includes persons in positions of authority, namely those who are still
active or have retired either as politician or senior government servant. There were 9
respondents interviewed under this category.
2. The intellectual elite category
This refers to people with special knowledge, namely experts and academics
who have been involved in research and writings on various aspects of Malaysian
politics and society. There were 10 people interviewed in this category.
3. Key opinion former category
These are peoples who were considered as having considerable influence in
shaping public opinion in Malaysia. Mostly they came from journalist or business
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backgrounds. There were 6 people interviewed from this group.
4. General public category
There were 26 people of the general public interviewed and they are divided
into three main category namely, university students; public sector respondents; and
private sector respondents.
1.7 Limitation of the Study
There are two apparent limitations to this study. First, is related to the
collection of primary data in Malaysia from March to May 1997. As the researcher
was given only three months to conduct the interviews and data collection in Malaysia,
this time limit has posed a major obstacle. Only 52 people managed to be interviewed,
and it was felt that more people should be involved to present a more wider set of
perspectives. The researcher also faced problems in getting appropriate appointments
for conducting interviews. Several key respondent in the political and bureaucratic
group as well as those in the intellectual category have changed the agreed appointment
resulted in failing to get a new appointment as the researcher could not find alternative
dates because of the time constraint.
The second limitation factor is related to aspects of the scope of the research.
When the research of the present study started in October 1995, the economic and
political conditions in Malaysia were totally different from the situation when the thesis
was about to be completed. Malaysia was then experiencing relative political stability
with constant annual economic growth of 8-9 percent for nearly a decade. It was
ranked as one of the emerging 'Asian Tiger economies'. Neither the researcher nor
many other political observers had anticipated that in 1997 'Asian Tigers' could have
been so 'tamed' when the region was plunged into its worst economic catastrophe since
world war II, which later catapulted political turmoil in several Asian states, of which
Malaysia is no exception.
Therefore as far as the thesis is concerned these economic and political crises
were not in the mind when the study conunenced in October 1995. Nevertheless, these
important developments need to be considered as they happened at the time the research
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was being conducted. Although the main focus of the study has not been changed, the
conclusion of the thesis could have been somewhat different if the crises had never
occurred. Since there have been fast changing events in Malaysia following the crises,
the researcher was confronted with a dilemma to decide the cut off point for the
research. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the research is confined to the point the
Malaysian High Court passed its verdict on Anwar Ibrahim on 16 April 1999.
Therefore, while it is assumed that there could have been some crucial developments
taking place in Malaysia since then, it is not within the scope of this study to examine
aspects of the full scale of the crises and their implications, even if they could have had
some significant bearing to the project of nation formation in the country. This
perhaps, could form an extension of the present study, and hence an interesting prospect
for future research.
1.8 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised into three parts and divided into ten chapters. Part I,
including the present one, comprises four chapters. The present discussion which made
up Chapter 1, among others, outlined the profile of the study which includes the general
introduction of the thesis; the problem statement; the objectives and the scope of the
study; and the methodology of the research. Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual and the
theoretical framework and also highlights some of the contemporary discourse on
ethnicity and nationalism. This chapter focuses on the major theories on ethnicity and
nationalism and attempt to establish the theoretical foundation for the study. This is
followed by Chapter 3 which explores the socio-political origins of ethnicity and
nationalism in Malaysia. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the
roots of ethnic politics, the rise of Malay nationalism and the mechanics of conflict
management in Malaysia. Why the mechanism almost collapsed culminating in the
May 1969 tragedy and how it was then reformulated is also explored. Chapter 4
extends the discussion on the processes, purposes and agencies of nation-building, with
special consideration given to the role of 'national awakeners', based on the
development of European nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This
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is followed by a discussion on the development of the debate on national identity and
nation formation that has emerged in Malaysia since the 1920s. This chapter attempts
to blend the theoretical debate on nation-building and identity formation with that of the
Malaysian experience.
Part II consists of three chapters. Chapter 5 begins with the discussion on the
impact of the 1969 tragedy which saw the re-emergence of the second wave of Malay
nationalism which asserted its influence in reshaping the project of nation formation in
Malaysia. This attempt was reflected in the formulation of three major national
policies, namely, the NEP; the Education and Language Policy and the National
Cultural Policy which marked the strong influence of the Malay nationalist agenda. But
in the course of the implementation of these policies, these Malay-centric policies were
fiercely challenged by the non-Malays who wanted to protect and promote their ethnic
identities.
Chapter 6 reveals the basis and the efficacy of Malay nationalism and the notion
of the Bangsa Melayu as the core element in Malay nationalist struggle. It also
examined the factions within Malay nationalist movement, namely the tripartite
struggle between the Malay Left, the Conservative nationalist and the Islamic group.
Apart from this it considers the emergence of Kadazanism and Dayakism in Sabah and
Sarawak, which illustrates the variation in the Bumiputera's communities notion of
nation-of-intent. Thus, this poses a question of the resilience of the notion of the
Bangsa Melayu as the definitive element in the construction of Malaysia's national
identity. Chapter 6 on the other hand, presents the non-Malays notion of nation-of-
intent with a principal focus on ethnic Chinese. It unveils the basis of the ethnic
Chinese identity and investigates the complexities found within this community and
their struggle to promote the notion of cultural pluralism in Malaysia.
Part III of the thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter 8 investigates the
problematic concept of the Bangsa Malaysia as 'the nation'. The concept is examined
from the `state's point of view' and compared to that of the people's interpretations. It
also considers government commitment to, and efforts in, promoting the notion within
the larger framework of Vision 2020, through several changes in their approach
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pertaining to the implementation of key national policies which constitute the hallmark
of the so-called 'liberalisation' policy in the 1990's. The main focus in this chapter
however, is to formulate the definition of the concept of Bangsa Malaysia and examine
how it can be consolidated, within the framework of Malay nationalism and the notion
of cultural pluralism.
Chapter 9 examines the task of mediating identities and building a national
consensus for the construction of national identity facilitated by the concept of Bangsa
Malaysia. To understand this process and the extent to which it could be carried out, the
impact of Mahathir's administration is explored, to gauge the changing and the
unchanging landscape of Malaysian society. Moreover, the immediate effect of the
1997 economic crisis which a year later turned into political turmoil, are also
considered in order to establish the parameters that could have long term effects on the
project of Bangsa Malaysia. Finally, Chapter 10 highlights the salient points of the
thesis in the concluding remark as well as suggesting some of the prospective areas for
future research as an extension of this study.
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CHAPTER 2
ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND
NATION-BUILDING: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Modern society is both more homogeneous and more diversified than those which preceded it
Ernest Gellner (1978:141)
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter the conceptual and theoretical foundations of ethnicity,
nationalism and nation-building that are central to the analysis of the study shall be
reviewed. The principal aim is to establish the relationships between these concepts and
construct a framework of ideas that will help in guiding subsequent discussion. This
chapter discusses several relevant theories and debates surrounding the notions of
ethnicity, nationalism and nation-building in divided societies that lays the foundation
for the overall understanding and explanation of the prevailing phenomena of the
political salience of ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia.
Ethnic cleavage is one of the most prevalent sources of internal divisiveness in
the world today. Over the past several years the world has been witnessing not only a
global resurgence of ethnic conflicts but also the rise of nationalism that has led to
disintegration of several countries. The problematic of ethnicity, nationalism and
nation-building has drawn enormous interest from scholars of varied disciplines in the
social sciences for many years. Indeed, the recent proliferation of writing on ethnicity
and nationalism (McCrone, 1998; Christie, 1998; Nairn, 1997; Hutchinson & A.D.
Smith, 1996; 1994; Billig,1995; Eriksen,1993; Schwarzmante1,1991; and Kellas,1991),
suggests a continuing interest in a phenomenon that defies its' predicted demise by
theorists of modernization (see: Weber in Gerth and Mills, eds., 1948; and Deutsch,
1966). Nevertheless, whilst it is recognized that it is not possible to construct a general
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theory of ethnicity and nationalism (see: McCrone, 1998:16), some form of theoretical
framework needs to be considered as far as the present study is concerned.
2.2 The dimensions of ethnicity
In this section the discussion shall be confined to aspects of the conceptual definition of
various terms related to ethnic groups and ethnicity. It shall attempt to provide some of
the answers pertaining to why ethnic groups enter into politics and of the impact of
ethnic political mobilisation in divided societies. It also explores some of the prevailing
mechanisms employed in countries that are embroiled with the problems of ethnic
divisions in their constant efforts to sustain democracy and bring about political stability.
2.2.1 The concepts of ethnic, ethnic groups and ethnicity
The term 'ethnic' derived from the Greek ethnos (which in turn originated from
the word ethnikos), which meant heathen or pagan (R. William, 1976:119; cited in
Eriksen, 1993:3-4). Nevertheless, in contemporary usage the term 'ethnic' and
'ethnicity' have something to do with the 'classification of people and group
relationships' (Eriksen,1993:4). According to McKay and Lewins (1978) the term
'ethnic group' should be used with restriction to those situations in which individuals
meaningfully interact on the basis of a shared ethnic trait(s). This is based on Stryker's
(1973:526) premise that:
...a group is a system of interactions. Where there is no interaction, there is no group. This is
an obvious point, but some social analysts have gotten into difficulty because they neglected
the obvious.
Considering Mckay and Lewins definition, a creation of an ethnic group stems from two
crucial factors, namely (1) interaction, which is based on (2) shared ethnic traits or
attributes. These two vital factors shall be treated as both constituting an important
basis to grasp the understanding of the notions of ethnic groups and ethnicity.
To begin with the latter, that is 'shared ethnic traits,' usually refers to aspects of
cultural markers such as race (biological origins), language and descent. However, this
objective mono-culture perspective of ethnic attributes seemed to be 'a narrow view
which stresses social continuity rather than social adaptation' (Barth, 1969:10-11).
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Therefore, a subjective perspective needs to be considered namely, aspects of a group's
consciousness of its identity distinctiveness and its recognition by others (see: Max
Weber in Parsons,1961:305-306); Glazer and Moynihan, 1963:13-14). However, Urmila
Phadnis (1989:14) argues that, 'Such a psycho-social dimension has its own difficulties:
how and at what point of time does a group arrive at such a self-ascriptive feeling?' As
such she insists that it is the linkages between both the objective and subjective
perspectives, 'the complimentary of one with the other that facilitates an understanding
of the processes of the evolution and growth of an ethnic group, characterized by
continuity, adaptation, or change' (Phadnis,1989:14).
Such a composite view has been provided by the syncretist's perspective like
Gordon (1964); Schermerhorn (1978); Royce (1982); and A.D. Smith (1986). To
consider one, A.D. Smith (1986:22-31) notes that there are six attributes to ethnie
(Smith's term for ethnic groups)- collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared
history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of
solidarity. All these clearly illustrate some form of collective identity in contrast to
others. Ethnic identities however, are not perennial, but rather are 'creations-whether
they are created by historical circumstances, by strategic actors or as unintended
consequences of political projects' (Eriksen, 1993:92). Therefore, identities are subject
to constant change and may result in the creation of 'new ethnicities'. 1 Embarking
upon this point, ethnic group can be seen as:
A historically formed aggregate of people having a real or imaginary association with a
specific territory, a shared cluster of beliefs and values connoting its distinctiveness in
relation to similar groups and recognized as such by others (Phadnis,1989:14).
The second factor that leads to the creation of an ethnic group is 'interaction'. As
observed by Stryker (1973), ethnic groups does not exist in isolation, but are rather a
product of contact. In this regard, Wallerstein (1960:131) asserts that, 'membership in
For an interesting discussion on the creation of 'The new ethnicities' see Stuart Hall , in Donald and A. Rattansi
(1992) eds.. Race, Culture and Difference, London:Sage. Barbara Ballis Lal (1983) on the other hand introduces
the notion of 'ethnicity by consent' to show that there can be a creation of ethnic cultures and identities by people
who are not related to one another by descent but rather who are committed to a special life style and set of
conventions, which they transmit to their children, such as in that of the Black Jews of Harlem; the Hare Krishna
movement, and the Black Muslim communities in the US. (see: Barbara Ballis Lal (1983) 'Perspective on ethnicity:
old wine in new bottles', in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 6, No.2, April, pp.154-73.
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an ethnic group is a matter of social definition, an interplay of the self definition of
members and the definition of other groups'. Thus, when two or more ethnic groups
interact with each other in a given socio-political setting, a phenomenon of 'ethnicity'
emerged. Ethnicity therefore refers to:
An aspect of social relationships between groups whose members consider themselves
culturally distinctive [emphasis added] from members of other groups with whom they have
a minimum of regular interaction.
(Eriksen,1993 :12)
Although cultural distinctiveness may lead to the creation of ethnicity, Eriksen
(1993:138) insists that anthropologist has gone a long way in relativising cultural
importance by stressing that it is only when 'cultural differences make a social
difference' that they contribute to the creation of ethnicity.
It is also misleading to simply equate ethnic groups with cultural groups and that
shared culture is the basis of ethnic identity. This point of argument was highlighted by
Fredrik Barth (1969) who stresses that it is the 'boundaries' which delimit the group that
should be the focus of analysis and not that of the 'cultural stuff' it encloses. This infers
that the discontinuity between ethnic groups is primarily a social discontinuity, not a
cultural one. In short, although many cultural elements such as religion, language,
customs and traditions are shared by a number of people, these do not always make
them belong to the same ethnic group. The Croats and the Serbs apparently shared
several similar cultural elements but they are distinct as far as ethnicity is concerned.
Therefore it is important to note that a common culture need not entail a sense of
community. Likewise, a sense of community may exist without supporting social
structure and without a shared culture (White, N.R., 1978).
On the whole, ethnic differentiation emerges as a result of a prior
institutionalization of contact within a single territory. This differentiation might draw
upon social, cultural and political resources. Within this framework thus, ethnicity may
also be viewed as 'a device as much as a focus for group mobilization by its' leadership
through the select use of ethnic symbols for social-cultural and politico-economic
purposes' (Burgess, M.E, 1978:261-86). This ultimately constitutes a driving force in the
emergence of ethnic political movements which in many respects aim to protect ethnic
interests. This aspect shall be examined shortly, but, before that let us examine the term
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ethnic against the terms 'race,' 'nation' and 'communalism' in order to establish a better
understanding of their meaning and linkages.
2.2.2 Defining the term race, nation and communalism
Quite often, the term ethnic is confused with the terms 'race' and 'nation'. Apart
from that, the term 'communal' and 'communalism' often appear in many writings
regarding Malaysian society and politics, this sometimes causes a great deal of
confusion. Eriksen (1993:5), argues that 'the distinction between race and ethnicity is a
problematic one'. However, James G. Kellas (1991:5) asserts that, "race' is
distinguished from 'nation' and 'ethnic group' mainly because 'races' are discussed in
predominantly biological terms, with particular emphasis on `phenotypical' distinctions
such as skin colour, stature, etc., and presumed genetic distinctions'. By contrast, the
term 'nation' encompasses a wider scope and sometimes refers to a state.
Generally, 'nation' means a group of people who feel themselves to be a
community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry. This may
not distinguish it from the term ethnic group. However, along with that, 'nation' has two
more significant elements namely, 'the objective characteristics' and 'subjective
characteristics'. The former include a territory, a language, a religion, or common
descent; whereas the latter refer to people's awareness of its nationality and their
affection for it (Kellas,1993:2). To Eriksen (1993), the distinguishing mark of the term
'nation' is its' relationship to the state (p.6). In short, whilst ethnic group refers to
peoples' relationships with other groups based on several characteristics, nation is
viewed as peoples relationship and attachment to the state.
Finally the term communal and communalism is widely used in literature on
Malaysian politics. According to Simon Barraclough (1984:413-420), this has two
connotations. First it refers to:
The phenomenon of political or social action based upon competitive group solidarities
where such groups derive their cohesion from relatively immutable factors such as language,
religion, race, and ethnic identity. This definition implies some form of conflict - especially
in the Malaysian context.
Secondly it is also used to describe:
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Attitudes resulting in a positive belief in the efficacy or desirability of, or a predilection for,
the organization of social and political action along communal lines. This often involves
judgments as to the motives behind such a preference for communally based action.
He argues that if the distinction of the two usages are kept in mind when reading the
literature on Malaysian politics, this may avoid some of the confusion that he has
examined in his observation. 2
 He proposes that to avoid the confusion in the usage of
the term, another term namely, 'ethnic' could be used as some scholars have done (such
as Stanley S. Bedlington, 1978) or 'continue to use the term communal and
communalism but to clarify particular definitions at the outset of each application of the
terms' (p.420). As far as this study is concerned, the term ethnic shall be used instead of
the term communal. This is in line with the trend prevailing in the contemporary study
of ethnicity and nationalism in the social sciences.
In sum, the term of reference that shall be used in the present study is that
ethnicity is considered as an aspect of social relationships between two or more groups
in which groups attachment and cohesiveness may stem from several common or shared
identifications such as descent, historical ties, and culture; and they coexist and compete
within the boundaries of a single territorial state or political authority. It is within this
framework that ethnic political mobilisation usually emerges, for the control and
management of power resources of the state, in which ethnicity serves as a device for the
pursuit of collective goals through competition and interaction. This aspect shall be
examined next.
2.2.3 Ethnic political mobilisations and the politics of ethnicity
Why ethnic antagonism may lie dormant for years and then suddenly erupt into
violence is something that often puzzled many people. What makes ethnicity so
enduring throughout history? Anthony Smith (1986:16) asserts that:
ethnicity is largely 'mythic' and 'symbolic' in character, and because myths, symbols,
memories and values are 'carried' in and by forms and genres of artifacts and activities
which change only very slowly, so ethnie, once formed, tend to be exceptionally durable
under 'normal' vicissitudes and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming
'mould' within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which
all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact.
2 See Simon Barraclough, 'Communalism confusion : toward a clarification of terms in the study of Malaysian
politics', in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 7. no. 3 July 1984.
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From this premise, what are the circumstances and pressures that might exert an impact
on ethnicity that led to the rise of ethnic antagonism? Ethnic politics do not simply
come into play because there are several ethnic groups in a given political unit. There
must be some basis for the phenomena to emerge and generate a dynamic and very
influential force into the system. Clifford Geertz (1963), identifies that there are several
ascriptive characteristics around which much of ethnic political conflict has revolved:
'blood ties, race, patterns of domination, language, religion, custom, geography and
history' (1963:109-111). According to Donald Horowitz (1985:139-40), theories
invoked to explain ethnic conflicts are premised on opposite assumptions:
Where the theory of cultural pluralism conceives of ethnic conflict as the clash of
incompatible values, modernization and economic-interest theories conceives of conflict as
the struggle for resources and opportunities that are valued in common.
On the whole, ethnic groups engaged in political activities to gain some political
leverage. This occurs when there is element of fear and threat of losing their identity and
other interests in politics, economic or cultural life. To protect and articulate their
political, economic and cultural interests or even grievances, claims, anxieties,
aspirations and dreams, ethnic groups have only one choice; that is entering into the
political arena. As they transform themselves into political conflict groups for interest
articulations, the emotional intensity of their internal ethnic cohesion rises. Even more
so when they have to cope with repressive political regimes which are constituted of and
dominated by a particular ethnic group. A 'perceived threat' against a groups' position
and status and, what is more important its identity constitutes a key factor that may
trigger ethnic groups to engage in political activities.
But why are identities so important and what circumstances changed them?
Eriksen (1993:68) underlines several factors that might constitute a perceived threat to
ethnic identity, but stresses that they are always related to some kind of change such as
migration, change in the demographic situation, industrialisation or other economic
change, or integration into or encapsulation by a larger political system. With regard to
this Epstein (1978:xiii) states that,
since ethnicity arises so often in circumstances of social upheaval and transformation, which are
frequently accompanied by severe cultural erosion and the disappearance of many customs that
might serve as marks of distinctiveness, a critical issue is how that identity is to be maintained.
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Cultural factors seems to play a significant role in the creation of identity. But, identity
only comes into existence when cultural elements have social and political relevance.
To preserve identities is to protect and enhance ethnic symbolism such as the ancestral
language, religion, custom, cultural elements, etc., that marked the very existenee of a
particular ethnic group within the larger society. It is within this framework of
preserving ethnic identities that ethnic confrontations usually erupt. Daniel Bell (1975)
saw that ethnicity has become more salient because it can combine an interest with an
affective tie. To him, ethnicity
provides a tangible set of common identifications- in language, food, music, names- when other
social roles become more abstract and impersonal. In competition for the values of the society to
be realized politically, ethnicity can become the means of claiming place or advantage.
(Bell, in Glazer and Moynihan,1975:169)
In a similar tone, Fortz (1974:105) notes that,
psychologically, ethnicity has one advantage over other modes of personal identity and social
linkage, namely, its' capacity to arouse and to engage the most intense, deep, and private
emotional sentiments.
Therefore, if an element of perceived threat exists for a particular ethnic group and a
conducive political atmosphere prevails, ethnic consciousness can be easily mobilised
into the political arena either as a homeland ethnic movement or a diasporic/irnmigrant
movement as proposed by Milton J. Esman (1985).3
Although the process of nation-building does not necessarily mean that all the
diverse ethnic groups have to assimilate themselves into a single national identity,
they may be required to subscribe to some form of national identity if national
integration is to be achieved. For many divided societies, creating an acceptable
national identity is one of the greatest challenges that has to be resolved as far as
nation-building is concerned. Indeed, this is one of the problems of having multiple
identities. As Eriksen (1993:138) puts it:
Esman(1985) saw that the origins and patterns of interactions in the politics arising from the activities of these two
classes of ethnic movements are so fundamentally different, the distinction that he proposes however, provides a
useful conceptual point of departure for further analysis of ethnic political movements and ethnicity in politics.
According to Esman, these two classes;(1) the homeland movements and, (2) the immigrant movements or
diasporic movement, can be clearly subdivided based on several characteristics. (see: Esman, Milton J. (1985),
'Two dimensions of ethnic politics: defense of homeland, immigrant rights, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 8,
No.3, July)
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There is no clear evidence for the assumption that it is inherently problematic to live in two
cultures, but such ambiguous situations can certainly be difficult to handle in an environment
where one is expected to have a clear, delineated identity.
This tends to be a subject of agonised public debate in many divided societies as it may
at times involved the question of loyalty to the state. Certain ethnic groups 'loyalty' to
the state may often be considered as doubtful as they may only want to be recognised as
part of the larger community in political and economic terms, but insist on remaining
distinct culturally. Ratnam (1965) saw that such situation clearly prevailed in Malaysia.
Concerning this aspect, Eriksen (1993:153) explains that:
In terms of ethnicity, multiple loyalties may be a problem for minorities, whose member may
often be loyal to-and indeed members of two ethnic groups or nations, or one ethnic group
and one nation. But why ought this to be a problem? Clearly because the ideology of the
nation-state remains hegemonic and the relationship between states is seen as one of
potential conflict.
Obviously, such a scenario tends to be one of the salient factors of ethnic
conflict in a given society and consequently, causes a great deal of difficulty in making
the process of nation-building a successful endeavour. In Malaysia, Sino-Malay
relations were clearly put to a severe test when the country was fighting against
communist insurgency (which were largely Chinese-oriented in character) during which
diplomatic relations with China were not yet established. Even after diplomatic ties
with China were later sealed in 1974, problems of multiple identities and loyalties
remained unresolved especially concerning that of the ethnic Chinese older generation
(see: Leo Suryadinata, 1997). Nevertheless, the post-independence younger generation
may develop a much more clearer delineated identity, no longer regarding China as their
homeland but rather as their ancestral homeland. In short, 'identity is partly imposed on
people from outside their own group' (Kellas, 1991:15). It is often the state that
classifies people according to ethnic group, nationality and race. Although the people
concerned may or may not entirely accept this classification, this classification usually
leads to dual or multiple identities, especially when a historic national identity is overlaid
with contemporary political status such as citizenship, or with a new 'national'
identification derived from the state.
To present an integrated framework of ethnic political mobilisations, it is argued
that ethnicity became politically salient because it is being deployed for competitive
purposes by political actors. Though the mechanisms of deployment are various, they
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may generally include political parties, bureaucracies, the military, trade unions, ethnic
organisations, and the like. Ethnicity alone need not generate conflict; but once it is
situated in a particular type of social or plural diversity, it may assume potential
significance. This is partly because, with scarcity being a major constraint in politics,
ethnicity becomes a crucial criterion for regulating political conflict and distributing
public goods in situations of plural diversity. As an ethnic group transforms itself into a
political group to compete with other ethnic groups, ethnic consciousness is heightened,
thus a phenomenon of the politicisation of ethnicity emerges. It is within these
circumstances that ethnic conflicts and antagonism develop. The unmanageable 'ethnic
political games' may result in ethnic hostility or even a catastrophe which may render
democracy prone to collapse. Realizing the agony and the devastating consequences of
severe ethnic divisions, several political choices have to be made to maintain order and
stability within the polity. One of the choice is to accept the real-politik of cultural
pluralism, hence managing ethnicity within this political-framework, an aspect which we
shall now examine.
2.2.4 Managing ethnicity: cultural pluralism and consociational democracy
On of the earliest studies of cultural pluralism was by J.S. Furnival (1939) and
this was expanded by M.G. Smith (1965). 4 To Furnival, a plural society is 'comprising
two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in
one political unit' (Furniva1,1939:446). He reckoned that in these societies,
Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways.
As individuals, they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling.
(Furniva1,1948:304)
Moreover, Furnival noticed that economic divisions also coincide with cultural divisions.
Hence, the separate communities incline toward conflictual behaviour, and the society
requires some external force to hold it together. He insisted that colonial rule is a prime
candidate to carry out this duty. By this Furnival implied that consensus politics could
not work in plural societies.
4 One of the early works of M. G. Smith on the concept of 'plural society' is 'The Plural Societies in the British West
Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). However, the most important statements
of M.G.Smith's theory of cultural pluralism are 'Social and cultural Pluralism', in Vera Rubin (ed.), Social and
Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences no. 83 (January 1960),pp. 763-
77; Leo Kuper and M.G. Smiths (ed.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkerley: University of California Press, 1969)
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Furnival was quite right to point out that plural societies are inherently prone to
violent conflict, however to maintain that only external force and not consensus could
ever hold them together is rather sceptical. Being part of the colonial machinery,
Furnival had to find ways and means to justify the presence of colonial administrdtion in
those societies. Several studies by Lipjhart (1968a, 1977) suggest that there were a
number of plural societies which successfully maintained stability and political order via
the mechanism of consociational democracy without having to rely on the use of external
or internal forces but rather, through consensus politics in accommodating conflicting
ethnic interests. To name a few, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland are
examples of consociational democracies in the developed world. To some extent,
Malaysia has been rather successful in creating relative political stability through the
same political arrangement.
Apart from that, Furnival seems not to state that the creation of many plural
societies were virtually linked to colonial policy which encouraged the influx of cheap
labour forces from several countries to develop the colonial economies. Hence,
gradually the largely homogeneous societies were transformed into plural societies,
where the colonial power acts as a 'buffer' between ethnic groups. But with the
departure of the colonial power after independence was granted to these countries, the
'buffer' that acted as a stabilising factor was also removed. Thus, these societies were
left alone to handle the delicate problems of cultural pluralism at their own discretion.
Some were rather successful but many others have not been so fortunate, and hence still
grapple with problems of national unity. Nevertheless, Furnival's contribution was to
recognise the basic problem found in plural societies which is significantly different and
quite distinct from that of those which are homogeneous.
Furnival's thesis was later refined and transformed into a general theory of
cultural pluralism by M.G. Smith (1965). Smith attempted to sharpen the idea of plural
society and uses it to theorise about ethnic conflict. In his view, not all societies
composed of diverse cultural groups are plural societies. He saw that a plural society is
characterised by the coexistence of incompatible institutional systems. On the contrary,
'pluralistic' societies contain one or more relatively distinct subcultures, but their values
systems are compatible with the national political consensus. This is an important
contribution by M.G. Smith. Another point raised by Smith is that cross-cutting
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cleavages of class or ideology need not mitigate ethnic distinctions, indeed, they may be
irrelevant to them (cited in Rabushka and Shepsle,1972:15-16). Smith demonstrates that
cross-cutting cleavages of class or ideology do not eliminate ethnic distinctions and their
political ramifications. Smith (1965) also points out that it is erroneous to equate
cultural pluralism with class stratification since one can vary independently of the
other. As noted above, he uniquely defines a cultural section of a population by its
institutional practices that may, or may not be compatible with those of other cultural
sections.
It is important to note that both Furnival and Smith have formulated a
fundamental point of departure in the study of plural societies. However, neither of them
went further beyond the analysis of whether ethnic relations can ever be amicable
without any reliance on the use of force. Nor did they explore whether ethnic
collectivities may retain their distinctiveness and live in peace and harmony with other
ethnic groups within the same state and society. As van den Berghe (1981:185) puts it,
'since peace and harmony imply equality, the question really asks whether stable cultural
pluralism can ever lead to a stable democratic polity', to what Lijphart (1968a, 1968b,
1977) has called 'a consociational democracy'. To this question, he agreed with Lipjhart
(1977), that it is difficult but not impossible to achieve a stable democracy in plural
societies, yet, only under very special conditions, which we shall now explore.
To Lipjhart (1977) consociationalism entails conscious co-operation amongst the
elite of different communities to control the destabilising effects of open ethnic
competition. This is accomplished by the elites' agreement to form a grand coalition
government as well as to restrict the circulation of more extremist junior elites and resist
mass pressures from the electorate for political change. Moreover, consociationalism
posits that each community must subscribe to the notion of political autonomy for other
subcultures. He saw that there are several prerequisites to achieve stability in plural
societies. Among others, they include the ability to recognise the dangers inherent in a
fragmented system, commitment to system maintenance, ability to transcend subculture
cleavage at the elite level, and ability to forge appropriate solutions for the demands of
the subcultures. 'These four prerequisites must be fulfilled', Lipjhart says (1968a:65), 'if
consociational democracy is to succeed' (cited in van den Berghe,1981:187).
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In appraising Lipjhart's views on consociationalism, van den Berghe (1981:188)
argued that the consociational model of polity is a special case of 'bourgeois democracy,'
that is, a state run by a capitalist, technocratic and bureaucratic elite through supposedly
representative institutions, elected officials and other paraphernalia of parliamentarism.
Apart from that, he saw that 'in a situation in which primordial attachments to ethnic
collectivities compete with class affiliation, as in plural societies, the illusion of
democracy can only be maintained if the elite itself is multiethnic and in proportions
approximating those of the constituents ethnies in the general population' (p.188). He
insists that, 'if that condition is not met, then the political system is perceived by the
underrepresented group as undemocratic because it is dominated by the over-represented
group or groups' (p.188). Therefore, he regards 'proportionality' at the elite level as a
key feature of consociational democracy, for it is through proportionality that the
multiethnic elite preserves the democratic fiction of representativeness and thus its' own
legitimacy. Besides, the muting of class conflicts in consociational democracy is seen
by him as an essential corollary of ethnic proportionality. Whenever ethnic sentiments
are politicised, class consciousness is lowered. In his words:
Under such circumstances, the class interests of the multiethnic elite are best served by a
system of consociational democracy. The more politicised ethnicity becomes and the more
ethnicized the polity, the more attention is deflected from class conflicts and redirected (or
redefined) in ethnic terms. Therefore, the less blatant the pursuit of class interest by the elite
becomes.
(van den Berghe,1981:188)
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in some situations in which ethnic disparities are
far more obvious than that of class interests, this as a result may significantly weaken
class consciousness. Besides, it can also be the case whereby which class stratification
coincides with that of ethnic divisions. In other words, those who belong to a particular
class also mainly belong to a specific ethnic group. As such, when ethnicity was being
politicised in the system, people tend to define themselves in terms of ethnicity rather
than their class affiliations. Therefore, the notion of a 'class struggle' could not spread,
as it is always being challenged by a stronger ethnic consciousness that prevails in the
system.
Although consociationalism may emerge as one of the possible range of
alternatives for mediating conflict in divided societies, it does not means that it is free
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from any shortcomings. Ethnicity is a dynamic and powerful force that once
systematically mobilised, may pose a serious threat, if it involves violence and hostility.
When there is a rise in the influence of an ethnic-nationalist counter-elite that challenge
the existing status-quo and present themselves as a formidable substitute to the ruling
elite, the consociational arrangements may be put under serious threat. At it worst, it
could even escalate to civil war. Lebanon, a long considered model of consociationalism
in the Developing World (Binder,1966; Lijphart,1977; D.A. Smock and A.C. Smock,
1975) was plunged into more than a decade of civil war beginning in 1975, when its
consociational framework was challenged by a nationalist counter-elite, including those
created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The tragedy in Lebanon has shown how
fragile consociational democracy is when confronted with such an enormous challenge
of severe ethnic conflict. The question is what are the conditions required that
contribute towards perpetual stability in consociational democracy?
The consociational and conflict management writers5 have identified promising
techniques to form an 'ideal type of consociationalism'. These include principles of
proportionality, mutual veto, concession, depoliticisation and so forth. Nevertheless, it
has to be noted that not all the 'ideal criteria' laid down by the consociational writers
prevail in every consociational polity. Some countries have to modify the system to suit
their needs and conditions. For Malaysia, the notion of proportionality and mutual veto,
for example, have never been the practice (Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Instead, the
existence of Malay privileges in the constitution and the notion of Malay political
dominance constitute the hallmarks of Malaysian consociationalism. Therefore, Milne
and Mauzy (1999:18) suggested that the Malaysian model of consociationalism be
considered as `hegemonic consociationalism'.
In short, it is argued that consociationalism, with all its limitations and
inefficiencies, is perhaps the best arrangement possible in situations of permanent ethnic
5 Eric A. Nordlinger attempted to enumerate the six 'successful' conflict regulating practices: (1) stable coalition; (2)
proportionality; (3) mutual veto; (4) `depoliticization', that is, agreement to keep government out of the most
contentious issues or prevent their public discussion; (5) compromise, either on particular issues, or on a package of
issues; (6) concessions, which differ from compromise in that they are not reciprocated (see Nordlinger, 1972:21-
31). Milton J. Esman categorizes four 'regime objectives', i.e., (1) institutionalized dominance, (2) induced
assimilation, (3) syncretic integration and, (4) balanced pluralism (see, Esman,1973:60-68). See also Donald
Horowitz (1985), Ethnic groups in conflict, University of California Press: California, for a comprehensive account
of the various mechanisms to address ethnic conflict in divided societies.
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pluralism and interdependence where the other alternatives (e.g. a la Lebanon) are too
awful to contemplate. The consociational democratic frameworks prevail in a situation
in which the state cannot become an 'ethnic nation' but instead has to remain as a
multinational state with guaranteed ethnic or social rights within it. As such; the state
has to accept and recognise cultural pluralism, hence adopting a power sharing approach
between the diverse groups as the basis for political stability. In terms of the politics of
ethnicity and nationalism it provides a model of goverment which allows for the
peaceful coexistence of more than one nation or ethnic group in the state on the basis of
separation, yet equal partnership. This also provides a system in which conflicting
interests can be mediated at national level through elite co-operation.
2.3 The Dimensions of Nationalism
Nationalism is full of puzzles. It is a form of 'practice' rather than 'analysis' (Brubaker); it
presents itself as a universal and global phenomenon, but is ineluctably particular and local
(Anderson); it is a feature of the modern age, but has its roots in something much older (Smith); it
is essentially about cultural matters-language, religion, symbols-but cannot be divorced from
matters of economic and material development (Nairn).
(David McCrone, 1998:6)
Nationalism emerged in many different places, at several different times and for a
multitude of different reasons. Therefore, to establish a single coherent theory that can
explained everything about nationalism is virtually unrealistic. The burgeoning literature
on the theories of nationalism speaks for this fact. Nationalism is a problematic concept.
In everyday usage, the term has been used in a great variety of ways by politicians,
journalists and members of the general public to denote several different things, and
often causes a great deal of confusion for those who are unfamiliar with it. It is
sometimes used to describe loyalty to the state, for which the proper term is 'patriotism'.
It is used to describe the belief that one's own culture and civilisation are superior to all
others, for which the right term is 'racial chauvinism'. In some other occasion, it is used
to refer to the feelings of 'national identity', which is not so much an incorrect usage as
an understandable but loose usage. The discussion in this section therefore, will first
explore the meaning of the concept, before proceeding into contemporary theoretical
discourse on nationalism and nation-building. The main concern is to highlight the
outstanding relationship between ethnicity and nationalism in the politics of nation-
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building, based on several prominent studies. This would then be used as a framework of
ideas for the analysis of the Malaysian experience.
2.3.1 Nation, ethnicity, and nationalism: the theoretical linkages
It has been noted in previous discussion that the distinguishing mark between the
term 'nation' and 'ethnic' is the former relationship with the 'state'. Thus, 'nation' has a
wider connotation, whilst the term of reference for 'ethnic' is rather restrictive. As a
terminology, 'nation' derived from Latin word natio, which initially referred to a social
collectivity based on birth or race (Phadnis,1989:20). However, in the context of
contemporary usage the term has been expanded to describe the inhabitants of a country.
It thus, became a virtual synonym for the total population of a country regardless of its
ethnic composition (Horowitz, 1985:39-40).
One of the most outstanding ideas about the concept of nation came from
Benedict Anderson (1991) in his renowned book - 'Imagined Community' 6 . Anderson
considers 'nation' as a modern phenomenon that links a cultural group and the state to
create an abstract community. In his famous words, nation is 'an imagined political
community- imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'. Imagined in his term
does not necessarily implies that nation is 'invented' but rather the people who define
themselves as members of a nation 'will never know most of their fellow-members, meet
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'
(Benedict Anderson (1991: 6). In brief, Anderson attempts to convince that there was a
cognitive process involved in the construction of an idea of a nation.
Anderson's view however, was refuted by Anthony Smith (1986) who argued that
'the new imagining' and new thoughts which led people into national consciousness and
nationalism are not really so new (p. 169-173). To Smith, nations emerged from older
ethnic ties, despite admitting that they are largely a modern phenomenon. In his view
nation is:
a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass
education system and common legal rights.
(Smith,1989:342)
6 Anderson's book was first published in 1983. Since then the book has been reprinted several times.
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To Smith, it is politicisation that transforms ethnic groups into nations. The political
process of nation formation however, derived its dynamism from older ethnic ties simply
because, 'in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallise ethnic
components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to 'nation-
building" (Smith,1986:17). One of the most obvious implications of ethnic
transformation into nation was that a demand for autonomy and self-government of the
group would appear, often but not always, in a sovereign state. Smith regards this ideal
as one of the components of 'nationhood' (1976:2). Smith however, cautions that
nationalism which in its widest sense refers to 'collective resistance to foreign rule', may
exist with or without a nation (Smith 1971:166). However, what Smith viewed as vital
for any nation is the growth and spread of national sentiment, which gained its internal
cohesion through 'the myths and symbols of the common past', which is basically
derived from ethnic collectivities (p.343).
Smith adopts an 'ethnicist perspective' in explaining the process of nation
formation in human history. Thus, his theory on the rise and spread of nationalism was
also centred on the peculiar link between ethnicity and the state. Smith regards
nationalism as both an ideology and a form of political behaviour. As an ideological
movement, nationalism serves the purpose of 'attaining and maintaining the autonomy,
unity and identity of an existing or potential nation'. Whilst as a political movement,
nationalism 'often antedates, and seeks to create the nation, even if it often pretends that
nation already exists (Smith, 1989:343). With regard to this, Kellas (1991:4) argues that
as a form of political behaviour, 'nationalism is closely linked to ethnocentrism and
patriotism'. To him, this behaviour stems from perceptions and feelings of itself as
distinct from others and the awareness of its' member as components of a nation. Those
who do not belong to the nation are seen as different, foreigners or aliens, with loyalties
to their own nations. The willingness to die for one's own nation, reflects the strongest
form of nationalist political behaviour, or rather an extraordinary force of nationalism.
In Smith's view, to materialise the nationalist's goals be they autonomy, unity,
identity and so on, there needs to be some core networks of association and culture,
around which and on which, nations can be built. These refer to collective aspects shared
by the people such as language group, religious sects and historical territory, which in his
view are some of the fundamental building blocks for nation formation. In short,
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nationalism in Smith's theory is a variant of ethnicity, primarily because nationalism is
deep rooted in ethnic ideological foundation (Eriksen, 1993). However, such an
'ethnicist perspective' was not shared by some other writers, which David McCrone
(1998) classified as the 'modernists' school of thought led by Ernest Gellifer. Both
school of thoughts however have their own admirers and critics.9
What is the source of this powerful force that triggers nationalism to flourish?
According to the ethnicists' perspective, nationalism emerges as a result of politicisation,
which intend to transform ethnic groups into nations. For Anderson (1996a), nationalism
derives its force from the combination of political legitimation and emotional power.
However, Ernest Gellner (1964; 1983; 1996a), the leading modernist scholar, saw that
socio-economic factors embodied in the process of modernisation and industrialisation
were crucial in the rise of nationalism. The key dispute between the 'ethnicists' and the
'modernists' school of thought lies in the argument as to whether the existence of ethnic
culture constitutes a precondition for the rise of nationalism. For the ethnicists, this
element was crucial, as nationalism derived its strength and energy from 'older ethnic
ties' (Smith, 1986). On the contrary, the modernists maintained that the impact of the
changing nature of economic, social and political conditions brought about by the
process of modernisation and industrialisation, were far more crucial than anything else
(Gellner, 1996).7
In Gellner's view, nationalism is not a phenomenon essentially connected so
much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, 'but with its uneven diffusion...'
(1964:158). Of more importance, as he puts it in his most famous words, 'nationalism
invents nations where they do not exist' (Gellner,1964:164). Obviously, Gellner adopts a
purely functional approach in explaining his theory of nationalism. Thus, contra Smith,
his idea of nationalism and the ideal of the 'nation-state' were not necessarily based on
ethnicity. Rather, he stressed on the voluntary coming together of people in a state with
a shared culture. However, the question is what pulls them together to be a cohesive
9 The latest publication which shared many of Gellners thoughts came from David McCrone (1998), The Sociology of
Nationalism. Other contemporary scholars who echoed Gellner in their perspective on nationalism were
Hobsbawm (1990); Michael Mann (1992); John Breully (1982;1993); and Sami Zubaida (1989). Smith has on his
sides his co-editor John Hutchinson (1994;1996); J.Llobera (1994); J. Armstrong (1982); and Leah Greenfeld
(1992) . These are only some of the many others who have contributed in the growing literature in the study of
ethnicity and nationalism in recent years.
7 David McCrone in his book The Sociology of Nationalism (1998: 10-16) presented an outstanding comparison
between the 'ethnicists' and the 'modernists' dispute.
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social and cultural unit and of more importance what binds their emotional feelings?
'Why should people be prepared to die for what is in this analysis an imperative of a
rational economic and social system of industrialisation (Kellas, 1991:43)?' Is it not
because of something else which is rather symbolic and intangible but are deeply
embedded in their inner-selves? Though, relevant and crucial, the modernists' theory
however, could not provide convincing answers for all these questions.
While both Smith and Gellner agreed that nationalism is largely a modern
phenomenon, they fundamentally disagreed on what constitutes the basis of nationalism.
To Smith, nation and nationalism are attributed to ethnicity. Smith, as demonstrated
earlier, argues that ethnic communities emerged prior to the creation of nation-states.
Smith's fundamental argument lies in the 'ethno-symbolic base'. In his words:
There is considerable evidence that modern nations are connected with earlier ethnic categories
and communities and are created out of pre-existing origin myths, ethnic cultures and shared
memories; and that those nations with a vivid, widespread sense of an ethnic past, are likely to be
more unified and distinctive than those which lack that sense.
(Smith, 1996a:385)
He maintains that modern civic nations and nationalism have only extended and
deepened premodern ethnic identities and structures, and they certainly require symbols,
myths and memories of ethnic cores or what he called ethnie, if they are to generate a
sense of solidarity and purpose in a secular era. Smith demonstrates that by using the
ethno-symbolic paradigm, one can see the relationship between nationalism and the
intense emotional ties embodied in the common past which the modernists tend to
downplay or neglect. However, on the other hand, the ethnicists struggle to explain the
linkages between the past and the present which the modernists have been able to explain
(McCrone, 1998). For the modernists the missing link lies in industrialisation and
modernisation, which resulted in socio-economic and political changes, which gave rise
to nationalism and the notion of 'nation-states'. But for Smith, 'if nations have no
cultural 'navels', they must invent them' (McCrone, 1998:16). He saw that, 'it is
difficult to see a modern nation maintaining itself as a distinctive identity without such
mythology, symbolism and culture. If it does not have them, it must appropriate them, or
risk dissolution' (1986b:228-263). Smith indicates that identities are created and this
view is supported by Eriksen (1993) who stresses that many anthropological studies
confirm that identity and cultural elements are not immutable (Eriksen, 1993). They are
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creations and most creations are dynamic and subject to constant change in accordance
with changes in the social, economic and political circumstances.
In short, the key dispute between the ethnicists and the modernists' school of
thoughts is not that complicated. Whilst the modernists argued that it was the
consequence of modernisation and industrialisation that brought about the socio-
economic and political change, which led to the rise of nationalism and the creation of
nation-states; the ethnicists maintain that nationalism is attributed to older ethno-
symbolic factors even when it emerged as a modern phenomenon or in the post-modern
era. In exploring the ethnic factor in the rise of nationalism in 1990's, Ghia Nodia
(1994:14) describes, 'nationalism as a coin with two sides: one is political, the other
ethnic'. He argues that, though there are instances where one predominates the other in
varying degree; 'the relationship may be expressed as one of political soul animating an
ethnic body' (Ghia Nodia, 1994:14-15). Nodia's assertion that nationalism is 'a political
soul animating an ethnic body', clearly reflects the gist of Smith's theory on nationalism.
Thus, the ethnicist perspective provides a clear framework of analysis to examine the
intense conflicts created by contemporary ethnic nationalism, as they insist on greater
appreciation of the inner 'antiquity' of many modern nations despite exploring new
grievances and dissatisfactions caused by modern and sophisticated socio-economic
demands, as argued by the modernists.
There are several other apparent limitations in the modernists theory of
nationalism. The modernists could not provide satisfactory answer for the rise of
nationalist sentiments in the Developing World. There is no compelling explanation
provided by the modernists about primordial roots of nationalism, and its strong
emotional appeal which emerged in these countries when they fought for independence
against Western colonial powers. These societies were largely agrarian, non-
industrialised, and non centralised. Nor were all participants of the nationalist
movements in these countries commonly educated in a standardised language or
education system. Yet, the mass appeal for support in the nationalist struggle was very
apparent. Ordinary masses can identify themselves with these movements and they were
emotionally engaged in the struggle.
Apart from these, many of these countries that bore the marks of cultural
pluralism have not transformed into a homogenous culture even after industrialisation
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and common education system took off. Instead, many are still striving hard to
overcome the enormous challenge of ethnic divisions to forge stronger nation-state.
Some of them failed miserably in this efforts and were plunged into civil war-hence
disintegration of the state. In several places democracy was subsequently replhced by
either totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Some have had to adapt to the system of
consociational democracy in order to secure peace and stability from the divisive effects
of cultural pluralism. With that, the process of cultural homogenisation may probably
take a longer time to emerge. Apparently the modernist template could not provide
adequate explanation for all these peculiar developments. On the other hand, the ethno-
symbolic perspective may, to some extent, provide some of the answers. However, it
still could not satisfactorily explain several other peculiarities that prevail in the
developing countries.
Furthermore, the resurging nationalism or the late-modern expression of
nationalism' out of 'post-materialist values' in 'post-industrial' societies is clearly
different from nationalism resulting from industrialisation (Inglehart,1977;
McCrone,1998). It is apparent that Gellner's theory hardly explains the salience of
nationalist behaviour in its contemporary form. Nevertheless, despite some of its
weaknesses, the modernist account of nationalism is still considered by many writers as
an importance contribution in the study of nationalism against which all other theories on
nationalism can be compared with. James Kellas comments, 'it does not tell us all we
want to know, but it gives us clear theory relating nationalism to industrialisation, 'high
culture', and the changing structure of the modern state' (Kellas, 1991:44).
In comparison to Gellner and Smith, Benedict Anderson (1996a) argues that the
development of nationalism is not strictly confined to industrial societies but rather, it
can be analysed in almost any society. He pointed out that the role of 'print-capitalism'
was crucial and indeed served as catalyst to the widespread development of nationalism.
By this, Anderson argues that the massive scale commercial printing which occurred
together with the development of the capitalist system has made an enormous
contribution to the spread of the idea of 'the nation' and the ideology of nationalism, not
only within one 'nation', but throughout the world. In this, 'print-capitalism' serves as a
necessary condition for the wide spread of nationalism. The printing revolution has
strengthened and developed vernacular languages by means of dictionaries and literature,
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hence creating linguistic nationalism. The common language and education which
printing facilitates helped to develop a sense of nationality among people. Thus, nations
are 'imagined' by many people and nationalism eventually developed. This is not a kind
of false consciousness. Anderson notes: 	 •
in fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even
these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by
the style in which they are imagined.
(Anderson, 1983:6)
To Anderson, the emotional power of nationalism lies in a faith of everlasting life
through membership of a continuing nation in which, nation represents the continuity of
the extended family from one generation to the next. He also argues that in the age of
declining religion, with its belief in life hereafter, nationalism has an edge in its' special
appeal as a 'secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning'
(Anderson,1983:11). This does not necessarily imply that nationalism historically
'supersedes' religion, but rather is a large cultural system with religious characteristics.
In his 'revisionist' accounts published in 1996, Anderson (1996a) identifies 'the census',
'the map', and the 'museum' as three institutions of power which substantially
influenced the way in which the colonial power 'imagined' its dominion, which also lay
down the backdrop for its' anti-colonial successor. The census introduced by the
colonial, characterised the people in the colonies according to race and ethnicity for
administrative purposes. Consequently, ethnic-racial classification was created and laid
the foundation for ethnic-racial political consciousness and allowed them to 'imagine'
their political communities. In colonial Malaya, the Malays were shocked with the
outcome of the 1931 census which indicates that they were out-numbered by the Chinese
immigrant populations thus triggering the rise of Malay nationalism (Roff, 1994;
Rustam A. Sani, 1976). The census also exposed the severity of indigenous Malay
deprivation in education and economic position in comparison to the immigrant
communities. Malay nationalism escalated because the census 'told' them that they were
under serious threat as far as demographic and socio-economic well-being was
concerned.
The map outlined the geographical territory based on the political authority of the
colonial powers. Consequently, it became a rallying emblem and logo for the people in
the colonies in which they 'imagined' and identified themselves. Anderson saw the role
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of the museum as important in terms of its ideological possibilities in face of indigenous
up-rising. Ancient monuments and archaeological artefacts help to 'prove' and re-affirm
the status-quo of the natives. The census, the map, and the museum partly illustrates the
importance of aspects of 'common past' and 'symbolism' which Anthony Smith and the
ethnicists have been arguing about. The only difference is that while Smith may say that
this 'imagining' is not really so new as it is related to ancient communities; Anderson on
the other hand, illustrates not only aspects of the 'ancient stuff', but also the process by
which nations were 'imagined' through the direct or indirect effects of the colonial
activities as exemplified in 'the census', 'the map', and 'the museum'. In this respect,
Anderson's contribution has its own merit, particularly in identifying the rise and spread
of nationalism in former Western colonies.
Apart from Anderson, Chatterjee's study on India (1986;1993;1996) is also an
interesting contribution which can provide a crucial insights on the understanding of
ethnicity and nationalism in several developing countries. Chatterjee critically rejects
Western concepts or rather the Western template of nationalism, which is largely based
on European experience, as outlined in the works of Anderson and Gellner. His main
contention is that nationalism in India and perhaps elsewhere is of a different form
(1993:73). Chatterjee (1993), Van de Veer (1994), and T. Basu (etal., 1993) have all
indicated that anti colonial Indian nationalism have not been a secular political
movement because it partly reflects the consolidation of Hinduism in the struggle.
Similarly, the study of Chandra Muzaffar (1979), A.C. Milner (1982), Ariffin Omar
(1993), Roff (1994); and Shamsul AB (1996a) have also indicated that Malay
nationalism has not been a secular movement either as Agamafislam (Religion/Islam),
Raja (Malay Ruler), and Bahasa (Malay Language) have formed the basis of Malay
nationalism. Roff (1994) in his study of Malay nationalism demonstrates that the role of
'the reformist' Malay religious scholars was extremely crucial at the early stage of the
development of Malay nationalism. On the whole, the nature of the rise of nationalism in
India and Malaysia clearly contradict Anderson's contention that, the dawn of
nationalism was also the dusk of religion (Anderson, 1996a:11). The importance of
religion cannot be factored out in contemporary nationalism. More recently, the
nationalist struggle in the Balkan region which involved the Bosnians, the Serbians, the
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Croatians, and the Albanians in Kosovo clearly illustrates the potent interplay of religion
and ethnicity in the battle to materialise the nationalist's political goal.
It is also important to state that there are several type of nationalism. To James G.
Kellas (1991) nationalism can be seen at three different categories:
	 •
(1) Ethnic nationalism8 - which refers to the nationalism of ethnic groups such as the
Kurds, Latvian, and Tamils, who define their nation in exclusive terms, mainly on the
basis of common descent. In this type of nationalism, no one can 'become' a Kurd,
Latvian, or Tamil through adopting Kurdish, etc., ways.
(2) Social nationalism - refer to the nationalism of nation that defines itself by social ties
and culture rather than by common descent. This type of nationalism stresses the shared
sense of national identity, community and culture, but outsiders can join the nation if
they identify with it and adopt its social characteristics. Thus Scots, Catalans and
Russians accept as members of their nations those who do not 'ethnically' belong, but
who become Scots, Catalans, and Russians by joining the nation socially and culturally.
(3) Official nationalism: is basically the nationalism of the state, encompassing all those
legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national identity and culture.
Patriotism is probably an alternative term that can be used to describe these sort of
sentiments.
Kellas's categorisation acknowledges that nationalism can be seen in several
contexts or situations. However, the ethnic factor is still crucial in two of his stated
categories, namely ethnic nationalism and social nationalism; whilst the third category
somewhat indicates the sentiment of state sovereignty and independent shared by its'
citizens. From this categorisation of nationalism, it is suggested that an appropriate term
is used to refer to different types of nationalism, or rather, use the term with some
clarification at the outset as to avoid confusion and ambiguity in its meaning.
In short, every modern state has its own unique characteristics concerning
citizens' composition. There are states which can be considered as 'nation-state' as their
8 Some writer such as Connors (1987) used the term 'ethnonationalism' interchangeably with nationalism to describe
about the relationship between ethnic group and nation, in more or less the same meaning with ethnic nationalism
noted above. Anthony Smith (1971) however, used 'ethnic nationalism', while another scholar Snyder (1983) used the
term 'mini-nationalism' to describe about the same nature of nationalism but uses a different term because of the
location and magnitude of nationalism. For a more detail account, see Ma Shu Yun, Tthnonationalism, ethnic
nationalism and mini-nationalism: a comparison of Connor, Smith and Snyder', in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.13
NO.4 October 1990.
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population is exclusively composed of an ethnic nation or social nation and more
important, having a strong national identity. On the other hand, there are also many
other states which are multi-ethnic or multi-national. Malaysia and several Southeast
Asian countries fall under this category. According to Leo Suryadinata (1997), these
countries can be called 'state-nations' rather than 'nation-state'. This is because in these
societies ethnic identities are still strong in contrast to national identity that is yet to be
developed. These countries therefore, can also be considered as `nation-in-the-making',
as nation-building still constitutes a primary national agenda.
On the whole, it can be argued that the position of nationalism virtually
transcends all political ideologies, including class and sectional interests. It follows that
a fundamental way to grasp the nature and shape of the modem world is through an
exploration of the nature and origins of nations and nationalism. As Smith (1989:340)
eloquently puts it:
The modern world has become inconceivable and unintelligible without nations and nationalism;
international relations, in particular, though they deal in the first place with the relations between
states, are built around the premises of nationalism.
Such a scenario explains the vibrance and the viability of nationalism as both an
ideology and a political movement. Despite the claims that we are now entering into an
era of the so-called `borderless world' as a result of the spread of modern capitalism and
information technology (Kenichi Ohmae, 1990); or as Francis Fukuyama (1989) rightly
or wrongly states that it is an era of 'the end of history' since communism was defeated
by democracy and capitalism; and thus it marked the beginning of 'the new world order'
as envisaged by George Bush (the former President of the United States); nationalism
still persists and continues to exert its extraordinary impact in shaping and mapping the
modem history of the world.
In sum, all the perspectives presented in this discussion clearly indicate the
complex nature of nationalism. Nationalism as experienced in several developing
countries has its own unique characteristics. Indeed, nationalism in different parts of the
world relates to widely differing political, economic and cultural contexts. Nationalism
as an ideology and a political movement illustrates a complex dialectic which emerged as
an imagined political community (Anderson, 1996a), that has both secular and spiritual
dimensions (Chatterjee, 1993), which often rise out of political and economic changes
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(Gellner, 1983), yet, found its root in 'ancient' ethnie and symbols (Smith, 1986). Thus
practically all can be seen as a variant of ethnicity (Eriksen, 1993). Perhaps, there is no
other modern phenomena which has such a multi-faceted character as nationalism does.
Nationalism primarily is about people's relationship with the state. In this respect,
nationalism cannot be separated from the process of building, promoting and maintaining
the 'nation-state'. The subsequent discussion shall examine this phenomenon, especially
in the context of the project of nation formation in plural society.
2.3.2 Nationalism and 'nation-of-intent'
It has been argued that nationalism in its widest sense refers to collective
resistance to foreign rule to attain or restore political self-rule. However, in the event in
which the struggle for political self-rule has been succeeded, the framework of nationalist
struggle may take a different form. Whilst the validity of the notion of collective
resistance to foreign rule may still prevail when it involves the states' relationship with
another country, the post self-rule nationalist struggle tends to be consolidated to suit
new challenges, and in some circumstances, may re-emerge as a different kind of
nationalism. The notion of 'nation-of-intent' introduced by Robert I. Rotberg (1966) in
his study of 'African Nationalism', and later refined by Shamsul A.B. (1996a) reflects
this scenario.
Nation-of-intent basically refers to a more or less defined idea of the form of a
nation which include its territory, population, language, culture, symbols and institutions
(Shamsul AB, 1996a:328). This idea has to be shared by a significant number of people
who perceive themselves as members of that nation, and who feel that it unites them.
Shamsul elaborates:
A nation of intent may imply a radical transformation of a given state, and the exclusion and the
inclusion of certain groups of people. It may also imply the creation of a new state, but it does not
necessarily imply an aspiration for political self-rule on the part of the group of people who are
advancing their nation-of-intent. It may be an inclusive construct, open to others, and which is
employed as the basis for a political platform voicing dissent or a challenge to the established
notion of nation. In any case, the concept of nation-of-intent depicts an idea of a nation that still
needs to be constructed or reconstructed. It promises the citizens (or some of them) an
opportunity to participate in a 'grand project' which they claim as theirs.
(Shamsul AB, 1996a:328)
Shamsul's explanation illustrates that nation-of-intent is a type of nationalism that
can either be ethnic nationalism or social nationalism. It reflects political intentions
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both at discourse level and in concrete expression in the political arena by the ethnic
group who are advancing their notion of nation-of-intent. This group may be particularly
concerned about improving their position, and should the opportunity arise, attempt to
alter the existing status-quo to suit their needs and aspirations. That has been the case of
the local state of Kelantan under the rule of PAS and Sabah during the reign of the PBS.
The rise of Kadazanism and Dayakism in Sabah and Sarawak reflects that nation-of-
intent can also be a form of political expression of culture in a multi-ethnic society- or
'cultural sub-nationalism'. The discussion in Chapter 5 shall examine this phenomenon
more closely.
Although Shamsul notes that: 'conceptually, `nation-of-intent' is not dissimilar to
Anderson's concept of 'imagined political community", he maintains that the concept is
a more open-ended one, thus may emerge not only from a historical context of anti-
colonialism, but also in the post-colonial era (Shamsul AB,1996a:328-29). If African
nationalism has been complicated by competing 'tribal nationalism' (Rotberg, 1966;
Olorunsolo, ed.,1972), Shamsul saw that Malaysia bears the problem of conflicting
notions of nation-of-intent, both inter and intra ethnic groups. This state of affairs
consequently renders the socio-political system in Malaysia as very fragile. The vision
of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia, concomitant with the grand project of Vision 2020
was introduced against this backdrop to evade the rise of dismantling tendencies which
could threaten the state. On the whole, whilst Shamsul argues that the social origin of
nation-of-intent in Malaysia can be traced from the historical development of the polity,
this study goes further and attempts to demonstrate that it is the potent interplay of the
forces of ethnicity and nationalism that form the basis of the conflicting notions of
nation-of-intent which have characterised Malaysian politics and society since
independence.
2.4 The project of nation-building in plural societies.
The rhetoric of nation-building has emerged as an essential political agenda in
most plural societies as the state sought to neutralise competing ethnic ideologies of
nationhood. According to Anthony Smith (1989) a nation is built around an ethnic
community. Nevertheless, in many plural societies the development of nationhood had
to contend with the strong presence of diverse ethnic communities. In these societies the
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new independent states were created out of territories under colonial administration. With
the departure of the colonial master, the new ruling elites found that they inherited a state
without a nation. Instead, such elite had to face a daunting task of creating an undivided
loyalty to the new state amongst its' people whilst simultaneously developing a strong
sense of national identity out of the deep ethnic and cultural divisions. This challenging
task was to be resolved through the project of nation-building. According to Yogesh
Atal (1981), nation-building is a distinctive concept related to the development of a
polity that is characterised by stability and the people's firm commitment to it. To
achieve this, nation-building involves the utilisation of skills of social and political
engineering. The index of nation-building is the degree of political cohesion and
integration. He argues that
no programme of nation-building has to begin from scratch; since no concrete society has a zero
point of integration, no programme begins at that level. The programme of nation-building is, thus
a programme of making the structure more functional and more cohesive.
(Ata1,1981:6)
To him, the success of a nation-building programme - irrespective of whether it has been
consciously pursued or not - is to be measured in terms of the distinctive character of the
entity, and the functional interchanges within the system.
It is argued that for a plural society the process of nation-building means first, the
state has to manage centrifugal tendencies derived from the forces of ethnicity and
nationalism; and from this point, embark upon the process of mediating identities and
moving towards constructing the framework for national identity. In this respect, the
idea of a state's nationalism which precedes nation-building activity serves as a device to
unite people by creating the sentiment of belongingness and common identity. Atal
(1981:6-7) insists that the growth of strong national sentiment in the pre-independence
phase, imparting to the people a feeling of oneness, and an esprit de corps is thus, the
foundation on which the nation has to be built. He argues that the nationalist sentiment
must get 'institutionalised' in the political system and 'internalised' into the personality
systems of people. To achieve this, a conscious programme of political socialisation is
required to provide sustenance to the new civic culture. At the very initial stage, the
creation of symbols of national identity seems to precede all other initiatives. In this
regards, flags, anthems and uniforms all serve this purpose. Sports teams may also help,
particularly if successful at international level of competition.
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Nevertheless, creating a strong and solid national identity out of the diverse
ethnic and cultural divisions has never been an easy task. Flags, national anthems and
sports are not sufficient to materialise a viable project of nation formation as it requires a
more extensive, a comprehensive and in some situations even a more radical approach.
The history of multi-ethnic societies has seen distinctive alternatives being adopted by
different states in dealing with ethnic and cultural diversity. Sociologists have classified
those approaches into five important cultural processes: assimilation, amalgamation and
cultural pluralism (Rose, 1964); beyond the melting-pot or adaptive pluralism (Glazer
and Moynihan, 1970); and structural assimilation (Gordon, 1964). These approaches
lead to distinctive socio-cultural outcomes.
Assimilation aims to create cultural conformity to the dominant group culture.
This approach may only be possible if other ethnic communities are demographically too
small and politically weak to exert their influence vis-a-vis the dominant ethnic group.
However, in a situation in which every ethnic group was almost equal in number and
politically balanced, this approach may not be viable. As Kellas puts it, 'any nation
whose identity is based on language, religion, education or the Arts, and which is faced
with threat to its culture, is likely to react with nationalism' (Kellas,1991:70).
Amalgamation is a process of creating a new cultural entity which does not belong to any
of the existing cultures. While on one hand it may appear to be an ideal venture, yet in
reality this may not be quite practical as every ethnic group has to give up their existing
cultural traditions for the sake of building a new national identity and culture. By
contrast, cultural pluralism emphasises cultural accommodation, tolerance, equality and
cultural diversity. However, this approach may not radically change the existing cultural
divisions in the society. Adaptive pluralism on the other hand means that every ethnic
group is allowed to retain their ethnic identities, but they share many common attitudes,
perceptions and culture of the new homeland, thus are culturally different from the
peoples in their ancestral countries. Finally, structural assimilation refers to the
assimilation of the immigrant communities within the context of the economy, political
and educational institutions or structures yet remain distinctive in other institutional areas
such as religion, family and recreation.
In Malaysia whilst assimilation and amalgamation have not been the case, some
elements of the remaining three other approaches, namely cultural pluralism, adaptive
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pluralism and structural assimilation seems to prevail to varying degrees. As a plural
society, cultural diversity has always been a dominant characteristic of Malaysian
society. Nevertheless, over the years the new generation of ethnic Chinese and Indians in
Malaysia have developed distinctive cultural identities which made them different from
the Chinese and the Indians in China and India. Apart from that, structurally, together
with the other Bumiputera communities they have been absorbed into Malaysian
political, economic and education institutions, despite retaining their distinctive elements
in religion and family institutions. A another term that could be introduced to illustrate
the scenario that prevails in Malaysia is assimilative pluralism. In other words, whilst
the people ethnically and culturally remain distinctive, politically and socio-
economically, they tend to become more Malaysian.
Politically, Chan and Ever (1973:303-4) argued that in Southeast Asia there were
two alternatives adopted in dealing with the problems of nation-building. One was to
resort to a 'regressive' identity (backward looking) by reviving a long and proud cultural
tradition through an appeal to the 'golden past'. The other was a 'progressive' identity
(forward looking), culminating in an ameliorative programme of building a society by
discarding its feudal or colonial shackles in which one such option lay in establishing a
socialist state. For Malaysia both approaches were attempted, yet neither were
successfully materialised. Attempt by the communists (the MCP) to create a
'progressive' identity through the realisation of a socialist state in Malaysia was rejected
by the Malays as its struggle was incompatible with their historical, cultural and religious
identities. By discarding feudal and colonial bondages that have been strongly embedded
in the system in order to allow the establishment of a socialist or a communist state
would result in the elimination of Malay ethnic identifiers. Moreover, the MCP was an
organisation dominated by the Chinese. Therefore, the communists struggle was seen by
the Malays as a Chinese struggle which was clearly incompatible with their cultural
identity and political interests. On the other hand, attempts by Malay nationalists to
revive a long and proud Malay cultural tradition, which culminated in the creation of a
Malay nation-state, has been constantly challenged by the non-Malays especially the
economically superior ethnic Chinese. Instead, they envisaged a plural society nation
that would allow the diverse ethnic and cultural elements to co-exist along each other.
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In short, there is no simple answer to alleviate the effects of ethnic, religious or
linguistic cleavages in plural societies. Without consensus, a radical and coercive
approach in nation-building may often result in a setback. Neither ethnic cleavages nor
ethnic nationalism can be easily managed. State intervention may only resolve part of
the problem. However, overt intervention by the state in the nation-building project, may
result in the state being regarded as a tool to advance the interests of a particular ethnic
group. What is probably more reasonable for the government, is to embark upon
programmes aimed at minimising ethnic grievances in political and socio-economic
spheres, while simultaneously promoting 'state nationalism', a vision of common
destiny, and universal cultural values, among all the ethnic groups. Of more importance
is a national consensus in pursuing the project of nation formation. But the question is
how could these be attained without prejudice or implying that a nation-building agenda
is heading towards an ethnic project? Can a non-ethnic nationalism be envisaged in an
ethnically divided society?
Eriksen (1993), in his study of Mauritian nationalism saw that non-ethnic
nationalism, or supra-ethnic nationalism is possible to envisage, and this could be a
suitable approach for some societies. He saw that in Mauritian plural society, the
'nation' is depicted as a 'mosaic' of cultures, in which various ethnic cultures co-exist
and are recognised by the government as part and parcel of the national culture. Thus,
nation-building is based on cultural pluralism and not cultural homogenisation. In this
way the process of 'ethnogenesis' of the nation, may probably take a longer time to
emerge. In the meantime, every ethnic cultures and identities are considered as part of
the national identity and they continue to co-exist. Nevertheless, Eriksen has not
adequately explained whether living in such situation would result in strengthening the
'nation' and resolve ethnic predicaments in society. Neither did he provides a satisfying
explanation as to whether this would constitute a 'viable nation' in the long run.
Obviously, nation-building as argued by Atal (1981:23) is
a complex phenomenon; simplistic answers do not explain its intricate patterns, nor can one trust
the many proffered panaceas for instant nation-building. It is a journey towards the desirable but
the unknown, with several built-in handicaps all along the road.
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2.5 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated the complex relationships between
ethnicity and nationalism on one hand, and between these two phenomena and the
processes of nation-building, on the other. The linkages between them are not only
problematic but rather are three dimensional. That is, between the dynamic of ethnicity
contra the forces of nationalism, over the delicate processes of nation-building. It has
been argued in this chapter that ethnicity is an aspect of social relationships. The cultural
aspects therefore, are not central in this relation. It is only when cultural markers make a
social impact, that it then is considered part of the phenomena of ethnicity. Cultural
distinctiveness therefore, must play a social significance in people's relationships, in
order to call such phenomena an aspect of ethnicity. It has been argued that ethnicity is
largely 'mythic' and 'symbolic' in character, and since these elements change very
slowly, ethnicity tends to be durable and survive through many generations.
Ethnic groups engage in political activities to gain some kind of political
leverage. In most cases it is the element of fear and threat of losing their identity and
other interests in politics, economic and cultural life, that triggers ethnic groups to enter
into the political arena. Emotional intensity of internal ethnic cohesion rises as they
transform themselves into political conflict groups. Ethnicity thus, becoming politically
salient because it is being deployed for competitive purposes by political actors. This is
the scenario found in most plural societies. Thus, several political choices have to be
made to avoid the devastating effects of ethnic antagonism. Accepting cultural
pluralism, and managing ethnic diversity within this framework is one of the choices.
On the other hand, while ethnicity is managed, some form of political cooperation has to
be established between ethnic elite at the national level to govern the society. One
formula that can be adopted is consociationalism. However, this alone may not be
enough. A long term political and social framework to resolve the political salience of
ethnicity and nationalism needs to be considered. This is the role of the project of nation-
building.
Quite often, in the competition for the control and management of power
resources, ethnic groups will attempt to link themselves with the state in order to
strengthen their position. This partly explains how nationalism emerged as a variant of
ethnicity. Nationalism itself is a complex phenomenon. Several prominent theories
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discussed in this chapter have demonstrated the multi-faceted characters of nationalism.
Most theories presented here attempt to explain how nationalism came to dominate
various societies in the modern era. But, the patterns, the characteristics, and the
mechanisms of nationalist domination are different from one place to another. Indeed,
nationalism emerged in various different societies for a variety of different reasons.
Likewise, the social, political and economic repercussions of the nationalist struggle has
never been the same.
The peculiar relationship between ethnicity and nationalism can be seen in terms
of the political struggle between a dominating and dominated ethnic groups within the
framework of a modern nation state. Eriksen (1993:119) saw that:
In such context, the nationalist ideology of the hegemonic group will be perceived as a
particularist ideology rather than a universalist one, where the mechanism of exclusion and ethnic
discrimination are more obvious than the mechanism of inclusion and formal justice. This kind of
duality, or ambiguity, is fundamental to nationalist ideology- which is basically an ethnic ideology
which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group.
(Eriksen, 1993:118-119)
He argues that this is a common phenomena nowadays, where states tend to be
dominated politically by one of the constituent ethnic groups or, more accurately, by its
elite (Eriksen, 1993:119). As such there is a strong potential for the dominating ethnic
group to try to turn nation-building into an ethnic project. It is not surprising thus if
other ethnic groups tend to be suspicious and sceptical with state's attempt to promote
the project of nation-building. The state itself often is not a neutral agent in mediating
conflicts. It can be captured and used to pursue the interest of the ruling elite and that of
the dominating groups. As such, the dominant feature of politics would be one of the
'struggle' of every ethnic group against the state which is hindering its interests. The
fundamental implication is that the state itself would thus, appeared vulnerable in
managing ethnic conflicts.
A plural society is one in which politics is ethnicised, in which political
competition is overtly drawn along ethnic lines. It is argued that to understand the salient
features of ethnicity and nationalism in plural societies, two crucial aspects need to be
considered. First, the power structure of the state, and second are the competing ethnic
ideologies and their aspiration pertaining to their relationship with the state and its other
social collectivities need to be considered. When the state is organised as a
consociational framework, with power sharing mechanisms, every ethnic group will
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attempt to seek maximum power to protect their interests and influence national policies.
Every ethnic group will hope and work towards making the state fulfill their dreams and
ambitions. Therefore, competing ethnic ideologies in this connection may not be so
much about political independence, but rather about getting some limited objectives
pertaining to economics, cultural, religious, linguistics, and so on within the framework
of the existing state. These illustrate the notions of nation-of-intent held by each
individual ethnic groups.
The notion of nation-of-intent discussed here constitutes the basis of
apprehending ethnic ideology in a given political context. It is also argued that by
investigating the competing notions of nation-of-intent held by various ethnic groups, it
will facilitate an uncovering of the underlying factors that shape and influence the
phenomena of ethnicity and nationalism in the project and in the politics of nation-
building in a given state. This study shall adopt the perspective that ethnicity and
nationalism are attributed to 'ethno-symbolic' factors as argued by the ethnicists
perspective. Nevertheless, it shall also consolidate other perspectives where necessary, to
present a more integrated framework of analysis in investigating the phenomena of
ethnicity and nationalism in the politics of nation-building in Malaysia. This would
enable the major theories presented in this chapter to be tested in order to explore their
suitability and relevancy in the context of Malaysian experience. The next chapter shall
review the political development of Malaysia as a modem state, and the development of
ethnicity and nationalism in this process.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STATE, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND MANAGING ETHNICITY:
BACKGROUND TO THE MALAYSIAN CASE
3.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to present the socio-political background of
the development of ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia. In so doing, it will examine
the development of the internal structure of the state and the mechanisms of managing
ethnicity at the different stages of the country's political development. This would serve
as an important backdrop for investigating the social origin of ethnic political
mobilisations in the context of the development of the varying notions of nation-of-
intent circulating in the Malaysian polity. This chapter shall embark upon the premise
that the political salience of ethnicity in Malaysia is a product of conflict in broader
socio-political domain and not exclusively 'a product of history' as argued by Nash,
(1989); and Shamsul AB(1996a). Conflict occurs when the major ethnic groups
transform themselves into political groups for articulation of their interest and for
securing maximum power within the defined polity. In this respect, the 'ethno-
symbolic' perspective is applied in reviewing the historical domains of the politics of
ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia.
3.2 The development and management of ethnicity in colonial Malaya
As a modern state, Malaysia is still a very young country. It achieved its
independence from the British in 1957 as the Federation of Malaya, consisting of eleven
states'. Malaysia was only formed in 1963 with the participation of Sabah, Sarawak,
The terms 'Malaya', 'Malay', 'Malayan', 'Malaysian' and 'Malaysia' are often loosely used and therefore the
cause of confusion. 'Malaya' refers to the nine Malay state in the Peninsula, plus with the Straits Settlements of
Penang and Malacca. The original name for Malaya commonly used even in colonial times was Tanah Melayu,
literally translated to mean 'Malay Land' or 'Land of the Malays'. Malays are defined by law as the traditional
subjects of the Sultans (the Malay Rulers), and the people whose native tongue is the Malay language; whose
religion is Islam and practised Malay customs. 'Malayan' used as a noun refers to someone who is a permanent
resident of Malaya, regardless of race. The term 'Malaysian' formerly was applied to any of the Malay-Indonesian
ethnic stock peoples indigenous to the Malay peninsula or insular Southeast Asia. Presently, it has assumed a
53
and Singapore. For several political reasons, Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in
1965. Despite several disagreements in the Federal government's relation with Sabah
and Sarawak over the years, the Federation of Malaysia remains intact as a sovereign
state. The emergence of a plural society in Malaysia was the creation, and indeed, the
greatest legacy of British colonialism. Although historically, the Malayan peninsula has
always been home to people of diverse cultures, languages, and geographical origins,
Malaya was not considered as a plural society before the advent of British colonialism.
This is because the existence of the non-Malay populations then, was too small to be
accounted for and in many respects these communities have been largely absorbed into
the Malay society. However, the very rapid changes after 1850, and especially after
1870, did represent a major demographic, economic, and political break with the past.
Before the arrival of the British, the Portuguese and later the Dutch successfully
ruled Malacca for several hundred years after the collapse of the great Malay Sultanate
of Malacca at the hands of the Portuguese in 1511. The first British settlement in
Malaya was established in Penang in 1786, and it was only after 1874 that they began
their intervention in Malay states. The British secured political domination over the
indigenous population through indirect rule by making the traditional Malay ruling elite
an instrument of colonial interest. Through this measure the feudal structure of the
Malay society was reinforced, so that built-in mechanisms for social control and
traditional sanctions could be used to ensure compliance and submission, on the part of
the Malay people.
Moreover, colonial policies, notably the introductions of the Torrens system of
land administration, the educational system and the formalisation of Islam, were all
designed to increase the dependence of the Malays on their ruling elite, and indirectly,
on the colonial power itself (Abraham, 1997). This created a peasant-oriented
'traditional' Malay social structure that would act as a bulwark against resistance to
colonial domination. Above all, the threat that the massive influx of immigrants posed
to the very survival of the Malays as a community, acted as a further constraint on
Malay resistance to colonial rule and strengthened the dependence of the Malay people
on the Malay upper class. In this situation, there was little that the Malay masses could
more restricted meaning, embracing only the inhabitant of the Federation of Malaysia, namely, Malaya, Sabah,
Sarawak and for a time (1963-65) Singapore.
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do but look to their rulers, and indeed through them to the British colonial power itself,
for protection against alien immigration.
Although the Chinese and Indian communities had long been part of the social
and cultural milieu of Peninsula Malaya, it was not until the British colonial
administration policy of encouraging the influx of a huge number of immigrants from
China and India in the early nineteenth century that generated a dramatic change in the
character of the Malayan society. 2
 Indeed, the Malays were terribly shocked by the
1931 census which shown that for the first time they were out-numbered by the
immigrants. In 1835 the Malays constitute 85.9 per cent of the population, whereas the
Chinese form only 7.7 per cent. However, by 1931 their number had reduced to 49.2
per cent, while the Chinese rose to 33.9 per cent (Alvin Rabushka, 1972: 21; Syed
Hussin Ali (1975:23). This census, which was issued in the background of the 'great
depression' of 1929-1931 which also badly affected Malaya had generated a sense of
panic amongst Malay intelligentsia, which later triggered the rise of Malay nationalism
(see: Rustam A. Sani, 1976; Roff, 1994). This reflects Anderson's (1996a) contention
of the role of the census in promoting nationalism and anti-colonial movement in the
colonies.
Historically, the Chinese and Indian immigrants, primarily young males were
brought to perform specific economic functions in Malaya. The Malays were reluctant
to take labouring jobs instead of subsistence farming. Unlike the Malays, British social
control and domination over the immigrant communities was exercised through
employer-employee relationships. Although the evidence points to extreme exploitative
practices among Chinese and Indian coolies, the resistance to these relationships was
minimal. This was due to the nature of the recruitment policies and employment
practices, which emphasised certain criteria and value systems, that encouraged
dependent relations between employer and employee. The implementations of the
Kangany system for the recruitment of the Indian labourer and the creation of the
position of Capitan China to monitor the Chinese workers in the tin mining industry,
2 It was reported that before 1850, there were only 3 Chinese in the district of Larut in the state of Perak (centre for
tin mining industry). However, in 1862 the number sharply rose to between 20,000-25,000. By 1877, it increased
to nearly 40,000. About the same time, the number of Malay populations was only approximately 150,000
covering the large areas of the three Malay states of Perak, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan. According to 1835
census, the Chinese immigrants constitute 7.7 per cent (about 16,000) of the total population of Malaya. and Indians
were less than 1 per cent. By 1884, Chinese reached 29.4 per cent (more than 180,000) and Indian 6.7 per cent.
By contrast, the number of Malay populations in Malaya who constitute 85.9 per cent in 1835 dropped to 63.9 per
cent by 1884 (see: Rabushka, 1972: 21; Syed Hussin Ali, 1975: 23; and Leon Comber, 1985: 3).
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were two major approaches exercised by the British to secure compliance and non-
resistance attitude amongst the immigrants. 3 In the span of a few short decades around
the turn of the twentieth century, those immigrants who were given a specific role in the
newly expanding economy such as the tin mining industry, rubber plantations,
commercial centres, trading ports and so forth, have transformed the largely
homogeneous society of Malaya into a plural society. In the colonial setting, the
Malayan society was largely compartmentalised, with minimum contact between the
Malays and the immigrant communities and above all, there was a clear division of
labour along ethnic lines. Clearly, the social, political and economic landscape of
Malaya has been radically transformed during a relatively very short period of British
colonialism.
As the twentieth century unfolded, the political and economic interests of the
different ethnic communities produced competing claims and aspirations. However,
open confrontation has yet to occur, largely due to the minimum contact allowed under
the colonial system. The three major populations did not compete economically (Jomo
K.S., 1986), neither did they mingled much socially. Moreover, the colonial polity did
not allow them to contest for political power, as power was rested with the colonial
master. Nevertheless, a tiny number of Malay intelligentsia, saw that their community
has been left behind as many Chinese immigrants began to accumulate great wealth and
played leading roles in the development of the modern world of cities, higher education,
and social prominence. Khoo Kay Kim (1995), observes that the concern over the
Malay's socio-economic backwardness, has been expressed openly in the Malayan
English newspapers, as early as the late 19th century by several 'anonymous' Malays.4
Moreover, in 1906 several Malay intelligentsia from the reformist movement of
Kaum Muda (Young Generation), who were inspired by the Wahabi movement started
in the Arabian Peninsula by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1704-1792), began to urge
3 For further discussion on ethnic manipulation and exploitation in colonial Malaya see Collin E. R. Abraham,
'Racial and ethnic manipulation in Colonial Malaya', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 6 No. 1 January 1983, pp.18-
32.
4 In his study, Kho Kay Kim established that several younger generations of Malays have sent several letters to the
editor of The Malaya Tribune since November 1919 to express their feeling of disappointment that the Malays
have not done better all these years, and a desire to encourage a new spirit, one which tends to uplift the race and
make it take its place side by side, with the other races who are progressing in the Malayan peninsula. This was
confirmed by the Editor's column of the paper on 6 November 1919. Indeed, he highlights that the editor's
column of The Malay Mail (8 March 1901) has questioned: 'Have we [the British] as a nation acted honestly and
fairly to the Malays of the Federated Malay States?' (Khoo Kay Kim, 1995:9).
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the Malays to modernise to compete against the economically advanced non-Malays.
Through their newspaper, Al-Imam (1906-08) 'they warned that if the Malays remained
apathetic to education and material progress, they would soon be displaced by the
immigrants' (Wan Hashim,1983:25). Indeed, the Kaum Muda was consklered as the
first organised nationalist movement who planted the seeds of Malay nationalism in the
early 20th century, through their leaders such as Sheikh Tahir Jalaludin and Syed
Sheikh Al-Hadi, with their call for the social and economic up-lifting of the Malays
(Raden Soenarno, 1960; Khoo Kay Kim, 1971; Roff, 1994). This reflects that there was
a significant role played by the intelligentsia, in spreading the nationalist sentiments
amongst the Malays, in colonial Malaya via means of printing.
Since the British began their expansion in the Malay states, there were a number
of incidents of Malay resistance against the colonial power which predated the Kaum
Muda. Most of these resistance movements were led by Malay aristocrats, who saw
that their position was threatened as their power and positions were 'seized' by British
Advisers or Residents. Initially, the prime duty of the British Advisers was only to
'advise' the Malay Sultans on all matters, excluding Malay religion (Islam) and Malay
custom. However, gradually and in fact in practice, it was the Resident who actually
ran the administration of Malay states at the expense of the Sultans and the aristocrats.
Since the scale of resistance has not been so widespread, but strictly local in character,
they were easily crushed by the British. As the British managed to secure the Malay
Ruler's consent for the maintaining of law and order and modernised the system of
administration in the Malay states, the anti colonial movements gradually weakened and
temporarily halted, only to re-emerge many years later in a different form. Apart from
that, Wan Hashim (1983) notes:
...[the] idea of rebelling against the established order was foreign to the Malay community for
the prevailing dogma was that ordinary Malays must not meddle in politics because the politics
of the state and its people are in the hand of the Sultan and the traditional elite who must be
given complete loyalty. No Malay can betray his Ruler (Pantang Melayu menderhaka kepada
Rajanya)' 5.
Therefore, it is worth noting that before the Second World War, Malay
nationalism suffered heavy suppression from the ruling elite. Thus, it did not have a
chance to mature and to stimulate into a strong phenomenon of nationalist uprising.
5	 •	 •This is a dogma popularized by a Malay legendary hero, Hang Tuah, often mentioned regularly in Sejarah Melayu
or the Malay Annals.
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Moreover, A.C. Milner (1982), and Ariffin Omar (1993) note that Malay political life in
the pre-independence era was not centred on a 'state' but rather on a kerajaan (lit.
means kingdom), which the Sultan played a central role. In this respect, the Malays
'imagined' their community within the framework of the kerajaan and by having the
Raja in each Malay negeri (lit, local state). Such a notion also implies that 'state
parochialism' was high amongst the Malays, who tended to consider themselves as
subjects of the respective Sultan of each Malay state, rather than as member of a 'Malay
nation' of the Tanah Melayu (Malaya) in its wider sense. Since the institutions of the
kerajaan and the position of the Raja were retained, despite the colonial encroachment
into Malay political life, Malay masses saw that their relationship with the Malay
traditional system, and above all, their status-quo had not been very much affected.
Nevertheless, as far as Malay nationalism is concerned, Wan Hashim (1983:12) asserts
that:
Malay nationalism that matured and continued to develop until independence was a new
version. It was a movement for the independence of Malaya, the realisation of the economic and
educational backwardness of the Malays, and most important of all, their consciousness and fear
of alien (Chinese and Indian) encroachment into their land, the Tanah Melayu or the Land of the
Malays.
To some extent, these were among the issues raised by the Kaum Muda when
they started to implant nationalist sentiments in their newspaper, the Al-Imam, in 1906.
These Malay intelligentsia felt that Malay ruling elite's pact with the British colonial
establishment should guarantee Malay's social and economic status, along with their
recognised political roles, or at a minimum, the immigrants should not be given political
rights equivalent to the Malay population. In general, they saw that the colonial rule not
only changed Malayan pre-colonial social-structure, but has also relegated them to
positions of inferiority, both in relation to the colonial government and the immigrant
communities.
On the other hand, the Chinese and Indian immigrants did not show deep interest
in local politics at the initial stage. They regarded their status as temporary sojourners
without the obligations or benefits of citizenship. Rather, they felt secure for being
under the protection of the British. Indeed, this was the perception held by the Malays
then, as they also believed that the immigrants would return to their homeland when
their economic ends were met (Nash, 1989:27). Nevertheless, Clive J. Christie (1996)
indicated that as early as 1920's a small number of local born Chinese, popularly known
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as Babas or the Straits Chinese began to take an interest in local politics. The leaders of
both the Straits Chinese and local born Indian communities argued strongly that they
should be given equal rights with the Malays. This call was strongly expressed in the
1930's as the British attempt to 'reinforce the concept of Malaya as Tcinah Melayu'
(Christie, 1996: 37).
In contrast to the Malays, the immigrant communities felt disadvantaged, for
opposite reasons. They saw that colonial policies had not been fair to them. Whilst the
British constantly promoted a laissez faire economic system and encouraged
immigration, they however, denied the immigrants any political role or rights. On the
whole, the immigrant communities saw British-Malay political alliance as a feudal prop
that was incompatible with the modern world (Abraham, 1997). However, for the
British colonial administration, their role was to balance, not to resolve ethnic
grievances or conflicts, while maximising economic gain and minimising state
expenditure. The Malay community was to be left undisturbed as rural peasantry,
without the negative influences of modernisation and continued to be protected under
their respective Rajas, who were closely monitored and advised by British Advisers. On
the other hand, the Chinese and Indians could come in as labourers and could rise up
the economic ladder, but their role should not exceed their economic function. This
precarious system was maintained by the powerful ideology of imperialism and inherent
ethnic differences, backed up by political repression, wherever necessary.
In short, although the structure of Malayan society had been pluralised by the
beginning of the twentieth century, the question of the political salience of ethnicity did
not arise then, as widespread social interaction between the major ethnic groups was
practically denied under the colonial system due to occupational and residential
segregation. Although the Malay Left has formed the first political organisation known
as the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) in 1938 and envisaged political unification
between Malaya and Indonesia, under the slogan of the Melayu Raya (Greater Malay
Nation-state), the political radicalism espoused by this movement to overthrow the
colonial powers was crushed by the British, when many of their prominent leaders were
incarcerated and the movement banned. Furthermore, this only represented the political
conflict between Malay nationalists and the British and did not amount to open political
confrontation between the major ethnic groups. Apart from that, before the outbreak of
Second World War, KMM had not yet emerged as a mass political movement.
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Meanwhile, the Chinese immigrant political consciousness then, was rather
centred on the struggle between the Kuomintang (the KMT) and the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) and was China oriented. Basically, there were three major
Chinese nationalist factions. The first two, the KMT (formed in 1913) and the MCP
(formed in 1930) appealed to the well spring of China-centred nationalism to gain
support of the Chinese community in Malaya (Heng P.K.,1996). Whilst the MCP drew
its support largely from Chinese schools and the labour movement, the KMT had many
symphatisers from amongst conservative Chinese merchants and leaders of the Chinese
associations. On the other hand, the third organisation known as SCBA (Straits Chinese
British Association) formed in 1900 to represent the very small minority interests of
English-educated professionals and entrepreneurs within the Baba (Straits Chinese)
circle, was Malayan-oriented in political outlook. Christie (1996:37) saw that it was this
group that talked about the need to develop a 'Malayan consciousness' amongst the
Chinese as early as the 1920's. However, the call was not been so appealing then to the
larger Chinese immigrants who were attracted to the political rivalry between the KMT
and the MCP in China. The Indians on the other hand were more concerned with Indian
nationalism. On the whole, the pre-war British policy was to discourage Malaya-centred
ethnic political movements.
The development of diverse nationalisms in pre World War II Malaya was
largely due to the British policy of allowing the establishment of separate education
systems for differing ethnic communities conducted in their own vernacular languages.
The Chinese schools have their own teachers, curriculum and text books brought from
China. This as a result propagated Chinese nationalism and the Chinese tended to
'imagine' China as their 'nation'. A similar situation has also been the case as far as the
Indian immigrants were concerned. The Malays by contrast continued to 'imagine'
themselves around the notion of the Kerajaan, whilst an attempt by the Malay Left in
the late 1930's, to alter this perception with the propagation of the notion of the Melayu
Raya as the 'nation' had not been successful. Clearly, the British, through various
colonial policies have been able to help creating varying notions of nationalism for the
Malays, the Chinese and the Indians, hence served to successfully perpetuate
colonialism in Malaya.
Indeed, colonial Malaya has been widely acclaimed as the 'success story' of
British colonialism. The colonial administration, through the promulgation of specific
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policies for the different ethnic groups, gained for itself the role of an 'arbitrator'.
Moreover, Abraham (1983:28) comments:
because any real threat to political stability could come from the Malays, colonial policy was
always one of the 'pacification' of the Malays through their ruling class, combined with the
social control and economic exploitation of the immigrant groups. Moreover, by playing off the
Malays against the non-Malays, and the Chinese against the Indians, the British were perceived
as the regulators and arbitrators of legitimacy for the different groups involved.
The process of ethnic compartmentalisation according to economic function has won the
British two concurrent roles, namely as an 'arbitrator' and the 'pacifier'. With these two
inter-related roles, Malayan plural society has been effectively governed with relative
peace and stability. However this system collapsed with the outbreak of the Second
World War which saw the British forced out by the Japanese invasion, thus the fate of
the newly created plural society was entirely at the 'discretion' of the Japanese military
rule.
3.3 Ethnic mobilisation: the politics of co-operation and confrontation
Although the era of British colonial rule saw the Malayan plural society
functioning relatively successful, in terms of the dual imperial objective of the
maintenance of law and order and the achievement of a certain type of economic
growth, the outbreak of the Second World War, specifically, the period of Japanese
occupations (1941-1945), marked a significant shift in ethnic relations in Malaya.
According to Zainal Abidin Wahid (1983), the Japanese occupation has contributed to
the rise of nationalism in Malaya. Yet, it is also a paradox. On one hand, it has led to
rising nationalist sentiment especially among the Malays, but on the other, it was also
responsible for the deterioration of ethnic relations in Malaya (Zainal Abidin Wahid,
1983:117). Prior to their occupation of Southeast Asia, Japan was at war with China,
and their presence in Malaya saw continued hostility against the Chinese community.
On the contrary, the Malays were treated rather favourably under Japanese military rule.
The Japanese reign in Asia during the war also destroyed the myth of European
superiority, thus, significantly contributing to the rise of nationalism among the peoples
in Asia.
During the pre-war period the British playing the twin roles of arbitrator and the
pacifier, were relatively successful in managing ethnicity in Malaya. The period of
Japanese occupation saw growing political activity amongst various ethnic groups in
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Malaya. The 'colonial buffer' that had long produced 'peaceful co-existence' amongst
the diverse ethnic groups in Malaya was removed under Japanese rule. Nevertheless,
their first encounter was marked with suspicion and hostility. The Japanese encouraged
the Malays to be politically active and released all British political prisdners from the
Malay Left. KMM was revitalised, and the Japanese supported the notion of the Melayu
Raya and promised to assist their political struggle. The Malay Left was made political
partner of the Japanese (Firdaus Abdullah, 1985). The Chinese who were ill-treated
under the Japanese military rule eventually formed the MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Army)6, with the assistance of the British army to wage guerrilla warfare
against the Japanese. Clearly, ethnic groups were transformed into political conflict
groups during the Japanese occupation.
Worst still, between the period of the Japanese sudden capitulation and the
arrival of the British troops, the power vacuum in Malaya was capitalised by the
MPAJA to take revenge against the 'culprits' who worked for the Japanese during the
war. For about fourteen days the country saw the first atrocities in the history of Sino-
Malay relations. The government report notes:
They (the MPAJA) held kangaroo courts, committed atrocities, executed many Malays and
Chinese and terrorised the population wherever they held sway. During the brief period of
MPAJA ascendancy, the torture and killing of large numbers of innocent Malays become an
episode that is indelibly imprinted in Malay minds the dangers of Chinese ascendancy.
(National Operations Council, 1969:8)
In revenge, the Malays retaliated against the Chinese in rural areas until the British
came to set up a military rule known as the British Military Administration (BMA), thus
taking charge of law and order. Many writers saw that these two periods caused the
most devastating effects on and deep political scars to Sino-Malay relations in Malaya
(Goh Cheng Teik, 1997).
From that period onward, Malay-Chinese relations have been sensitive. As
Malaya moved into the post-war political framework, ethnic groups begin to engage in
more active political activity. The competition to gain maximum power in order to
safeguard their interests took a new dimension. As the prospect of returning to China
6 The MPAJA was formed by the Malayan Communist Party (the MCP- whose member was largely drawn from the
Chinese community) during the war with the back up from the British Army to assist them in the war against the
Japanese. They had received huge amount of arms and logistic supports from the British Army. Through the
MPAJA, the MCP has successfully widen its influence within the Chinese community who suffered severe
brutality from the Japanese army. Within three years of its formation, the number of its guerrilla has increased up
to 7,000 peoples, plus massive symphaty from the Chinese community. (See, Mohd Reduan Ash, 1984; Cheah
Boon Kheng, 1979)
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and India after the war became less attractive, as a result of political uncertainty in those
two countries, the non-Malays no longer saw their future in Malaya as temporary but a
permanent one. Thus, the Chinese and the Indian leaders in Malaya felt that it was
crucial for them to make every possible initiative to secure a permanent life in Malaya,
especially concerning the position of their community vis-a-vis the Malays in the new
political setting of the post-war Malaya. In short, this period marked a significant shift
in the pattern of political mobilisation and nationalist ideologies, crystallising in the
formation of political parties based on race and ethnicity.
Political development in Malaysia from the post-war period up to the 1980's
can be characterised as the politics of confrontation and accommodation between the
major ethnic groups (Nash, 1989). Nash (1989:30) saw that the co-operation,
accommodation and confrontation among the major ethnic groups took place at three
analytically distinct levels: the political, the economic, and the world of ordinary daily
interactions. However, in this discussion, Nash's proposed analytical levels shall not be
used. Instead, the political co-operation, accommodation and confrontation between the
major ethnic groups in Malaysia shall be reviewed in general terms, with particular
emphasis given to aspects of multi-ethnic elite pacts and the ups and downs of this
political pact in managing the forces of ethnicity and nationalism. This implies that
special focus is devoted to the political dimension, rather than the economic and cultural
spheres, which shall be examined in the next chapter.
3.3.1 From Malayan Union to Independence: Constructing the Social Contract
During the war, the Colonial Office in London had planned a new political
framework as to how the post-war Malaya ought to be governed (Noordin Sopiee,
1976). The Malays were shocked and felt threatened when the British Colonial Office
decided to make radical structural changes in the administration of Malaya, with the
introduction of the so-called 'Malayan Union' project, which was contained in the
White Paper presented to the British House of Commons on 10 October 1945. 7 The
introduction of the Malayan Union project in 1946, marked the growing intensity of
nationalism and ethnic politics in Malaya. Briefly, under this scheme, the British
7 For a detail account of the formation and the abolished of the 'Malayan Union', see Noordin Sopiee (1976)- From
Malayan Union To Singapore Separation; and for a more comprehensive and recent study of the subject see,
Albert Lau (1991)- The Malayan Union Controversy: 1942-1948
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indirect rule policy of Malaya will end as the British Colonial Administration would
have almost full control in the governing of Malaya compared to the varied
administrative arrangements that prevailed in the pre-war era. 8 The unitary system of
the Malayan Union implies that Malay Rulers would lose all their power and
prerogative to the newly created post of the Malayan Union Governor in place of the
British Residents. By implication, the Rulers' power would be reduced to act only as
caretaker in matters concerning the administration of Malay customs and religion.
Above all, the non-Malays will be granted equal status to the Malays under the Malayan
Union citizenship and political rights. The Malayan Union project, which would lay the
foundation for the establishment of the 'new nation' in Malaya was totally unacceptable
to the Malays, resulting in an unprecedented Malay up-rising. To the Malays, the
Malayan Union 'nation' had an immense political disadvantage to their interests. It
would render them equal to the immigrant communities, hence loosing their rights and
political identity as the indigenous people of Malaya. The institutions of the Kerajaan,
which they had long identified with, would be rendered vulnerable if the Malayan Union
'nation' was successfully created.
As detailed accounts of the scheme were unveiled, the Malay `administocrats'9
began their aggressive mass campaign to oppose the project. This campaign was led by
Dato Onn Jaafar, who called for all the Malays to boycott any occasion held by the
colonial administration pertaining to the implementation of the scheme. He also urged
the Malay Rulers to withdraw their prior agreement to the scheme, as it was obtained by
force and the tacit threat of deposition by the HMG special envoy Harold MacMichael.1°
8 Before the war, Malaya has three type of administrations, i.e. four Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangore,
Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan); five Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johore)
and three Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang and Malacca). The existence of a different type of political
structure has made it difficult for the British to uniform the system of law and administration in Malaya. To end
this, during the war, the Colonial Office began examining proposals for constitutional and legal reforms, and this
finally culminated in the formulation of the Malayan Union scheme.
9 The term used by Chandra Muzaffar (1979) to describe the Malay administrators in the colonial administration
who came from the aristocrat family background.
I ° Sir Harold MacMichael arrived in Malaya on 12 October 1945 to get the Malay Rulers signature for the
implementation of the Malayan Union scheme. At the same time he investigated the conduct of each Ruler during
the Japanese occupation, and, in the case of a disputed title to the throne, determined which claimant was rightful
sovereign. This is because during the Japanese occupation some of the Rulers were being replaced by a successor
by the Japanese. Noordin Sopiee (1976:27) notes that, MacMichael was empowered to use force majeure: he
descended upon the Sultans with a treaty in one hand and with the power to confirm or remove any of them in the
other. This was stated in Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on a Mission to Malaya, October I945-January
1946 (Colonial No. 194, London 1946, cited in Noordin Sopiee, 1976:27). Zainal Abidin Wahid (1983:124-37)
wrote that the Malay elite were informed by their Rulers that some of the Rulers signatory were obtained through
force and threat, as some of the Rulers themselves disagreed with the scheme. They argued that in the state of
Kedah, MacMichael had given an ultimatum to the Sultan, whose conduct during the war was accused as being
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For the Malays, they now 'seem set to the task of organising themselves into a political
force to be reckoned with' (Noordin Sopiee,1976:25). The slogan of 'Malaya is for the
Malays', was chanted throughout the anti-Malayan Union campaign. The biggest rally
of protest was set to be held after the date of the Union's inauguration oil the 1 April
1946. However, before that the British had been given some notice of its potential.
Noordin Sopiee (1976:25) notes:
On 15 December 1945, on his arrival in Kota Bharu, MacMichael had been confronted by a
mass demonstration reported to have been 10,000 strong. On 10 February 1946, 15,000 Malays
(including 450 women) staged a mass demonstration at the inauguration of the Onn bin Jaafar-
led Movement of Peninsular Malays (Johore). These were revolutionary events in Malay and
Malayan politics. Then, on 1 March 1946, 115 representatives of forty-two Malay organisations
met in Kuala Lumpur. Twice before the War attempts had been made to form a Malaya-wide
Malay political organisation. On this occasion and under the guidance of Dato Onn, state
parochialism for the first time gave way to national solidarity; the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress
resolved to form UMNO, a United Malays National Organisationlformed on 11 May 19461 The
Malays became a race awakened. (emphasis added)
The Malay up-rising against the Malayan Union was the biggest Malay
nationalists' showdown against the British in Malayan history. Even the struggle for
independence was rather calm as it was achieved by peaceful political negotiation. It is
worth noting however, that when UMNO (United Malays National Organization) was
formed in 1946, its main objective was to oppose the Malayan Union, the question of
achieving independence had not yet emerged. The idea of fighting for independence
only emerged a few years later. The formation of UMNO, however, marked an
important turning point in the history of Malay nationalism in Malaya. Although there
were several Malay political organisations formed prior to the establishment of UMNO,
they were small and largely parochial in character. It was UMNO that emerged as a
major national political party which united the Malays throughout Malaya. This has
enabled it to be the strongest voice for and the legitimate representative of the Malay
masses. The Malayan Union has created UMNO and helped it to emerge as the political
force to be reckoned with. With wide-ranging support from the Malays, UMNO have
been able to play a bigger role in the subsequent political events in Malaya. Indeed, the
mainstream Malay nationalist ideology was and has been represented through UMNO.
As far as the non-Malays were concerned, they had a mixed reaction to the
Malayan Union project. Albert Lau (1991:125-30) notes that the Chinese, whom the
pro-Japanese. If he decline to sign the Union treaty a successor, who would sign it, would be appointed Sultan.
The incidents in Kedah posed the question of the validity of the implementation of the scheme as one of the
agreement was forcefully obtained. It became apparent later that the Sultan of Perak had also being given a similar
ultimatum.
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British sought to benefit from the scheme were divided on the issue. 11 Support among
the Chinese 'Right' and the 'Left', for the Union project remained generally
unenthusiastic or saw this as irreconcilable with their political idealism. 12 The Chinese
Right who mainly subscribed to the ideal of 'Malaya for the Chinese' or a .'Malaya for
China', felt that the issuing of the Malayan Union citizenship would automatically annul
their Chinese nationality. In comparison to the Chinese Right, the Chinese Left whose
focus of political orientation was 'Malayan' and not China, the Malayan Union did not
meet their demand for an elected 'democratic government' and the right to vote for
which the British had as yet no immediate plans. The Chinese 'Centre' were
represented by moderate and mainly English-educated middle class intellectuals. These
Chinese who were members of a newly formed political party, namely, the Malayan
Democratic Union (MDU- formed on 21 December 1945), generally welcomed the
Union plan. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Malays' attitude towards the Malayan
Union scheme, Zainal Abidin Wahid (1983:133) asserts that although some quarters of
the Chinese community supported the Union motion, they however, remained silent
about their stand.
Being confronted with strong Malay opposition, finally, on July 3 1946, the
Colonial Office agreed that the Malayan Union would be substituted with a Federal
form of government. Moreover, the post of the Governor would also be replaced by a
High Commissioner as a symbolic gesture that governmental authority was derived
from the Malay Rulers rather than the British Crown (Straits Time, July 5, 1946, p.1).
Apart from that, the MacMichael Treaty which secured the Malay Ruler agreement to
the Malayan Union would also be abrogated. Noordin Sopiee(1976:30) comments:
Two factors appear, however to have played important roles in forcing the British Government
to reconsider willy-nilly the Malayan Union question: (I) the perception of great, organised and
increasing hostility, particularly Malay hostility to the Malayan Union, and (ii) the rise of
opposition to British policy from those British officials in Malaya whose very task was to foster
and implement that policy.
II According to Albert Lau, part of the objective of the Malayan Union was the British intention to resolve the
citizenship problems in Malaya. In the pre-war period, the Malays in Malay states (all the states which have a
Sultan) were subject of the respective Sultan in the state. On the other hand all the populations in the Straits
Settlements were considered as British subjects, as the British had full control of the territories. However, the
huge number of the non-Malays (the immigrants of their descendant) who reside in the Malay states do not have
any political status.
12 The Chinese Right is comprising of mainly China-born and pro Kuo Mintang elements of the Chinese community
in Malaya. Conversely, the Chinese Left is basically referred to the Chinese community who supported the
ideology of the Malayan Communist Party. See Albert Lau (1991:125-130).
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In short, the Federation scheme was more acceptable to the Malays as it would lead to
the creation of a 'nation' which restored the pre-war Malay political dominance, despite
the fact that the immigrant communities would be given citizenship rights in a more
stricter term in contrast to the Malayan Union citizenship.
Nevertheless, the non-Malays felt that the new Federation of Malaya
arrangement would lead to a possible reversion to the pre-war system of colonial rule
with its openly 'pro-Malay' policies. Gordon Means (1976:55) writes:
the Malay reaction against the MacMichael Treaties was followed by a similar non-Malay
reaction against procedures which gave primary responsibility for the new constitution to the
traditional elite of Malay society and to the Colonial Government.
A mounting chorus of protest against the proposed Federation of Malaya constitution
had also come from the Malayan Communist Party and from the Malay Left of the
Malay Nationalist Party (MNP). The MNP envisaged the Melayu Raya vision, that is a
political unification of Malaya and Indonesia and an end to colonialism in the Malay
archipelago. Those non-Malay organisations who opposed the Federation of Malaya
subsequently joined forces to form an organisation called the Pan-Malayan Council of
Joint Action (PMCJA) which later changed to All-Malaya Council of Joint Action
(AMCJA) on 22 December 1946 under the leadership of Tan Cheng Lock. 13
 Given the
numbers of its members, the AMCJA claimed that they were the legitimate spokesman
for the non-Malays with which the British should conduct negotiations on
Constitutional issues. The main concern of the AMCJA was to seek an equality of
status among all the peoples of Malaya.
The AMCJA however, rejected the Federation scheme and in place of that
outlined six basic principles that they upheld, namely:
1. A united Malaya which includes Singapore.
2. The formation of a single State Legislative Assembly in which its members were to
be elected from throughout Malaya.
3. Equal political rights for all Malayans who accept and devote their loyalty to Malaya
as their homeland.
4. The Malay Rulers remain as sovereigns and a constitutional ruler who will be advised
by a democratic assembly, chosen by the people.
13 Among those who associated themselves in the AMCJA were the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), Malayan
Indian Congress (MIC), Malayan New Democratic Youth League, Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Ex-Service
Comrade's Association and Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions. It was claimed that the total numbers of the
AMCJA members may reached 400,000 peoples. (see: Means, 1976: 83-88)
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5. Matters that concerned Islam and Malay custom remain under exclusive power of the
Malays.
6. Special efforts must be made to assist the progress of the Malays.
All these aspects reflect their political aspiration for post-war Malaya. It seems that
while they recognise the position of the Malays, as stated in items 4, 5, and 6, it was the
aspect of equal political rights and citizenship, that matter most to them.
For the radical Malay nationalists from the MNP, the proposed constitution for
the establishment of the Federation of Malaya did not converge with their demand,
namely Malaya's independence and political unification with Indonesia. They
disagreed with UMNO leaders who were only concerned about opposing the Malayan
Union but not total liberation of Malaya from the British. Initially, the MNP was part of
UMNO, however, it pulled out a month later on the grounds of difference in objectives
and political ideology with the conservative Malay nationalists who dominated
UMNO's leadership. Together with several other Malay radical organisations which
also opposed the Malayan Union and the proposed Federation constitution, they formed
an organisation called PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat). 14 PUTERA consist of MNP,
Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) and Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS). While PUTERA
accepted the AMCJA six principles, it adds four more principles of its own :
1. Malay is to be made the official language of Malaya.
2. Matters pertaining to foreign affairs and defence have to be co-responsibility of the
Malayan and the British Government.
3. Malay is to be the title for citizenship and nationality in Malaya.
4. The national flag for Malaya should reflect the colours and national pattern of
Malaya.
These four principles together with the other six AMCJA points sealed the pact between
PUTERA and AMCJA. On this score, Zainal Abidin Wahid (1983:137) remarks:
since the AMCJA accepted all the principles outlined by PUTERA, especially in that of making
Malay as the official language for Malaya and as well as Malay as the title for Malayan
nationality, thus, the relevant question to be asked then is, is it possible to say that a united
Malayan nation could be established then, had PUTERA-AMCJA obtained the political power?
14 PUTERA was formed on 23 February 1947. The inspiration provided by the Indonesian nationalist movement is
evident in the name of the organization itself. This organization was patterned along the lines of the union of
political parties formed by Sukarno in 1943 which was also called PUTERA (see: Noordin Sopiee, 1976:41).
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It was obvious that PUTERA has made a call for Malay to be installed as the
official language for Malaya since 1947. Yet, only twenty years later that this was fully
implemented in Malaysia. Apart from that, it was also clear that PUTERA-AMCJA
Alliance was different in contrast to UMNO in advocating about the integration of
Malayan plural society and the formation of a 'Malayan nation'. The relevant question
to be asked is, was this then constitute a genuine shared aspiration between the Malay
Left and the non-Malays? Tan Sri Samad Ismail, one of the active participant in
PUTERA-AMCJA pact explained:
At that particular juncture, what mattered most for the Chinese was aspects of Malayan
citizenship. They were not too bothered about Malay being made the name of Malayan
nationality or Malay as the official national language for Malaya. The fight for Chinese
language and education only emerged after independence, that is after they had secured
Malayan citizenship. Our objective then, was to show to the British that we have a better
alternative which was more acceptable to both the Malays and the non-Malays in contrast to the
conservative Malay nationalists who were only concerned about the Malays.°
Although the PUTERA-AMCJA alliance claims that they represent the majority of the
people of Malaya, thus, should be invited in every consultation pertaining to
constitutional reform, this was ignored by the British. Instead, they proceeded with the
proposed draft of the Federation of Malaya constitution which came into being on
February 1, 1948. Following this, PUTERA-AMCJA call for a hartal or general strike
to be carried out throughout Malaya in protest of the new constitution. However this
failed to convince the British to revoke the plan.
Means (1976) argues that despite some criticism and protest, the new
arrangement seems to constitute something which the Malays could live with and one
which the non-Malays found difficult to reject completely (Means, 1976:56). On the
whole, the establishment of the Federation of Malaya on February 1, 1948 returned the
pre-war status-quo of the Malays. Above all, it lay the basis for a Malay political
dominance in the Malaysian polity. Provisions in the new constitution entrenched the
status of the Malay Rulers as constitutional monarchs within each of the Malay States.
This entailed that the Malay Rulers would have a special responsibility for protecting
the interests of the Malays, rather than being impartial heads of states outside the
political spectrum. The notion of the Malay Kerajaan which seems to collapse under
the Malayan Union had been rectified. Apart from that, the Federation Agreement had
also provided for a strong central government in a federal setting. Thus, strong
15 Interview with Tan Sri A Samad Ismail.
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institutions of central state rule dominated by the Malays evolved, as in the bureaucracy,
the police and the armed forces, and more importantly, the Federal goverment would
have strong constitutional powers. This is another form of concession given to the
Malays. For the non-Malays, the provision of the citizenship in the Federal 'constitution
would allow them to acquire federal citizenship after fulfilling certain requirements of
domicile, Malay or English language proficiency, birth and oath of allegiance.
However, while many Malays considered the new citizenship requirement very
generous to the immigrant communities, the non-Malays considered it as too restrictive
and designed to deny the non-Malays full legal and political rights in Malaya (Means,
1976:57).
The Chinese left-wing political movements were very disappointed with the
outcome of the Federation constitution. As a result the Malayan Communist Party,
decided that their struggle will be perpetuated in the form of an armed struggle. Both
the British and right wing Malay nationalists saw this as the greatest threat to ethnic
relations and continued stability as the MCP was predominantly Chinese in character.
Moreover, it aligned itself with the Communist Party in China. Their main intention was
to overthrow the British and establish a Malayan Communist State. In an attempt to
woo Chinese support for their struggle, the communist exploited the grievances of the
Chinese against both the British and the Malays (Means, 1976:122). Clearly, the MCP
revolt threatened the already fragile Malayan social fabric. Malaya appeared to move
into the brink of civil war. In response to that, the British declared the state of
Emergency in 1948 and an all-out war against the communist insurgency began. Many
of the left-wing politicians, including leaders of Malay radical nationalists from the
MNP had been incarcerated for their anti-establishment activities and suspicion of their
sympathy for the MCP struggle. This resulted in the weakening of the Malay Left,
which was in the advantage of UMNO to present itself as a formidable force
representing the cause of Malay nationalism.
To isolate the Chinese from the MCP struggle, the British fostered the creation
of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949. However, the MCA had yet to
become a political party as it was first established as a welfare organisation. By now
UMNO foresaw that Malaya's independence was inevitable to counter the communist
propaganda to fight for independence. UMNO eventually made independence its
national agenda. The British however indicated that independence would only be
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considered if the Malays and the non-Malays could work together in a political
partnership. With this condition, it implied that the British rule out the possibility of the
creation of a Malaya-Malay nation-state. Beyond that, they had no immediate plan to
leave as there was a strong belief that, had they left, civil war would break-out, given
the intensity of the MCP armed struggle and above all the prevailing poor state of ethnic
relations in Malaya. Worth noting however, is that the British still had huge economic
interests in Malaya, ranging from plantations to modern businesses.
In the context of burgeoning nationalist sentiment among the Malays and the
continued use of propaganda and revolutionary activities by the MCP, the British were
in the process preparing Malaya for eventual self-government. They saw that there was
a need to accustom Malayans to some form of democratic processes to serve this
purpose. Meanwhile, Dato Onn- the UMNO leader, felt that, since the British would
only consider granting independence on the condition that a Sino-Malay political
partnership was established, UMNO should open its door to the non-Malays, hence
becoming a multi-ethnic party. However, this idea was rejected by the UMNO
grassroots, as they strongly believed that UMNO should continue to be the party for the
Malays. Dato Onn, thus decided to leave UMNO and continue his political struggle and
idealism in a new party called the IMP (Independence Malaya Party).
There are two crucial points here. First, the British saw that ethnic antagonism,
even in a mild form, threatened social cohesion, without which democratic politics
becomes difficult if not dangerous. This thus, led the British to create a kind of
'imagined nation' for the people of Malaya to counter both the Malay nationalists notion
that 'Malaya is for the Malays' and the MCP's notion that Malaya is 'a Chinese-based
communist nation'. Second, prior to that the British had established the so-called
'Communities Liaison Committee' (CLC) in 1949, to inculcate goodwill and co-
operation among the major ethnic groups in Malaya, to address the mounting intense of
ethnic antagonism in the post-war years. This arrangement served as a crucial tool to
condition the mind of the nationalist elite on political accommodation and co-operation.
Means (1976) saw that it was the experience in the CLC that probably softened Dato
Onn hard-line attitude, which was reflected in his call for UMNO to be made a multi-
ethnic party. In short, the crucial role of the British in fostering the notion of 'pluralistic
nation' in Malaya was clear. While on one hand this had not gone well with the
mounting nationalist sentiments among the Malays, it served to indicate the British
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intention to make moderation pay. This had a significant bearing on the subsequent
political process in Malaya in term of facilitating the notion of co-operation and
accommodation among the major ethnic groups.
In 1952, the British held the election for Kuala Lumpur Municijgal Council.
Both UMNO and the IMP seem set to contest the election to get the people's
endorsement for their political course. The IMP, which presented itself as a multi-
ethnic party, was rather convinced that it could win the election, for it had two key
political leaders of the time, Dato Onn and Tan Cheng Lock, the leader of the Strait
Chinese who was also the founder of the MCA. According to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie,
the former Malaysia's Foreign Minister who was then tasked as the returning officer for
the election:
based on the electoral register, UMNO could easily win the election single handedly as the
majority of the registered voters were Malays. Although Kuala Lumpur was densely populated
with the Chinese, many of them were then not entitled to vote as they have yet to obtain their
citizenship which can only be conferred on very stringent procedures as stipulated in the
Federation constitution.16
Based on that, Ghazali took the initiative to warn local UMNO leaders about the
difficulties that UMNO Municipal Councillors might encounter in governing Chinese-
dominated Kuala Lumpur, had they won the election, since the Chinese may not be
represented in the Counci1. 17 The Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO then discussed the
matter with national UMNO leaders and an electoral pact with the MCA was envisaged.
Finally UMNO and the MCA teamed-up to form a political pact rather than a merger to
contest the election and went on to win the election convincingly. Means (1976) notes
that, the UMNO-MCA political pact has made it difficult for the IMP to campaign
against communalism. Indeed, all parties 'contesting the election came out in favour of
communal harmony, despite the 'communal harmony' of the UMNO-MCA was not
quite the same as the IMP's professed ideal of non-communal politics' (Means,
1976:134). This was the beginning of the political co-operation between the Malays
and the Chinese.
Encouraged by their success in the electoral pact in the 1952 election, which
they secured nine out of twelve seats, the UMNO-MCA pact was later expanded to
include the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) thus formed the Perikatan or the Alliance
16 Interview with Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie- the former Malaysian Foreign Minister.
17 Ibid.
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party. The Alliance then participated in the first Malaya legislative council election of
1955 where they comfortably won 51 out of 52 seats. The Alliance has proved itself as
a successful formula for managing the political salience of ethnicity and nationalism in
Malaya, and this convinced the British that Malaya's independence was inevitable.
The creation of the Alliance Party constituted the basis for consociational
arrangements in Malaysia. The Alliance's framework proved to be a useful device for
sorting out communal demands through negotiation and compromise rather than open
confrontation. The British finally accepted the Alliance formula both as a recognition of
the realities and so as not to impede self-rule. In the struggle for independence, then,
quite a number of critical ethnic issues became temporarily submerged, which only
surfaced later to plague the resilience of the Alliance's consociational formula.
As Malaya's independence became inevitable, the new constitution needed to be
drafted. At this juncture, the Alliance leaders who represented Malaya's multiracial
society had to make several political compromises to agree to form the substance for the
constitution. They came to a point of compromise in which the non-Malays would be
granted with citizenship rights which would allow them to have equal political rights to
the Malays, but in return the Malays were granted with some form of protection to allow
the government to address their socio-economic backwardness. This constitutional
protection known as 'Malay special rights' culminated in Article 153 of the Malayan
Constitution. Apart from that, Malay was to be made the national language (Article
152), and Islam the official religion for the Federation (Article 3). These ground rules
were written into the Malayan constitution and were regarded as the multi-ethnic 'social
contract' or more commonly known as the Merdeka compromy (the Independence
compromise) (Crouch, 1996). The compromy which was made on the basis of the
quid-pro-quo principle, clearly laid the foundation for the establishment of a 'plural
society nation', which recognised Malay political dominance. This is the very basis of
the Malaysian consociational polity.
However, some writers saw that these provisions were never fully understood by
those of the younger generation, and even those who had tacitly agreed to their necessity
who began to take issue with their implications in the 1960s (Zakaria Alunad,
1989:355). After Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaya to form Malaysia in
1963, a debate ensued on the status of the Malays and the non-Malays and the agitation
for a Malaysian Malaysia was triggered by Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore Premier. This
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severely threatened the fabric of the consociational arrangement. It plagued Malaysian
politics for many years and at its worst led to ethnic riots on May 13, 1969 which nearly
brought consociationalism to collapse.
•
3.3.2 From Perika tan to Barisan Nasional: The trials and tribulations of the social
contract
Although the Federal Constitution provides the Malays with special rights under
Article 153 for the government to embark upon necessary measures to address their
socio-economic backwardness, the Alliance government since independence was not
able to sufficiently thrash out these issues. They apparently had been preoccupied with
various challenging political tasks which threatened the stability of the state. The
continued communist insurgency, the formation of Malaysia, confrontation with
Sukarno, and the Malaysian Malaysia campaign espoused by Lee Kuan Yew which
finally led to Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia were all critical issues which the
government needed to attend to. As a result, the agenda to address Malay socio-
economic deprivation had not been adequately addressed.
On the contrary, the non-Malays saw that Malay political hegemony and the
'exclusive' constitutional provision made for the Malays under Article 153 had rendered
them 'second class' citizens. They also espoused multi-lingualism and wanted their
languages to be given equal status as a national language. The Malays however, felt
that independence had not significantly changed their socio-economic position. First,
they had to share political power with the non-Malays who had been rewarded with full
citizenship, and hence, crucial democratic rights to enable them to participate in the
political process. However, in return the Chinese continued to question Malay
constitutional provisions which had not been fully translated to improving their socio-
economic well-being. Above all, they saw that the strong Chinese economic power and
their ascending political influence posed a serious threat to Malay political supremacy.
It was this dialectic that led to ethnic political conflict in Malaysia prior to the 1969
racial riots. Indeed, this reflects the conflicting ethnic ideology between the Malays and
the non-Malays, pertaining to their relationship with the state. Tables 1 and 2
demonstrate the socio-economic gap between the Malays and the non-Malays in 1970.
Both tables clearly show that as far as poverty and participation in the modern economy
were concerned, the Malays were in the poorer position.
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Since the political structure of the country is based on ethnicity, politics also
responded to this reality. Despite the real-politik of ethnicity, Malaysia adopted the
formal structure of the Westminster model of democracy without much modification.
Nor did many realise the consequences inherent in the freedom that democrLy provides
especially in the airing of extreme ethnic demands in the political arena. In retrospect,
within twelve years from independence, Malaysia held three relatively 'free' democratic
elections. Nevertheless, the development of democracy was also marked with the
growing intensity of ethnic politics and communalism within the system.
Table 1
Households in poverty by ethnic group in Peninsular Malaysia 1970
All Poor Poverty Percentage of
households households incidence total poor
(000) (000) (%) households
Malay 901.5 584.2 64.8 73.8
Chinese 525.2 136.3 26 17.2
Indians 160.5 62.9 39.2 7.9
Others 18.8 8.4 44.8 1.3
Total 1,606.0 791.8 49.3 100
All rural 1,166.7 683.7 58.6 86.3
All urban 439.3 108.1 24.6 13.7
Source: Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980(1976:180)
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Table 2
Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Company in Malaysia 1969
All Industries
Companies incorporated in Peninsular Malaysia (RM000) (A)
Residents
Malays 49,294 1.0
Malay interests 21,339 0.5
Chinese 1,064,795 22.8
Indians 40, 983 0.9
Federal and State Governments 21,430 0.5
Nominee Companies 98,885 2.1
Other individuals and locally controlled companies 470,969 10.1
Foreign controlled companies in Malaysia 282,311 6.0
Non-residents 1,235,927 26.4
Net investment by Head Office 1,391,607 29.7
Total 4,.677,540 100
Source: Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 (1976:184)
Since it came to power, the Alliance government realised that its survival and
control over the Malaysian government heavily relied upon its ability to manage and
mediate the existence of diverse and conflicting ethnic interests. Paramount to the
mediation process was the 'bargain' principle made between the three parties before
independence. This bargain formula stuck as long as the elite of the coalition remained
in moderate hands and so long as the parties concerned felt bound to the bargain. It is
also depended on the coalition being resilient to extremist pressure. However, with
increasing ethnic political mobilisation, conflicting demands and counter-demands had
emerged within and outside the coalition framework. In short, ethnic mobilisation had
always been at its peak during election times. Nevertheless, despite the strong
centrifugal tendencies, democracy survived in the period of the first twelve years of
independence. Yet in reality, national politics had been tense and Wan Hashim
(1983:83) described the period preceding the 13 May 1969 racial riots, as a period of
disintegration and ethnic polarisation.
76
Many writers regard the 1969 general election as an important turning point in
the country's political history (von Vorys, 1975; Means, 1976; Milne and Mauzy, 1980;
Wan Hashim, 1983; Zakaria Hj. Ahmad,1989). It marked a significant shift as the
election really put to test the vibrance of Malaysia's consociationalism. Also earlier
elections had not truly focused upon the critical issues of the polity in relation to race
and ethnicity, even though polarisation had emerged since the 1959 election. However,
this election was held with independence celebrations in the background. The 1964
election on the other hand 'distracted' the electorate because of the external military
threat of Indonesian confrontation (von Vorys, 1975:251). In the 1969 general election
communal issues were blown out of proportion by most opposition parties which
engulfed the Alliance into a very defensive position.
Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1989) notes that, 'up to 1969 the country's political system
had allowed full vent to the airing of communal demands, which reached a crescendo in
the campaign of the May general election' (Zakaria,1989:360). Throughout the
campaign, there were a number of sensitive issues raised by various political parties,
that sharply divided the Malays and the non-Malays electorates along ethnic lines. The
Democratic Action Party (DAP) I5
 together with the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)
emerged as champion for defending the non-Malays political interests. The slogan of
creating a Malaysian-Malaysia that came up while Singapore was in Malaysia has been
exploited by these two parties. This attracted substantial urban support from the
Chinese community. Means (1976:394) notes that 'the DAP argued that the entire
structure of Malay special rights only created a 'rapacious' Malay capitalist class, but
did not aid the Malay peasants or urban poor'. In place of Malay special rights, the
DAP proposed in their manifesto an egalitarian policy and 'national integration on the
basis of the common economic interest of the have-nots of all races' (Means, 1976:394).
Besides, they also called for official national status of English, Chinese and Tamil.
They also called for equal treatment for all four streams of education.
Meanwhile, PAS representing the right-wing 'Malay-extremists' appealed to the
Malay electorates on the basis of their Islamic faith and identity as an ethnic and cultural
15 The DAP was established in 1965 when the Registrar of Societies declared that the Peoples Action Party (PAP)
had become illegal because it was a foreign political party after Singapore had left Malaysia. As such, the
remnants of the PAP still in the union reconstituted themselves as the Democratic Action Party. Continuing the
slogan of building a 'Malaysian-Malaysia', the DAP attracted substantial urban support from among the Chinese
community by capitalizing on the image of dynamic leadership patterned after the accomplishments of Lee Kuan
Yew's PAP government in Singapore. (see: Means, 1976:393-94)
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community. Besides, the party also demanded that further efforts be made to help the
Malays in terms of constitutional amendments, which would strengthen their
constitutional rights. Moreover, they argued that the government had not done enough
to help the Malays, while they had given up too much to the non-Malays. On the whole,
Alliance leaders have been severely challenged by extreme communal views from both
the Malay and the non-Malay opposition parties. Nevertheless, they continued their
campaign with asking the electorate to look at their fourteen year track record of being
in office and pledged to pursue further economic growth, social reform and policies to
establish a prosperous, stable, liberal and a tolerant society (Means, 1976:394). The
Alliance also accused the opposition of being irresponsible in playing up racial
sentiments while being unable to offer a credible alternative government. As the
election result emerged, it became clear that although the Alliance regained control of
the Federal government, it had lost its two-third majority. From 89 seats won in the
1964 election, the Alliance only secured 66 seats in the 1969 election.
In celebrating their electoral achievement, opposition parties supporters staged a
'victory' parade in Kuala Lumpur one day after the election, during which racial
tensions were aroused even further by the jeers and epithets directed by some boisterous
Chinese and Indian demonstrators against Malay onlookers (Means, 1976:397). 16 To
the non-Malays the election results gave an impressions that, their political power was
ascending while their dominance in the Malaysian economy remained unchallenged.
However, the Malays saw that their political supremacy was now at stake with the
ascending political power of the Chinese, while their economic inferiority remained
unchanged. The feeling of Malay anxiety was best described by Dr. Mahathir's remark
(1971:14):
They foresaw a Malaysia in which they, without economic strength and deprived of political
superiority, would forever be under the thumb of the immigrant Chinese and Indians. They
foresaw their position rapidly deteriorating and the whole nation losing its basic Malay
character. They foresaw Malay leaders bowing and scraping in order to gain the favour of
Chinese superiors. The whole picture was frightening to them...
16 Some of the slogans carried in the banners and placards by the demonstrators were too abusive and intimidative,
thus caused anger and feelings of humiliation amongst the Malays. Among them, 'Malays have fallen' (Melayu
sudah jatuh); 'Malays now no longer have powers' (Melayu sekarang tak ada kuasa); 'Kuala Lumpur now
belongs to the Chinese' (Kuala Lumpur sekarang Cina punya); 'Malays may return to their village' (Melayu
selcarang boleh balik lcampung); 'Malays get out, why do you remain here' (Melayu keluar, apa lagi duduk sini);
'We'll thrash you, we are now powerful' (Kita hentam lu, sekarang kita besar); 'This country does not belong to
the Malays, we want to chase out all Malays' (Ini negeri bulcan Melayu punya, kita mahu halau semua Melayu);
etc. (se: Goh Cheng Teik,1971:21)
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Thus, on the eve of the 13th May, a large number of die-hard Malays assembled at the
house of the Selangor Menteri Besar, Dato' Harun Idris to stage a counter demonstration
against the non-Malays, specifically to 'warn' that the Malays were still in charge of the
country. Before this demonstration of force had even started, ethnic clashes had erupted
in Kuala Lumpur. The country was plunged into a state of fear and panic.
It was later reported that the casualty figures of the riot was 178, but the total
killed was estimated by correspondents on the scene to be much higher. 16 For twenty
one months that followed, the state of emergency was declared and Parliament was
suspended. To take control of the situation, an all-powerful cabal, known as the
National Operations Council (NOC), was established under the stewardship of Tun
Abdul Razak, then the Deputy Prime Minister. The NOC took several crisis measures
to restore order in the country and revive political stability after the convulsive event of
communal riots. Only in February 1971 the NOC rule relinquished its extraordinary
powers to make way for democracy to be restored. Nonetheless, a number of
restrictions were introduced in the political sphere to avoid the recurrence of a similar
incident in the future. This marked another turning point in Malaysia's democracy
which saw increasing elements of authoritarianism being brought into the system.
The violence that occurred in 1969 was also a testimony to the potent interplay
of the forces of ethnicity and nationalism in the country. It happened when political
parties mobilised their supporters along ethnic lines and insinuate its followers on ethnic
issues. During the NOC rule the NCC (National Consultative Council) whose members
comprise of various ethnic representatives, scholars, and government agencies was
established to assess the overall situation of the country and make necessary
recommendations to avoid the recurrence of a similar incident in the future as well as
looking for ways and means to forge national integration. Apart from that, UMNO had
also organised seminars and congresses aimed at establish measures to tackle the
problems of Malay deprivation in various socio-economic fields. In the aftermath of the
1969 incident several new policies and legislative rulings were introduced by the
16 John Slimming (1969: 29-48), who was an eye witness to some of the rioting and its aftermath, estimates the
death toll was about 800. He claims that a large proportion of the casualties were Chinese who had been shot by
army units in the later stages of the rioting. The government reported that 178 persons had been killed in the
rioting, but gave no ethnic distribution of the casualties. The Government of Malaysia, The May 13 Tragedy: A
Report of the National Operations Council, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1969). The arson damaged during
the May 13 riots was later estimated to be M$15 million. See: Straits Times, July 18, 1969,p. 21.
(see:Means,1976:412)
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government. These changes can be seen in four main areas; namely, the introduction of
the Rukunegara' or a 'national ideology'; the introduction of three new national
policies in economics, education and culture; and finally the amendment of the
constitution and the introduction of new legislation to curtail excessive pOlitiking and
the politicisation of ethnicity.
To further reduce excessive politiking as well as moving towards extensive
coalition-building, the scope of the Alliance party, which was primarily based on a
tripartite coalition of Malay-Chinese-Indian configuration, was broadened in 1974 to
include more members from other groups. A number of 'moderate' opposition parties
were invited to form a new 'grand-coalition' party to replace the Alliance. Regional
based political parties from Sabah and Sarawak were also included in this new grand
coalition which was later to be called the Barisan Nasional (BN). The prime architect
of this venture was Tun Razak, then the Prime Minister of the country. Before that, in
1972 the Alliance coalition with the Gerakan state government was established in
Penang, as well as with PPP in Perak and followed by the coalition with PAS state
government of Kelantan. Before going to the polls in 1974, on June 1 of the same year,
the BN was formally established which consisted of nine political parties, namely,
UMNO, MCA, MIC, PAS, PPP, Gerakan, SUPP, PBB, and the Sabah Alliance Party.
According to D.K. Mauzy (1983:73-74)
...(the) scheme was devised by Tun Razak as a political strategy for achieving a widely
representative and broadly consensual government. Although the Alliance enjoyed a solid
parliamentary majority, Tun Razak believed that this was no longer adequate for the task of
reducing political strife, for forging ethnic harmony, for ensuring government legitimacy, or for
meeting the goals of economic development as specified in the NEP
The creation of the BN left only the DAP and the Socialist Front in opposition.
PAS, however, left the coalition in 1977, following the political crisis in the state of
Kelantan which led UMNO to recapture the state in the 1978 election. The creation of
the BN resulted in the ruling party emerging stronger and a more stable government
was put in place. The BN domination of electoral politics in the post 1970 period was
very obvious. This marked a new era of rebuilding consociationalism which was
severely damaged following the 1969 tragedy. Although PAS and the DAP continue to
play their role as two dominant opposition parties representing the interests of the
Malays and the non-Malays outside the goverment, the stability of the BN remained
unaffected. Given the condition of opposition parties which were disunited, let alone
80
their sharp ideological differences, it is hard to imagine how the position of the BN
could be threatened through electoral politics.
Although there had been an attempt made by opposition parties to present
themselves as a credible alternative to the BN coalition, during the MO general
election, opposition parties still have not been able to eject the BN from power. Prior
to the 1990 general election, UMNO was divided as a result of a leadership crisis. The
party was torn apart between Team A (led by Dr. Mahathir) and Team B (led by Tengku
Razaleigh) during the April 1987 UMNO party election. In that event, Mahathir's
leadership was bitterly challenged by Tengku Razaleigh, then Minister of International
Trade and Industry, which finally resulted in the party being deregistered by the High
Court in 1988. 18
 When UMNO (Baru [New UMNO]) was formed by Mahathir in 1988,
Tengku Razaleigh who lost the fight had chosen not to join the party but instead
established a new party called Semangat 46 (lit. Spirit of 1946, after that of the year the
old UMNO was formed). In the 1990 general election he led the two overlapping
opposition coalitions, the Gagasan Rakyat and APU, challenging the BN almost on a
one-to-one basis in the Peninsular. The establishment of two overlapping opposition
coalitions instead of one clearly demonstrated how difficult it was for certain opposition
parties such as PAS and the DAP, who had sharp ideological contrasts to work together
as political partners 19 . Though the two parties have a common objective to defeat the
BN, they found it difficult to present themselves in one solid electoral pact due to sharp
ideological differences. Therefore, the separate opposition coalition were the answer to
18 Following Tengku Razaleigh slim defeat to Dr. Mahathir (Mahathir won by 43 votes) for the post of UMNO
President, 11 dissident party members (virtually all were Razaleigh's loyal supporters) filed a suit against the
UMNO Secretary General and seven party divisional secretaries. They alleged that the April 1987 election was
invalid because delegates from 30 unregistered branches, and illegal members at Woman and Youth meetings, had
helped elect divisional delegates to the April 1987 UMNO General Assembly and election. On February 4, 1988,
the High Court Justice Harun Hashim who was presiding over the UMNO election dispute, declared that instead
of the April 1987 UMNO election was null and void, it was the party itself that had committed an offence under
Society's Act which stipulated that any illegal members, branches, and divisions which took part in the election of
a registered organisation would render that organisation an unlawful society. As such, UMNO became an
unlawful organisation. Following the High court ruling, an attempt was made by both Mahathir and Razaleigh to
reregister UMNO. However, it was Mahathir's application that was accepted by the Registrar of Society, and a
new party called UMNO (Baru [New UMNO]) was formed on 13 February 1988. Mahathir insisted that the new
party has to be clearly identified with the old one and reiterated that it was for legal-technical matters that UMNO
has to be reregistered, yet the spirit and the ideology were still that of the old UMNO. (See: Ahmad Fawzi Basri,
1992:264)
19 The Gagasan Rakyat comprises Semangat 46, the DAP, PRM and the PBS. The APU on the other hand was
made up of Semangat 46, PAS, and PRM. While the Gagasan was a multi-ethnic opposition coalition, APU was
a Malay-Muslim opposition coalition. The establishment of these two opposition fronts was simply because the
DAP cannot accept PAS's objective of establishing an Islamic state, whilst PAS held the view that electoral
collaboration with the non-Muslims was against Islamic teaching. (see: Means 1991; and Crouch 1996)
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this problem. The BN capitalised on this scenario to portray the opposition coalitions
as a fake political front attempting to mislead the people. At the last minute, the 'ethnic
card' used by the BN proved to work in their favour.20
 Despite losing the Kelantan state
government to APU, with PAS playing a leading role, and Sabah being dOminated by
the PBS, whilst most urban constituencies were captured by the DAP, yet at the federal
level, the BN was still returned to power with its two-third majority remained intact.
Lim Kit Siang, the Opposition Leader argued that the 1990 general election was
significant in the sense that 'the pendulum theory' which was believed to have
characterised the voting behaviour of urban Chinese voters had been broken in that
election. 21
 To him several policies that came into existence in the post 1990 election
ought to be seen in the context of the outcome of the 1990 general election. In his
words:
The government tends to dismiss the weightage and the meaning of urban voters message put
across to them in general election as they presumed that they could get hold of the urban
electorate votes lost in previous general election in the next election. The fact that the pendulum
theory was broken in 1990, meant that a lesson has to be drawn from the 1990 general election.22
Therefore Kit Siang saw that when Mahathir unveiled the New Development Policy
(NDP), Vision 2020, and the notion of Bangsa Malaysia in February 1991 to replace the
NEP which ended in 1990, these had to be connected to the outcome of the 1990
election.
Despite the attempt by opposition parties to work closely as political partners,
still they could not match the BN, least of all when opposition was in disintegration, as
depicted in the 1995 general election which saw the break-up of the Gagasan Rakyat as
a result of the DAP pulling out from the coalition. The 1995 general election returned
the BN to power with a bigger mandate. It is argued therefore that until and unless the
opposition could present themselves as more credible, the position of the BN as a strong
20 The potential of the BN losing its two-third majority seem imminent when a few days before the poll the ruling
party in Sabah, the PBS which was a member of the BN left the coalition to join the Gagasan Rakyat. However,
the government propaganda machines, namely the state control TV and the press, turned the voters, especially the
Malays against Tengku Razaleigh and his two opposition fronts. By working together with the PBS which was
known as a party dominated by the Christian-Kadazan ethnic group, the media portrayed Tengku Razaleigh as
helping the Christian agenda. A picture of Tengku Razaleigh wearing a Kadazan headgear with a symbol similar
to the Christian `cross' during his electoral campaign in Sabah was widely published by the media. This was
believed to have swayed away many Malay voters against the opposition. (see: Harold Crouch. 1992:39)
21 The pendulum theory refers to the voting behaviour of urban Chinese voters who tend to shift their vote from the
government's party to the opposition from one election to the other in an attempt interpreted as to safeguard
Chinese interests.
22 Interview with Lim Kit Siang.
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and stable coalition would not be seriously threatened. Clearly, despite the emergence
of strong authoritarian tendencies in the government in the post 1970 period, the
consociational formula first established under the Alliance framework and later
strengthened through the BN concept has been able to provide Malaysia With a more
stable government, and has been the key to its economic development. The system has
been able to absorb most of its difficult threats in the post 1970 period, and the rapid
economic development occurring in the country since then has served the ruling party
well. Although the 1997 economic crisis, which a year later turned political as a result
of the Anwar Ibrahim affair, seemed to pose a serious problem to the Mahathir- led BN
government, it is argued that the stability of the Malaysian consociational polity may
not be significantly affected so long as the basic political parameters involving the BN
and the opposition parties remain unchanged.
3.4 Conclusion
In retrospect, this chapter has demonstrated that Malaysia is not only a plural
society but also a very divided one. The society became very divided as a result of
ethnic groups transforming themselves into political conflict groups to compete in the
political arena along ethnic lines to protect and promote their interests. The discussion
has demonstrated that the political salience of ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia was
the product of conflict. It has been illustrated that both the pre and post 1969 political
process in Malaysia indicate that Malay political hegemony and the unassailable
political rights of the non-Malays stands as a very fundamental issue in the politics of
nation-building in the country. Malay nationalism that matured in 1957 has played a
significant role in the articulation of Malay interests and the demand for the
improvement of their socio-economic well-being vis-a-vis the non-Malays. Above all, it
has also helped to sustain their political hegemony against the growing threat of Chinese
economic superiority and their ascending political power.
It is argued that the pluralistic nature of this society constitutes the basis for the
understanding of ethnic politics and ethnic relations in Malaysia which, as noted by
many scholars (Means, 1976; Zainal Abidin Wahid, 1983; Wan Hashim, 1983;
Horowitz, 1985, etc.) were exacerbated by the impact of the Japanese occupation in
World War II and have been perpetuated in the form of ethnic political mobilisation in
the post independence years. Thus, as argued by Zakaria (1989:377) it is unlikely that
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'race as a leitmotif of political consciousness and as a plank of political power will be
overtaken by some other factor such as class'. 18
 Diamond and Plattner (1994) notes
that, 'once deep ethnic divisions are mobilised into electoral politics,.., they tend to
produce suspicion rather than trust, acrimony rather than civility, polari gation rather
than accommodation, and victimisation rather than toleration' (Diamond and Plattner,
1994 :xix).
This was the scenario that largely reflects the state of ethnic relations in
Malaysia from independence until the outbreak of the 1969 racial riots. Therefore, the
system must have a durable conflict management mechanism which would serve as a
safety valve in mediating ethnic conflict. The consociational mechanism established in
1957 however was a very fragile system which appeared not to be able to absorb the
immense pressure derived from the forces of ethnic political mobilisation. As a result, it
almost collapsed in 1969 and this required the establishment of a new and a more stable
system. The formation of the BN ought to be seen in this light. The creation of BN has
enlarged the basis of the consociational framework and makes it more representative of
various ethnic groups in the country. With the participation of the major Sabah and
Sarawak parties, the grand coalition framework has reflected a broader idea of power
sharing in the government. Such arrangements have contributed towards creating a
more lasting stability and social harmony within the federal setting.
Although ethnicity as the basis of Malaysian politics remains unchanged, the
framework of political accommodation between the national elite representing various
ethnic groups has improved since 1970's. There was a prevailing view that open ethnic
confrontation benefits no one except the interests of political opportunists. As far as
the ruling coalition was concerned, competing ethnic demands, tended to be articulated
within the boundary of the 1957 bargain. However, this had never been easy as it
tended to be challenged by 'extremist elements' within and outside the ruling coalition.
However, the strategy of depoliticisation of ethnicity in the post 1970's culminated in
several 'oppressive' pieces of legislation, such as the Sedition Act, Police Act, Printing
Act, the Official Secret Act and the powerful Internal Security Act (the ISA) have made
it difficult for most parties to exploit ethnic issues for political gain as it had been in the
18 There are several writings that have examined Malaysian politics with the class approach, i.e., (B.N Cham, 1975),
(Hua Wu Yin 1983), (Lim Mah Hui 1980;1985), however, the most frequent approach used was the perspective of
ethnicity.
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past. As such many critical ethnic issues have been subdued. Nevertheless, this is not to
suggest that ethnic political expression has been denied, but rather it has been limited
within the defined 'rules of the game'. This has caused immense discontent for the
opposition parties, and also amongst government critics both local and foreign.
This development marked growing tendencies of political authoritarianism in
Malaysia. While democracy provides space for dissent to be expressed into the system,
it requires reliable means for managing conflict peacefully and constitutionally, keeping
it within certain boundaries of decency, order, and restraint. However, in the case of
severely divided societies, those elements of decency, order and restraint were, quite
often, difficult to manage, thus exposing the system to threat from centrifugal
tendencies. Diamond and Plattner (1994:xviii) argue that 'for several reasons, ethnicity
is the most difficult type of cleavage for a democracy to manage.' In the study of the
failure of democracy in a number of Asian and African countries in the 1950s and
1960s, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972:62-92) concluded that 'democracy...is simply not
viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences.' Perhaps, this explains the
prevailing system of quasi-democracy in Malaysia since 1969. While the government
has been able to subdue its critics, many non-Malays saw that the aggressive efforts by
the government to consolidate Malay nationalism into its various national policies
during the NEP penod (1970-1990), in the name of achieving national integration was
in fact an attempt to turn nation-building into an ethnic project. The following chapter
shall examine this phenomenon in the context of the role of national policies and nation-
building in Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 4
NATION-BUILDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBATE ON
IDENTITY FORMATION IN MALAYSIA
4.1 Introduction
It was argued in the theoretical discussions that nationalism can be seen as both
an ideology and a political movement. On the other hand, nation-building as a process
is partly a by-product of 'modernisation' (Bendix, 1977), and partly the result of
'deliberate government policies' (Breuilly, 1993: 278) to create a cohesive and
integrated socio- political entity in a state. This chapter will examine these phenomena
in the context of the process, purposes and agencies of nation-building, with special
consideration given to the role of intellectuals, 'national awakeners' and political elite,
based on the development of European nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. This will be followed by a discussion on the development of the debate on
identity formation in Malaysia that has emerged since the 1920's - in particular, that
advocated by various intellectuals and section of the political elite. It is hoped that this
will serve as an important backdrop necessary to explain the nature of the political
debate over the relationship between nation-building, ethnicity, culture and national
identity both at the general theoretical level, and in the context of the Malaysian case.
4.2 Nation-building: The process, purposes and agencies
It has been established that the ultimate aim of the process of nation-building
was to create a cohesive social and political community in which the people strongly
identify themselves with the nation more than with other collectivities. In other words,
the process of nation-building stricto sensu is to create a `fully-fledged nation' or an
outlook which gives an 'absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values
and interests' (Hroch, 1996: 80). However, the crucial question to ask here is how and
under which circumstances this 'noble' goal can be attained? Can some insights be
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drawn upon from the experience of several European nation-states in the past to analyse
the situation in the developing countries such as Malaysia? To what extent did the
industrial revolution that began in England and the ideas of the French revolution
significantly influence the process of nation formation in Europe? What Can we learn
from these European phenomena in the context of nation-building in developing
countries?
Despite the view that the Western template of nationalism differs from that
experienced in several developing countries (Chatterjee, 1993), Reinhard Bendix (1977)
argued that the efforts of many of the newly independent states in building a national
political community could be compared with the nation-building process of Western
countries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While not all the
developments that took place in the European context are relevant to the problems
encountered in developing countries, Bendix (1977: 2) argued that 'the insights gained'
from the Western experience cannot be lightly discarded. They certainly shed some
light on the analysis of the political development in those countries which are still
largely faced with the daunting task of building a 'united nation-state'. In his words:
There is nothing inherently wrong about using the history of Western societies as the basis of
what we propose to mean by development - as long as the purely nominal character of this
definition is understood. The history of industrial societies must certainly be one basis for our
definitions in this field. Trouble arises only when it is assumed that these are 'real' definitions,
that development can mean only what it has come to mean in some Western societies.
(Bendix, 1977:7)
By development, Bendix was referring to both the processes of industrialization
and modernization. According to Bendix (1977:406) industrialization and indeed
modernization tend to have the same effects wherever they occur. By industrialization,
he referred to the process of 'economic changes brought about by a technology based on
inanimate sources of power as well as on the continuous development of applied
scientific research' (Bendix, 1977: 6). Modernization on the other hand, referred to 'all
those social and political changes that accompanied industrialization in many countries
of Western civilization' (Bendix, 1977:6). Among others, these include 'urbanization,
changes in occupational structure, social mobility, development of education- as well as
political changes from absolutist institutions to responsible and representative
governments, and from a laissez-faire to a modern welfare state'(p. 6).
Modernization generated social mobilisation in which industrialization induced
rural workers to leave their native villages to seek work in the new industrial areas,
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hence eroding the social communities of rural areas and mobilizing the workers for
absorption into the larger national society. Although Bendix (1977:407) stresses that
kinship ties, religious beliefs, linguistic affiliations, territorial communalism, and other
forms of associations in a traditional social order have not disappeared even in the most
highly industrialized societies, some of the older ties or associations were weakened as
a result of modernization and industrialization. In short, Bendix (1977:433) notes that
'the growth of citizenship and the nation-states is a more significant dimension of
modernization than the distributive inequalities underlying the formation of social
classes'. Although not all the processes of political development of a nation work as
smoothly as depicted in the above outline, this does offer a crude overview of what has
taken place in many industrial societies in Europe since the late eighteenth century.
One of the manifestations of modernization was the spread of standardized
education in vernacular languages in place of Latin which had long been the language
of knowledge in European feudal societies. Such a development provided conducive
conditions for the spread of the dominant national language and culture, so that
members of what were once distinct communities became gradually merged into the
national whole. Beyond that, as argued by Anderson (1996), 'print-capitalism' also
spearheaded this phenomenon. The development of a common language is the first step
towards promoting mutual understanding among different people. Above all, a nation
require a common language in order to call it 'the nation'. Birch (1989:11) argued that
by measures of this kind, the French almost stamped out the speaking of Breton, the
lowland Scots rendered Gaelic extinct on the Scottish mainland, and the English drove
the Welsh language into decline (Birch,1989:11). Clearly, mass education and the
development of national language well served the purposes of sustaining a new civic
culture within society.
While the role of education and the national language were instrumental in the
rise and spread of nationalism and in promoting the sense of nationhood, modernizing
education also produced intellectuals in various fields, whose skills were crucial in the
formation of political ideas and in the organizing of political movements. Bendix
(1977:429) notes that 'intellectuals as a distinct social group emerged as a concomitant
of modernization'. These intellectuals 'underwent a process of emancipation from their
previous subservience to the Church and to private patrons, because industrialization
created a mass public and market for intellectual products' (Bendix, 1977:429), thus
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simultaneously creating a new and indeed bigger role for the intellectuals within society.
Although nationalism cannot be seen as the politics of any particular class, neither can it
be regarded merely as the politics of the intellectuals (Breuilly, 1993:51). Yet history
has shown that intellectuals played an enormous role in propagating and 'leading the
nationalist struggle. Breuilly notes:
It is not surprising, therefore, that nationalism, particularly in earlier phases, tends to draw a
very large proportion of its supports, and even more its leadership, from the professions. This is
reflected in the membership of such bodies as the German National Assembly of 1848-49 or
early Indian National Congress. It is also reflected in concern with issues such as recruitment to
public service, educational facilities and official language policies.
(Breuilly, 1993:47)
Nevertheless, the categories of actors who initiated and carried the processes of either
state- or nation-building differ significantly. Habermas (1996:283) asserts that:
With regard to the formation of modern-states, mainly lawyers, diplomats and officers engaged
in the construction of an effective bureaucracy, while on the other side writers, historians,
journalists preceded the diplomatic and military efforts of statesmen (like Cavour and
Bismarck) with the propagation of the - at first imaginary- project of a nation unified on cultural
terms.
All these developments resulted in significant socio-political transitions in many
European societies in the nineteenth century. The feudal-absolutist societies were then
transformed into capitalist and secular democratic societies which place emphasis on a
constitutional form of government. In other words, Habermas notes that the process of
democratic transformation of the nation of the nobility (Adelsnation) into a nation of the
people (Volksnation), required a deep psychological shift on the part of the general
population. Like Bendix, Habermas argues that the process of modernization had
inspired academics and intellectuals whose work and 'nationalist propaganda unleashed
a political mobilization among the urban educated middle classes, before the modern
idea of a nation met with broader resonance' (p.283). As illustrated earlier,
professionals and intellectuals have specific skills such as literacy and administrative
and legal training which can be used in political matters. For example, lawyers can
utilize their skills in relation to constitutional negotiations, and government officials on
matters of administrative reform. They saw themselves as the 'vanguard of society'
(Breuilly,1993:47-8) and indeed that was the perception held by the people at large.
These qualities enabled them to hold leadership positions in the nationalist struggle and
thereafter within the political hierarchy of the society. Clearly, the role of intellectuals
and political elite or the so-called 'national awakeners' was instrumental and inherently
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crucial in the development and spread of nationalism and in the process of nation
formation.
The rise of nationalism could provide new forms of identity which contained the
fusion images of an ideal state and ideal society (Breuilly,1993:48). Moreover,
nationalist ideology 'operates as a means of guiding and promoting development'
(Breuilly, 1993:269). In this connection, Habermas (1996: 284) argues that development
and modernization which resulted in the formation of collective identity 'had a catalytic
function for the transformation of the early modern state into a democratic republic', a
view not very dissimilar to the one held by Bendix (1977). As he puts it:
The national self-consciousness of the people provided a cultural context that facilitated the political
activation of the citizens. It was the national community that generated a new kind of connection between
persons who had been strangers to each other, so far. By this, the national state could solve two problems
at once: it established a democratic mode of legitimation on the basis of a new and more abstract form of
social integration.
(Habermas, 1996:284)
Habermas argues that with the development of the new kind of national identity,
gradually the people transformed their position from the status of private subjects to
holders of citizenship. Subsequently, with the transition from a more or less
authoritarian rule to a democratic national state, 'citizenship gained the additional
political and cultural meaning of an achieved belonging to a community of empowered
citizens who actively contribute to its maintenance' (Habermas, 1996:285). In short, the
consolidation of political nation with cultural nation resulted in the creation of nation-
state. From the experience of the formation of European nation-states, it is obvious that
driven by the process of modernization which resulted in the creation of the institution
of egalitarian citizenship,
the nation-state did not only provide democratic legitimation but created, through widespread
political participation, a new level of social integration as well. In order to fulfil this integrative
function democratic citizenship must, however, be more than just a legal status; it must become
the focus of a shared political culture.
(Habermas, 1996:289)
However, in the process of attaining this goal - as pointed out by Habermas - the
question arises whether such a formula can still work in complex and diverse societies.
Can this system similarly operate as smoothly as is hoped in a society which is divided
along ethnic lines where none of the existing ethnic groups constitute a significant
majority, and where the political battle is overtly fought on an ethnic basis? Would not
the process of nation-building culminate in a dialectic between creating a 'civic-nation'
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vis-a-vis 'ethnic-nation' as cultural homogeneity tends to indicate a tendency towards
the oppressive maintenance of a hegemonic majority culture? Habermas notes that in
today's world, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity continue to grow very rapidly, and
'except for policies of ethnic cleansing, there is no alternative to this rOute towards
multicultural societies' (Habermas, 1996:289). Therefore, he saw that if different
cultural, ethnic and religious subcultures are to co-exist and interact on equal terms
within the same political community,
the majority culture must give up its historical prerogative to define the official terms of that
generalized political culture, which is to be shared by all citizens, regardless of where they
come from and how they lived. The majority culture must be decoupled from a political culture
all can be expected to join.
(Habermas, 1996:289)
Apart from that, Habermas suggested that nationalism be replaced with 'constitutional
patriotism' so that the level of the shared political culture can be separated from the
level of subcultures and prepolitical identities (including that of the majority) which
deserve equal protection only once they conform to constitutional principles (which are
spelled out in this particular political culture).
Nevertheless, to suggest the replacement of nationalism with constitutional
patriotism is one thing, but actually to make it happen is entirely a different matter,
especially when it involves deep and intense ethnic and cultural divisions, such as those
confronting many plural societies in the developing world. Indeed, Habermas
(1996:289-90) himself admitted that in contrast to nationalism, 'constitutional patriotism
for many people appears too thin a bond to hold together complex societies'. Therefore,
the relevant question to ask is under what circumstances this problem can be resolved,
so that a liberal political culture or 'civic nationalism' shared by all citizens can be
created to accommodate all the diversities within society? To Habermas, liberal
political culture can only hold together multicultural societies if 'democratic citizenship
pays in terms not only of liberal and political rights, but of social and cultural rights as
well' (p.290). But what concerns him and many others is the rise of fundamentalism,
extremism and terrorism in the name of 'nationalist struggles' which threaten to destroy
the fabric of civil society, phenomena that can be seen in many instances throughout the
globe.
It is also important to note that it is not correct to regard all civic nationalism as
'good' and all other nationalisms as 'bad'. The dialectic between 'civic nationalism' and
91
'ethnic nationalism' is not a straightforward one. I David Brown (1999) in his attempt
to elucidate the distinction between the two concepts suggests that the liberalism or
illiberalism of nationalism might not be related to its ethnic (or cultural, the term he uses
instead of the term ethnic) or civic basis, but might depend both upon whether the class
articulating the nationalism is marginalised or upwardly mobile; and upon whether the
wider society becomes focused upon ressentiment in relation to threatening others, or on
developing a self-generated identity. By `ressentiment', Brown was referring to feelings
of insecurity which may generate envy and hatred in reaction to other nationalisms. In
his words,
Thus instead or arguing as hitherto that cultural nationalisms are intrinsically illiberal, it may be
useful to reformulate the argument. Perhaps it is those nationalisms, whether civic or cultural,
which are articulated by insecure elite and which constitute ressentiment-based reactions against
others who are perceived as threatening, which consequently become illiberal. By the same
token, perhaps civic and cultural nationalism which begin as protest movements but do not
develop their identity primarily in relation to threatening others, and which are articulated by
self-confident elite, are most likely to take liberal form.
(Brown, 1999:298)
Brown cited several examples to support his case. He argues that civic nationalism may
take on authoritarian forms, as articulated by Suharto in Indonesia. Indeed, the
Indonesian military oppressive ventures in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh provinces
clearly depicted the 'agony' of the Indonesian civic nationalism in the name of
preserving the Pancasila and the notion of the unity of Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian
nation). By contrast, Brown (1999:299) cited the study of John Hutchinson (1987) on
cultural nationalism to demonstrate how the Irish nationalism 'changed remarkably in
three different 'revivals', from Anglo-Irish and liberal to Gaelic and populist, depending
upon which intellectuals were mobilising it; which threats and dangers they stressed;
which symbols- religious or secular- they employed'. In short, the civic-ethnic
dichotomy in the analysis of nationalism has to be carefully scrutinised so as not to
simply equate one as 'good' nationalism and the others as 'bad' as pointed out by David
Brown in his study.
I David Brown (1999) in his article which appeared in Nation and Nationalism Vol.5 Part 2, preferred to use the
term `cultural nationalism' instead of the term `ethnic nationalism' since he argued that the term, `ethnicity' is hotly
contested between those who use it to refer to myths of common kinship and ancestry, and those who use it to refer to
the biological fact of genetically fixed primordial racial attributes. Nevertheless, in this study it is clearly spelled out
that the term `ethnicity' refers more to aspects of social relationship rather than those of common kinship and
ancestry or that of aspect of primordial racial attributes. Therefore, the term `ethnic nationalism' will continue to be
used in this discussion since its conceptual definition has been clearly established at the outset.
La
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On the whole, the discussion thus far has highlighted that based on the
development of several European nation-states such as England and France, the origin of
nations cannot be simply explained without discretely considering the effects of the
changes in the spectrum of society, and the political-economic relationships. Ernest
Gellner and the modernist school of thought have consistently maintained that
nationalism is a product of industrialisation, or as Bendix saw it as one of the
consequence of the process of modernisation. 'The fact that the rise of modern capitalist
society comes in the same period as the rise of nations is not merely a chronological
coincidence' (Hroch, 1998:94). Obviously, there are many lessons regarding nationalism
and nation formation that can be learned from the experience of industrial revolution in
England and indeed the French revolution. However, as argued in Chapter Two,
modernisation and industrialisation may not explain everything about nation formation,
as nationalism can also be deeply embedded in the ethno-symbolic basis as argued by
the ethnicist perspective. Nevertheless, the impact of industrialization and the process
of modernization should not be simply downplayed. Likewise the role of national
awakeners as demonstrated in the roles played by the intellectuals, middle classes and
political elite were crucial to awaken 'unconscious nations' to emerge as thriving nation-
states by making nationalism into both a powerful political ideology and an appealing
political movement.
4.3 Identity formation in Malaysia: the development of the debate
The debate on identity formation and nation-building in Malaysia emerged long
before the country achieved its independence in 1957. Various political elites and
intellectuals engaged in these debates, both at a formal and informal level to articulate
the interests of their respective communities. These debates not only produced several
substantial recommendations for the government to address the acute problems of ethnic
relations in the country, but beyond that demonstrated an intense dialectic between
Malay and non-Malay notions of Malaysian national identity. The following discussion
evaluates some of the key issues raised in these debates to provide a crucial backdrop in
the analysis of the politics of identity formation in Malaysia. Although the debates can
be clearly divided into the pre-independence period and the post-1969 era, the key issues
involved tend to be tied to the conflict between the Malay-centric notion of national
identity and the non-Malay's cultural pluralist version of Malaysian national identity.
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4.3.1 The Pre-independence Debate
It has been argued in Chapter Three that whilst most members of the Malay
intelligentsia were concerned about the immigrant communities' encroachment into
their land, and urged the Malays not to be apathetic concerning education and material
progress and so risk being displaced by immigrants, a group of the Malay political elite
from the KiVIM envisaged the political unification of Malaya and Indonesia, under the
slogan of the Melayu Raya, as the ultimate solution to 'save' the Malays, and
simultaneously create a stronger and greater Malay nation-state. On the other hand,
whilst it has been indicated that Chinese and Indian nationalisms before the outbreak of
the Second World War were externally oriented, a group of Chinese known as the Straits
Chinese or the Baba community, through their organisation called SCBA (Straits
Chinese British Association) formed in 1900 had begun urging the immigrant
communities to adopt a 'Malayan consciousness' attitude to protect their interests in
Malaya. As early as the 1920s, Tan Cheng Lock - the leader of the Straits Chinese, 'was
talking of the need to develop a 'Malayan consciousness' among the immigrant
communities to serve the purpose of the eventual creation of a 'united self-governing
British Malaya' (Christie, 1996:37).2
 Unlike the rest of the Chinese who were either
more concerned about the 'tug of war' between the KMT and the MCP, or others who
were rather apolitical, the SCBA had attempted to resolve 'a delicate balance between
Chinese origins on one side, and commitment to citizenship within the British Empire
on the other (Christie, 1996:33). Christie (1996:33) notes:
Against the traditional insistence on the part of the Chinese government that all Chinese-
whether inside the empire or not - were irrevocably tied to China by the laws of blood
affiliation (jus sanguinis), it was a central part of the Straits Chinese political programme that
jus soli should have priority over jus sanguinis.
By jus soli, the Straits Chinese were referring to the notion of primary loyalty
based on one's land of abode rather than the affiliation of blood links. The notion of
2 Tan Cheng Lock was, in many respects, typical of the membership of the Chinese elite of the Straits Settlements of
Penang, Malacca and Singapore. Western-educated, a Christian, and with a distinguished lineage in Malacca and
Southeast Asian region, he represented the class upon which the British colonial government in the Straits
Settlements colony had increasingly come to rely in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the influence of the Straits
Chinese had been informal rather than formal. Increasingly, Chinese community leaders like Tan Cheng Lock
demanded, first, that the Straits Chinese should have substantial representation in the government and administration
of the Straits Settlements; and second, that the Chinese immigrants throughout the Malay peninsula should be given a
greater sense that Malaya was their true home. It was Tan Cheng Lock who led the Chinese community to establish
the Malaysian Chinese Association ( the MCA) as a political force that later co-operated with UMNO in the
formation of the Alliance which successfully negotiated Malaya's independence deal with the British (see:
Christie,1998:188-89).
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loyalty that they promoted 'was not towards Britain as such, but towards the British
empire as a political entity; it was focused on the specific territory of the Straits
Settlements and British Malaya within the greater political entity' (Christie, 1996:33).
The objective of this concept was to demand that the colonial government should
recognize the position and the contribution of the Straits Chinese and the immigrant
communities alike in the development of the Malayan economy, and so honour them
with a greater political stake in the Malayan government. Indeed, this was the vision of
Tan Cheng Lock as exemplified in most of his speeches and writings made since the
1920s, that is to create a pan-Malayan Chinese community who were proud of their
Chinese origin but owing their sole commitment and allegiance to Malaya, thus playing
an equal role to the Malays in the governing of a democratic Malaya (Tan Cheng
Lock, 1947).
Although the Japanese invasion of Malaya had in effect marginalized the
Chinese community, Tan Cheng Lock who spent the war in exile in South India had to
some extent maintained his relationship with the British authorities. Christie (1996:39)
argues that it was from this vantage point that Tan Cheng Lock established his own
'Overseas-Chinese Association' and lobbied hard for his ideal of a united Malaya with
equal rights for all races. The key objective of this association was 'to [put] pressure on
the British government to ensure that the voice of the Chinese community was heard in
the planning for the future of Malaya after the war' (Christie, 1998a:189). In 1945 Tan
Cheng Lock submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in
London expressing the aspirations of the Chinese community in the future governing of
post-war Malaya. Here are the key points raised by Cheng Lock in the memorandum:
We [are] strongly of the opinion that the only safe, sound and wise policy for the future
Government of Malaya should be to rally to its support those true Malayans, who passionately
love the country as their homeland and those who intend to settle there, and who are united by
the legitimate aspiration to achieve by proper and constitutional means the ideal and basic
objective of Self-Government for a united Malaya within the British Commonwealth and
Empire, in which the individuals of all communities are accorded equal rights and
responsibilities, politically and economically, including a balanced representation of the various
communities in the Government to ensure that no one community will be in a position to
dominate or outvote all the others put together.... [citing the population estimation in 1949
which indicated that the Chinese community was the most numerous section of the population in
Malaya (approximately 43 per cent in contrast to the Malays who formed 41 per cent), Tan
Cheng Lock argued:]... If the government should enforce a policy of aiming at the removal of
sectional barriers and the treatment of the different communities on the footing of equal rights
and opportunities and duties and responsibilities and on the principle that no single community
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should be placed in a position to dominate the others, all obstacles in the way of its
constitutional progress and development towards self-government should vanish, as has been
amply demonstrated in the case of other territories with mixed communities and races.
(Tan Cheng Lock, 1947:61-73)
It is clear that the gist of Tan Cheng Lock's proposal was to press the British
colonial administration to 'end the separate status of the Malay states with their
respective sultans, and therefore the end of the concept of tanah melayu, or the land of
the Malays' (Christie, 1998:189). This, would allow the immigrant communities to
claim parity to the Malays as far as aspects of citizenship and political rights were
concerned. It was not entirely clear as to what extent Tan Cheng Lock's call for the
implementation of an egalitarian concept of citizenship and nationality in Malaya for all
the people who regard Malaya as their home significantly influenced the British in their
post-war political planning for Malaya. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that if the Malayan
Union scheme that was introduced in 1946 is considered in this context, it is clear that
the Union plan embodied most of the aspirations contained in Tan Cheng Lock's
memorandum. It was the Malayan Union project that had further intensified the debate
on identity formation and nation-building in Malaya between the Malays and the non-
Malays political elite. The Malayan Union also resulted in the intensification of Malay
nationalism leading to Malayan independence.
It has been argued in the previous chapter that the Malayan Union plan sought to
achieve two concurrent objectives, namely, the unification of Malaya administrative
system excluding Singapore, and resolving the citizenship question by granting common
citizenship to all the people of Malaya. By 'Malayan Union', the obvious implication
would be a lowering of the status of the respective Malay negeri and their sultans and
the gradual `detribalization' of the Malay community. The Malay rulers would lose
their sovereignty over their territory. Of more concern to the Malays was the term
'Malayan' which was to be used to denote all the citizens of Malaya, both the Malays
and the immigrants. The Malays were opposed to being called 'Malayan' as the term
had come to mean people who had some association with Malaya but did not include
Malays as it was then understood (Lau, 1991:193). In fact, this was the term used by
Tan Cheng Lock when he demanded that the British grant equal citizenship rights to the
non-Malays. Apart from that, the Malayan Union policy on citizenship stated that
British subjects would not lose their nationality upon being granted Malayan Union
citizenship (Albert Lau, 1991:69). With that, the immigrant communities would be
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entitled to dual nationality. This for the Malays raised the question of loyalty of the
non-Malays towards Malaya. Above all, they did not want the Malays to become like
the Arabs of Palestine or the Red Indians of America, swamped and overwhelmed by
the immigrant population since the very loose citizenship policy of the Malayan Union
would have qualified 83 per cent of the Chinese and 75 per cent Indian immigrants to
become citizens of the Malayan Union.
In short, the two core issues that sparked anger among the Malays were the
questions of 'citizenship' and 'union', which were clearly a major departure from the
traditional British policy which had always maintained that Malaya was primarily a
Malay country. The Malayan Union episode raised several crucial issues which
dominated or strongly influenced the pattern of ethnic politics and the debate on identity
formation in Malaya. Issues such as Malay rights and privileges, citizenship, the ethnic
structure of political power, the identity of the country, the position of the Rulers, and
the place of the non-Malays in Malaya were all central questions leading to Malaya
independence and thereafter (Noordin Sopiee, 1976).
When the Malayan Union plan was revoked by the British as a result of fierce
Malay opposition, to be replaced with the Federation of Malaya constitution in 1948, the
debate on identity formation in Malaya took a different form. As argued in the previous
chapter, despite the replacement of the 'Union' plan with the 'Federation' scheme which
reconstituted the Malay rulers' sovereignty over their respective state; and of more
importance the application of a more stringent citizenship policy for the immigrant
communities, the British still achieved their two-prong objectives contained in the failed
Malayan Union project, namely, to unify Malaya's administrative system (though under
a different name), and creating a common citizenship policy for the people of Malaya
(though under a more rigid procedure). With these points in place, the British could
now embark upon post-war rehabilitation programmes to 'redevelop' Malaya's
economy. Nevertheless, they realized that given the persistent tension in ethnic relations
in the country which had deteriorated since the Japanese occupation and its aftermath, as
well as the massive threat posed by the communists, some form of inter-ethnic co-
operation had to be forged in order to create calm and stability in the country which was
crucial for the redevelopment of the socio-economic programmes. Christie (1998:192)
notes that 'the dynamo that started the process of inter-ethnic elite bargaining was the
Communities Liaison Committee [CLC]', which was set up in 1949. This multi-ethnic
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committee which consisted of six Malays, six Chinese, one European, and two South
Asians was chaired by Malcolm Macdonald who was the British Commissioner-General
for Southeast Asia.
In the course of the CLC deliberation the question of forging intei-ethnic co-
operation was always high on the agenda. Christie (1998:192) states that 'At the heart
of the discussion was the question of identity, and the general acceptance of the idea of
forging a Malayan identity and a 'Malayan-mindedness'- a project that required
concessions on the part of all ethnic groups'. He further asserts:
this involved a willingness to redefine federal citizenship in such as way as to open that
citizenship to a larger number of non-Malays who were clearly ` Malayan-minded'. This
widening of federal citizenship could then open the door for the creation of a broadly defined
'national' citizenship of an independent Malaya.
(Christie, 1998:192-3)
It was reported in the Macdonald report (CO 717/183) to the Secretary of the State for
the Colonies that the CLC agreed unanimously that the 'Malays have a special position
in the Federation on account of the fact that for centuries Malaya has been their sole
home, and that the country includes nine Malay States with Rulers in Treaty relationship
with the King, the Rulers and States also being internationally recognised.' The report
further notes that it was also
unanimously agreed that the aim in the Federation of Malaya is the establishment of self-
government with sovereignty status, and that a nationality should be created for all qualified
citizens irrespective of race. ...The Committee agreed that this special position of the Malays
should be safeguarded, the purpose being to ensure that they are not politically dominated in
their country, and that as time goes on they also take an increasingly important part in the
economic life of the country. The agreement of the Chinese and other non-Malay leaders to this
principle is valuable.[Subject to this], which is not regarded as coming into conflict with the
principle now enunciated, it was agreed that all Federal citizens (to become nationals in due
course) should enjoy equality of status, privileges and opportunities in the Federation,
irrespective of race. The agreement of the Malay leaders on the Committee to this is important,
and created a very good impression on their non-Malay colleagues.
What could be derived from the agreement reached by the multi-ethnic elite during the
CLC deliberations was that the Malays were well prepared to accept the non-Malays as
equal citizens to themselves provided the non-Malays in return agreed to recognise their
position as the 'rightful' owners of the Tanah Melayu, and hence should be accorded
special treatment as to protect and improve their socio-economic well-being. Apart
from that, in the course of the discussion on citizenship, attention was also given to the
fact that
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...if a real nation composed of peoples of several races is to develop in Malaya, its citizens
should speak a common language....This question of education is of course fundamental to the
problem of creating an inter-racial nation in Malaya.
(CO 717/183 cited in Christie, 1998:198)
With that unanimously agreed upon, the committee proposed that the teaching of
Malay should be compulsory in all Government and State-aided primary schools.
Moreover, it was suggested that all facilities should be provided for the progressive
elimination of communal schools, and the establishment of central schools to be
attended by children of all races in which the medium of instruction would be either
Malay or English. It was clear that the CLC forum had not only scrutinised aspects of
citizenship, but went on to discuss the dimension of cultural integrity towards the
development of 'Malayan nationality'. In the final memorandum issued for publication
a number of substantial recommendations were made towards this goal, such as that
schools should begin the day with a salute to the Federation flag and the singing of the
national anthem; the hanging of the Royal portraits of the King [of Britain] and the
Malay Ruler in schools to familiarize children with national symbols; the celebration of
the Federation Day; and so forth. In the final analysis, the memorandum notes that
'What we want to do is to bring into the fold of Federal Citizenship people of the type
that will build up into a Malayan nation and the more there are of such the better' (CO
717/183).
Although the CLC resolutions was not binding in the sense that the agreement
reached was never meant to be implemented by the colonial administration, nor did it
constrain the political elite and the parties they represented, Means (1976) notes that it
was the experience in the CLC that probably softened the hard-line attitude of its leading
members, especially Dato' Onn and Tan Cheng Lock, towards multi-ethnic political co-
operation in the subsequent development of Malayan politics. Dato' Onn's failed
attempt in 1951 to open UMNO membership to the non-Malays, hence making it as
'United Malayan National Organization' perhaps can be seen from this perspective.
From the time the Federation of Malaya was inaugurated in 1948, very rapid and
generally unexpected developments took place in Malaya. Beginning with the
municipal council elections, the first Federal Legislative Assembly election was held in
1955 which sealed the Malay-non-Malay political co-operation through the Alliance
framework. With these development, independence — which was perceived by Dato'
Onn during the CLC deliberation in 1949 as only possible in 15 to 20 years' time —
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become inevitable. In 1956 the Independence Constitutional Commission was set up
headed by Lord Reid consisting of well-known jurists from Britain, Australia, India and
Pakistan. The general findings of the Reid Commission had some implications for the
construction of national identity in Malaya.
Although the Reid Commission received 131 memoranda from various parties
and organizations, it was the memorandum from the Alliance party that had made
substantial impact in the formulation of the final draft of the proposed independence
constitution. The Commission gave special weight to the Alliance memorandum simply
because it represented the overwhelming elected majority in both the Federal and state
councils, and because the Alliance comprised the three major ethnic organizations in
Malaya. Of all the major findings of the Reid Commission the question of citizenship
was once again highest on the agenda. The Commission divided the formula for the
granting of citizenship in independent Malaya into four categories:
(i) those who already possessed rights of citizenship;
(ii) those born in the Federation on or after Merdeka Day;
(iii) those born in the Federation before Merdeka Day and resident there on Merdeka
Day;
(iv) those resident in the Federation on Merdeka Day but not born there.
(Report, 1957:14)
These categorizations implied that the Commission was unwilling to recommend the
principle ofjus soli with retrospective effect, as demanded by some sections of the non-
Malays. Nevertheless, what was clear from this was that the Reid Commission findings
on citizenship were not
'based on the notion that Malaya was a Malay country and that it belonged only to the Malays.
They were clearly geared to the aim of creating a multi-racial nation in Malaya and were a
continuation or logical extension of the process inaugurated in 1948 that was based on the
policy stated in the preamble to the Federation of 1948 'that there should be a common form of
citizenship in the said Federation to be extended to all those who regard the said Federation or
any part of it as their real home and the object of their loyalty'.
(Vasil, 1980:37-8)
Whilst Vasil's assertion above with regard to the creation of a multi-ethnic
nation in Malaya may well be true, it has to be stated that other general findings of the
Reid Commission clearly demonstrated recognition for the Malays to be politically
dominant in this multi-ethnic nation. By making Malay 'the sole official language' and
by recommending that the Malay special position should be assured and 'that the present
position will continue for a substantial period...', the Commission demonstrated full
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awareness about the significant position of the Malays in contrast to the non-Malays.
Although in the initial report the Reid Commission refused to designate Islam as the
official religion for the country, this was rejected by the Alliance's counter
memorandum to the Commission. In the final draft this principle of the official religion
for the Federation was accepted with the additional points that other religions might also
be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. The debate on identity
formation and nation-building did not come to an end, despite the inauguration of the
independent multi-ethnic Federation of Malaya in 1957. All these, however, were only
the beginning of the drift. In the post-independence years all the key issues in Malay-
non-Malay relationships and the construction of Malaysian national identity were put to
serious test through electoral politics. In the aftermath of the May 1969 incident, the
questions of identity and nation-building were once again resumed.
4.3.2 The Post-1969 Debate
Two months after the May 1969 incident, the government announced that the
country would soon have a 'national ideology', or the Rukunegara as a new 'political
religion', to improve and tackle ethnic disaffection within the society. Means (1976:
401) argued that what the government wanted was to make all Malaysians 'to be bound
by the principles of Rukunegara, and it intended to make Rukunegara a cornerstone of
its basic strategy for government policy on communal issues'. To Wan Hashim
(1983:90) the Rukunegara could be seen as 'a new pragmatism aimed at integration and
national unity as to strengthen the status quo and the legitimate authority.' The
Rukunegara reads as follows:
Our Nation, Malaysia, being dedicated—
to achieving a greater unity of all her people;
to maintaining a democratic way of life;
to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared;
to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural tradition;
to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and
technology;
WE, her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these principles—
Belief in God (Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan)
Loyalty to King and Country (Kesetiaan kepada Raja dan Negara)
Upholding the Constitution (Keluhuran Perlembagaan)
Rule of Law (Kedaulatan Undang-undang)
Good Behaviour and Morality (Kesopanan dan Kesusilaan)
The Rukunegara was the product of the National Operation Council (NOC) and the
National Consultative Council (NCC) that was set up in the aftermath of the civil
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disturbances of 13 May 1969. According to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie who was the
'architect' of Rukunegara, the Rukunegara would 'serve as the nexus uniting the people
of Malaysia' (cited in Means, 1976:400). Therefore, it could be regarded as the 'Pillars
of the Nation'. The Rukunegara defines not only the relation between citizen and
citizen, but also the relation between the citizen and the state — what the state expects of
the citizen and equally important, what the citizen has the rights to expect the state. It
can be seen as an attempt to promote a sense of shared beliefs, values and principles of
mutual understanding, where a process of national unity and nation-building can be built
upon.
In other words, the Rukunegara represented the national consensus for the
formulation of a framework of beliefs and national unity. This consensus was attained
via NCC deliberations, whose membership comprised representatives of various ethnic
communities. It is also clear that many of the principles of the Rukunegara are basically
derived from the constitution. 'This represents a spelling out of the principle on which
the constitution is based but which had not been explicitly stated when it was drawn up'
(Wan Hashim, 1983:92). In short, the creation of a national ideology as represented in
the promulgation of the Rukunegara laid a crucial basis for the construction of national
identity and nation formation in Malaysia. Indeed, the nexus between the Rukunegara
and Vision 2020 introduced two decades later is not merely a tenuous one, despite the
time lapse between the two.
As stated earlier, following the May 1969 racial riots and the declaration of a
state of emergency, the National Operation Council (NOC) which was established as a
'virtual government', to restore law and order published its report on 9 October 1969. In
explaining the causes of the May 13 incident the report asserted that the Malaysian
constitution contained several entrenched provisions which
represent binding arrangements between the various races in this country and are the
underpinning on which the constitutional structure, such as fundamental liberties, the machinery
of government and a score of other detailed provisions are built. If these entrenched provisions
are in any way eroded or weakened, the entire constitutional structure is endangered and with it,
the existence of the nation itself. It was the failure to understand and the irresponsible and
cavalier treatment of these entrenched provisions that constituted one of the primary causes of
the disturbances on May 13, 1969.
(NOC Report,1969: 85)
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The NOC report further notes that,
It will be necessary for the government to enact laws which will inter alia make it an offence
for any person to utter, print or publish words or statements or do any act which questions any
matter, right status, position, privilege, sovereignty, or prerogative established or protected in
entrenched provisions of the Federal Constitution, or which has the tendency to promote
feelings of ill will and hostility between the various races.
(NOC Report, 1969:86)
Perhaps the meaning of this report can be further elucidated by the speech made by Tun
Razak in the Parliament of February 1971, when presenting the Bill to amend the
Constitution to strengthen the position of these so-called 'entrenched provisions'.
A new generation has grown to adulthood since independence, which is unmindful of the
delicate and careful compromises agreed upon by the various races befme we attained
independence in 1957. ...There are also unscrupulous individuals who seek to ride to power by
inciting and exploiting racial emotions, fears and mistrust.
(Asian Almanac, 1971: 4519, cited in Vasil, 1980:191)
It was clear that what the NOC report and the speech by Tun Razak were
implying is that the 'sacred' social contract sealed by the multi-ethnic political elite
from UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC, which preceded the formulation of the 1957
Merdeka constitution, was paramount to inter-ethnic political co-operation. The serious
challenge posed by political parties, especially that of the opposition in the course of the
1969 election campaign had, however, severely damaged the basis of the political fabric
of the society. The NOC report made several explicit prescriptions as to how the matter
should be addressed. It stated that the people, especially the non-Malays, must first
understand the importance of these 'entrenched provisions' of the constitution. Second,
the government must enact laws to prevent ethnic provocation with regard to these
'entrenched provisions'. Moreover, Article 152 of the constitution relating to the
position of Malay as the national language has to be added to the 'entrenched
provisions'. It was also recommended that the position of the Malay Rulers governed
by Article 159, had to be strengthened by making it mandatory for the Parliament to
obtain the consent of the Conference of Rulers, before it could be amended or repealed.
When Parliament was reconvened in 1971 and the NOC disbanded, all those
aspects discussed above were immediately brought to Parliament as bills to be debated
and later passed as several new laws governing ethnic politics in Malaysia. Clearly,
after conditioning the people's mind with the new 'political religion' of the Rukunegara,
which stressed goodwill, inter-ethnic co-operation, national integration, loyalty to King
1
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and country, and upholding the Constitution and the laws, bold steps were taken to
protect the 'entrenched provisions'. This, as argued in the previous chapter, paved the
way for the emergence of a new era of political authoritarianism in Malaysian politics.
With regard to the question of national unity, it was clear that the government response
following the 1969 incidents was geared not only to cope with the immediate problems
of ethnic polarization but also, to contain the unprecedented threat to Malay political
hegemony. The government message was clear: if national unity was to be achieved,
the entire basis of the politics, namely, the special position of the Malays and their
Rulers, the national language, and the status of the non-Malays as stipulated in the
constitution, had to be observed and respected. It also implied that a Malay-centric
approach would and should lay the basis for identity formation and nation-building in
Malaysia.
Apart from the reports and the recommendation from the NOC and the NCC,
several Malay intellectuals and the political elite had also expressed their views on the
question of Malay rights, culture and issues of national identity. One of the most
outstanding views came from Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in his book - The Malay
Dilemma. The book which was published in 1970 was banned by the Malaysian
government for its uncompromising views on Malay rights and Sino-Malay relations.
Prior to the publication of his book, Dr. Mahathir, who lost his seat in the 1969 election,
began a campaign of attacking the Tunku Abdul Rahman led Alliance government for
his 'accommodative attitudes and policies towards the non-Malays' (Means, 1976:398).
He was later expelled from UMNO and was regarded by the party leadership as an
'ultra' Malay nationalist who, 'believes in the wild and fantastic theory of absolute
dominion by one race over other communities, regardless of the Constitution' (Tun Dr.
Ismail, 1969, cited in Means, 1976:399). The Malay Dilemma was a product of Dr.
Mahathir while he was in his political exile and illustrated Mahathir's vision for the
Malays and the country. Whether all of his views expressed in the book remain
relevant, or otherwise, after he become Prime Minister in 1981 and to what extent these
are reflected in various government policies and actions over the past eighteen years, is
an interesting aspect of socio-political research. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of
this study to go deeper into that as it is more concerned about extracting some of the key
aspects of Mahathir's views on ethnicity, nationalism and nation-building in Malaysia.
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In The 'Malay Dilemma Mahathir explicitly stated that Malays are the rightful
owners of Malaya, that immigrant are guests until properly absorbed. In his words,
To be truly indigenous one must belong to no other race but that truly identified with a given
country. If one's racial origin is identifiable and accepted to any other country, one is no longer
indigenous and cannot claim the country one has settled in as one's own. This is not to say that
if all other qualifications of citizenship are fulfilled this claim cannot be valid. But mere claim
of loyalty or belonging does not in itself justify citizenship....I contend that the Malays are the
original or indigenous people of Malaya and the only people who can claim Malaya as their one
and only country. In accordance with practice all over the world, this confers on the Malays
certain inalienable rights over the forms and obligations of citizenship which can be imposed on
citizens of non-indigenous origin.
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1970:133)
The Malay Dilemma refuted the claim that since the Chinese and the Indians are the
people who developed Malaya and made it prosperous, they henceforth should be
conferred the right of ownership, without regard to other considerations. To Mahathir,
'If mere development entitles any race of settlers to the country in which they settled,
then surely the British would have first claim in Malaya, Kenya and other colonial
territories' (p.131). Mahathir also makes the point that immigrants are not truly
absorbed until they have abandoned the language and culture of their past. Mahathir
uses the term 'definitive people' to describe the position of the Malays.
The Orang Melayu or Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula.
The aborigines were never accorded any such recognition nor did they claim such recognition.
(p.127) ...no one seriously suggests that the white Australians have less right to govern
Australia than the aborigines. The Australians are accepted by international consent as the
people of Australia. International consent and recognition is very important in the
establishment of a national identity. (p.122)
The Malay Dilemma clearly presented the Malay case for their claim as the
indigenous people of Malaysia. Therefore, it implies that national identity and national
culture have to be built based on these Malay characteristics. Mahathir strongly
defended all the attributes of Malayness and insisted that these are not a matter for
compromise. As he puts it,
The burden of my argument is that the Malays are the rightful owners of Malaya, and that if
citizenship is conferred on races other than Malays, it is because the Malays consent to this.
That consent is conditional. (p.126)
The condition set up by Mahathir was explicitly set out: that all the attributes of
Malayness, namely the Bahasa Melayu, the Malay special position, Islam and the
position of the Malay Rulers, must be fully accepted as key attributes in constructing
Malaysian national identity and culture. The Malay Dilemma also 'laid bare the Malay
sense of humiliation at their economic backwardness which contrasted with the
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'complete Sinocization of the economy of the country' (p.51, cited in Khoo Boo Teik,
1995:28). In short, Mahathir argued that, 'the Malay dilemma is also a Malaysia
dilemma. The Malaysian nation cannot expect to thrive and prosper with this cancer
eating away its' heart' (p.103). For Mahathir, Malay political dominance wa's the basis
for the survival of Malaysian nation and this implies that Malay nationalism therefore
the basis of Malaysian nationalism.
The discussion thus far has centred on the conflict between the Malay and non-
Malay notion of the basis of national identity. However, it should not be construed that
the Malays are united on the notion of Malay nationalism and the dominant thesis. It
has to be stated that whilst UMNO, by virtue of its status as the leading partner in the
Alliance coalition has been able to portray itself as the 'vanguard' of Malay interests,
PAS, prior to the 1980's era though thriving on Islamic ideology, did not differ much
from UMNO as far as the ideological dimension is concerned. However, after the party
was 'captured' and dominated by the 'Young Turk', or the Ulamak leadership in 1982,
the party immediately set out its ideological differences with UMNO. The rise of
Ulamak leadership in PAS coincided with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in
1979 and scholars tended to regard this as a phenomena of global Islamic resurgence.
Since this aspect will be covered at length in chapter 6, the discussion here will only
present a brief outline on the relationship between Islam and nationalism and it
implications for the definition of an Islamic state in Malaysia, as staunchly propagated
by PAS.
To set apart PAS's Islamic ideological differences from UMNO's nationalist
leanings, the former attacked the notion Malay nationalism, 'in order to instigate a
sentiment of antagonism and resentment towards UMNO' (Ahmad Fawzi Basri,
1992:155-6). Fawzi Basri (1992:156) notes that PAS 'even likened the Malay
nationalist movement to the Kemalist movement in Turkey, which was said to be
influenced by Jewish free masonry'. PAS's media instrument, the Harakah, even
published several articles to denote Malay nationalism as `assabiyyah', or a sectarian
and narrow-minded nationalism of the Arabs, which they argued, was condemned by the
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself (Mulchtar Che Ali, 1986). PAS advocated the
formation of an Islamic state as an alternative to UMNO's secular nationalist ideology.
Above all, the party 'tried to convince the Malay masses that they were working for
Islam, and to go against them meant to go against Islam itself' (Fawzi Basri, 1992:158).
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It was noted that the phenomenon of one Muslim branding another as lafir' (infidel) as
a result of PAS "fatwa' reached its peak during Ramadhan in July-August 1982 (Fawzi
Basri, 1992:157).
It can be argued therefore, that if an Islamic state is ever established by PAS in
Malaysia, the Malay dominant thesis would have a stronger Islamic fervour, despite
PAS renunciation of Malay nationalism. As an Islamic party dominated by the Malays,
it is difficult for PAS to distinguish itself from a Malay image, as the non-Malays tend
to regard the party as an 'extremist' and 'radical' Malay political movement. If UMNO
and Malay nationalism are branded as lafir' and therefore, should be politically
'eliminated', the non-Malays (the majority of whom are not Muslim) perhaps might
wonder how the PAS Islamic state would treat them had they come to power.
PAS argued that the notion of an Islamic-state offers a better prospect for the
implementation of justice for the non-Malays than what the notion of Malay nationalism
can offer. 3 An Islamic state does not distinguish between a Chinese and a Malay.
According to PAS, 'even a Chinese can be a Malaysian Prime Minister provided he is a
Muslim'.4 PAS recognize the concept of multi-culturalism and every ethnic group is
entitled to its religion and culture. In other words, PAS is saying that an Islamic state
will not dominate the non-Malays and they will not be discriminated- something which
the non-Malays may not be able to enjoy within the political realm of Malay
nationalism. An Islamic state perhaps may only distinguish between the Muslims and
the non-Muslims. UMNO while not rejecting PAS's idea of establishing an Islamic
state, however, argued that PAS will not be able to establish its vision until and unless
the non-Malays can accept the concept. UMNO realize that to openly attack the notion
of an Islamic state championed by PAS is politically unwise as it would affect the
support of the Malays to the party. Instead, UMNO always argued that it has a more
substantive programme for implementing Islam in the country without affecting the
interests of the non-Muslims. UMNO also constantly stated that the notion of Malay
nationalism is compatible with Islam as it is not meant to oppress the non-Muslim but
rather to improve the socio-economic well-being of the Malays.
Nevertheless, for the non-Malays, since Islam is an all-embracing religion,
accepting Islam would mean allowing a total transformation of the secular nature of the
3 Interview with PAS President, Haji Fadhil Noor.
4
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state. Moreover, the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia would mean that they
would not have a significant role to play in the governing of the country until they
become Muslim. Despite the notion of Islamic justice propagated by PAS, the non-
Malays are very sceptical of PAS fundamentalism and radicalism given the UMNO-
PAS conflicts that have badly divided the Malays in rural areas (these aspects are
examine in later chapters). These are among the key factors that made it difficult for the
non-Malays to accept PAS. And these also constantly make the debate on identity
formation and nation-building very much alive both within and across ethnic groups in
the country.
4.4 Conclusion
There are two main issues covered in this chapter. First, it illustrated the process
and the development of nation-state based on the European experience. It was argued
that the process of modernization and industrialization were crucial in the emergence of
nationalism and nation-state, as depicted in the history of the French revolution and the
industrial revolution in England. Nevertheless, it was argued that whilst much can be
learned from the development of nationalism in the European history, the European
model of nationalism has to be carefully scrutinised before it can be applied to examine
a similar phenomenon in developing countries, many of which are still grappling with
the huge challenge of nation formation.
It has also been demonstrated that the role of the intelligentsia, or national
awakeners, was instrumental in the rise of the idea of nation-state and national identity.
With regard to this, the second part of the chapter has outlined the development of the
debate on identity formation in Malaysia by examining the ideas and vision of various
political elites and intelligentsia from both the Malay and non-Malay ethnic
communities. It was clear that although the development of the debate on the issue of
nation-building and identity formation can be traced since the 1920's and still very
much alive in the contemporary Malaysian politics, the main contention has always been
the conflict between the Malay-centric notion of national identity vis-à-vis the non-
Malay notion of multi-culturalism. In the 1980's this problem has been complicated, as
a result of global Islamic resurgence and the rise of Ulamak leadership in PAS, which
rejected the notion of nationalism and instead envisaged the establishment of an Islamic
state in Malaysia. All these issues will be further analysed in the subsequent chapters.
PART II
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
COMPETING 'NATIONALISMS'
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CHAPTER 5
FROM STATE BUILDING TO NATION-BUILDING: A CRITIQUE OF
NATIONAL POLICIES
5.1 Introduction
It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter that as a result of the May
1969 tragedy, the government embarked upon several radical reforms to address the
problem of ethnic imbalance and disunity in the country with the ultimate aim of
achieving national integration. These reforms can be seen in terms of the formulation of
the New Economic Policy (NEP), the National Cultural Policy, and the reformulation of
the National Language and Education Policy. Although these three major policies were
aimed at complementing efforts towards national integration, they can also be seen as an
attempt to consolidate Malayness and Malay nationalism into the project of nation
formation. Indeed, the introduction of all these policies can be seen as a hallmark of the
revitalisation of Malay nationalism, to complete its unfinished agenda in the socio-
economic and cultural spheres.
Nevertheless, the non-Malays saw that this was a conscious attempt on the part
of the Malay nationalists to turn nation-building into an ethnic project at the expense of
their interests. Above all, they considered that such moves would severely affect the
framework of multi-culturalism in Malaysia. Though, these three major policies were
devised to grasp the ultimate objective of inducing the process of nation-building, what
emerged in the implementation of the policies were new obstacles and controversies.
This chapter will examine the extent to which these so-called reforms have made an
impact on the project of nation-formation in the country. This will show some
important insights about the understanding of the perceptions, responses and reactions of
the various ethnic groups in Malaysia to the idea of creating a united Malaysian nation
or the Bangsa Malaysia. To begin with, the discussion will examine the politics of
language and education as this has a very long history in influencing the pattern of
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ethnic politics in Malaysia. Next is the discussion of the NEP and this is followed by
the investigation on the National Cultural Policy.
5.2 The National Education Policy
Education has long been recognised by sociologists as the most effective agent to
transmit to new generations all the values, norms and experiences of civilisation
developed by previous generations. Indeed, society can only survive if there exists
among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; and education perpetuates and
reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child from the beginning the essential
similarities which collective life demands (Emile Dukheim, 1961; Talcott Parsons,
1959). Apart from being a formal agent to equip people with modern skills and
knowledge, education in modern complex society is, at the same time 'a major element
of the apparatus of a modern state' and 'all national education systems indoctrinate the
oncoming generation with the basic outlook and values of the political order' (Key,
1965: 315-6). Thus, it is almost impossible to divorce education from politics.
It is evidently clear that theoretically, education provides one of the most
effective means for social and political integration in modern society. In the United
States, a society that had to assimilate wave after wave of immigration and to create new
loyalties to the new homeland, education was viewed as the 'instrument par excellence
of inducing newcomers to the American way of life' (Cremin, 1962:68). This process
of Americanization is vital, since the new immigrants came from various parts in the
world and were different from their predecessors. It was schools and the education
system in general, that carried out this crucial task to develop the American norms and
values, that led to the creation of 'American culture'.
In developing countries, education once again stands as the principal institution
for overcoming problems of 'ethno-cultural pluralism'. In many cases the national
language policy is often consolidated into the education system as an instrument for
integration and nation-building. Von der Mehden (1969) perceives that the most
important factor for integration in the developing nations is the national language and
education system. In many countries, the mission of national integration through the
means of education is explicitly spelled out in government reports, such as in India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico and also in Malaysia (Ibrahim
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Saad, 1979:51). Obviously, the importance of education and language is immensely
crucial for the success of nation-building in divided societies.
In retrospect, the politics of language and education in Malaysia has its long
history in shaping the pattern of ethnic political mobilisation. The political salience of
language and education had emerged prior to independence. The basis of the national
education system in Malaysia was laid by the Razak Report issued in 1956. This report
spelled out a clear defined mission for social integration of the people in Malaya.
Before the introduction of the Razak Report, education in Malaya was the responsibility
of the various ethnic communities themselves. According to Lim Mah Hui (1980:150)
education was never a matter of priority for the British, who concentrated on developing
Malaya's economy. The British adopted a laissez-faire approach in education for
Malaya that led to the establishment of five types of schools: Malay vernacular schools,
Chinese vernacular schools, Indian vernacular schools, English schools and Malay
religious schools. This situation led to the phenomenon of the association of ethnicity
with schools and ultimately perpetuated and reinforced cultural pluralism in Malaysia
even after independence.
Prior to the 1969 tragedy, the politics of language and education was centred on
several key issues. While the government maintained that a single national language
policy as stipulated in the Federal constitution and the Razak report of 1956 was
important to forge national unity, the non-Malays demanded that multilingualism should
be the basis of the national language policy. In other words, while recognizing Malay as
the national language, the non-Malays wanted Mandarin, Tamil and English to be given
equal status to Malay. Apart from that, the non-Malays also saw that the provision of
article 21(2) in the 1961 Education Act was a serious threat to the continued existence
of Chinese and Tamil schools in Malaysia. Until the introduction of the 1996 Education
Act, which revoked the clause, the existence of Section 21(2) of the 1961 Act, made
Chinese primary schools liable to extinction by the mere stroke of the Minister of
Education's pen. The clause enabled the Education Minister to change the status of
government sponsored Chinese and Indian primary schools to national language primary
school when he deemed fit. Nevertheless, despite such a provision, no Education
Minister had ever used his power to convert Chinese and Indian primary schools to
national language school. Chinese and Tamil primary schools continued to exist and in
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the case of Chinese schools, the number of student enrollment in these schools has
increased over the years.
For the Malays, they saw that the government has been rather lenient in
implementing the national language policy in education.' Although the 1961 Education
Act stated that by 1967 all government primary schools or government aided primary
schools (including government English primary schools, and Chinese and Tamil primary
schools that were funded by the goverment), must use the national language as
medium of instruction, this has not been implemented. The Malays also felt that the
implementation of the national education policy has not adequately addressed their
socio-economic backwardness. Education in Malay was only available up to secondary
level. Even if a Malay student from a Malay medium school had the opportunity to
pursue higher education, he or she may only be accepted at the Department of Malay
Studies in the University of Malaya (the only university that existed then), as this was
the only department that conducted its teaching in Malay. Apart from that the Malays
saw that the non-Malays continued struggle for multilingualism was a direct challenge
to the 1957 social contract. The period between 1957-1969 saw the politics of language
and education polarising Malaysian society (Kua Kia Soong, 1990; Ibrahim Saad, 1976).
Even in the post 1970 period, the complexities that prevailed in the politics of language
and education reflected the competing ideologies of nation-of-intent in Malaysia and
had indeed affected the state of ethnic relations in the country.
As a reaction to the 1969 racial riots the Cabinet Committee on Education made
a number of important recommendations. These included: removing unequal
participation in education; improving opportunities for higher educational attainment
among youths from disadvantage groups; developing stronger moral and ethical
qualities of citizenship for school children; greater emphasis on vocational orientation in
education; and streamlining the professional and administrative management of the
education system (Education in Malaysia, 1980:5). The 1969 report on education also
marked a major change in educational emphasis. The Malay language, later to be called
the Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian language), replaced English in all English schools and
for the teaching of most subjects. Nevertheless, the position of Chinese and Tamil
primary schools, as well as Chinese private secondary schools remain undisturbed.
I Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
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Furthermore, the Malays and Bumiputera pupils were given much easier access
to the competitive higher levels of education, such as university entrance (more
popularly known as the quota system). This was done in accordance with Article 153 of
the Federal Constitution and in line with the objective of social engineerihg, as laid
down in the NEP. Several more universities have been established to cater for the need
for higher education, especially among the Malays. From only one university, which
existed before 1970, five more universities were established by 1985. A number of
polytechnics were also established to provide education at diploma and certificate level,
in technical and apprentice fields, for Bumiputera students. The most significant move
was the establishment of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM-the National
University of Malaysia) in 1970, which symbolised the fulfillment of the national
language and education policy, as the university fully used Malay as its medium of
instruction. In addition, the Mara Institute of Technology (ITM), a higher institute of
education exclusively for the Bumiputera community run by MARA (a government
agency that was established in 1960's to assist the Bumiputeras in small and medium
scale businesses), was established at around the same time. Since then, a number of new
ITM branches were opened throughout the country. Under the Fifth Malaysia Plan
225.21 million Ringgit was allocated for ITM. The Ministry of Education has also
established 30 residential schools throughout the country to provide a better education
for 6,927 students, who were mostly Bunuputera (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986).
MARA has also established 45 MARA Junior Science Colleges and 14 mini
vocational training institutes (the Institut Kemahiran Mara or IKM), to achieve the same
objective of improving education facilities for Malays and Bumiputera communities.
The government investment in education has increased from RM25.8 million in 1969 to
RM350.8 million in 1980, and the expenditure per student in tertiary education rose
from RM3,700 to RM12,900 annually (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981). Moreover, by
1982, there were 50,000 Malaysian students pursuing education abroad, mostly in the
United Kingdom and North America, or Australia. Most overseas Bumiputera students
were fully funded by the government, or its agencies such as MARA, Petronas and so
on. MARA alone spent 690 million Ringgit under the Fifth Malaysia Plan to provide
scholarships for Bumiputera students (Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990).
The non-Malays were distressed with such developments. However, the
struggle of the Chinese to preserve and promote their culture, language and education,
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has never lost its momentum. Both Chinese political parties and the Hua Tuan (Chinese
Guilds), work closely to pursue Chinese interests in education, language and culture (Sia
Keng Yek, 1997). Due to limited places available in local universities, non-Malay
parents have to send their children abroad for further education. By 1987, 'there were
around 61,000 non-Malay students studying overseas, the majority of whom were self-
sponsored students (Kua Kia Soong, 1987:80). In response to this, Chinese
educationists began their aggressive campaign to establish the `Merdeka University', a
private university which used Mandarin as its medium of instruction. Although the
Merdeka University issue has emerged much earlier, the campaign heightened in the
post 1970 period.
For nearly a decade the country witnessed the aggressive campaign of the Dong
Jiao Zhong (Chinese Education Movement) to establish the Merdeka University
project. 2
 For three general elections, in 1969, 1974 and 1978, the issue dominated
election campaigns. The cause was championed by the DAP with the strong support of
the Hua Tuan. The Merdeka University issue has put the MCA and the Gerakan (one
Chinese political party while the other is a Chinese-based multi-ethnic party) as member
of the BN coalition government in a very difficult situation, with regard to facing
Chinese voters. The issue reached its climax when Michael Beloff, a Queens Council
from England was employed to file a suit against the government in Malaysia's High
Court in 1981. However, the High Court dismissed the suit with costs, on the basis that
the project was against the national education policy, in particular the 1971 Universities
and Colleges Act. 3
 The case was then brought to the Federal Court for appeal against
the High Court ruling but was once again rejected. Dismissing the appeal with costs, the
Lord President, Tun Suffian made the following remarks:
...bearing in mind the history of education in Malaysia, the divisive results of allowing separate
language schools, the experience of 'our neighbour' with a private university, and the
determination of Parliament to regulate schools and universities as an instrument of bringing
about one nation, the court had no choice but to hold that Merdeka University, if established,
would be a public authority within Article 160(2) of the Constitution.'
2 The Merdeka University issue was one of the Chinese guilds and educationists reactions to the 1961 Education Act
and also a direct response to the establishment of the National University of Malaysia in 1970. They wanted to
establish a private university, similar to the Nanyang University in Singapore that used Mandarin as its medium of
instruction. Nanyang University has now merged with the National University of Singapore and Mandarin was no
longer the medium as it was replaced with English. The call for the establishment of the Merdeka University was
made in the 1969 election. (see: Safar Hashim,1989, in Jurnal Negara,Jil. XIII, Bil. 11989)
3 The Act stipulated that a public or private sponsored university in Malaysia was considered to be a public authority.
Since Article 142 (1) of the Federal Constitution stipulated that Malay as the national language is to be used in all
public authority activities, the Merdeka University which intended to make Mandarin its medium of instruction was
thus ruled as being contrary to the provision made under the Constitution. (New Straits Times, 7 July 1982)
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Obviously, the controversies of education and language had strongly influenced
the post-independence political scene. The issues were central to woo Chinese voters in
general elections, and at the same time it was also very sensitive for Malay voters.
While opposition parties such as the DAP and PAS had an advantage of exploiting
language and education issues, in seeking voters support, this always placed the ruling
parties in the BN coalition in a very tough position. The MCA and the Gerakan had to
face the DAP allegations that they were not doing enough for Chinese education.
Indeed, when the MCA attempted to dissociate the party from the Merdeka University
project in 1969, it cost the party very dearly in that election.
To some extent, the growing popularity of the DAP amongst non-Malays' voters
in the post 1970 period, was largely attributed to its 'success' in exploiting the language
and education issues (Sia Keng Yek, 1997). To counter the DAP, the MCA and the
Gerakan in most situations had to explicitly show their sympathy on the issue, but
implicitly support the cause of Chinese education, thus insisting that by virtue of their
position in the government, they could do better to protect Chinese interests. On the
other hand, UMNO, while realizing the importance of Chinese voters' support for the
BN, had to balance that with the sensitivities of Malay voters, in facing PAS criticism
that they were selling-off Malay interests to the MCA and the Gerakan. For more than
three decades education has plagued ethnic political mobilisation in Malaysia. Although
the issue at stake might be different from one election to the other, the main contention
remained the same. 4 That is the non-Malay, in particular the Chinese saw Chinese
schools and language as a crucial mark of Chinese identity, thus has to be protected at
all costs. For the Malays, the general view was that the continued existence of Chinese
and Tamil schools, have not significantly helped in promoting national integration.5
4 Several different issues have engulfed the politics of language and education in Malaysia since independence.
From 1947 to 1970 the main conflict was on the issue of a single national language policy vis-a-vis multilingualism.
In the post 1970-1982 the Merdeka University issue has centred the language and education controversies. In 1987,
the decision to place the non Mandarin-speaking Chinese headmasters in Chinese primary schools by the Ministry of
Education has sparked the row between Chinese educationists and the government. Nevertheless the crux of the
issue has always been the continued survival of Chinese and Indian schools as the non-Malays saw that article 21(2)
of the 1961 Education Act provides a special power for the Minister of Education to change the status of these
schools into national language schools. This issue however, was ultimately resolved with the introduction of the
1996 Education Act which revoked the 1961 Act.
5 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid; Rustam A. Sani; Chamil Wariya. Indeed most Malay respondents
interviewed tend to agree that the continued existence of Chinese and Tamil schools has not significantly contributed
towards national integration.
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The dilemma faced by the government was to balance these two views, while at the
same time avoiding ethnic conflicts and promoting national integration.
Despite the ups and downs throughout the history of its implementation some
believed that the policy has contributed to promoting national integrdtion. 6 In
comparison to the situation in the 1960's most Malaysians today speak and understand
the national language. It has become the most important symbol of national identity in
Malaysia. Wan Yaacob Hassan the Director of the National Unity Department asserts
that:
The national education policy is the most successful policy in the process of nation-building in
Malaysia. Without this policy, the national language vision will not materialise. Education has
been a very crucial instrument to foster integration over the past three decades. Although we have
Chinese and Tamil schools, not all non-Malay parents sent their children to these schools.
Although the language used in vernacular schools is either Mandarin or Tamil, the syllabus is
standard national curriculum that was devised by the government. No one can deny the
contribution and the success of the national language and education policy.'
To Dr. Ranj it Singh a historian from University of Malaya:
it is clear that language has not been a problem now, though in the sixties there was some problem
with it. We already have a common education system where integration is continuously being
pursued through a common national language and curriculum. Everybody accept the role of
Malay as the national language. Malaysian society is becoming much more cohesive as far as
language and education system are concerns.8
When a similar question was posed to Mr. Lim Kit Siang, the DAP leader as to whether
the national language and education policy has significantly contributed towards
promoting national integration he gave the following answer:
If you are talking about promoting a common national language, then it is essential, as this is a
precondition for the creation of one Bangsa Malaysia. But you must also give full recognition of
the multilingual reality that exist in Malaysia. If the people feel that their mother tongue were
being threatened, then it would immediately create rejection. If you look at the early seventies,
when the government began to convert English schools into national schools and later attempted
to do the same to the Chinese schools, it has caused a lot of ethnic tension and backlash. Even
among English educated Chinese who have never been interested in mother tongue felt that it was
a threat to their cultural identity. This is assimilation. People should have the opportunity to
preserve and develop their own ethnic languages.9
Although Kit Siang did not give a straight forward answer, he seemed a lot more
lukewarm in his reply. Dr. Tan Seng Giaw, who is the DAP Vice-Chairman gave these
remark:
To me language is a very important instrument for integration. Yes, the national education policy
has made many significant contributions, especially in the use of Malay as the national language
6 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid and Rustam A. Sani.
7 Interview with Wan Yaacob Hassan Director of the National Unity Department, Ministry of National Unity and
Social Development.
8 Interview with Dr. Ranjit Singh.
9 Interview with Lim Kit Siang.
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and medium of instruction in schools. But as far as vernacular schools are concerned, my view is
that the Chinese and Indian languages that are used there are just a vehicle to convey the
knowledge and education. What is important is that we use the same standard national
curriculum. Vernacular schools are not the source of disunity in Malaysia. Even Malays are
disunited in terms of their support to either UMNO or PAS, yet they went to the same national
schools. Therefore, I would say that by using the same language and going to the same schools
will not guarantee that people will be united. It is politics and human factors that contribute to
ethnic division in Malaysia.1°
Clearly the two DAP leaders were rather cautious in their remarks on the contribution
made by the national language and education policy. Although the second part of Tan
Seng Giaw's comment tends to confuse between national integration and that of party
fragmentation, he however, 'recognised' the importance of national language and
education policy in promoting national integration. On the hand, both DAP leaders
however, insisted that the position of vernacular schools must be protected.
Although at face value the answers given by the two DAP leaders may indicate
'the support' for the national language and education policy, this may not entirely
reflect the 'hostility', that might still prevail below the surface. A point made by Kua
Kia Soong (1987), an ardent Chinese educationist and former DAP Member of
Parliament, may perhaps sum up the non-Malays 'real' reaction to the national language
and education policy:
The attitude of the government towards people's own language and the Independent Chinese
Secondary Schools is also an indication of its illiberal policy towards the non-Malay languages
and education stream. ...Another divisive factor in education is the result of the implementation of
the NEP in student enrollment in the various educational institutions, awarding of scholarship and
the like. ...The existence of almost wholly-Bumiputera public institutions like Mara Junior Science
Colleges and the residential schools are not only seen as unfair and unequal opportunities, but are
evidence of double standards when the government argues that vernacular schools are
segregationist. ...Deserving non-Malays refused places in local Universities through a quota
system based on ethnicity rather than socio-economic status are more likely to harbour deep
frustration and resentment at what they see as racial discrimination.
(Kua Kia Soong, 1987:70-80)
Clearly there are several critical issues that disturbed the non-Malays on the
implementation of the National Education Policy. Whilst the Malays may appear
satisfied with the position of Malay as the national language and its role to forge national
integration, the non-Malays may still have some reservation which regard to vernacular
schools, awarding of government scholarships and the quota system.
Nevertheless, some shift occurred in the post 1990 period especially after the
government introduced the 1996 Education Act, which many Malays perceived as
contrary to the spirit of the Razak Report of 1956. This time around, a controversy was
I ° Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw.
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sparked between the government and Malay intellectuals, with regard to several
provisions in the new Act, which are seen as implicating the position of the national
language and the project of nation-building. The government's rationale for the
amendment of the education act, was to pave the way for Malaysia to emerge as the
centre of excellence, in higher education in Southeast Asia. As such, several reforms in
the education policy were necessary, such as allowing English to be used as medium of
instruction in private universities and colleges, to attract foreign students to study in
Malaysia." Therefore, to make this goal materialise, Parliamentary Acts governing the
education system have to be changed. These include the Federal Constitution, the 1961
Education Act, the National Language Act of 1967 and the University and University
Colleges Act of 1971. Apart from that, the Government saw that while it intends to
reduce the number of students sent overseas for tertiary education due to massive
currency outflow, the major constraint for this plan was the insufficient places that local
universities can provide, to cater for the growing needs in higher education. Therefore,
the government felt that by allowing the establishment of private colleges and
universities, the questions of insufficient places in local universities and the financial
burden of the government to funding tertiary education, can be addressed. This is the
backdrop to the introduction of the 1996 Education Act.
As the details of the Education Bill were revealed in Parliament, many Malay
intellectuals including some UMNO veterans and PAS politicians, raised their concern
over the implication of the amendment on the position of Malay as the national
language and its far reaching effects on the project of nation-building. 12 It is worth
noting that in the past, major amendments in the national education system often
resulted in a political row between the government and Chinese educationists, or
Chinese political parties. However, the 1996 Education Act amendment was
exceptional. The non-Malays neither explicitly supported, nor aggressively opposed the
Act. This is something very peculiar as far as the history of national education policy
was concerned. This question was posed to Dr. Kua Kia Soong, a leading figure of the
Dong Jiao Zhong, in an interview with him but he simply said that the position of
Chinese schools is still at threat under the new education policy. 13 However, one
Chinese academician from the National University of Malaysia, admitted that almost all
II Interview with Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin Minister of Youth and Sports.
12 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid; Rustam A. Sani; Datuk Salleh Majid; and Chamil Wariya.
13 Kua Kia Soong was interviewed on 2 May 1997 at his Dong Jiao Zhong office in Kajang Selangor.
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issues and aspirations concerning Chinese education and language were resolved and
fulfilled with the introduction of the 1996 Education Act. I4
 Therefore, if one is satisfied
with the policy, there is no need to oppose it.
Apparently, it was the Malays who were more concerned about the arhendment.
There were four key issues in the 1996 Education Act that provoked discontent among
many Malay intellectuals. These issues were:
1. Section 16 of the Act which states that with the exception of the expatriate schools,
the new Act finally recognised private education institutions including Chinese
independent secondary schools and private colleges and universities that used Mandarin,
or English as medium of instructions as part of the National Education System. Prior to
this, only Chinese and Tamil primary schools and government sponsored secondary
schools were considered as part of the national system.
2. The question of Malay language vis-a-vis English and Mandarin. The new Act under
Section 17 (1) empowered the Minister of Education to exempt any education
institutions to use language other than the national language as medium of instruction.
3. The impact of the Act upon national integration and nation-building.
4. The economic value of the national language and the employment prospect of
graduates from government sponsored universities, which used Malay as a medium of
instruction.
The provision of Section 16 and 17 of the 1996 Act abrogated Article 21(2) of
the 1961 Education Act that empowered the Minister of Education to change any
Chinese or Indian national-type-schools, to national school when he deemed fit. As
such, the central issue of non-Malays' concern over the future of Chinese or Tamil
schools has been resolved. Zainal Abidin Wahid (1996), a Malay nationalist and a
retired professor of history, argued that the provision of Section 17 (1) in the new Act
would ultimately lead the 1,290 Chinese primary schools with more than 580,000 pupils
and 540 Tamil primary schools that have 96,000 pupils to continuously used Mandarin
and Tamil as medium of instruction. Besides, 60 more Chinese independent secondary
schools will be regarded as part of the national system of education and continue to use
Mandarin as medium of instruction. 	 Zainal further contended that the newly
14 Interview with one Chinese academician from the National University of Malaysia who preferred to remain
anonymous.
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established 250 English medium private institutions of higher learning will also benefit,
as they are now considered part of the national education system. He argues that
since 95% of students in these institutions were Chinese and Indians, be it a Chinese or Tamil
national-type school, or even an independent Chinese secondary school, as well as the 250 private
colleges and universities; how could the country ambitiously claim that we are movirig toward
achieving the vision of the Bangsa Malaysia? Since those students will spend 16-17 years of their
educational life, from primary to tertiary education in isolation from the rest of the Malays, who
are mostly educated in Malay national primary and secondary schools and later continued their
study in public universities, that used Malay as the medium of instruction. How could one say
that nation-building is being forged through the National Education Policy. Can a united
Malaysian nation be created if this system prevails.°
Zainal and several other Malay intellectuals who opposed the amendment,
maintained that the 1996 Act did not reinforce the position of Malay as the national
language, but rather further strengthened the position of English, Mandarin and Tamil in
the National Education Policy. I6
 Apart from that he argued that the problems of ethnic
polarisation in the education system would prevail and perhaps deteriorate. To them the
Razak Report and the 1961 Education Act has identified that Malay as the national
language was crucial to be absorbed and enforced in the national education system to
promote nation-building. However, this important role of the Malay language in
fostering national unity would be seriously affected as a result of the implementation of
1996 Act. The critics also highlighted the implication of the policy on the perceived
economic value of the national language, and the future of graduates from the Malay
medium stream in the job market. They argued that English has been prominent in the
private sector. Given the growing importance of this sector in Malaysian economy, in
contrast to the public sector (the only sector that fully adopted Malay as their language
of business and communication), which continue downsizing their institutions and
activities in accordance with government privatisation and corporatisation policy, the
concern was that public university graduates would be at a disadvantage in the
competition for employment against those who came from private colleges and
overseas universities. Although improving the standard of English proficiency in public
universities would help, Zainal argues that the point he was making was that of the
economic value of graduates from Malay medium public universities, vis-à-vis
15 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid on 11 March 1997 in his house in Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Zainal' s
view on this matter was also published in his interview with a Malay magazine 'Tamadun' (March, 1997). This view
was explored in my separate interview with Rustam A. Sani, Johan Jaafar, Chamil Wariya, Nazri Abdullah, Dr.
Fawzi Basri, the late Professor Dahlan Hj. Aman, Salleh Majid, Fadhil Noor, Subky Latiff, and Tan Sri Ghazali
Shafei. All of them held a view similar to that expressed by Zainal.
16 Ibid.
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graduates from English medium colleges and universities in securing job in the private
sector which used English in their activities.
PAS also joined the critics and rejected the Bill. According to PAS's President
Fadhil Noor:	 •
From our point of view the 1996 Education Act has severely affected the Malays. As far as
Islamic dimension is concerned, the new Act has not making any improvement to strengthen the
role of Islam in education. Islamic religious schools have not benefited from the Act as they
would remain as they are now. The new Act also undermines the position of Malay as the
national language. We do not want the position of the national language to be reduced to only as
one of the compulsory subjects taught at private colleges and universities, yet English and
Mandarin are used as the medium of instruction. Malay has to be the main medium of instruction
at these institutions. After four decades of independence, it is embarrassing for the government to
reduce the position of the national language to be at par, with other languages which are
considered as the second or third languages, in this country. I was told by several PAS's
Members of Parliament, that most of the non-Malay MPs from across the bench, have given a big
welcome to the 1996 Education Act. It was obvious that the non-Malay's struggle over the past
forty years to promote their language and education was rewarded by the government culminating
in the 1996 Education Act, which has significantly changed the basis of the Razak Report.I7
In answering the critics, the Minister of Education, Najib Tun Razak (who is
also the eldest son of the late Tun Razak, who introduced the Razak Education Report in
1956) who tabled the Bill in the Parliament, argued that the position of Malay language
is preserved and protected under the New Act and will not be changed. The amendment
was done in accordance with Vision 2020, of making Malaysia as an industrialised
country and in line with the idea of creating a united Malaysian nation, or the Bangsa
Malaysia (Utusan Malaysia, 20 January 1996). However, he has not clearly explained
how the new act matches with the idea of creating a united Malaysian nation, neither did
he convincingly answer his critics on the question of the position of Malay as the
national language which has to compete with English and Mandarin under the new
National Education Policy. Instead, he stressed that:
the 1995 Bill would not only serve as an amendment to the 1961 Act, but rather is totally a brand
new and a futuristic education statute, that would lead Malaysia to emerge as a centre of
educational excellence in the world.
(Utusan Malaysia, 20 January 1995)
On this score, Johan Jaafar, Editor-in-Chief of the Utusan Malaysia (the major Malay
daily newspaper owned by UMNO) states that:
As far as I can see, under Mahathir's administration, linguistic nationalism is no longer important
as an instrument to bring about national integration. Mahathir is more concerned with the
economic aspect of nation-building than any other approach. Even in education, the government
has adopted a more liberal and global approach in order to transform education as one of an
important economic commodity. 18
17 Interview with Fadhil Noor, the President of PAS.
121
While Johan's remarks on 'linguistic nationalism' may be relevant as far as the non-
Malay and nation-building are concerned, it may not be particularly so when it involves
the Malays, especially with regard to the position of the national language. The changes
in the policy may, perhaps satisfy the non-Malays, yet provoked discontent among the
Malays.
In short, it is argued that although the new National Education Act was aimed to
modernize the Malaysian education system and was said as moving towards Vision
2020, the new initiatives in the education policy have clearly perpetuated the existing
scenario of the association of ethnicity with education. To several Malay intellectuals,
the 1996 Act was seen as one step backward in the nation-building process. 19 The main
contention was that, is it the Malay language, or English, or multi-lingualism, that
would best facilitate the process of nation formation in Malaysia? Chamil Wariya a
senior journalist with the Utusan Malaysia newspaper lamented:
At one particular point in time I used to think that the National Education Policy would continue
to make an important contribution towards the project of nation formation in Malaysia. However,
the policy was reversed by the 1996 Education Act. The government liberal stand on the use of
English at tertiary level and the establishment of hundred of private colleges and universities,
which used English and Mandarin as medium of instruction in recent years, had weakened the
objective of nation-building through the education system.2°
Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid saw that, 'if, in the 1970s and 1980's the Chinese
community sought to establish only one Merdeka University, the new education policy
rewarded them with numerous `Merdeka University'21.
As far as the non-Malays are concerned, the position of Chinese and Tamil
schools are no longer at threat, as the new Act finally incorporated them as part of the
national system. This resolved most of their concerns about the future of Chinese and
Indian education and languages. This is very important as far as the perpetuation of
their cultural identities are concerned. Clearly, their steadfastness in the long political
battle to materialise the notion of pluralism in education was paid off. By contrast, the
position of Malay as the national language though remained unaffected, yet, its
instrumental role to induce nation-building through the education system, appears to
have been compromised. Malaysians can choose to have their children educated in
18 Interview with Johan Jaafar.
19 Interview with Rustam A. Sani; Chamil Wariya; Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid; and the late Professor Dahlan
Haji Aman.
20 Interview with Chamil Wariya.
21 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
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Mandarin right from nursery, to tertiary level and this is recognised by the state as part
of the national education system, which is said to 'uphold' Malay as the national
language. English also seemed to enjoy almost an equal status to the national language
at tertiary level under the new education policy. While many Malays may not question
the importance of English to compete in the global world, they however, wanted Malay
language to play a vital role in the project of nation-building. Perhaps the relevant
question to ask is, is Bangsa Malaysia best achieved through a stronger, or weaker
Malay language policy? If aspects of 'essential similarities and homogeneity' (as
argued by many sociologists such as Dukheim [1961]; and Parsons [1959] as being
crucial to reinforce social integration) are considered in this context, clearly, the new
National Education Policy may not have much to offer. Perhaps these are some of the
most fundamental questions that need to be addressed by the government rather than
looking at education as a form of economic commodity.
5.2.1 Education and the politics of nation-building
The evolution of educational development in Malaysia has seen that education
and language policy was central in the project of nation-building. Almost all major
shifts in educational policy were geared towards achieving the objective of restructuring
the society and building a united Malaysian nation. Even the 1996 major educational
shift (which may not truly seem to be moving toward that direction) was said by the
government to be part and parcel of the mission of constructing the vision of the Bangsa
Malaysia. Since independence, the politics of language and education, has strongly
affected the pattern of ethnic political mobilisation. The crux of the problem is simply
this: while the state agenda has been to make education and language policy serve as an
instrument for political socialisation in line with the objective of promoting national
integration, the non-Malays, in particular Chinese educationists and politicians, saw that
it was also crucial for them to ensure that no matter what the education policy was, the
position of Chinese schools and the right to learn and promote Chinese language and
culture must be protected. They will not tolerate any form of assimilationist tendencies
in the education system. In fact, since the time Malay was institutionalized as the
national language in 1956, they began to challenge it with the notion of multilingualism.
Although the post 1970 period saw the strengthening of the position of Malay as the
national language and the consolidation of its role in the education system, the struggle
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of the non-Malays to gain state recognition for all Chinese and Tamil schools to form
part of the national education system prevails. To achieve this end various means were
used and the political arena has been the most effective way of pursuing it. The struggle
to establish the Merdeka University can be seen as part of the grand vision to materialise
the notion of multilingualism in the education policy.
For the Malays, apart from the question of social mobility through improving the
state of educational achievement of their community, they envisaged that Malay as the
national language should be made the core element in the National Education Policy.
For the Malays, the basis of the 1956 Razak Report has to be retained in the education
policy. They aspired to the institutionalisation of Malay language in the wider societal
life to reflect Malayness as the basis of national identity. For them, these aspirations
and expectations, are not only legitimate but must be met. As Chai Hon Chan
(1977:73) puts it:
...the Malays had made clear the terms and conditions for the non-Malays to be accepted into the
Malaysian political community; and one of the cardinal conditions was, and still is, the
wholehearted acceptance of Malay as the national language. For the Malays, loyalty to the nation
and the essential expression of Malaysian national identity entail the unconditional identification
of the individual with Bahasa Malaysia (Malay/Malaysian Language).
Perhaps, Chai's remarks explained why most Chinese politicians are reluctant to openly
criticise the policy in the post 1970 period. On the contrary, the non-Malays perceived
that if the principle of multilingualism in education was not observed, it would lead to
the diminution of the multi-ethnic characteristics of the Malaysian society. For them if
the principle of multilingualism in the education policy was not allowed, the education
system would turn nation-building into an ethnic project, hence the 'encapsulation' of
the non-Malays into Malay society.
The goverment had always confronted the daunting task of mediating the
conflicting aspirations between the Malays and the non-Malays. It has come to
realize that since any attempt that indicates the tendency of assimilation would invite
strong opposition from the non-Malays, it has to accommodate the interests of the
nation with that of the reality of plural society. By and large, while the national
education policy may contribute to making the role of Malay as the national language
felt, yet, the association of ethnicity with education has not been totally removed.
The growing numbers of enrollment in Chinese primary schools in recent years speak
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for this fact. 22 For the non-Malays, until the introduction of the 1996 Education Act,
national education policy as laid down by the Razak Report as well as the 1961
Education Act (specifically Article 21(2), was perceived as a vexing issue in
Malaysian education system. Indeed it was perceived as a threat to the continued
survival of Chinese and Tamil education. They saw that the assimilationist agenda
was still clearly embedded in the national education policy. However, the
enforcement of the 1996 Education Act seems to be a great relief for them. The new
education policy was a hallmark of the success of four decades struggle to materialise
the agenda of multilingualism in education. Above all, it has fulfilled the basic
agenda of Chinese and Indians struggle in the politics of education. What was clear is
that with the abrogation of article 21(2) of the 1961 Act, and given the state
recognition of education in mother tongue from primary to tertiary level, most of the
non-Malays' anxiety about the future of vernacular education has been finally
resolved. To what extent this would change the pattern of the politics of education
involving the non-Malays in the future is yet to be seen. Also, to what extent this
marked government's attempts to set up a new framework of accommodation towards
the construction of the Bangsa Malaysia is another dimension yet to be ascertained.
Nevertheless, for many Malay intellectuals, the implementation of the 1996
Education Act, marked the government's compromise of the basis of the Razak
Education Report, thus 'sacrifices' one of the important attributes of Malayness, namely
the Malay language. Although the government said that 1996 Education Act was in
line with Vision 2020 and the idea of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia, many Malay
intellectuals instead argued that the new Act could revert the crucial role of the national
language in promoting national integration. They saw that the effective role of Malay,
as the national language in inducing the process of nation-building could be greatly
affected, as the new Act has strengthen multilingualism. Whether this forms some of
the symptoms of the revitalisation of Malay linguistic nationalism is yet to be seen. If
this is to be the case, would not it thus invite a non-Malays counter reaction to defend
the 'new status quo', that was created by the 1996 Education Act. As the impact of the
policy may only emerge in the years to come, the crucial question to ask is to what
22 There are 1,290 Chinese primary schools with more than 480,00 pupils that exist throughout Malaysia
in 1997. On the other hand, there are 440 Tamil schools which accomodate 96,000 pupils nationwide.
(See: Zainal Abidin Wahid 1997a).
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extent will this new education policy facilitate the process of creating a united
Malaysian nation as envisaged in Vision 2020?
5.3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) - 1970-1990
The May 1969 racial riots also alerted Malaysians to the harsh realities of the
effects of economic imbalance amongst the different communities. The goodwill and
compromise practiced amongst the three major communities which had lasted for twelve
years after independence has developed in the context of differing economic growth
trends culminating in sizeable gaps in the standard of living amongst them. The riot also
prompted the Malays to believe that whilst their political supremacy was under threat,
their socio-economic well being has not changed, but rather, has continued to
deteriorate. For the Malays, the economic dimension of Malay nationalism has not been
completed. Indeed, the perpetuation of Malay nationalism in the post 1970 period
reflects the burning desire to address the Malay's economic agenda.
The government also realised that until and unless some major reform is made to
address the grievances of the Malays in the fields of economics and education, the
condition of ethnic relations in the country would not be substantially improved. A
series of consultations were held amongst the various community leaders and in 1970
the New Economic Policy (the NEP) was introduced to rectify the problem of economic
imbalances amongst the communities. Though the policy was economic in nature, the
overriding objective of the NEP was political, that is, to achieve national unity. A two
pronged strategy to achieve this goal was adopted:
i) eradicating poverty irrespective of ethnicity
ii) restructuring society so that the identification of ethnicity with economic function
and geographical location is reduced and eventually eliminated.
(Fourth Malaysia plan 1981)
5.3.1 The NEP and socio-economic reforms
To attain the NEP objectives, various state intervention measures were
undertaken including the establishment of various state-owned enterprises or
institutions. Each state-owned enterprise was given specific responsibility to deal with
the problem of economic imbalances in society. The development of these state-owned
enterprises such as Bank Pertanian Malaysia (The Agricultural Bank), LPN, FAMA,
LKIM, RISDA, FELDA, FELCRA, MARDI, MARDEC, MIDA, UDA, Petronas,
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FIMA, HICOM, PERNAS, PNB and so on has been very apparent and extensive since
1970 and so has state intervention in the economic development of the country.
Scholars who have studied this phenomenon have given their own descriptive
interpretation, including 'from laissez faire towards socialism' (Milne and Mauzy,
1980; Bruce Gale, 1981); 'state capitalism or bureaucratic bourgeoisie' (Hing Ai Yun,
1985; Jomo 1986); 'Malay economic indigenism' (Wan Hashim,1983); 'development
by trusteeship' (Ozay Mehmet, 1986); 'communal capitalism' (Chandra Muzaffar,
1985); 'positive discrimination' in favour of Bumiputeras (Seaward 1986);
Bumiputeraism policy' and 'Malay economic nationalism' (Shamsul AB, 1996; 1997).
Whatever it is, it clearly reflected the government's strong determination to pursue a
very radical approach in the implementation of the NEP, given the limited time frame of
20 years for the policy to last. The government's aim was to allow the redistribution of
wealth programmes to work as effectively as possible, so as to rectify the socio-
economic imbalances that prevail amongst ethnic groups, in which the Malays and the
Bumiputeras were the most affected.
It is important to note that programmes for redistribution of wealth will only be
viable so long the country can sustain reasonable economic growth to cope with the
cost and dislocations of redistributive policies. As such, the government since the late
Tun Razak stewardship has constantly attempted to create a favourable investment
climate in the country to attract foreign investors. Except in the mid 1980's when
economic recession hit the country as a result of the plunging of commodities prices,
economic growth during 20 years of the NEP period was reasonably high. Even in the
post NEP period, growth continued to be a crucial factor in determining the success of
wealth redistribution programmes. Dr. Mahathir puts this rather succinctly:
Managing our nation-building well will also entail we redress the socio-economic imbalances
among the various ethnic groups and then various regions in our country. Grow, we no doubt
must. If we do not grow we will not have the resources to redress anything.
(Ministry of Information, 1992)
It is within this context that the 1997 economic crisis which has severely affected
Malaysia and the Southeast Asian region in general, was viewed with great concern by
some observers with regards to its impact on the socio-political parameters of the
society, in particular that of ethnic relations. 23
 Nevertheless, despite the economic
23 On 11 January 1998 the Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Agency predicted that ethnic
tension was imminent in Malaysia following the economic turmoil that hit the Southeast Asian region. According to
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downturn which turned into political turbulence a year later following the abrupt
dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim, ethnic crisis has not yet been the case in Malaysia, as it has
been in Indonesia as a result of the downfall of the Suharto regime in May 1998.
However, as far as correcting ethnic disparity in the socio-economic field is concerned,
growth is fundamentally crucial in order to materialise wealth redistribution
programmes.
It has to be noted that apart from its two-pronged strategies stated above, the
NEP also set a target of at least 30 per cent for the Bumtputera ownership and
participation in all industrial and commercial activities to be achieved by 1990. This
was the government's direct response to the low participation of the Bumiputera's
community in the economy. The statistics in 1969 indicate that the ownership of share
capital in Limited Companies by ethnic groups was Chinese 90.5 per cent, Malays 5.9
per cent and Indian 3.6 per cent. However, of the total RM5,678 million share capital,
62.1 per cent was accounted for by the foreign interests, whilst the Chinese own 22.8
per cent, Malays 1.5 per cent and Indian 0.9 per cent (Second Malaysia Plan,1971). To
ensure that the Bumiputera communities gain access to all sectors of the economy and
acquire a more equitable share of the wealth of the country, the provision of 'Malays
special rights' promulgated in Article 153 of the Constitution was expanded in various
government policies. These include, the extension of Bumiputera quotas for
government employment; Bum iputera quotas for access and funding into higher
education; and certain kinds of business licenses and government contracts. Apart from
that most state-owned enterprises provide special assistance programmes for
Bum iputera, or acted as surrogate institutions for the transfer of foreign or government
capital shares and ownership to the Bumiputera communities. Under the Industrial
Coordination Act, the government has made it compulsory for the private sector to
observe reserved quotas for employment of Bumzputeras as well as to establish plans for
the training and promotion of Bum iputeras to more skilled and higher paid managerial
positions.
the analysis, ethnic tension might arise between the Malays and the Chinese and Indian minorities as a result of a stiff
competition for the limited resources in the country following the crisis. However, such predictions were dismissed
by the government. Even opposition parties disagreed with such a view. They noted that Malaysia has learnt its
lesson from the 1969 tragedy and will not be easily driven into such a scenario, as the basis of ethnic unity and
cooperation that was established since 1947, was highly valued by its' multi-ethnic society. (See: Utusan Malaysia,
12 January 1998)
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To initiate more rapid development of Bumiputera ownership and control of at
least 30 per cent of the country's economic pie, the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB),
a Bumiputera trust agency, was involved in buying corporate shares and acquiring
control of industries and enterprises on behalf of the Bum iputera cdmmunity.
Furthermore, when foreign corporations operated in Malaysia or engaged in joint-stock
agreements with local private or government corporations, the agreement usually
specified a quota of stock issues to be reserved for sale to Malays or to Bumiputera trust
agencies (Jomo K. Sundram, 1983:56). These were among the most obvious measures
undertaken by the government during the NEP period to address Malay grievances in
the socio-economic fields. Clearly, all the possible avenues that could be exploited to
induce wealth redistribution to rectify the low level of 1.5 per cent of the Malay and
Bumiputera stake in the county's economics pie in 1969 were explored by the
goverment under the NEP agenda.
What then is the performance of the policy and to what extent have its objectives
being attained? In general, despite the fact that poverty is still prevalent in some sectors
such as fishing, estate workers and those in urban slums and remote rural areas, the NEP
programmes for eradicating poverty have been successful in bringing down the level of
poverty in the country. As far as restructuring of society is concerned, the Malay and
the Bumiputera communities by 1990 have been able to secure approximately 22 per
cent of the country's economic equity. Although, it was 8 per cent short of the original
target, the tremendous change brought about by the NEP in both aspects has to be
recognised. In fact, some writers argued that this figure may not reflect the real equity
secured by the Bumiputera as it did not account for equity owned under nominee
companies (which arguably are largely owned by Bumiputera) and the stake owned by
the goverment which in the final analysis could raised Bumiputera's equity much
higher (Kua Kia Soong, 1990; Ozay Mehmet, 1986). Table 3 below demonstrates inter-
ethnic economic imbalances that prevailed in Malaysia in 1970 and the improvement
made in 1985 and some latest statistics in 1995.
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Table 3
Progress of The New Economic Policy, 1970-85/95
I. Eradication of Poverty
(incidence of poverty) 1970 1985
Peninsular Malaysia 49.3 18.41
Rural 58.7 24.71
Rubber smallholders 64.7 43.41
Padi Farmers 88.1 57.71
Estate workers 40.0 19.71
Fishermen 73.2 27.71
Coconut Smalholders 52.8 46.91
Other Agriculture 89.0 34.21
Other industries 35.3 10.01
Urban 21.3 8.21
Sabah 58.32 33.11
Sarawak 56.52 31.91
II. Mean Monthly Household Income
in Malaysian Ringgit:
(in constant 1970 prices) 1970 1995
Bumiputera 172 1,600
Chinese 394 2,895
Indians 304 2,153
Urban 428 2,596
Rural 200 1,300
III. Restructuring of Society
(a) Restructuring of Employment Pattern
(Figures in 1970 refer to Peninsula Malaysia only)
(i) by selected occupation
(in percentage) 1970 1985
(Ethnic Group) (Ethnic group)
B C	 I 0 B C I	 0
Professional
and Technical	 47.0 39.5	 10.8 2.7 54.4 32.4 11.1	 2.1
Administrative
and managerial	 24.1 62.9	 7.8 5.2 28.2 66.0 5.0	 0.8
Production	 34.2 55.9	 9.6 0.3 45.5 43.1 10.9	 0.5
Agricultural	 72.0 17.3	 9.7 1.0 73.5 17.2 8.3	 1.0
Sales	 26.7 61.7	 11.1 0.4 37.9 56.8 5.2	 0.1
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(ii) by selected
professionals
membership 1970 1995
Architect	 4.3 80.9 1.4 13.4 27.0 71.3 1.5 0.2,
Accountants	 6.8 65.4 7.9 19.9 12.6 80.5 5.9 1.0
Engineers	 7.3 71.0 13.5 8.3 38 43 15 4.0
Doctors	 3.7
(b) Restructuring of Corporate
44.8 40.2 11.3 32.4 32.6 32.5 2.5
Sector 1970 1995
Bum ip utera 2.4 24
Non-Bumiputera 34.3 63
Foreign 63.3 11
(Source: Government of Malaysia :Fourth and Fifth Malaysia Plan, and 1996 Yearbook of Statistics)
The table clearly demonstrates that the level of poverty in Peninsular Malaysia has
sharply declined from almost 50 per cent in 1970 to 18.41 per cent in 1985. The
incidence of poverty in Sabah and Sarawak had also dropped from nearly 60 per cent in
1970, to between 30 per cent to 33 per cent during the period 1970-1985. Nevertheless,
in general, the commercial and business sectors are still predominantly controlled by the
Chinese. Therefore, the government through the National Development Policy (NDP)
that replaced the NEP in 1990 continued to pursue programmes to improve Bumiputera
participation in the commercial and business sectors.
Another important dimension of the impact of the NEP is the creation of the new
Bumiputera 'middle' and 'upper middle class'. I2
 This has altered the class structure
within the Bumiputera community, to be more stratified in comparison with the
scenario in the past, which has only two dominant classes, namely, the feudal/aristocrat
class and the rural peasant class. The new Malay middle class created by the NEP was
sometimes regarded as the new capitalists or as Shamsul AB (1997) called them, as the
class of the Malay 01(Bs (Orang Kaya Baru or lit. 'New Rich Person). The
emergence of this new Bumiputera's middle and upper class were considered as an
important element in generating the sense of confidence within the Bumiputera
communities of their political and economic position in facing Chinese economic
12 The emergence of this small group of Bumiputera capitalist class was proposed by several observers, as being
created at the expense of the majority of the Bumiputeras, who are still remain in poverty. The making of this
exclusive class has been subject to criticism by various scholars, both Malays and the non-Malays, such as Lim Mali
Hui (1984), Zawawi Ibrahim (1984), Jomo (1989); Jomo and Ishak Shaari (1986); Ozay Mehmet (1986); Kua Kia
Soong (1992); Gomez and Jomo, 1997). In fact, this perceived discrepancy in the NEP, has also caused resentment
among many non-Bumiputeras who regard the NEP, as a policy to produce richer and well off Malays and
Bumiputeras and not for eradicating poverty or restructuring of society (Kua Kia Soong, 1992).
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strength, which has also recorded a growing trend during the NEP period, despite the
criticism that the policy was only meant for the Malays. Indeed, as a result of this so-
called new sense of confidence within the Malay and Bum iputera communities, the
government has introduced several so-called 'liberalisation' policies in the economy and
education, in the post 1990 period, which some observers argue as moving away from
its earlier Bum iputera tendencies. 24 This shall be examined in the later chapters.
5.3.2 The NEP critics
Since the NEP focused on efforts to uplift the socio-economic conditions of the
Bum iputera communities, the non-Bumiputeras felt that they were alienated by the
policy. This was one of the main criticisms leveled against the government by the non-
Malays during the period of the NEP implementation. Although, the level of poverty
has sharply declined and Bumiputera participation and stake in the economy has
increased, could this really reflect that the problem of national integration has been
resolved or partially overcome? To what extent do economic policies and performance
have a correlation with national integration and ethnic polarisation? To answer this
question, one needs to review the whole question of national unity and the NEP, not
merely by looking at the quantitative values as demonstrated by the statistical figures,
but to also by evaluating the qualitative and subjective dimensions of the problem.
Rustam A. Sani (1991) notes that there is a tendency in the government approach to the
question of nation-building in Malaysia to perceive it as merely a matter of economic
and physical development. Therefore, when the process of nation-building is perceived
in terms of strategic economic balance between ethnic groups, it tends to focus on
aspects such as economic quantum and percentages owned by diverse ethnic groups but
ignores more profound aspects of nation-building such as the question of developing
national identities and a sense of nationalism.
To Rustam, the fundamental issue faced by Malaysia has always been
the problem of consolidating all sorts of diversities that were inherited by history (especially the
colonial history) to mould a solid social unity in the form of a nation that could then play the role
of active participant in the modern civilisation of the world. (Rustam, A. Sani, 1991)
Rustam observes that the future of a country which was based on the politics of
economic distribution of wealth, in terms of quantum or percentage according to ethnic
24 Interview with Johan Jaafar; Chamil Wariya; and Rustam A. Sani.
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groups, risks an unstable future. Quite likely, the amount of distribution has to be
negotiated and renegotiated over time as circumstances change. Thus, the rival ethnic
groups would always be alarmed over such development when it occurs, and the
perpetuation of conflict to protect the interests of each community would be a
permanent scene in the political arena. Nevertheless, the New Development Policy
(NDP) that was in place since 1990, has not specified the distribution of wealth in terms
of percentage or quantum based on ethnicity as rigidly as the NEP. Instead, as stated in
Vision 2020, Malaysia's economic development agenda would be geared towards
achieving the status of a fully developed country and one which ensured an
economically just society (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a). In other words, the NDP
intends to create a society where there is a fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of
the nation, in which a full partnership between ethnic groups in economic progress
prevails. This would thus ensure that the identification of ethnicity with economic
function, and the identification of economic backwardness with ethnicity are being
eliminated. Nevertheless, there is always a great difference between the stated objective
and the actual outcome of any public policy, the NEP or even the NDP for that matter
thus are no exception.
Over the 20 year period of the NEP, the non-Malays, through their
representatives inside and outside the government, had continuously raised their concern
and grievances over the implementation of the NEP which they argued only benefited
one community, the Malays, to the neglect, exclusion and detriments of others (Chua
Jui Meng, 1988; David Chua, 1988; Lim Lin Lean, 1988; Kua Kia Soong, 1990, 1992;
Lim Kit Siang, 1986). Moreover, some critics argued that even amongst the Malays, it
was the elite group and the corporate class who were close to UMNO leaders that really
benefited from the policy, especially in the wealth redistribution programmes (Jomo
K.S.,1995; Gomez,1994; Ozay Mehmet, 1986). Following the 1997 economic
downturn, it become more fashionable to talk about the rise of 'crony capitalism' in
Malaysia, instead of only the rise of the new Malay corporate class and UMNO' s central
role in terms of 'rent-seeking' (Jomo, 1995; Gomez and Jomo, 1997), or 'the corporate
involvement of political parties' (Gomez, 1994). Quite ironically, in the midst of the
economic and political turmoil, the most vocal criticism against the so-called crony
capitalism, nepotism, and corruption in the Mahathir's administration, came mainly
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from amongst Malay middle class who were basically the product of the NEP and the
government's affirmative action policy (see: FEER 12 November, 1998).
Indeed, the creation of several different terms to describe the same thing,
reflects the unceasing criticism (be it academic or political) against the NE?, wealth
redistribution programmes and above all the affirmative action policy that is still in
practice in Malaysia. To some extent those close to UMNO's top leadership from both
the Bumiputera and the non-Bumiputera corporate elite may have been getting greater
access in accumulating wealth in terms of the distribution of goverment contracts and
projects under the NEP or even under Mahathir's privatisation policy. However, it was
inaccurate and indeed a gross error, to suggest that the policy had only benefited a small
group of corporate elite at the expense of the entire Bumiputera and the non-Bum iputera
communities (c.f. Kua Kia Soong, 1987:50-67). As illustrated in Table 3, the NEP has
significantly transformed the socio-economic landscape of Malaysian society, especially
the Malays. Many thousands of children of ordinary farmers, fishermen, rubber tappers,
teachers, soldiers, policemen, civil servants and so on, have been transformed into a new
middle class as a result of the policy. The creation of a sizeable Malay and Bumiputera
middle class in the post 1990 period would not have been conceivable without the NEP.
From another point of view, Shamsul A.B. (1996a) argued that the controversy
arises because the academic writings on the NEP and its implementation by both Malay
and non Malay scholars, have been somewhat ethnicised, as a result of the nature of the
policy. He noted that:
On the one hand, a number of non-Bum iputera scholars opposed to the NEP have been writing
'scholarly' books and articles in international journals on the impact of this discriminatory policy
on lower-class Malaysian Chinese and how it has made a few Bumiputera extremely rich. On the
other, a group of Bumiputera scholars has defended the NEP and published 'academic' pieces
which argue that without the NEP the condition of the poor Bumiputera would worsen and
another racial riot occur as a consequence. They also ask 'what's wrong with having more
Bumiputera millionaires. ...with the exception of Peter Searle's thesis (1994), no detailed and
systematic studies have been carried out to show the role of the Malaysian Chinese in the
commercial sector, or to what extent they have benefited from the NEP. For non-Bumiputera
scholars to describe the benefits that Chinese have received from the NEP would only weaken
their 'academic' argument about the highly discriminatory nature of the policy. The 'nationalist'
Bumiputera scholars seem to find it a waste of time to study ethnic groups other than the
Bum iputera.'
(Shamsul AB, 1996a:24-25)
By and large, the non-Malays disenchantment over the NEP was founded on several
important issues, which have led to the entire NEP programme of eradicating poverty
and restructuring of society being politicized and perceived in ethnic terms.
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The non-Malays's criticism concerning the implementation of the NEP could be
summarised into four important domains:-
(i) questioning of affirmative action programmes and Bumiputeralnon-Bumiputera
dichotomy;
(ii) questioning of government statistics pertaining to the NEP;
(iii) questioning whether poverty eradication programmes and restructuring of society
only benefited the Malays and not the poor and the needy among all Malaysians; and
(iv) questioning whether the redistribution of wealth programmes more greatly benefited
the Malay elite and corporate class and not the ordinary Malay masses.
On the question of affirmative action programmes to assist the Malays and other
Bum iputera communities, the non-Malays argued that the problem confronting
Malay/non-Malay relationship springs from the 'dichotomy of Bumiputera and non-
Burmputera' , which has led to the democratic rights of the non-Malays in Malaysia
being eroded through the years through the BwmPuteraism policies of the government
(Kua Kia Soong, 1992:73). To them, 'the racial quota system is not only divisive but
irrational and obfuscatory' (Chinese Memorandum on The Post 1990 Malaysian
Economic Policy). The non-Malays feel that the dichotomy of Bumiputera and non-
Bumiputera has rendered them 'second-class citizens' of the country. Dr. Tan Seng
Giaw the DAP Vice Chairman comments:
In our effort to rectify the socio-economic imbalances, we must not create further disaffection and
discontentment among the people. While the NDP have some flexibility, it is actually a
continuation of the NEP. The perception that we now have is that Malays are helped by the
government and the non-Malays have to help themselves. Even in business, the prevailing view is
that Malay businesses were helped by the government and the non-government agencies are
supposed to help the non-Malay businesses. In the allocation of shares to the people in the
government's privatisation projects there should not be a single group monopolising the project.
In the education policy why must we continue to have quota systems for admission which is based
on ethnicity and not meritocracy.25
On matters pertaining to official statistics relating to the NEP issued by the
government, the non-Malays argued that, 'these figures are doctored to suit political
ends.. .by the fact that all compilation is undertaken by the EPU (Economics Planning
Unit of the Prime Minister Department), which is staffed at the senior level, almost
exclusively by Malays' (Kua Kia Soong, 1992:38). Related to this, Kua Kia Soong
notes that, 'in many cases, official statistics are taken by ideologists to put a scientific
gloss on conservative political convictions (1992:29). As such, he argues that, `...in the
25 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw.
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politics of the NEP, poverty itself has been politicized as some government leaders
identify poverty only with the Malay community' (1992:26). In his view, the problems
faced by the Malays have been exaggerated by the 'suspicious' government statistics,
which may not reflect the actual condition of economic imbalance amorigst ethnic
groups in Malaysia especially in terms of attainment of the NEP target of 30 per cent
Bumiputera's participation in the economy. Some argued that the Bumiputeras have
achieved well beyond the 30 per cent equity targeted by the NEP as many nominee
companies owned by Malay corporate elite were not accounted for in the government's
statistics (Jomo, 1995; Kua Kia Soong, 1992)
In addition, they also questioned whether the Chinese and Indian poor have
benefited fairly vis-a-vis the Malay poor from access to land, physical capital, training
and other public facilities that are supposed to be given to help the poor irrespective of
ethnicity, as underlined in the NEP blueprint (Lim Lin Lean, 1988:40). Apart from that,
David Chua (1988) argues that, 'the deviations in the implementation of the National
Education Policy and the New Economic Policy with reference to educational
opportunities are the root cause of the mounting discontent, dissatisfaction and growing
sense of deprivation among Malaysian Chinese' (p. 77). Moreover, Ozay Mehmet
(1988) notes that the Bumiputera elite who have benefited from the NEP trusteeship are
small, powerful and influential groups organised as a cartel, who gain through collusion,
transaction costs and other forms of non-competitive bargains. Therefore, it was argued
that, despite the Malays being able to increase their equity to 22 per cent in 1990, the
Malay poor have seen precious little change in their lifestyles. The criticism against the
NEP, by and large, was multi-dimensional and Osman Rani (1987) puts it rather
eloquently:
it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the criticism leveled against the government,
particularly on the NEP, were on the policies per se, or on the way the policies were implemented,
or on the results (intended or otherwise) of the implementation themselves; just it is equally
difficult to know whether the criticism about the NEP were genuinely to correct the weaknesses
inherent in the policy, or because they were being made a scapegoat to press for parity in other
fields, beyond economics.
Issues surrounding the implementation of the NEP clearly reflected the ramifications in
addressing the problems of ethnic imbalances and national unity in Malaysia. The
Bum iputera and the non-Bumiputera communities tend to have opposite views on how
nation-building is to be achieved in Malaysia.
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While the non-Malays felt that they have been discriminated against by the
policy, the Malays saw that without the policy, the condition of the Bumiputera
communities could have been worse and another ethnic riot would be imminent.
Indeed, as Indonesia succumbed to ethnic violence (which saw the victimi ghtion of
the minority ethnic Chinese who were said to have dominated the Indonesian
economy) as a result of the 1997 economic crisis, leading local Malay press
highlighted that Malaysians should be grateful to the NEP and above all the
affirmative action policy which have helped averted a similar incident from recurring
in Malaysia (Utusan Malaysia, 16 May 1998). The feeling of the Malays about the
policy and the non-Malay criticism of its implementation perhaps is best reflected by
the following speech made by Datuk Abdullah Ahmad in 1986, who was the former
Political Secretary to the late Tun Razak who was the architect of the NEP.
Let us make no mistake - the political system in Malaysia is founded on Malay dominance. That is
the premise from which we should start. The Malays must be politically dominant in Malaysia as
the Chinese are politically dominant in Singapore...The political system of Malay dominance was
born out of a sacrosanct social contract which preceded national independence. There have been
moves to question, to set aside and to violate this contract that have threatened the stability of the
system. The May 1969 riots arose out of the challenge to the system agreed upon, out of the non-
fulfillment of the substance of the contract. The NEP is the programme, after those riots in 1969,
to fulfill the promises of the contract in 1957. But now we are beginning to have questions about
the political system all over again, this time under the guise of the implementation of the NEP....
You must not forget that if the Malays are pushed to the wall they would react. When what
happened on May 13 is evoked it is dismissed as a ruse to resurrect the ghost of 1969....In the
Malaysian political system the Malay position must be preserved and Malay expectations must be
met. Even after 1990, there must be mechanism of preservation, protection and expansion in an
evolving system. ...The non-Malays can have their own schools, if they so want, their language,
culture and religion. They have so many organisations that voice and represent their interests.
They are quite capable of effecting change- as in obtaining agreement for the amendment of the
Education Act. Indeed, one state in Malaysia has even been recognised as a de facto Chinese
State. ...But what does UMNO get for its pains? ...I say to all- the Chinese in Malaysia and to
Singaporeans - don't play with fire.
(Abdullah Ahmad, cited by K. Dass, 1997)
Between the time this very provocative speech was made in late August 1986 and
October 1987, the Malays and the non-Malays have had exchanges of arguments on
several sensitive issues such as the Bumiputera/non-Bumiputera dichotomy and the
position of Chinese education, which heightened ethnic tension in the country. As a
result, the infamous massive crackdown known as ' Operasi Lalang' was launched in
October 1987 by the government to avoid the recurrence of the 1969 incident.26
Before the expiry of the NEP period, in 1988 the goverment has established the
National Economics Consultative Council (NECC), or better known as MAPEN' in
1
26 See Harold Crouch(1996); and Gordon Means (1991), for detailed account of the Operasi Lalang crackdown.
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Malay (Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara), to formulate a new policy for the post
1990 period.27 Although MAPEN submitted its recommendation to the goverment,
not all of these recommendations were accepted. Instead, it was the government itself
which finally decided that Vision 2020 and the National Development Policy (NDP)
will be the country's next agenda in the post 1990 period. 28
 Throughout the years, as
well as in the course of MAPEN deliberations, the non-Malays sent a strong signal to
the government that they could not tolerate another 'NEP' to prevail after 1990.
Therefore, though, the objectives of the NEP have not been fully accomplished, the
perpetuation of Malay economic nationalism must take a new form. Vision 2020 and
the notion of Bangsa Malaysia, therefore, could be seen in this perspective. Although
the NDP blueprint has not clearly stated the specific quantum or percentage for the
Bum iputera community as it has been in the case of the NEP, in reality Bumiputeraism
policy prevails. The government continued to observe the policy of at least 30 percent
Bumiputera participation in the economy. As the debate over the NEP gradually died
down, Malaysians tend to be more concerned about Vision 2020, and the interest in this
subject keeps on growing in the post 1990 period.
5.3.3 The NEP and National Unity
Regarding the NEP, it is clear that economically speaking, Malaysians on
average are better off now than say 30 or 40 years ago. The overall standard of living of
the people, irrespective of ethnicity, has significantly improved. Absolute poverty has
been substantially reduced, and so has inter-ethnic inequality. Nevertheless, the ultimate
aim of the NEP of achieving national integration has yet to be fully attained. This was
clearly reflected in Vision 2020's nine strategic challenges, which placed the agenda of
creating a united Malaysian nation, or the Bangsa Malaysia as the most basic and the
most fundamental challenge yet to be resolved, in order to realize the target of turning
Malaysia into a fully industrialised country in 2020. In as much as the NEP is
concerned, it does seems that economic success, though necessary, has not been a
sufficient condition to achieve national integration. But this does mean that economic
27 MAPEN was established in 1988 consisting of various individuals, political parties, NGO's representing wide
range of interests in the country under the Chairmanship of Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, one of the architects of the NEP.
The MAPEN final report was submitted to the government in 1990, however, the Prime Minister said that 'the
government was not bound to accept all the proposals of the NECC' (The Star, 29 August 1990)
i
28 Interview with Tan Sri Ghazali Shafei.
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factors can be simply ignored. The danger is that, whilst economic success can easily be
offset by other negative factors, failure in economics is easily manipulated and
politicized and that eventually may worsen the process of nation-building.
Economic development, therefore, is instrumental for the whole 'project of
nation-building to succeed. Indeed, growth has to be sustained, so long as the wealth
redistribution agenda is to be pursued. It is within this context that the 1997 economic
turmoil that hit Malaysia and other 'South East Asian Tigers', caused much alarm
within the goverment and the Malay community. The collapse of the economy would
have grave consequences for all the achievements made during the NEP period. In other
words, the socio-economic disparity between ethnic groups that have been rectified
since 1970 could reemerge as a result of the economic meltdown. If this occurs, it
would inevitably affect the politics and thus, in one way or another, implicates ethnic
parameters and the entire social fabric. Ethnic violence that have occurred in Indonesia
following the economic crisis was something many Malaysians would not want to see
occurring in Malaysia. As far as the NEP is concerned, it is apparent that the agenda of
Malay economic nationalism is yet to be perfected. Though the government seems to be
more concerned about achieving the status of an industrialised country as laid down in
Vision 2020, economic programmes to induce more Malay and Bumiputera
participation in the areas in which they are less represented continue to be promoted and
encouraged, despite the official expiry of the NEP in 1990. It is argued therefore, that
economics is no more than one of the many factors that is needed for success in the
process of nation-building. As indicated through the NEP experience, it tends to be
more important in preventing ethnic conflict, than in resolving the problems of national
integration. As such, economics as part and parcel of the whole process of nation-
building, has to be consolidated with several other factors such as education, culture,
change in human values, orientations and perceptions, if a new Malaysian nationalism is
to be developed in line with the vision of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia.
5.4 The National Cultural Policy
In the same way as the reform in the education and economic policies (NEP)
have triggered endless controversies, the introduction of the National Cultural Policy in
1971, has also turned to be a critical issue in the politics of nation-building in Malaysia.
The non-Malay communities saw that the formulation of National Cultural Policy, is but
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an explicit indication of Malay cultural domination against other cultures. Thus, if the
policy is fully implemented, it would result in the dilution of the multi-ethnic cultures
that prevail in the country. Although the policy stated that the traits from other cultures
which are pertinent would be absorbed to enrich the national culture, making Islam and
Malay culture as the basis of the national culture was unacceptable to the non-Malays.
Their opposition to the National Cultural Policy was a straightforward one, in contrast to
the criticism made against the NEP, or the education policy. Apart from that since the
formulation of the policy, the government seems unable to devise substantial
programmes or strategies to implement the policy.
It is argued therefore, that the formulation of the National Cultural Policy has
only served to accommodate the rising tide of Malay nationalism that re-emerged in the
aftermath of the May 1969 incident, yet it remains a blueprint which has never been
implemented. Although the non-Malay opposition to the policy prevails, the debate
concerning the policy has been somewhat subdued in recent years. The reason for this
lies in the fact that no substantial attempt has been made by the government to
aggressively pursue policy. Above all, the repeated assurances given by top government
leaders (especially Dr. Mahathir), that assimilation policy would not be implemented in
Malaysia, have been able to ease some of the concerns of the non-Malay communities.
Nevertheless, despite the failure of the government to effectively implement the policy,
no attempt has been made to review the policy. The discussion in this section will
outline some of the crucial issues pertaining to the debates on the National Cultural
Policy. It will also examine the problematic of the cultural dimension in the politics of
nation-building in Malaysia.
5.4.1 The Politics of the National Cultural Policy
The concept and the basis of the National Cultural Policy were formulated in
1971, at the end of the National Culture Congress held in University Malaya, Kuala
Lumpur. The policy was the major outcome of the congress which was overwhelmingly
dominated by right-wing Malay nationalists.29 It is important to note that the Congress
29 Tan Sri Samad Ismail, a veteran journalist who was also known for his leftist's ideas in the past, argued
that the National Congress on culture held in 1971 was a Malay affair as the non-Malays have not been
invited to participate in its deliberation. The Congress was largely dominated by right-wing Malay
nationalists, and even he himself was not invited to attend the meeting. (Interview with Tan Sri A. Samad
Ismail)
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was held when the country was still recovering from the aftermath of the May 1969
incident. Then, the Malays were anticipating moral and political support, after their
constitutional position was seriously challenged by the non-Malays in the 1969 election,
that led to the outbreak of the riot. Later, The Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports,
issued the guidelines of the foundation of national culture, which was adopted from the
resolution of the congress:-
(1) That the basis of national culture is the culture which is native to the region.
(2) The traits from other cultures which are pertinent should be absorbed to enrich the
national culture.
(3) That Islam as the offIcial religion of Malaysia should play its role in the formulation
of the national culture.
Whilst the Malays generally welcomed the policy guidelines, as it merged with
the aspiration of Malay nationalism, however, the non-Malays (especially the Chinese)
saw the policy as a major threat to the multi-ethnic characteristics of Malaysian society.
Indeed, the policy was regarded as a move towards assimilation, and an attempt to
subjugate their cultures under the domain of Malay and Islamic cultures and traditions.
The non-Malays clearly opposed the policy and considered it unfair. To them, the
policy does not do any justice to the interests of the other communities who have made
Malaysia their home. Besides this, they argued that it does not recognize that sheer
numbers alone, make it necessary to provide a legitimate role to their cultures,
languages and religions (Ting Chew Peh, 1985; Chew Hock Thye, 1979; Kua Kia
Soong,1990). They maintained that the modern concept of citizenship, recognizes the
right of a citizen to use and study his/her own language, adhere to his/her own faith, and
practice his/her own culture, as inviolable rights according to the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights (Chinese Organisations Joint Memorandum, 1983).
In their memorandum to the government in 1983, the Chinese Guilds and
Associations, laid down four main grounds for opposing the National Cultural Policy:
(1) the process of letting the scholars and politicians of one ethnic group to unilaterally
formulate policies with such profound and far reaching consequences, under the
auspices of the Government, is not consistent with the principle that the national culture
must develop through democratic consultation;
(2) while stressing the importance of Islam and the Malay culture, these principles deny
the significant role that should be played by the cultures and religions of the non-
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Malays. This is contrary to the principle of equality and uninhibited development of the
cultures of all ethnic groups;
(3) they exhibit the close-minded philosophy of cultural development centering on the
Malays, rather than a liberal attitude of promoting the interaction with and absorption of
other non-Malay and foreign cultures;
(4) they indicate the tendency towards using the power of administration, to force
assimilation, an action not acceptable to the non-Malays.
(The Chinese Organisations Joint Memorandum 1983)
The Chinese community feel that all ethnic cultures in the country should be
given equal treatment in the process of building the national culture for Malaysia. The
memorandum does not concentrate only on cultural issues, but went on further to argue
about the problems affecting Chinese language and education, literature, arts, and
religion in Malaysia. Apart from the Chinese, the Indian community also submitted a
similar memorandum to the government in 1984, to highlight their concern over the
policy which was essentially founded on a similar basis. In general, the non-Malay
communities in Malaysia were deeply concerned about the future of their cultures and
called on the government to adopt a more liberal approach to National Culture, and
revamp the policy accordingly.
The non-Malays instead, proposed four major principles to be adopted as the
basis for the national culture:
(1) The fine elements in the culture of each ethnic community must form the foundation
of the national culture.
(2) The guidelines for the establishment of a set of common cultural values are science,
democracy, rule of law and patriotism.
(3) The common cultural values must be expressed through the unique forms of each
ethnic group, as well as reflect the multi-ethnic characteristics of the Malaysian society.
(4) The process of developing the national culture should be consistent with the
principle of equality of all ethnic groups and the method of democratic consultation.
The non-Malays questioned that the objective of the National Culture should be 'Unity,
not Uniformity'. However, it seems to them that the emphasis of the government
appeared to be shifting from the concept of cultural unity, to cultural uniformity, with
rejection of important strands of culture found in Malaysian society in favour of Malay
Culture (Indian Community Joint Memorandum, April 1984). The non-Malays insist
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that the National Culture Policy should reflect three main characteristics: it should
include aspects of cultural diversity; common values of the society; and must be truly
Malaysian oriented. Clearly, their stand was absolutely in conflict with the official
stand of the government.
Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid in an uncompromising view argued:
To me if the non-Malays wanted to be true Malaysians they have to make several sacrifices. One
of these is the Chinese must be less Chinese and the Indians have to be less Indian. If they want to
be just like the Chinese in Mainland China or the Indian in India, it is better for them to return to
those countries. I have repeatedly said this on several occasions to the non-Malay audience. To
the question why they should regard Islam as an important element for the national culture, my
answer is go back to history. Some of the non-Malays do not like to face intellectual discourse
based on history, as this would weaken their argument. If we do not take history as an important
element, then we cannot trace back the process of political development in this country especially
the root of its socio-political origins.30
If Professor Zainal's view could represent the Malays' view on the national culture,
clearly it reflects the sharp contrast between the Malay ideas of 'national identity' and
the non-Malay's vision of 'Malaysian identity'. As long as this difference remains, a
national cultural policy that is acceptable to all, and the one that everybody could be
proud of, would be difficult to develop.
Although anthropologists argued that culture is creation, and changes over time
(Eriksen, 1993), as far as the politics of culture in Malaysia is concerned, the Malays,
the Chinese, and the Indians regard themselves as belonging to and inheritors of three
great traditions, that is the Malay-Islam, China and Hindu. Therefore, any attempt to
instill the national culture that is based on values and norms perceived to be different
from one's own culture is a very sensitive subject. Apart from that, since Malay and
Islam in Malaysia are always taken to be synonymous, the non-Malays sometimes find
it difficult to distinguish what is Islam and what is Malay. To them, if 'Malay culture
is to become the basis of National Culture, then it follows that Islam will be the basis of
National Culture and because Islam is such an all-embracing religion, it also follows that
the National Culture in such a context will have little or no room for other cultures'
(Indian Community Memorandum, 1984).
Obviously such a situation is not acceptable to the non-Malays, whose cultures
are based on different religious beliefs and norms. As they put it, `... in the final
analysis, (this) will lead to the Islamisation of the country, in which the cultures of other
communities cannot really survive for long (Indian Memorandum).' As such, the
30 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
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Malay-Islamic culture approach to the formation of National Culture is utterly
unacceptable to them. Moreover, the situation in Malaysia is different from that of
some other countries in Southeast Asia. For example, although in Thailand and
Indonesia the Chinese are numerically more than that of Chinese and Indians put
together in Malaysia, they only represent a small fraction of the population - 10 per cent
and 3 per cent respectively. In these countries, the Chinese were gradually merged into
the dominant group as a result of various assimilationist trends in language and
education, and cultural and socio-economics policy. Nevertheless, this by no means
implies that those countries are free from problems of ethnic politics. The superiority of
ethnic Chinese in business and economic are very peculiar in those states. This could
be one of their major asset and perhaps serve as a catalyst for the assertion of their
ethnic identity in due time. But it could also constitute a liability, as has been seen in
Indonesian politics. Every time there is national economic turmoil, ethnic Chinese will
live in fear, as they are being made 'scapegoats', by some quarters of the population.
That was the case in the 1998 civil riot in Indonesia, that saw ethnic Chinese shops and
business being looted and burned, as a result of the economic crisis that badly hit
Indonesia and the rest of the region.
Obviously, defining the identity of a nation is probably the most challenging task
for Malaysia in its quest of nation-building. The political acts of planning in the field
of culture, including implementation of the plan are more difficult, complex and
dangerous than comparable acts in education and economic. This is due to the fact that
one is dealing with intangible values, differences in perceptions and personal attitudes.
Cultural policy is more complicated than other kinds of policy because culture can
neither be forced nor commanded. Cultural regimentation would simply not work in the
real-politik of the modern world. Even the communist totalitarian regimes which
attempted the regimentalisation of culture processes for several decades were doomed to
fail, as seen in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Highhanded treatment of
culture and of cultural relations could only led to adverse effects and is simply counter
productive.
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5.4.2 Resolving the Cultural Dilemma
Given the socio-political reality that prevails in Malaysia, what are the options
that the country has in dealing with the national culture issue? According to Chandra
Muzaffar (1980) the best possible approach to developing national identity and national
culture in Malaysia is to recognize the position of Malay as the sole official and national
language and the status of Islam as the official religion of the country 31 . At the same
time, the use and study of other languages and the practice and perpetuation of other
religions and cultures must be guaranteed. The other communities would also enjoy
full equal opportunities in the political and economic spheres of the nation. He also
argues that:
(the) distinction in status and significance between Malay and Islam, on the one hand, and the
other languages and religions, on the other, should not be perceived as inimical to the interest of
the other communities. ...the position of Malay and Islam is consistent with historical realities; it
also helps sustain the only tenable conception of national identity. 'There should not be any
apprehension among non-Malays as long as the right to speak and study one's language and
practice one's religion and culture is protected.
(Chandra Muzaffar,1980:40)
From Chandra's point of view, putting other languages and religions on the same status
as Malay and Islam would be grossly unfair to the history of the land; for Malay has had
a long, unbroken relationship with the cultural history of this region, just as Islam has
been a major factor in the social development of the Peninsular, since the 15th century
(Chandra Muzaffar, 1980:39; Syed Naguib al Attas, 1972).
According to Chandra, the approach that he proposes is consistent with the
Federal Constitution of 1957, a constitution which inter-alia recognizes the official
position of both Malay and Islam, while providing for the continued existence of other
languages and religions (1980:41). Apart from that, Chandra also observes that the
national culture must also emphasize aspects of common values in the cultural life of the
nation. He notes that many Malaysians have failed to realize that there is so much that
they share in common as inheritors of great traditions:
Malays, Chinese and Indians value the family as the basis of the community. All of us emphasize
respect for parents, the aged and the wise. Islam, Confucianism and Hinduism regard a collective
social morality as essential for happiness and harmony. Unbridled materialism and greed are
condemned by all our cultures. Corruption is a vice in the eyes of all our communities. ...Finally,
all the three traditions place a great deal of premium upon sincere, able leadership in the quest for
a virtuous society.... It is commonalties of this sort in social philosophy and in cultural practices
31 Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is a distinguished non-Malay scholar who is known for many of his rational
ideas in criticizing government policies on various issues.
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that deserve to be highlighted in a society, which proclaims national unity, as its primary goal.
Exaggerating ethnic differences, or seeking ethnic solutions, for every single social malaise would
be a dangerous approach to adopt in a multi-ethnic setting.'
(Chandra Muzaffar, 1980:41-42)
Although the logic of Chandra's view was obvious, it may not represent the view
held by the majority of the non-Malays. Ting Chew Peh (1985), a Chinese sociologist
who currently is the MCA Secretary General and a Federal Minister asserts that in order
to ensure that Malaysia could attain its objective of building the national culture, the
government has to consider that, (1) the national culture reflect the socio-political reality
of the society; (2)that it is sensitive to the desire and needs of the various sections of the
society; (3) and emphasis the spirit and the aspirations of the Federal Constitution, the
Rukunegara (the National Ideology), principle of equality, justice, freedom and
democratic consultation; and (4) giving all ethnic cultures equal and fair treatment.
Ting's view was clearly a reflection of the non-Malay communities' aspirations
concerning the national culture, as clearly underlined in the Chinese and Indian
Communities Memorandum to the government in 1983 and 1984. Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu
Khoon the Chief Minister of Penang commenting on the politics of the national culture
argues that cultural matter in Malaysia should not be too formalised. In his words:
It should not be formalised. Although you may have an organisation that takes this as an aim to
promote things, you cannot promote it in a very rigid way. Instead it should be through an
informal way of encouraging informal interactions. It should not be a 'top-down' process, but
rather the opposite way, that is the 'bottom-up' process. It must come from the people. It is
obvious that a process of integration and not assimilation, is taking place in Malaysia. It is not so
much has to be based on ethnicity, but rather a sort of sense of sharing among ethnic groups in
Malaysia about their future destiny. This would diffuse every potential that might hinder the
process of integration. The people now are more accommodative and sensitive among each other
than they have been in the past. We could see that people shared a lot of similarities in foods,
customs, the way they dress, their daily practices and so on. I do not think that religious and
cultural differences that prevail in Malaysia constitute major obstacles to the creation of national
culture and identity. To me, we should continue to develop the economy of the country, rather
than putting too much emphasize on the socio-cultural aspects. A lot of people tend to end up
with very petty arguments, over say 'whose culture should dominate in the creation of Malaysian
culture, or whose ' bangsa' should be the dominant ' bangsa' . When we start arguing like this it
becomes confrontational and we could lose sight of the higher ideal. On the other hand, if
Malaysians involve in the economic task of competing with other nations, than we tend to learn
from one another and we tend to blend?'
Although, the introduction of the national culture should be substantiated with
tangible programmes, as in the case of the NEP, this has not been the case in Malaysia.
Despite major disagreements on the philosophy of the policy from various sections of
the population, the implementation of the policy by the government has not been
32 Interview with Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Khoon.
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consistent. Ibrahim Saad (1983), called this as 'the politics of ambiguity', and argues
that it is a form of conflict regulation in Malaysia. It is only during times of crisis, that a
clear definition has to be made and until such a time, emotional issues are always kept
on the periphery (Ibrahim Saad,1983:66). Ibrahim was referring to Dr. Mahathir's
speech to the Malay World Conference in December 1983, in which the Premier said :
we have agreed that integration and unity will be inculcated and built by using one language, that
is the national language; one culture, that is the national culture. The national language is the
Malay Language and the core of the national culture is the culture that is native to this region.
It was this statement by Dr. Mahathir, that prompted the non-Malay communities to
submit the memorandum to the government in 1983, expressing their grave concern
over the government stance on the implementation of the National Cultural Policy.
Although the statement by Dr. Mahathir reflected the government's firm stand on the
policy, Ibrahim saw that no firm action has been taken to make the policy materialise
from it's rhetoric. In the meantime, the government appears to find it convenient to use
a conflict management policy, that is promoting cultural tolerance and harmony within
the society.
The inconsistency continued when in 1988 Mahathir stated that:
by accepting Malaysia, Bangsa Malaysia and Bahasa Malaysia does not make us a Malay. In
terms of ethnicity, we remain as Chinese, Indian, Iban, Kadazan, or Murut and so on....Without
abandoning our ethnic identities, we could still be a meaningful Bangsa Malaysia..
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1988)
Obviously, whilst the first speech reflected that the government is committed to
the principles of the National Cultural Policy, however, the second speech implies that
the government could accept and tolerate cultural pluralism. The second speech was
made in 1988, prior to the introduction of Vision 2020 in 1991. After Vision 2020 and
the notion of creating the Bangsa Malaysia was officially unveiled, there was another
statement made by the Premier in what was seen as another attempt to clarify the
government's policy on cultural development in Malaysia.
previously we tried to have a single entity but it caused a lot of tension and suspicions among the
people because they thought the Government was trying to create a hybrid. There was fear among
the people that they may have to give up their own cultures, values, and religions. This could not
work, and we believe that the Bangsa Malaysia is the answer.
(The Star, 11 September 1995)
Although the later speech by Dr. Mahathir has not clearly explained, as to what should
constitute the Bangsa Malaysia, it indicates Mahathir's admission that there was an
attempt in the past to create a single entity C previously we tried to have a single
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entity'...). This statement could have been referring to the assimilationist tendency
embodied in the national cultural policy.
While the government, from time to time made ambiguous statements about the
policy, this ambiguity was also reflected in the reactions by various sections of the
population representing their respective interests. For the Malay-minded section of the
society, 'Malay' and 'Islam' are the most important provision in the policy and should
be considered as 'core elements' (Aziz Deraman,1989; Zainal Kling, 1988). To the non-
Malays, despite the provision for accepting some aspects of their culture as part of the
national culture, they considered the policy as containing a strong sense of Malay-
centrism and a tendency towards forced assimilation (Chinese Joint Memorandum,
1983). Although the government seems to realize that the non-Malays are not prepared
to tolerate the philosophy of the National Cultural Policy, so far no attempt has been
made to revise the policy. This is probably due to the fact that any attempt to review the
policy to accommodate the non-Malays' aspirations could only result in generating
distrust and anger amongst the Malays towards the government. Therefore, alongside
the decline of the issue, especially in the post 1990, the government probably felt that it
was better for the question of national culture to be set aside at this juncture, until there
was a need for it to be revitalized.
In sum, the controversies of the National Cultural Policy demonstrated the
difficulties in the formulation and implementation of a national policy that confront
sensitive ethnic interests in society. It is not easy for the government to facilitate a
formula that is acceptable to all parties. The conflict over the National Cultural Policy
only reinforces the fact that the cultural dimension of nation-building is much too
complicated to be resolved, when it is combined with ethnicity and communal politics.
5.5 Conclusion
In Malaysia, the people are constantly being reminded that every project on
which the government embarks, be it economics, education, politics, or social, is for the
sake of national integration. Since independence, the political elite in Malaysia regarded
the question of national unity and nation-building, as superseding any other political
agenda. Without national unity, there will be no political stability and even the
democratic process of the country would be in jeopardy. Virtually all major policies
devised by the government are aimed at promoting national unity. Therefore, any study
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embarking upon the question of nation-building in Malaysia would be insufficient
without a critical assessment over the three major national policies, namely, the National
Education Policy, the NEP, and the National Cultural Policy. These national policies
were formulated and aimed at addressing the acute problems of ethnic division in the
country in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riots, which nearly brought the political
system established in 1947 to total collapse.
Over the past four decades, the Education Policy has in many ways influenced
ethnic politics in Malaysia and remains an important variable, as far as nation-building
is concerned. A similar thing applies to the NEP and the National Cultural Policy,
despite the lack of a coherent strategy in the implementation of the latter. Nevertheless,
whilst the debate on education and language policy continues, especially after the
introduction of the 1996 Education Act, a similar debate on the NEP has gradually died
down as the policy ended in 1990. The National Cultural Policy continues to be a
controversial subject and the political discourse has been more restrained in the post
1990 period. Despite the rejection of the non-Malay communities of the principles of
the National Cultural Policy, the government itself has not aggressively pursued the
policy, as it has done for the National Education policy and the NEP. Thus, it has been
argued that to a significant extent the Education and Language Policy, and the NEP,
despite having confronted by enormous challenges, have been able to play an important
role in rectifying the socio-economic imbalances in the society, and therefore have
contributed towards national integration. On the contrary, the National Cultural policy
failed to make any significant headway.
The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that the three major national policies
of education and language, the NEP, and culture, constitute an important part of the
larger nationalist project to materialise the aspiration of Malay nationalism that was not
in place when independence was achieved in 1947. Those projects however, were
repackaged and presented in the form of Malaysian project, in order to garner support
and participation from all segments of the society. However, elements of Malay
nationalism embodied in those three major polices, that were hoped to strengthen Malay
identities in the national agenda of constructing a Malaysian nation, were seriously
questioned and challenged by the non-Malays. The most obvious challenge was
directed at the National Cultural Policy, which after more than two decades since its
inception, still could not be practically implemented. On the other hand, the education
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and language policy, despite being contentious, have been able to proceed. The NEP,
though, had to face various criticism for its Bumiputeraism tendencies, yet managed to
survive its twenty year period. The NEP has brought about a number of significant
changes in the socio-economic landscape of Malaysia's plural society.
Apparently, the Malay nationalist project culminating in those three national
policies was in collision with the real-politik of ethnicity that prevail in Malaysia's
plural society. Since the political structure of the polity is based on the consociational
formula, the Malays despite their political supremacy, have to accommodate to the
aspirations of the non-Malay communities. Failing to adequately respond to the non-
Malays' aspirations would result in the weakening of the consociational pact as the
protest votes would served to the advantage of the non-Malay opposition parties.
Likewise, insufficient attention to Malay aspirations would also result in PAS
capitalizing on Malay grievances thus making electoral gains against UMNO. This
would result in the erosion of the Malay power-base in government. Therefore, the
real-politik has always been to strike a fine balancing act to accommodate these
centrifugal tendencies that prevail in the society. The discussion in this chapter also
demonstrated that there was no coherent direction in the project of nation-building in the
post 1970 period, as more attention was given to managing ethnic conflict and
promoting ethnic harmony rather than constructing a viable framework for nation
formation. To what extent Vision 2020 and the notion of constructing the Ban gsa
Malaysia which was officially introduced in 1991, could serve the said purpose is yet to
be seen. Nevertheless, before this can be further examined, it is crucial that the roots of
the varying perceptions between the Malays and the non-Malays on the project of
nation-building are explored, in order to establish the parameters upon which the
viability of the notion of Bangsa Malaysia can be assessed. This task shall be carried
out in the subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
IMAGINING THE NATION I : THE MALAYS AND THE BUMIPUTERAS'
IDEAS OF A NATION
6.1 Introduction
The discussion in previous chapters has demonstrated that, despite various
difficult threats and challenges, Malaysia has been quite successful in sustaining its
fragile consociational polity established since 1957. In other words and to be more
specific, despite the most severe threat posed by the May 1969 incident, its political
system survives, and indeed emerged stronger as a result of several political reforms
made in the post 1970 period. Nevertheless, similar reforms in nation-building
culminated in three major national policies discussed earlier aimed to build a cohesive
social fabric of the society has not been so successful in contrast to the state-building
agenda. The presence of strong centrifugal forces in the form of ethnic political
mobilisations constitute the greatest challenge for the project of nation formation in
Malaysia. It is argued that it is the ideological contestations of an 'ideal' form of a
nation that underpinned ethnic political mobilisations in Malaysia.
The present and the succeeding chapters therefore, will attempt to analyze the
social origins of ideological contestation of the Bumiputera and the non-Bumiputera
communities with regard to the ideas of 'nation-of-intent'. The discussion in this
chapter will first, examine how the Malays grapple with the notion of Bangsa Melayu as
the basis of 'nation of intent' throughout the development of Malay nationalism. This
would illuminate the notion of Malays as the sole owners of the Tanah Melayu, and
their self-proclaimed position as the Bum iputera (sons of the soil). It is imperative to
comprehend how the notion of Ban gsa Melayu has become the focal point of identity
and loyalty for the Malays as this constitute a crucial foundation in the understanding of
the roots of Malay nationalism. Exploring the social origins of Malay nationalism is
crucial since it was Malay nationalism that transformed the Malays into political
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conflict group, first against the British, and later against the non-Malays in constant
attempts to sustain Malay political supremacy.
The chapter also examine how and why the three key attributes of `Malayness':
bahasa, agama dan raja (language, religion [Islam], and royalty) played a yital role
within the factions of the Malay nationalist movement in the past, and still have a
profound influence in contemporary Malaysian politics. Apart from that, the cleavages
in the Malay notions of nation-of-intent are also examined. If pre-independence Malay
politics saw a 'tug of war' between the conservative Malay nationalist and the Malay
Left, the post independence arena was dominated by the contestation of the notion of
Malay dominant state held by UMNO and the Islamic notion of nation championed by
PAS. Besides, the discussions also assess as to what extent the rise of Kadazanism and
Ibanism poses new challenges (at least in Sabah and Sarawak) to the dominant idea of
Bangsa Melayu as the basis of nation-of-intent especially in the post 1980 period.
These challenges question the resilience and efficacy of Bangsa Melayu and Islam as the
definitive element in the construction of Malaysia's national identity.
6.2 Exploring the notion of Bangsa Melayu as a 'nation'
The rise of Malay nationalism in the 1920's was attributed to the disruptive
political, economic and social pressures which had resulted from British colonial rule
and the influx of mass immigration of Chinese and Indians to Malaya since the late 19th
century. The rising nationalism was marked by a crisis of Malay self-identity. This
crisis of identity culminated in the question posed by Malay intellectuals of the time of
defining who or what should constitute the Bangsa Melayu (see Roff, 1967; Ariffin
Omar 1993). 1 Indeed, in the development of Malay political history the term `bangsa'
was a problematic concept, as it was used to denote people, race, ethnic, community,
nationality, state, or nation (Ariffin Omar,1993; Badriyah Hj. Salleh,1994). The term
could refer to any one of those meanings, depending on the context it was used.
Nevertheless, the discussion here attempts to examine the notion of Bangsa Melayu as a
From the 1920's until independence Malay intellectuals such as Shayk Mohd Salim, Za'aba, Rahim Kajai and Ishalc Hj.
Muhammad as well as a number of Malay press such as Al-Imam, Warta Malaya, Majlis and Utusan Melayu were involved
in agonise public debate on the question of who should be called the Bangsa Melayu'. Among some key points in the
debate were the issues of Melayu versus Peranakan, that isthe question of whether the notion of a Bangsa Melayu should
include (1) those self-proclaimed Malay from Indian blood descent (Darah Keturunan Keling-DKK) and Arab blood
descent (Darah Keturunan Arab-DKA); (2) Islam as a bonding factor; (3) or the Malays socio-economic deprivation as a
basis for the unity of the 'Bangsa Melayu'. (see Roff, 1967; Ariffin Omar 1993)
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'nation' based on sociological definition of the term employed in this study. According
to Anthony Smith (1989:342) the 'nation' is 'a named community of history and
culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common
legal rights'. Smith (1986) maintains that nations are not necessarily a. modern
phenomena, but rather originated from older ethnic ties. In other words, nations and
nationalism are also the products of pre-existing traditions and heritages which have
coalesced over generations (Smith, 1996a, cited in McCrone, 1998:15). In short, while
'ethnic group' refers to peoples' relationship with a particular group based on several
ascriptive characteristics, 'nation' is viewed as groups' attachment to the state
(Eriksen,1993:6). As such, the distinguishing feature of the 'nation' is its political
relationship to the state. To what extent does this definition fit with Malays' conception
of the Bangsa Melayu as a nation?
For the Malays, political life prior to independence was not centred on a 'state',
but rather on a lerajaan' (A.C. Milner, 1982). The concept of 'state' was not yet a
familiar one in Malay political culture. Although there exist several Malay 'negeri' or
states (as understood in the modern context), these negeri could be considered as states
only after the advent of British colonial intervention. 2
 It was during the colonial rule
that state boundaries were demarcated, collection of revenue was done, and a modern
administrative system was introduced to fulfill the needs of a modern state. Ariffin
Omar (1993:4) suggests that, 'although for administrative purposes the British saw the
negeri as states, they were aware that in the minds of most Malays, it was the kerajaan
that mattered'.
Apparently, the Malays perceived their political conditions in terms of the
'Kerajaan', in that they considered themselves to be living in a community oriented
around a 'Raja' who was not only the focus of loyalty but also the affiliation of
religious and psychological significance. To Milner (1982), the Malay word for
'government', 'state' or 'kingdom' is kerajaan. As such, since kerajaan means 'being
in the condition of having a 'Raja', most Malays considered themselves to be living not
in so many states but under individual 'rajas' (A.C. Milner,1982:8-9). In this regard,
the notion of Ban gsa Melayu could categorically fit with the definition of the term
2 In Malay term, the term ' negeri ' should be properly distinguished from ' negara'. Whereas the latter refers to 'a State' or a
'Country', the former denotes a 'state' which is a smaller political territory such as in the context of several small states
which made up a bigger 'Federal State'.
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nation as explicated by Smith (1989). In spite of not having a mass education system as
pre-requisited (since mass education was not possible prior to independence), enough
other characteristics listed by Smith existed within Malay society for the community to
be considered as a 'nation'. The Malays have in common, a shared culture and history;
a `negeri' and a lerajaan' as a unified territory; a traditional agricultural economy; and
common political and legal duties for the Sultan and the Kerajaan.
By having all those characteristics, the Tangsa Melayu' could be viewed,
(though, not as it was understood in the modern context), as a 'nation' even prior to
independence. However, what existed then, was not a single nation, but rather several
'nations' centred upon distinct `negeri' and lcerajaan' within the nine Malay states. To
echo Smith's view, the nation emerged from the social and historical roots of ethnie and
was not necessarily a modern phenomenon or a product of modern capitalism and
industrialism (1986:169-173). Smith also notes that nationalism as a collective
resistance to foreign rule may exist with or without a nation (1971: 175). In this regard,
Malay nationalism that found its momentum in 1930's could be seen as a collective
attempt to reconstitute and rejuvenate the notion of the Ban gsa Melayu as a nation as a
result of colonialism and the threat of encroachment from immigrant communities.3
Nevertheless, Badriyah Haji Salleh (1994) argued that the position of the Malays as a
'sovereign nation' has been reduced to an 'ethnic community' when the question of
citizenship began to influence the politics of nationalism and independence in the post
war years. She pointed out that this has been subtly consolidated by the term used in the
government census in 1947 in describing about Malaya's population which saw the
Malays categorised as one of the ethnic group along with the Chinese and the Indians.
This categorisation continued to be used in all the censuses conducted in Malaysia until
today. Thus, the relevant question to ask is to what extent the Malays still regard
themselves as a `bangsa' or only as an 'ethnic community'. If they still considered
themselves as a `bangsa' then this would complicate the process of constructing the
' It has always been implicit in studies on Malay nationalism that political awakening among the Malays began to take shape
in 1920's when they were confronted with problems of 1929 economic depression, retrenchment in government
employment, administrative decentralisation and challenges from the growing number of immigrant population as
exemplified in the 1931 census. Indeed, the 1931 census was a shocking moment for the Malays as they realised that sheer
number alone threatened their position against the immiggrant communities. This, as a result led them to organise
themselves into political or quasi political movement to assert their position and building-up political consciousness among
the Malays. (See: Roff, 1967; Ratnam, 1965)
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Bangsa Malaysia' as Malaysia would concurrently have 'two bangsa'- Bangsa
Melayu' and the Rangsa Malaysia'. We shall examine this later.
By the end of the nineteen century the British has integrated the nine Malay
states into two systems of administration known as Federated Malay States (FMS) and
Unfederated Malay States (UMS), while a territory without a Raja was called Straits
Settlement. However, this initiative did not lead to the creation of a single Malay
nation. State parochialism or primordial loyalty to the negeri based kerajaan was still
strong among the Malays. Rustam A. Sani (1976:34) suggests that, despite several
attempts from the negeri-based political organisations to unite the Malays in the 1930's,
'the nation of intent for their version of Malay nationalism took the form of 'statist'
notion of the nation' .4 In this regard, the statist notion of a nation viewed the Bangsa
Melayu in terms of their relationship with the distinct negeri or kerajaan. This was a
manifestation of state's parochialism that prevailed at the time. In other words,
although anthropologically the Malays belong to one ethnic stock, politically they (at
this particular juncture) viewed themselves as distinct communities based on their
relationship with their respective Raja and Kerajaan. Ariffin Omar (1993) notes that,
up to the outbreak of the Second World War, every attempt to unite the Malays
politically and develop a broader-based nationalist movement ended in abject failure.
This failure was attributed to several key factors such as the divisive issues of Melayu
versus Peranakan, state parochialism, and disapproval by the traditional elite and the
British of Malay mass involvement in politics (see Roff,1967; Ariffin Omar, 1993).
The first attempt to develop the notion of Bangsa Melayu as a nation
transcending the 'statist' notion of a nation came from the Malay Left in the Kesatuan
Melayu Muda (KMM- Young Malay Union) in 1938. Using the slogan of the Melayu
Raya (Greater Malay Nation-State), Ibrahim Yaacob, the leader of the KMM called
upon the Malays 'to rise as one bangsa who possesses a civilisation and refinement who
will at the very least become one bangsa... in the south of the Asian continent, living in
its homeland' (cited by Ariffin Omar,1993:20). To Rustam A. Sani (1976:34), the
KMM concept of a nation clearly was more inclined towards an 'ethnicist' notion of the
4 Rustam employed Smith's interpretation to carefully distinguish between the 'statist' notion and the 'ethnicists' notion of a
nation. The 'statist' basically define the nation as a territorial-political unit. Nationalism becomes the aspiration of the
colonised population for self-government of the new political community whose boundaries were established by the
coloniser. 'Ethnicits' per contra, see the nation as a large, politiced ethnic group, defined by common culture and alledged
descent. (See: Rustam A. Sani 1976:34; Smith,1971:176)
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nation, that is to unite the Malays based or ethnicity transcending the negeri-based
concept of a nation, thus emerged as an ethno-nationalist movement which viewed
Malaya-Indonesia confederation (the Melayu Raya) as a larger political entity-hence a
basis of the 'nation-state'.
The vision of the KMM was to overthrow the British and bring about political
unification between Malaya and the Dutch colonial territories under the Melayu Raya or
the Indonesia Raya concept. This attempt manifested the frustration of Malay
intellectuals of the Left with the narrow-minded state parochialism that exist within the
Malay communities. It is worth noting that the Melayu Raya concept was not intended
to sustain the kerajaan based nation, but instead to establish a Republik Indonesia Raya
(Firdaus Abdullah,1985). As such, it could be seen as an anti-kerajaan notion of a
nation. Perhaps, this explains why the Malay Left has not been successful to garner
wider support among the Malays as their political struggle failed to relate to Malay
traditional relationships and sentimental attachment to the kerajaan. Their aim, as
stated earlier, was to unite the 60 millions Malay populations throughout Malay
Archipelago and liberate Malaya from colonial domination and the growing notion of
'imagined Malayan community' amongst the Chinese and the Indian in the 1930's.
As early as the 1920's some of the Chinese (especially the Straits Chinese) have
claimed that as 'Malayans' they have become inseparable with this country, and thus
entitled to political rights (Clive J. Christie,1996:37). However, the Malays did not
recognize the term and considered the non-Malays as foreigners who had no rights in
the Malay states. For example, Rahim Kajai an ardent proponent of Bangsa Melayu as a
'political imagined community', called upon the British High Commissioner in the late
1920's to stop the bangsa-bangsa asing (lit, the foreigners or the immigrant peoples)
from claiming rights in the country (see: Ariffin Omar, 1993:18). With the flowering of
Malay journalism since then, the wave of Malay nationalism was able to be extensively
promoted. This is parallel with Benedict Anderson's (1983) observation that 'print
capitalism' constitutes a vital contributive factor in the rise and spread of nationalism
and the idea of 'imagined community'. The significant development that need to be
noticed here is that the conflicting ideas of 'imagined political community' or nation-
of-intent between the Malays and the non-Malays had emerged as early as in the late
1920's. Nevertheless, the effective role played by the British as the 'pacifier' and the
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'arbitrator' was able to avert open political confrontations. Above all, they (the Malays
and the non-Malays) have yet to transform themselves into political conflict groups.
The conflicting notions of nation-of-intent between the Malays and the non-
Malays worsened in the aftermath of the sudden capitulation of the Japanese Army in
August 1945. The rise of the Bintang Tiga (lit. the Three (Red) Star), the Chinese
communist guerrillas from the MPAJA to seize power in Malaya before the arrival of
the British troops sparked immense fears among the Malays about the possibilities of
losing their political power to the Chinese. They were alarmed about the future of their
Rulers, religion and their identity as a nation. In an attempt to establish a communist
state in Malaya, the Bintang Tiga guerrillas intended to destroy the Malay kerajaan. The
conservative Malays and many of the Malay masses who were outraged by the violent
communist activities, perceived the MPAJA's aim as the greatest danger to the survival
of the Bangsa Melayu. Since the kerajaan has a crucial role in representing Malayness,
namely their identity, religion and culture, a threat to this so-called Malay noble
traditional institution (either real or imaginary) would inevitably provoked Malay
counter reactions. The Malays rose to defend their 'homeland', and several clashes with
the communists occurred. Indeed, as demonstrated, the two weeks' rule of the Bintang
Tiga over Malaya has severely damaged Sino-Malay relations in the country (Cheah
Boon Kheng, 1983). Further bloodshed was averted as the British troops swiftly
returned to take control of the situation.
The pre-World War II political scenario in Malaya saw not only a divergence of
the notions of nation of intent held between the Malays and the non-Malays, but beyond
that there was already some fragmentation within Malay nationalist movements. Apart
from the strong sentiment of state parochialism, political differences that existed
within Malay nationalist movements also divides the community. On the one hand
there was the Malay Left, which had to draw its strength and legitimacy in direct
confrontation with the colonial powers; and on the other there were the conservatives
who were supported by traditional and aristocratic centres, and whose symbols were
effectively incorporated into the colonial regime. The sharp ideological contrast was
very apparent between the two Malay nationalist movements. While the Malay Left
wanted to establish the Melayu Raya; the conservatives led by the `administocrats' on
the other hand were pro the Bangsa Melayu and the kerajaan based nation, and fought
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within the framework of the colonial structure. The irreconcilable differences between
the two nationalist groups were more apparent in the course of the Malayan Union
controversies. Although the return of the British with the Malayan Union scheme
temporarily reunited the two groups, the sharp ideological contrast between the two
nationalist movements set them apart only two months after being together within the
UMNO' s framework which was established in May 1946. Initially, UMNO was
established as a coalition of various Malay organisations in Malaya before later turning
itself into a political party to fight for independence.
The Malays' revolt against the Malayan Union was based on the perception that
the new political structure would inevitably resulted in diminishing the positions of the
Kerajaan and the Bangsa Melayu as the basis of the nation. Apart from that Albert Lau
(1991) notes that, the Malayan Union project was 'to favour the Chinese - a policy
which correspondingly, and necessarily, detracted from the pre-war policy that favoured
the Malays' given the war-time sacrifices of the Chinese community (Albert Lau,
1991:279). However, for the Malays the common citizenship rights to all the peoples of
Malaya and the unitary structure of the Malayan Union system of goverment would
deny the pre-war protective agreement signed between the British and the Malay Rulers
and as a result have grave consequences upon their political status as the indigenous
people of Malaya. Indeed, this was the aim of the British, as noted in the colonial file:
the Sultans in the future must be made to become 'harmless puppet' in order to circumscribe their
ability to undermine the overriding objectives of union and common citizenships.
(Gater to Stanley, 19 May 1943, CO 717/147 no. 52001/I, cited in Stockwell, 1979:32)
For the first time in the development of Malay nationalism, the Malays were united
when all the state-based Malay organisations were brought together under the banner of
UMNO to oppose the Malayan Union. The slogan of 'Malaya is for the Malays' and
1-lidup Melayu' (Long Live the Malays) were among popular catch-phrase to call on the
Malays to unite as one 'bangsa' in opposing the Union scheme. The establishment of
UMNO within the premise of the Sultan of Johor Palace on 11 May 1946 to oppose the
Malayan Union was a hallmark of UMNO relationships with the Kerajaan.
The Malay Left (then, represented in the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya-
PKMM or Malay Nationalist Party-MNP) who at the initial stage were together with
UMNO however left the coalition after realising that UMNO's opposition to the Union
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scheme was only to return to the pre-1941 political status-quo and not to accelerate the
pace towards Malaya independence and achieve unity with Indonesia as envisaged in
their Melayu Raya vision. As such, the Malay Left's desire to liberate Malaya was
incompatible with that of UMNO's limited objective to restore the kerajaan ar41 return
to the status-quo. For the Malay Left, the logical alternative, then was to separate and
pursue their different objectives accordingly. Dato' Onn, who led the Malays in UMNO
came from an `administocraf background and was more concerned with the future of
the Malay Rulers whom he perceived have been deceived by the Mac Michael Treaty,
the implication of which threatened the position of the entire Malay ban gsa. He was not
defending the Sultans per se but rather the institution of the Sultans as a guarantee and
symbol of Malayness vis-à-vis the Malayan Union. Therefore, defending the Sultan
meant, protecting one of the basic element of the Bangsa Melayu identity. Worth
mentioning however, though the Malays wanted to keep the Sultans for symbolic
reasons, they always have 'practical' problems with them in reality. In the post
independence period, several crises occurred between the government and the Rulers at
various level resulted in further erosion of the latter's constitutional power first in 1983
and later in 1993. Nevertheless, despite the crises, the institution survives and UMNO
as the backbone of the government has been able to maintain a relatively 'good'
working relationship with the Malay Rulers.5
With the establishment of the Federation of Malaya in place of the Malayan
Union, the pre-war institutions of the kerajaan and Malay negeri were restored and the
notion of Bangsa Melayu as the basis of the nation was recognised by the British.
Indeed, the notion of Bangsa Melayu which the Malays had long attempted to
conceptualize has been legally defined by the Federation Constitution. 6 The non-
Malays had to undergo a more stringent procedures before being considered citizenship
rights in contrast to the jus soli principle proposed in the Malayan Union scheme. All
these developments led the conservative nationalists in UMNO to receive formal
5 See Harold Crouch (1997:142-8) for detailed discussions of the ups and downs in the government and the Royalty
relationship since 1970's.
6 What constitute a Malay was defined by the Federation Constitution of 1948 (and this has been maintained in the
independent's constitution and remain valid until now) as a person who:
(i) habitually speaks the Malay language
(ii) professes Islam as his/her religion
(iii) conforms to Malay custom
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recognition as the sole political representatives of the Bangsa Melayu, which thus
strengthened their position in subsequent political developments.
While the British were preoccupied with a counter-insurgency campaign to fight
the communists, along with efforts to isolate the Chinese from the movement, the Malay
Left suffered grave political setbacks as many of their leaders were incarcerated and
their organisation disbanded based on allegations of their association with the
communist. By contrast, UMNO continued to assert its political influence and
supremacy within the Malay communities and was preparing to demand a more serious
political concession leading to Malaya's full independence. This was possible because
UMNO' s immediate agenda was successfully attained, namely, the dignity of the
kerajaan has been reinstituted and the position of the Ban gsa Melayu reaffirmed as
enshrined in the Federation of Malaya Constitution. Obviously, the Malayan Union
controversies has resulted in several important developments in Malay nationalist
movement. State parochialism was put aside and the Malays emerged much more
united, as crystallized in UMNO as the new political vehicle for the nationalist struggle.
Although the leftist movement continued to co-exist alongside UMNO, the British
recognition to the latter and the former's inability to garner wider support from the
Malays gave added advantage to the `administocraf led nationalist movement.
Although the enactment of the Federation of Malaya Constitution reinforced the
notion of Ban gsa Melayu as the basis of the nation, the desire to transform this into the
creation of a Malay nation-state in Malaya did not materialize. The British, nevertheless,
were more inclined toward making Malaya a 'plural nation' based on two obvious
reasons. First was the ongoing arms conflict with the communist who were mainly
Chinese in character. And second, the fact that there exist a considerable number of
immigrant communities already prepared to settle in Malaya. Denying these immigrant
communities a rightful place in post independence Malaya would only served to the
advantage of the communists who have made several crucial impact both domestically
and internationally (USSR, China, North Korea, Indo-China and so on). UMNO
therefore, had to make several fundamental compromises to accommodate with the
notion of the 'pluralistic nation' as envisaged by the British, if they were to play a major
role towards and beyond Malaya's independence. As a result, the party was not able to
pursue the notion of 'Malay nation-state' but rather had to operate within the framework
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of a 'Malay dominant-state', within the super-structure of Malaya's plural nation. At
the same time, UMNO had to cope with the challenge posed by PAS, an Islamic based
political party established by the ulamaks, who left UMNO in 1951 on the grounds of
disenchantment with the party's secular-nationalist leanings. PAS then, constituted
another division in Malay nationalist movements, whose aim was to establish an Islamic
state in Malaysia. Thus, PAS had its own notion of nation-of-intent, namely the
creation of an Islamic nation. Post independence Malaya has seen that apart from the
political challenge posed by the non-Malays who preferred a more `pluralised'
Malaysia, UMNO had to consolidate Malay nationalism with fundamental principles of
Islamic ideology, given the growing popularity of PAS as an alternative political party
among the Malays, at least in three Malay heartland states of Kelantan, Terengganu and
Kedah.
6.3 UMNO, Malay nationalism, and 'Malay-dominant' thesis
The British had indicated that independence would only be granted so long as
UMNO was willing to accept the real-politik of plural society and working in
partnership with the non-Malays in governing Malaya. 7 It was this factor that prompted
Dato' Onn, the founder of UMNO, in his enthusiasm to secure an earliest possible
independence to propose to open the party to the non-Malays. However, Onn's attempt
to turn UMNO into a multi-ethnic party was rejected by its members. Consequently, he
had to relinquish his position as party leader and later quit the party. Although the
Malays owed him so much for his stand against the Malayan Union, they were not
prepared to sacrifice their interests for the sake of the leader's vision. UMNO rank and
file felt that accepting non-Malays in UMNO tended to imply the abandonment of
Malay special rights and would also make it difficult for UMNO to champion the cause
7 According to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the British foresaw that this condition would not be easily met by the Malay
nationalists and the non-Malay political elites at the time simply because the political and social divisions between the two
communities were very apparent. As such, this would allowed the British to prolong their stay in Malaya to protect colonial
economic interests. However, UMNO later proved that the party was ready to cooperate with the non-Malays under the
Alliance partnership as demonstrated in the 1952 Kuala Lumpur Municipal election and later in the first election of the
Federation Legislative Assembly in 1955. With that, indepenedence became inevitable as the basic condition laid by the
British has been met. (Interview with Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie)
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of the Malays (Means, 1976:125). Onn's vision was to make UMNO pave the way for
the development of non-communal or non-ethnic politics in Malaya.8
At a glance, his vision may appeared not very dissimilar to the notion of
'Malayan nation' envisaged in the failed Malayan Union project which Onr) fiercely
opposed. However, Onn tended to define a 'Malayan' by reference to the Malays, in
that the non-Malays would be accepted as full citizens of Malaya only after they had
proved their loyalty and had measured up to certain standards (Means, 1976:133).
Whereas, under the Malayan Union scheme a blanket approval of citizenship rights
would be given to all regardless of ethnicity, let alone 'loyalty'. However, UMNO were
not convinced with his rhetoric and were not ready with his intention to change the party
as the United Malayan (instead of Malay) National Organisation, and so led the way for
the creation of the 'Malayan nation', something which they had just successfully
opposed a few years back. UMNO clearly rejected the idea as the fire of Malay
nationalism set by Onn in 1946 has made them to envisage and identify the party as the
vehicle of Malay nationalist struggle towards the construction of a 'Malay nation-state'.
Nevertheless, since the British has made it clear that any future political
framework for Malaya must take into consideration a significant participation of the
non-Malays, Tunlcu Abdul Rahman who succeeded Onn had to opt-out to perpetuate a
'plural society nation' which Onn envisaged earlier when he negotiated independence
with the British. But in contrast to Onn who wanted to make UMNO a multi-ethnic
party, Tunku instead worked out a political cooperation with the non-Malays through
the Alliance framework which was first experimented in 1952 Kuala Lumpur Municipal
election, and later proved to be workable in the 1955 first Federation election. As such,
UMNO's notion of establishing a Malay nation-state has to be modified to suit with the
political reality that prevailed. Nevertheless, Tunku insisted that while UMNO was
ready to accept the idea of a pluralistic nation, the concept has to be based on Malay
political dominion led by UMNO as the pillar of the government. This has been
UMNO's notion of a nation from 1957, until Mahathir officially introduced the notion
i
of Bangsa Malaysia in 1991.
8 According to Means (1976) Dato' Onn remarkable change in his political stance was a by-product of his involvement in
the Communities Liason Committee established by the British in 1949 to alleviate the immediate causes of inter-ethnic
friction in Malaya, in particular the Sino-Malay relations. (pp. 122-134)
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As far as nation-building was concerned, what UMNO and the government have
been pursuing since independence was national integration or national unity within the
framework of a pluralistic nation (Shamsul AB, 1996a). When Tun Razak took over
UMNO leadership from Tunku Abdul Rahman (as well as became Malaysia:s second
Prime Minister) he continued the same framework of a plural society nation. The same
framework prevailed under Hussein Onn leadership as the third prime minister. Whilst
the three major national policies namely the NEP, National Education Policy, and
National Cultural Policy can be seen as attempted to turn nation-building into an ethnic
project, this has not been successful for various obvious reasons, despite several
important improvement made in the upliftment of Malay socio-economic well-being.
Therefore, it was clear that the project of nation formation was still operating within the
framework of national unity and perpetuating the notion of plural society nation. The
Bumiputeraism policy culminated in the NEP, and elements of Malayness such as
Malay language, Malay culture and Islam which were emphasized in the Education
Policy and the National Cultural Policy only served to perpetuate and strengthen Malay
symbolism and identity within the framework of Malaysian plural society. In short, the
framework of 'pluralistic nation' has not changed since it was created in 1957 despite
the revitalisation of Malay nationalism in the aftermath of the 1969 incident until 1991
when Mahathir officially introduced Vision 2020 and the idea of constructing the
Ban gsa Malaysia. Clearly, what UMNO was more concerned about was to sustain
Malay political dominant or ketuanan Melayu, and to pursue policies leading to the
upliftment of Malay socio-economic well-being in face with the ascending economic
power the Chinese community.
Although Malay nationalism gave birth to UMNO and remained an important
notion for the party, it could not be regarded as UMNO's political ideology per se.
Ahmad Fawzi Basri (1992) notes that it is 'pragmatism' that controls UMNO's political
thinking.9 UMNO has not been strictly dictated by the ideology of Malay nationalism
in its political struggle as the dominant political party in the post independence
Malaysia. `UMNO's programmes are always ad hoc and change according to
circumstances' (Fawzi Basri, 1992:375). Fawzi observes that in 1970's UMNO made
9 See the meaning of 'Pragmatism' in Horance Standish Thayer (1968)- Meaning and Action: A critical History of
Pragmatism (cited in Ahmad Fawzi Basri, 1992:375)
163
`Developmentalism' its ideology. However, in the 1980's upon confronting with PAS's
Islamic fundamentalism which attacked nationalism as against Islamic teaching,
Mahathir reinstated Malay nationalism in a different form by introducing Islamisation
programmes in his administration, while at the same time claimed that UMN • was the
third biggest Islamic party in the world (Fawzi Basri, 1992). By so doing, Mahathir was
attempting to reflect that UMNO' s nationalism and Islamic thinking were far more
progressive yet moderate in contrast to PAS's retrogressive, narrow-minded, divisive
and extreme interpretation of Islam.
Pragmatism in UMNO became more apparent when Mahathir in 1997 reiterated
that, `UMNO's struggle changes according to time and its objectives may also change to
suit with the needs and problems that it faced at any point in time' (Utusan Malaysia, 12
May 1997). However, he insisted that, 'what remains unchanged is the party spirit and
struggle to ensure that the Malays achieved equal status with other developed nations
around the world' (Utusan Malaysia, 12 May 1997). This statement implied several
important meanings. Mahathir indicates that political ideology is not an important
matter for the party, as it may change according to circumstances and priorities that the
party faces at any particular juncture. However, the party is determined to ensure that
Malays continue to improve their socio-economic backwardness in order to sustain their
political dominance. In other words, UMNO will remain primarily a Malay-based
political party to protect and pursue Malay interests, and in so doing, may adopt
whatever ideology suits its purpose in order to ensure that Malay political primacy and
hegemony unaffected. Although Mahathir has popularised the notion of Ban gsa
Malaysia in his vision 2020 and urges Malaysian to eschew ethnicity in order to
construct the Bangsa Malaysia (The Star, 11 September 1995), as far as UMNO is
concerned, no changes has so far occurred in the party suggesting that it is eschewing
ethnicity. Whilst UMNO has shown some flexibility in accepting non-Muslim
Bumiputera when it was expanded in Sabah in 1992, the party remain a Malay party.
Nevertheless, the notion of Bangsa Melayu as it was previously perceived is changing
under Mahathir's leadership. This became apparent especially in the post 1990 period.
To ensure that Malays continue to be dominant politically and thrived
economically, Mahathir has redefined the notion of Bangsa Melayu and urges the
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Malays to transform themselves to be the Melayu Baru' (the New Malay). 1 ° This came
out in November 1991 during UMNO Annual General Assembly, several months after
Vision 2020 and the notion of Bangsa Malaysia were unveiled. Melayu Baru simply
means that, Mahathir wanted the Malays to be, 'capable of meeting all challenges, able
to compete without assistance, learned and knowledgeable, sophisticated, honest,
disciplined, trustworthy and competent.' To him the true Melayu Baru is a new breed of
self-made men, 'individuals [who] through their own efforts and skills.., will achieve
progress' (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991b). This implies that Mahathir intended to
persuade the Malays not to rely so much on their constitutional rights and government
assistance, but instead to pursue economic success through their own efforts and
strength. According to Rustam A Sani (1993), the notion of Melayu Baru was
Mahathir's answer to some section of the Malays who were doubtful as to whether the
Malays would have a proper place among other Malaysians in an industrialised
Malaysia when Vision 2020 was attained. Although a new sense of self-confidence has
emerged among the Malays as a result of several important achievement made through
the NEP, Rustam A. Sani (1993) observed that some Malays still wonder whether they
can really benefit from the construction of Bangsa Malaysia and Vision 2020.
Therefore, Mahathir's notion of Melayu Baru was a reaffirmation that the
Malays
would have their rightful place not as participant, but indeed as a 'definitive community' in the
context of Bangsa Malaysia, provided they are willing to transform themselves to be the
Melayu Baru.
(Rustam A. Sani, 1993:86-87)
Positively speaking, the Malays have to change their socio-cultural milieu in order to
face the tough challenges of modernisation and industrialisation, if they were to survive
politically, and thrive economically. The notion of Melayu Baru is also in line with the
government's objective to induce 'the creation of an economically resilient and fully
competitive Bumiputera community' and 'the healthy development of a viable and
robust Bumiputera commercial and industrial community' (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a).
This is the group, together with the existing 'new' middle class which were largely
'engineered' by the state according to the logic of Malay parity with non-Malays since
I ° See Rustam A. Sani (1993); Muhammad Haji Muhd Taib (1993) and Zakry Abadi (1993) for an elaborative discussions
about the notion of Melayu Baru.
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1970 that would lead the way to the creation of the Melayu Baru (Khoo Boo Teik,
1995).
More importantly, Mahathir reckoned that this is also the class in whom he
believes the future of the Malays can be entrusted, none than any other class within the
community. Khoo Boo Teik (1995) notes that, this would 'complete [the] rehabilitation
of the Malays [and they] can now be seen in their rise as a class able to claim parity with
the non-Malays and the rest of the world'. As such, ' [F]rom the point of view of
Mahathir and his Melayu Baru, the prehistory of the Malays has ended' and `...by
extension, the history of Ban gsa Malaysia may perhaps begin' (Khoo Boo Teik,
1995:338). This observation by Khoo Boo Teik is interesting as recent development in
UMNO indicates the growing influence of the Malay business and corporate class,
broken the long time domination of the `administocrats' within UMNO. While UMNO
still retain itself as mass political organisation which draws its membership from
amongst the Malays of various socio-economic background, however, in the 1990's the
important role played by the business and corporate class within the party became more
apparent. The rise of Mahathir as UMNO's President marked this changing phenomena
within UMNO. To a large extent, this group (the business and corporate class) was seen
as increasingly becoming important power broker within the party by virtue of their
close affiliation with UMNO's top leadership. The emergence of the phenomena of
'money politics' within UMNO was largely attributed to the dominant role played by
this new class who effectively consolidated their wealth to secure important position in
the party (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). Above all, the outpouring criticism of the so-called
'corruption', 'cronyism', and 'nepotism' in Mahathir's government which became
popular catch-phrase following the 1997/98 economic and political crises were also
linked to this group.
The rise of Mahathir as UMNO President broke the party's long time association
with the administocrat leadership. Although in 1987 there was an indirect attempts to
revive this link culminated in Tengku Razaleigh's challenge to Mahathir's presidency,
the attempt has not been successful." Mahathir survived, despite winning the contest
11 Tengku Razaleigh is a veteran UMNO politician who has a strong feudal background as he is an uncle to the present
Sultan of Kelantan. The differences between Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh can be seen not only in terms of their
background, but also in the context of their worldview on various socio-economic aspects. Both men were UMNO Vice-
President in 1976. But when Tun Razak passed away in 1976, Hussein Onn who took over as Malaysian Prime Minister
chose Mahathir as his Deputy Prime Minister. In UMNO leadership election of 1987 Tengku Razaleigh who was then
166
with a very small margin. In fact, Tengku Razaleigh, despite his strong feudal
background is also a wealthy businessman who have long been associated with Malay
business and corporate class within the party. Mahathir, who is a physician by training
came from a middle class family. By contrast, all his predecessors were Britisb trained
lawyers and came from the administocrat background. These differences in family,
educational and professional training background between Mahathir and his
predecessors may perhaps explained some of his outstanding political acts and
orientations." Following the bitter fight between Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh in
1987 which caused split in the party, top party leaders had reminded party members to
exercise restrain in practicing democracy in UMNO. With that came repeated call that
leadership contest at the top was not necessary (Shamsul AB, 1998). Instead, it should
be left to the natural process of succession just like the practice of big business
corporation. UMNO consolidated the notion of the Melayu Baru and its new middle
class image to behave more and more like a big corporation.
It is apparent that the socio-political landscape of the Bangsa Melayu is
changing under Mahathir leadership. Though Malay Rulers remained important as far as
the Malays and their constitutional rights are concerned, their existence are perhaps felt
much more as a symbol of Malay identity vis-a-vis the non-Malays than anything else.
UMNO under Mahathir's leadership, had twice engaged in a bitter constitutional crisis
with the Rulers, which resulted in several important prerogatives and constitutional
powers of the royalty curtailed and some of these powers transferred to Parliament and
to the Executive." These episodes were something which had never happened under his
Minister of International Trade and Industry joined force with Musa Hitam, Mahathir's first ex-Deputy who resign a year
earlier from Mahathir's cabinet for various differences with the premier, to challenge Mahathir's leadership. The party was
clearly divided between Team A (led by Mahathir) and Team B (led by Tengku Razaleigh. (See: Shamsul A.B. (1988:170-
88); and Mohamad Abdad Mohamad Zain (1988:22-41)).
12 Jon Swain wrote in the Sunday Times London (28 November 1993) that Mahathir has made an art form of snubbing the
Anglophone world because his nationalism almost certainly stems from his early education, when he failed to gain admision
to read law in Britain. Khoo Boo Teik (1995:10) noted that Mahathir left medicine for politics only to practise politics as
medicine'.
13 The first Mahathir crisis with the Malay Rulers occurred in 1983 over the issue of royal assent to Parliamentary Bills and
the power of the King to declare state of emergency. The crisis resolved when the executive and the royalty reached a
compromise, in which the latter retained its prerogative of declaring an emergency and the former would be able to
implement its Parliamentary Bill as Law after 30 days the Bill was submitted to the King with or without the royal assent.
The second crisis in 1993 was related to the conduct of the Rulers and their legal immunity, after several civilian were
assaulted by the Sultan of Johor and his heir to the throne which resulted in the establishment of special court to implement
legal proceeding against the Rulers. As such, they were no longer enjoyed legal immunity before the law. (see Chamil
Wariya, 1993)
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predecessors despite some ups and downs experienced between several state
governments and the Rulers over times. Indeed, some perceived (and this has been
made part of opposition parties' attack on the government) that following the 1993
Constitutional amendment to trim the power of the royalty, Mahathir was made a new
'feudal lord' in Malaysian politics. 14
 At the peak of the 1983 crisis with the royalty,
Mahathir even stated that the future of the Malays lie in themselves and not in the Raja
(Chamil Wariya, 1992). Although the institution of the Sultan remain important, the
political role of the traditional kerajaan was transferred to the Malay led government
with UMNO as the backbone. This took place in 1957 when the system of
Parliamentary Democracy and Constitutional Monarchy introduced in Malaysia. In this
regard, UMNO's crucial role was to safeguard the interests of the Bangsa Melayu and
simultaneously served to sustain the symbol of Malay relationship with the notion of
the kerajaan. These constituted important political and symbolic roles that UMNO was
entrusted with and had always attempted to portray to the Malays.
Mahathir has attempted to convince the Malays that economic success is a
decisive factor that will determine their political, cultural, and language position in the
future (Rustam A. Sani, 1993; Shamsul A.B. 1996b). He insisted on many occasions
that the propagation of Islam as a progressive religion would be meaningless if the
Malays who constitute the majority of the Muslims in Malaysia still live in the
condition of economic backwardness (see: Khoo Boo Teik, 1995:34-46). This clearly
implies that for Mahathir, linguistic nationalism, the Sultans, Malay culture and Islam
are not as important as economic nationalism if the Malays were to survive in the
industrialising multi-ethnic Malaysian society. In other words, and according to the
logic of Mahathir, the three pillars of Malayness, namely Bahasa, Agama dan Raja may
not be as important as Malay economic relationship with the state. The important
question to ask is: Is Mahathir then suggesting that economy should form another
attribute of Malayness, or perhaps the most important one in contrast to the Bahasa,
Agama, dan Raja?
Mahathirs's notion of Melayu Baru represent a reassertion of Malay economic
nationalism and Malay economic relationship with the state. To some analysts (Rustam
14 Interview with Subky Latiff
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A. Sani, 1993; Khoo Boo Teik, 1995; and Shamsul A.B. 1996b), this is the notion that
Mahathir has been trying to instill among the Malay middle class since he assumed
leadership in UMNO and in the government. However, whilst many Malays may
recognised the importance of the economy for the community, some are less excited
with the idea of pushing aside other attribute of Malayness into the background.
Indeed, Shamsul A.B. (1996b:333) argues that:
Mahathir's concept of a nation and national identity is beginning to be perceived as problematic by
the so-called 'nationalist faction' within the bumiputera circle of bureaucratic intellectual. [They
have articulated their disenchantment]... with Mahathir attempt's to introduce English language at the
tertiary level, his attacks on the Malaysian royalty, and perceived these move as subtle attempts to
'deconstruct' Malayness.
The criticism made against the 1996 Education Act as discussed in previous
chapter and the so-called Mahathir's 'liberalisation' policy in the post 1990's are clear
evident of this contestation. To Mahathir's critics, this is a serious threat to the very
existence of Malayness 'three principal pillars, namely bahasa, agama dan raja
(Shamsul AB, 1996b:333). To Khoo Boo Teik (1995), this is what Mahathirism is all
about and he contended that Mahathir 'is the most Malay nationalist of his generation',
yet 'transformed himself into a new Malaysian nationalist' (p.9). Given the trend that
exists in UMNO, namely the decline of 'traditionalism' in the party (Fawzi Basri, 1992),
the propagation of the notion of Melayu Baru, and the government's continuing efforts
to induce the enlargement of the Bumiputera commercial and industrial communities,
the next millennium would inevitably witness a dramatic change to the Malays' socio-
political outlook and their worldview as a community. Whether this would bodes well
towards the construction of the Bangsa Malaysia or otherwise is yet to be seen.
Obviously, the rapid process of modernisation and industrialisation added with new
thinking and perceptions anchored by Mahathirism and Vision 2020 would certainly
shaped new facet of the Bangsa Melayu, and thus, the notion might ultimately deserved
a re-examination or perhaps redefinition. Indeed, some of these aspects have begun to
emerge following the economic and political crises that occurred in 1997/98 which saw
Mahathir and UMNO were seriously criticised on various grounds, largely by the Malay
middle class engineered by the party over the past two decades. This has operated to the
advantage of PAS, UMNO's long time political arch-rival, whose political influence
among the Malays has seen a dramatic increase following the twin crises and also
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perthaps as a result of Malay disenchantment with the perceived dilution of the three
principal pillars of Malayness, under Mahathir's led government over the years.
6.4 PAS, Islamic fundamentalism and the notion of 'Islamic nation'.
	 .
As argued earlier, UMNO is not an ideologically-based political party, but
rather, thrives on pragmatism. In facing the growing challenge from PAS, UMNO has
always been prepared to portray itself as a party which is also championing for the cause
of Islam, but at the same time do not neglect about the interest of the Malays. The fact
that PAS has not been able to form an alliance with non-Malay political parties, while
UMNO has been sharing power with the other communities since the past four decades,
reflects the latter's image as a moderate political party in the eye of the non-Malays.
Although UMNO has articulated the government's Islamisation programmes since
Mahathir came to power, these have not altered the party's image as a moderate,
democratic and secular political party. I5 As such, quite often, PAS was singled out by
UMNO as a fundamentalist and fanatical political party propagating Islamic extremism
in the country (see, Hussin Mutalib, 1990).
PAS was a 'foetus' first conceived by UMNO, but left its 'parent' in 1951 to
survive on its own after discovered that the secular leanings of the latter were
incompatible with its religious vision. The formation of PAS also gave Malay radicals,
who had adopted a low profile after the emergency was declared in 1948 and numerous
leftists detained, the opportunity to re-surface (Alias Mohamed, 1994:202). The first
Islamic party to be established in Malaysia was not PAS but Hizbul Muslimin which
was formed in 1948, however the party was banned by the British during the
emergency. Naturally, when PAS was established, many of the disbanded Hizbul
Muslimin members joined the party, together with some of the prominent figures in the
Malay Left movements. Dr. Burhanuddin, the MNP leader who was known for his
Melayu Raya vision, also joined the party and was made its President in 1956.
Is Since Mahathir came to power in 1981, he has introduced Islamisation programmes in Malaysia, partly, in coping with the
phenomena of Islamic resurgence around the globe as a result of Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. His success in
persuading Anwar Ibrahim - known internationally as a dinamic Islamic youth leader, to join UMNO in 1982 (later to
become Mahathir's heir-apparent until he was sacked in September 1998) has intensified UMNO's Islamic image. This
could be seen as part of Mahathir's political strategy in neutralising Islamic fundamentalism propagated by PAS in the wake
of Khomeini Islamic Revolution in Iran. Among the programmes which have been implemented since then, were the
assimilation od Islamic values in government administration, the establishment of Islamic International University, Islamic
Bank, Islamic Insurance, and Islamic Pawnshop. (see Chandra Muzaffar, 1987; Zainah Anwar, 1987; Hussin Mutalib
1990)
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Although PAS was formed by the ulamaks who left UMNO, led by its first President
Haji Ahmad Fuad, throughout its development until early 1980's the party's ideology
was Islam-cum-nationalism (see: Funston, 1980; Hussin Mutalib, 1990; Alias
Mohamed, 1994). This was evident in the speech made by Dr. Burhanuddin upon
defending his involvement in the nationalist movement before joining PAS in which he
stated:
Many people are confused with the word `assabiyyah'. They equate it with nationalism and they thus
say there is no nationalism in Islam... Actually assabiyyah connotes fanaticism or parochial
tendencies or communalism, and these are not the same with the broader interpretation of
nationalism which is supported in Al-Quran.
(cited in Kamarudin Jaafar, 1980:97-98)
Indeed, PAS has chosen to indulge in ethnic chauvinism in its rivalry with UMNO to
capture Malay voters support since its first engagement in electoral politics in 1959.
Some of the issues that had been raised by PAS which could reflect its chauvinist
tendencies in the 1950's and 1960's were accusing UMNO as leaning towards the non-
Malays to the detriment of the Malays; demanding that the clause 'the country belongs
to the Malays' be included in the Constitution; that UMNO had sold out Malay rights;
and that non-Malays should be excluded from top political and military positions (Milne
and Mauzy, 1980; Funston, 1980; Hussin Mutalib, 1990). Clearly, the Malay-Islam
dialectic was PAS's early ideological background until the Old-Guard in the party was
toppled in 1982 by the Young Turks (Mauzy, 1982) or the Islamic 'purists' (Alias
Mohamed, 1994), eager to change the party into a truly Islamic political movement.
Although PAS was successfully persuaded by Tun Razak to join the BN
following the 1969 tragedy in the name of Malay unity and to reduce excessive
politiking, the decision made by its top leadership was not well received by several
PAS's key figures who later left the party • 16 Datuk Asri Haji Muda, then the party
President, in defending his action in bringing PAS into the BN, argued that the move
was for the sake of Malay unity, and 'this demonstrates yet again that PAS, in spite of
its Islamic ideals, could not totally discard its Malay ethnic mould; that ensuring Malay
dominance was more important than spreading Islamic humanistic and universal
principle' (Hussin Mutalib, 1990:110). Nevertheless, this marriage of convenience
between UMNO and PAS did not last very long before PAS divorced itself from the BN
16 Those who left the party includes former Secretary General Abu Bakar Hamzah, Amaludin Dams (Pas Senator for 15
years) and Ahmad Fakhruddin (former party Youth Leader).
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in 1977 following a political crisis in Kelantan, the east-coast state which has been
under its control since 1959) 7 The crisis led UMNO to capture the state in the 1978
election which brought to an end PAS's eighteen years legacy in Kelantan until it
recaptured the state in 1990. The 1978 general election was the biggest PAS qlectoral
disaster in its history as a political party. Hussin Mutalib (1990:111) notes:
the year 1978 was also significant for PAS in that it heralded a major transformation in the
nature and composition of the party leadership- from one which emphasized Malay dominance
to one which championed the Islamic identity."
The 1978 PAS electoral disaster has mounted criticism on Asri 's leadership in
the party. The rank and file criticized PAS leadership not only on the grounds of its
decision to join the BN, but also because of the party's failure to force the government
to implement Islamic laws in the country while it was in the coalition. Several
important developments took place domestically and internationally between 1978 to
the next general election in 1982, which worsened the leadership crisis in the party. In
1979, Islamic government was established by Khomeini in Iran following the success of
Islamic revolution which saw the collapse of the Shah Pahlevi dynasty. This event
generated mix feelings around the world about the phenomena of Islamic resurgence.
For many of the establishment in Muslim countries and the West, the developments in
Iran laid the prospect of the spread of the idea of Islamic revolution and was perceived
as a very serious threat. However, those committed to Islamic ideals welcomed this
event with a sense of euphoria. In 1981, Mahathir took over the leadership in UMNO
and became the new Malaysian Prime Minister. Shortly before the 1982 general
election, Mahathir had successfully brought Anwar Ibrahim, a charismatic ABIM
17 The crisis in the state of Kelantan occurred after PAS disaggreed with UMNO's choice of Datuk Mohd Nasir as the state
new Chief Minister. The majority of PAS Kelantan State Assemblymen past the vote of no confidence to him and even took
the case to the court which finally led to chaotic political situation in the state. As a result, the Federal Parliament past the
emergency law in Kelantan and put the state under Federal rule for sometime until fresh election was held in 1978 which
saw the end of PAS 18 years rule in the Kelantan. (see: Alias Mohamed, 1994)
18 Shortly before the 1978 election, two prominent leaders from ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Islamic Youth
Movement of Malaysia) namely, Fadhil Noor and Nakhaei Ahmad joined PAS to contest the election. According to ABIM
sources, the entry of these two leaders into PAS was endorsed by ABIM's syura (consultative committee) to help revitalised
PAS as a political movement after the bitter crisis in Kelantan which force the party to leave the BN (Fawzi Basri, 1992).
Fadhil later became the party President, and Nakhaie who was the party Secretary general in the 1980's, however joined
UMNO in early 1990's. As an Islamic-based NGO, ABIM then led by Anwar Ibrahim saw that PAS's electoral losses would
weakened Islamic cause in Malaysia, thus it has a moral duty to help the party for the sake of Islam. Indeed, ABIM until the
admission of Anwar Ibrahim into UMNO was very symphatetic to PAS's struggle. Apart from Anwar's charismatic
leadership, ABIM gained its credibility as the voice of dissent on Islamic matter when PAS was in the BN (Chandra
Muzafar, 1987).
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leader, into UMNO. This development was a big blow for PAS as the party was hoping
that Anwar, who for many years was affiliated with the Islamic struggle, would joined
the party instead of UMNO (see: Hussin Mutalib, 1990). All these developments only
led the younger and more radical group or the 'Young Turks' in PAS to feel that radical
change was badly needed in the party if PAS were to survive as a relevant Islamic party.
They were greatly displeased with the manner in which Islam had been subordinated to
Malay culture and nationalism under Asri's leadership. Apart from that, they perceived
that Asri's leadership could not match Mahathir's dynamism in UMNO, which gained
new strength following Anwar Ibrahim's participation in the party. Although the 1982
general election saw PAS fairly improved its performance, this could not saved Asri's
leadership, which was brought to an end in 1983.
Alias Mohamed (1994:182) notes that, although Haji Yusoff Rawa, another PAS
Old Guard was made the party President after the departure of Asri, he was considered
as 'no more than a figure head' who was exploited because of his personal grudged with
the former leader. However, Fadhil Noor- the Deputy president, Haji Hadi- the Vice
President and Nalchaie Ahmad- the Secretary General, all of whom were former ABIM
leaders, dominated the party. I9
 This gave ample opportunity for the Islamic 'purists' 'to
inject radical Islamic values into the party' (Alias Mohamed, 1994:182) and to make
necessary changes in the party's struggle. 2° Most importantly, 'the new leadership
quickly introduced a more fundamentalist element by declaring the political goal of
PAS to be the creation of an Islamic state' (Alias Mohamed, 1994:182). Besides,
UMNO was branded by PAS as un-Islamic because of its `assabiyyah' tendencies or
struggles on the basis of Malay nationalism which was perceived as against Islamic
teaching.
UMNO in its counter reaction, contended that Malay nationalism is not
`assabiyyah', an answer which echoed Dr. Burhanuddin's speech made in 1956 upon
defending his earlier involvement in nationalist struggle before joining PAS and
appointed as the party's third president (Fawzi Basri, 1990; Hussin Mutalib, 1990). As
19 Nakhaie Ahmad left PAS to join UMNO in 1989. Presently, Fadhil Noor is the party President and Haji Hadi Awang is
his deputy. The latter is Member of Parliament for Marang and the former is Kedah State Assembyman for Bukit Raya.
20 The party structure was revamped and a new structure introduced to remodel PAS's struggle after that of the new Iranian
regime under the mullah. This was evident in the creation of the 'Dewan Ulamak' (Council of Islamic Clergy) which was
empowered to issue rulings on religious matters and was complementary to the party's Central Committe.
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a result, new ideological clashes surfaced between `UMNO Islam' and 'PAS Islam'.
The politics of 'Holier than Thou' was being made a 'trademark' of PAS struggle
against UMNO in an attempt to garner wider supports in Malay heartland states, namely
Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu (Fawzi Basri, 1992:158-59). To a certain Went PAS
leaders tried to influence the Malays by proclaiming PAS as Tarti Allah' (Hizbullah or
the Party of the Almighty God) (Muhamad Abu Bakar,1987:159; Fawzi Basri,
1992:163). UMNO however argued that PAS should not be equated to Islam for the
latter is a holy religion, yet the former is just a political party using Islam as a mean to
achieve its political end (Utusan Malaysia, June 30, 1979). The conflicts and divisions
between the two Malay parties had severely affected the Malays in rural areas. 21
 In fact,
extremism in PAS had surfaced since the Ulamak took over the party culminated in the
infamous Yat-wa Haji Hadi' in 1984 which branded UMNO `kafir' or an 'infidel'
organisation and whosoever dies in the struggle against UMNO is considered a `matyr'
(Mukhtar Che Ali, 1985:60). As a result of the fatwa tensions arose between the party's
followers and UMNO members at the grass-roots level
After Haji Fadhil Noor took over PAS leadership, the image of the Ulamak rule
in the party was further enhanced. PAS's vision to establish an Islamic state in
Malaysia becoming more evident after Kelantan was recaptured in 1990 and retained in
the 1995 general election. Since then, the party has attempted to implement the strict
Islamic syariah law known as lludud' in the state. However, this was proved
unsuccessful, as it needs the Federal Constitution to be amended before it can be
implemented. The Federal government has been determined not to allow such an
amendment to take place. To UMNO, PAS's Hudud was based on the party's
interpretation of Islam and was thus not representing a true teaching of Islam. Above
21 In several areas in Terengganu and Kelantan PAS's members boycotted the Imam (prayers leader) appointed by the local
religious authority and instead put on their own Imam. In several places in those two states the incidence of 'two Imam'
occurred in which PAS and UMNO supporters perform the prayers simultaneosly but separately under their respective
Imams. Separate burial ground for PAS members were also created by PAS members; the party members marriages to an
UMNO members had to be solemnized twice, first by the government Imam and then by the PAS Imam. Apart from that
there were also reports that marriages broken because of husband and wife supported different political party. There were
also instances when PAS members refused to eat meat from animal slaughtered by UMNO man. The root causes for all
these incidence was the believe instilled by PAS leaders among its followers, especially that of Haji Hadi so-called fatwa'
(doctrine) that UMNO members were infidel because UMNO separated politics from religion and their struggle was based
on nationalism and not Islam. The worst occured in 1985 when PAS's 'hardcores' clashed with police in Kampong Memali,
Kedah in an incident which claimed eighteen lives, and twenty-nine injuries, following attempts by the police to arrest their
local leader- Ibrahim 'Libya' under the Internal Security Act, on charges of causing a threat to national security. (See: Safei
Daud, 1997; Mukhtar Che Ali, 1985:60;Alias Mohamed, 1994:183).
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all, it does not taken into account the real-politik of multi-ethnic and multi-religious
nature of Malaysian society (Alias Mohamed, 1994; Hussin Mutalib, 1990). PAS's
concept of an Islamic state was based on the idea that the country would be
administered with Quranic principles, the Sunnah (the Prophet traditions), and.the Syura
(the Consultative Council consist of the Ulamaks). Islamic law would be applied to all
the people, Muslim and non-Muslim.
PAS also declared that our nation is 'Islam' (Harakah, 5 May 1997). In that,
PAS' s President Haji Fadhil Noor asserted that, 'whosoever accepted Islam, they are
considered as our 'nation' regardless of ethnicity, colour or creed'. To him, PAS's
conception of a nation does not relates to descent, blood ties and so on as suggested in
the Western concept of 'nation" (Harakah, 5 May 1997). As such, it was evident that
PAS has its own notion of nation-of-intent, namely the Islamic nation, in contrast to
UMNO's notion of Malay dominant state or Mahathir's vision of the Melayu Baru and
the Bangsa Malaysia. In an interview with Haji Fadhil Noor, he explained PAS's
notion of an Islamic nation.
In Malaysia, the word Malay is synonymous with Islam, that is a person would not be considered a
Malay if he renounced Islam or no longer a Muslim. In other words, a Malay must be a Muslim. That
is how the Constitution defined Malay. However, Islam does not belongs to the Malays, instead it is a
universal religion. Therefore, if we take Islam as our nation, it could accept anyone regardless of
his/her ethnic origins. A non-Malay cannot be a Malay even though he/she might wish so, but Islam
can accept anyone of any ethnic background. When the prophet's companion, Salman of Persia was
asked from which nation he belongs to, his answer was that my nation is Islam. Islam cut across any
other nation. Islam can unite people of different ethnicity, culture, and language. The Islamic state
does not means that all its citizen should be a Muslim. There will be non-Muslim in it. The most
important thing in the governing of an Islamic state is the implementation of justice to all the people.
It is the question of justice that mattered most to the non-Malays in Malaysia, and Islam can provide
a better framework for justice to prevail in this coun tly22
While some non-Muslims may recognised the concept of universalism of Islam, to what
extent is the notion of Islam as a nation acceptable to the pluralistic society in Malaysia?
Has the concept of the universalism of Islam propagated by PAS convinced the non-
Malays that the party is a non-ethnic political party given the fact that the party is
dominated by the Malays. If UMNO itself seems to be very reluctant to openly
declared that it has an intention to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia, given its
refusal to amend the Federal constitution to allow the PAS-led Kelantan state
government to implement the Hudud law in the state, to what extent would the non-
22 Interview with Haji Fadhil Noor in Alor Setar, 24 April 1997
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Malays be impressed by PAS's vision to create an 'Islamic nation' in the 'Islamic State
of Malaysia'?
To the DAP, Islamic state is unconstitutional and detrimental to the multi-ethnic
characteristics of the country. In the words of the DAP leader:
Islamic state would be a divisive and disruptive event in the country. Even the non-Muslim
Bumiputera would reject it. To be a secular state does not mean that we reject religion. We recognize
that Islam is the official religion of the country, but other religion should be allowed to be peacefully
practiced in the country.23
The DAP has constantly uttered its unequivocal rejection to the idea of establishing an
Islamic state in Malaysia. The infamous remark of 'over my deadbody' made by
Karpal Singh (DAP Deputy Chairman) during the 1990 general election to quash the
BN allegations (especially from the MCA and the Gerakan) that the DAP was
supporting PAS to establish an Islamic state perhaps still fresh among many
Malaysians. This had and will always remained the most contentious subject as far as
PAS and the DAP relationship was concerned. Even to other non-Muslims in Malaysia,
the subject remained sensitive. Whilst many non-Malays may well aware that Islam is
the official religion of the country, they perceived that the country was established on
the basis of a secular democratic system. Dr. Ranjit Singh argues that:
As far as Islamic revivalism do not penetrate into the appendages of government, people will not see
it as a threat to the existing system. But if it lead to an Islamic oriented government or Islamic
structured government, then the non-Malay communities will feel threatened. The big question here
is whether Islam is imposed onto the people. If the political system orientation is moving towards
Islam there will be two kind of repercussion. One will be from the international community, and the
other is its implication on ethnic relations in the country. Malaysia still need an inflow of foreign
capital to sustain its economy to achieve Vision 2020. Any changes in the political system leading to
the creation of a theocratic state would not be favourable for foreign investment. Therefore, I do not
see that even Anwar Ibrahim who is known for his Islamic idealism would be able to transform
Malaysia towards an Islamic state if he ever become the Prime Minister. Neither do any other
leaders. There are so many difficult obstacles that lay ahead if this is to be carried out.24
Indeed, there are many other crucial questions that PAS still need to answer
about the structure, and the implication of the establishment of an Islamic state with
regard to the position of the non-Muslim in the Islamic government and in the Islamic
system as a whole in order to convince them and the rest of Malaysians alike about its
ultimate political objective. Does the notion of an Islamic state would mean that only a
Muslim could be a member in the Islamic government? Explaining this, PAS President
argues:
23 Interview with Lim Kit Siang
24 Interview with Dr. Ranjit Singh
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Yes, that is the practice. How could someone who does not commit and practice Islam supposed to
formulate and implement policy that is in accordance with the Islamic teachings. How could an anti-
socialist person being included in a socialist government? Can someone who opposes democratic
principle be included in a democratic government? So what is the unusual thing about the principle
of an Islamic government. This is the practice in the Iranian Islamic Republic which saw the non-
Muslim represented in the parliament but not in the government. What is of more important is the
implementation of justice.25
To provide answers is one thing, but to effectively convinced the non-Malays to support
the idea is totally a different matter. PAS realize that this has never been an easy task
for the party given the non-Malays confusion about its struggle, let alone facing with the
government propaganda machine. In the words of its President:
We accept the fact that this is not an easy task as other political and religious organisations
representing the Christians, the Buddhists, and the Hindus have constantly opposed the idea of an
Islamic state. But as far as we are concerned, the capability and the effectiveness of any endeavour
to propagate Islam very much lies with the government as it has fund and machinery, and more
importantly the power to achieve this end. However, the BN government may have a different view
as they believe that their socio-economic development programmes is the key to national unity. PAS
fully aware and realize about the difficulties that we faced, given the prejudices and
misunderstanding about Islam and furthermore having had to face with the propaganda from our
opponents and the media.76
PAS argued that UMNO fail to forge a solid national integration despite various policies
and programmes it has implemented over the past forty years. Therefore, PAS
questioned:
On what basis UMNO is going to unite the people. Malay nationalism has failed. Nationalist would
never forgo its own language for the sake of economic gains and pave the way for other languages to
supersede the national language. Is multilingualism a basis for Malaysian nationalism? Malaysian
nationalism has never existed. All we have is communalism and ethnic politics. So what is the basis
for unity then? That is why PAS believe that Islam can be the alternative. Anwar Ibrahim attempted
to Islamise UMNO by joining the party in 1981, but he has not been successful in doing that.
Indeed, his Islamic image has been tainted since he joined the party. We have predicted this before,
and it is happening now. I think if the present framework of political and economic development
continued, it is hard to imagine how the country can achieve the vision of creating a Bangsa
Malaysia in the year 2020.27
It is apparent that PAS rejects UMNO's ideas of a secular democratic state as currently
practiced in Malaysia, and the idea of an ethnic-based nation or Malays as the basis of
the nation envisaged by UMNO leaders. PAS saw that even by having Anwar Ibrahim
in the government, UMNO has not been able to convince them that UMNO is heading
towards creating an Islamic state in Malaysia, what more after he was rejected from the
party. Therefore, the party will continue with its struggle and oppose UMNO on this
25 Interview with Haji Fadhil Nor
26	 .
opcit
27 Interview with Haji Subky Latiff, member of PAS Central Committee.
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ground. PAS also blamed UMNO for its failure to interpret and effectively implement
Islam, and thus preventing the non-Malays from turning to Islam as an alternative
approach for nation-building, despite having the power and authority to do so. In fact,
UMNO's attitude towards Islam was seen as adding to the existing misconception about
the religion among he non-Muslims. 28
 Nevertheless, PAS on the other hand fail to
convince the non-Malays that it is not a Malay party using Islam as an ideological
platform, and so has not been able to attract supporters other than Malays. By contrast,
UMNO in an attempt to 'show how tolerant its 'Islam' is, has joined the non-Malays to
condemn PAS for 'abusing' Islam' (Shamsul A.B., 1996a: 20) and wrecked Malay unity
in the country.
Although PAS is committed with Islamic ideals, the party in many instances has
shown that it was also concerned with matters pertaining to Malay interests. The party
will criticize the goverment if and when it perceived that there was a threat to Malay
interests resulting from any of the government actions. For example, the PAS joined the
efforts of Malay intellectuals in condemning the government for passing the 1996
Education Act and 1996 Private Education Institutions Acts on the ground that both
Acts poses serious threat to the position of the Malay language and Malay interests in
genera1.29
 Apart from that the party also staunchly opposed the policy of privatising and
corporatising higher education as the policy was seen as denying the poor people's right
for education. PAS is championing a policy of free education for the people." In short,
PAS who advocates the politics of 'Holier than thou' and the notion of an Islamic state
will continue to attack UMNO's secularist and nationalist leanings. Therefore, the
contestation between `UMNO Islam' and 'PAS Islam' would continue to prevail in
Malaysian politics so long the two parties compete for political support.
The Islamic faction represented by PAS which offers concept of an 'Islamic
nation' demonstrates a division within the Bumiputera communities' notion of nation-
of-intent. This division has been further deepened when the dominant Bumiputera
ethnic groups in Sabah and Sarawak neither proved to be beguiled by UMNO's notion
of Malay dominant state, nor to be enchanted with PAS's idea of Islamic nation, but
instead envisaged the notion of Kadazanism and Ibanism/Dayakism as the basis of a
28 Interview with Haji Fadhil Noor - PAS President
" Ibid
30 Interview with Haji Subky Latiff
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'nation', at least in those two Borneo states. Although the notions of Kadazanism and
Ibanism only involved the peoples in Sabah and Sarawak, the impact of the movement
should not be underestimated, as it could seriously affect the Federal-state relations and
national integration the moment it gained political momentum and wider support from
the masses.
6.5 The Challenge of Kadazanism and Ibanism
Kadazanism and Ibanism (Dayakism) 31 are terms refer to the nationalist
sentiment developed within the Kadazan and Iban ethnic groups to exert their political
rights vis-a-vis the Muslim Bumiputera and Federal government political hegemony in
Sabah and Sarawak. One of the important elements underlying the rise of Kadazanism
and Ibanism is the demographic factor which has seen a more complex ethnic
composition in Sabah and Sarawak than in the Peninsular Malaysia. In these two states,
the non-Muslim and non-Malay Bumiputeras are more dominant demographically in
comparison with the Muslim Bumiputeras and the Malays. 32 Nevertheless, as far as
political power is concerned, the non-Muslim Bumiputeras perceived that politics in
these two Borneo states tend to be dominated by the Muslim Bumiputera groups who
were backed by the Peninsula's Malay political might. The Chinese, though, who
constitute neither the majority nor the minority ethnic group, emerge as an important
'power broker' whose support is crucially vital for any of the Bumiputera groups
intending to dominate the local politics of Sabah and Sarawak.
Kadazanism and Ibanism therefore, could be seen as a form of 'ethnic
nationalism' exploited and manipulated by the Kadazans and Ibans political elites to
challenge the Muslim-Bumiputera political domination of Sabah and Sarawak after
Malaysia was formed in 1963. At times, these sentiments, especially Kadazanism, was
31 The Dayaks are commonly refers to The Ibans (Sea Dayak), Bidayuh (Land Dayak) and Orang Ulu ( a collection of
smaller groups such as the Kayans, Kenyahs, Kelabits, Penans and other indigenous), whose proximity may be defined in
terms of their socio-cultural similarities. The majority of the Dayalcs have either remained practitioners of their traditional
beliefs or embraced Christianity. (see: Jayum A. Jawan, 1994; and Ave and King, 1986) In this regard, lbanism and
Dayalcism refers to the same movement led and dominated by the Ibans and the terms therefore, are used interchangeably.
32 In Sabah, the Bumiputera ethnic groups made up 57 percent of the state's population of 1.2 million in 1986. The detail
breakdown is as follows: Kadazans (mostly non-Muslim) 20 per cent; Muslim Bajaus 10 per cent; Muslim Malays 7 per
cent; and Muruts (mostly non-Muslim) 3 per cent. The Chinese form 15 per cent of the total population with others such as
Indians, Sikhs and so on making up the remainder (see: BH. Shafruddin et. al, 1988). For Sarawak, of the total estimated
population of 1.6 million in 1988, the Bumiputeras form about 70 per cent while the Chinese constitute 29 per cent and
Others 1 per cent. Among the Bumiputera groups the Ibans constitute 30 per cent; Malays 21 per cent; Bidayuhs 8 per cent;
Melanaus 6 per cent; and Orang Ulus 5 per cent (see: Jayum A. Jawan, 1994).
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clearly directed against the Federal government to 'free' Sabah from the so-called
'colonisation of the Semenanjung' (the Peninsular Malaysia). Apart from the
demographic factor, many of the Kadazan and the Iban leaders considered that
politically, the status of Sabah and Sarawak are different from that of the other.Malaysia
states. Loh Kok Wah (1992:227-8) notes: 'some harboured the opinion, still very much
alive today, that Sabah [and Sarawak] had entered into arrangement as an equal partner
with the Federation of Malaya'. Sabah and Sarawak were the parties of the signatories
to the London Agreement and as such, 'should not be treated as 'one of the thirteen'
states, less be dominated by Kuala Lumpur' (see also: Pairin Kitingan, 1986; Joseph
Kitingan, 1987; Searl, 1983; and Jayum, 1994). This also implied that if the Malays are
the 'definitive' ethnic group in the Malay peninsula, the Kadazans and the Ibans
therefore are the 'definitive' peoples in Sabah and Sarawak (see: Loh Kok Wah, 1992).
In other words, Kadazanism and Ibanism could be seen as ethnic Kadazan and
Iban notions of nation-of-intent to counter the expansion of the Peninsular Malay
political dominant thesis into Sabah and Sarawak. Although there are some similarities
between the notions of Kadazanism and Ibanism, it is rather inaccurate to regard the
political pattern and trends in Sabah and Sarawak are identical. There are major
differences between these two states. In Sabah, the Kadazans managed to translate their
favourable population numbers and proportion of state legislative seats into control of
the government as demonstrated in the era of the PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah- United
Sabah Party) rule from 1985-1994. in Sarawak, since the end of the
Stephen Kalong Ningkan reign in 1966, the Iban demographic dominance 'has yet to be
translated into political supremacy at the state level' (Jayum A. Jawan, 1994:237). As
the political scenario in Sabah and Sarawak is somewhat varied, the development of
Kadazanism and Ibanism are therefore, best explored separately to grasp a better
understanding of its significance in terms of the competing notions of nation-of-intent
within the Bumiputera communities in Malaysia.
33 PBS is actually a multi-ethnic party but dominated by the Christian Kadazans ethnic group led by Joseph Pairin Kitingan
who was the Chief Minister of Sabah during the party rule from 1985-1994. Although the party was brought down from
power in the 1994 dramatic Sabah election by UMNO led BN coalition party, however, the party remained as an important
opposition party in Sabah by virtue of its influence in the state and the fact that its continue to hold a considerable number
of seats in the Sabah State Assembly and Federal Parliament.
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6.5.1 Kadazanism
The idea of Kadazanism was first developed by Donald Stephen as an attempt to
unite the non-Malay Muslim and non-Murut Bumiputera of Sabah or the various
`Dusun' (lit. 'orchard' but implying 'country hicks') sub-ethnic groups in Sabah under
one common name as the `Kadazan' ethnic group in the 1960's (see: Roff, 1969; Loh
Kok Wah, 1992). Since this was achieved, Kadazanism has served as an important
symbol of Kadazans political unity culminated in the formation of UNKO (United
National Kadazan Organisation) to forge a counter-hegemonic movement against
Malay-Muslim domination when Sabah joined Malaysia in 1963. The political aim of
Kadazanism was achieved when Donald Stephen was made the first Sabah Chief
Minister after the formation of Malaysia. However, Stephen' tenureship as Sabah Chief
Minister only lasted for two years when tensions built-up between him and the Federal
leader which were attributed to his fascination with Lee Kuan Yew's concept of
Malaysian-Malaysia, and also to his desire to reexamine Sabah's continued
participation in Malaysia after Singapore withdrew from the Federation in 1965. He
was then sent as Malaysia's High Commissioner to Australia, and was replaced by Tun
Mustapha, a Suluk-Muslim, who was the leader of USNO (United Sabah National
Organisation). Form then on, Roff (1969) noted began the 'demise' of Kadazan
nationalism, before it was 'reincarnated' by Joseph Pairin Kitingan in 1985. In the
1980's when the Kadazan dominated multi-ethnic party the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS)
came to power, Kadazan nationalism reemerged and was exploited to oppose the
'Federal government's colonisation of Sabah' and the alleged Federal government
'dishonour' of the 'Twenty Points' of the Malaysia Agreement. 34 This led to tension
being built-up between Kota Kinabalu and Kuala Lumpur, which in the end paved the
way for UMNO to enter into Sabah in 1991.
In retrospect, the re-emergence of Kadazanism in 1985 can be attributed to
several key factors. The Kadazan ethnic group felt that they had been alienated for a
34 Before Sabah committed itself with the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Sabahans had put down a list of conditions to
safeguard certain interests of the state. These conditions known as the 'Twenty Points', covered a wide range of issues
which hoped to preserve some of the state autonomy when the Federation of Malaysia was formed. Though, the Twenty
Points question was considered resolved when Sabah State Constitution drafted and the Federal Constitution amended in
1963 to accomodate the Sabahan wills, the PBS accused the Federal government of not honouring the Twenty Points
aggreement.
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very long time. Under Tun Mustapha's USNO regime, the process of `Malayization and
Islamization' (Abdullah, 1976) was perceived by many Kadazans who were Christian as
against the spirit of Malaysia's formation. Malayization and Islamization refer to
continuous efforts by the Sabah state government to foster national unity through the
policy of 'saw bahasa, saw kebudayaan dan satu agama' (one language, one culture
and one religion). As a result, the Kadazan communities felt that the positions of the
Kadazan language, culture and Christian religion were under threat. Even after the
Berjaya Party replaced USNO in 1976, this process of Malayization and Islamization
continued. Although the consciousness and the sense of deprivation were high among
the Kadazans, the lack of strong political leadership capable of effecting a strong
opposition to those policies has hindered them from making significance political
breakthrough.
Nevertheless, as rapid economic growth took place in Sabah from the 1970's to
the 1980's, the state government was able to fund public expenditure in education and
human resource development for the Bumiputera communities in line with the NEP
objective. As such, there emerged a group of intelligentsia and a sizable middle class
within the Kadazan communities who were becoming more critical of their political and
socio-cultural position vis-à-vis the domination of Muslim-Bumiputera and the
autocratic Harris Salleh's government. Loh Kok Wah (1992:237) observes that 'rapid
economic growth was also accompanied by a growth in the system of patronage,
bringing cronyism and nepotism to unprecedented heights in the state'. This was a
situation not very dissimilar from the situation in UMNO's dominated Peninsular
politics. The Harris Salleh leadership and the Berjaya government were seen as a
corrupt and autocratic regime, not very different from its predecessor, the USNO
government. The Kadazans saw that though they constituted the biggest community in
the state, Sabah's growing economy and representation in the state goverment and
bureaucracy were mainly dominated by the Muslim-Bumiputera groups. They felt that
the Kadazans were discriminated and their rights abandoned. Therefore, the perception
which was developed was that they were being 'colonised' by the Federal government,
who were using the local Muslim-Bumiputera elites to achieve the hegemonic objective.
This claim was substantiated when the Labuan Island (which was part of Sabah) was
accorded by Harris Salleh to the Federal government to form part of the Federal
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Territory, without compensation. The perceived Federal government intervention in
Sabah affairs was unacceptable to many of the Kadazans.
The Kadazan also rejected the term Tribumr used by Harris Salleh in official
government reports to denote all the Bumiputera communities in Sabah. To them the
term Tribumi', which also includes the Indonesian migrants and Filipino refugees who
were mostly Muslim, was a deliberate attempts by Harris Salleh's goverment to
increase the percentage of Muslim Pribumis at the expense of the Kadazans. 'They felt
themselves under siege, their distinctiveness being 'defined away' and their claim to be
the 'definitive people' of Sabah being made inconsequential as they came to be
outnumbered' (Loh Kok Wah, 1992:244). Apparently, `...the Kadazans have found
themselves to be subordinated to the Malays and discriminated against in favour of
Muslim natives who also claim to be Malays by virtue of their religion (J. Kitingan,
1984:236-7). Consequently, when Pairin Kitingan was expelled from the Sabah
goverment for his continuous challenge and criticism of Harris Salleh's policies of
pro-Muslim Bumiputera and pro-Federal; the Kadazans counter hegemonic movement
found its momentum. The movement was turned into a political party, and culminated
in the formation of the PBS, shortly before the 1985 Sabah state election.
Pairin leadership in the PBS was supported by the majority of Chinese
community who were also dissatisfied with many of the Berjaya government policies,
especially its pro Muslim attitudes. Berjaya was severely defeated in the election and
when PBS came to power, the notion of 'Sabah is for the Sabahan' was advocated to
promote Kadazanism as the basis of Sabah society. Pairin Kitingan was installed as the
Ilugoun Siou' (the paramount leader) by the Kadazan community, a position once
honoured to Donald Stephen in the 1960's but left vacant since the demise of the leader.
Since the PBS came to rule Sabah, tensions rose between the Muslim Bumiputeras and
the Kadazans. This time around it was the Muslims communities that felt that they were
under-siege from the Christian Kadazans dominated government. USNO's attempt to
revive its position in the state has not been successful despite the support it constantly
received from the Federal government. Although the PBS was admitted to the BN
coalition before the 1986 general election, the relationship between Kota Kinabalu and
Kuala Lumpur was under strain condition following the PBS constant criticism towards
the Federal government pertaining to several issues involving Sabah. This includes the
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petroleum royalty issue, the 1963 merger issues, and the demand for Kadazan-Dusun
language to be taught in school (Walter Raymond, 1995). When the PBS turned against
the BN to support Tengku Razaleigh's led opposition coalition, the Gagasan Rakyat, in
the eleventh hour of the 1990 general election, UMNO decided to go on an 'all out war'
against the party. USNO was dissolved to pave the way for UMNO to be established in
Sabah in 1991. The BN finally brought down the PBS government after a dramatic
Sabah state election in 1994.35
Although the BN finally managed to recapture Sabah also with the help of the
Chinese, 'the fire of Kadazan nationalism seem to be still burning' by virtue of the PBS
ability to capture most of the Kadazan dominated Parliamentary constituencies in the
1995 general elections (Shamsul A. B., 1996a:22). Although the BN was returned to
power in the 1999 Sabah election, the result of the election clearly shown that the PBS
influence in Kadazan dominated constituencies still prevails. 36
 While UMNO dominated
all the Muslim Bumiputera's constituencies, the PBS whose campaigned once again
centred on Kadazan nationalism continued to control Kadazans hard-core areas.
By and large, the Kadazanism that reemerged in 1985 was based on cultural and
socio-economic factors. According to Professor H.M. Dahlan, `Kadazanism reemerged
because the government has not properly resolved the crucial questions of culture
involving the community'. 37 He argued that:
The people in Sabah and Sarawak have accepted the concept of Malaysia with all its great symbols.
But the question is, while accepting Malaysia, do they have to sacrifice their language? Do they
have to see their ethnic culture extinct in their homeland? This is not about political separation. As
long as they do not ask for their ethnic symbols to be made a prime symbol for the nation, the
35 In 1994 Sabah election, the PBS won 24 seats and BN captured 20 seats. However, a short time after the PBS formed the
state government, several of its representative hopped into the BN which finally saw BN managed to seize power and pave
the way for UMNO to have its first Chief Minister in Sabah. As part of the strategy to woo support from the Sabahan voters,
the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir promised that if UMNO and the BN was given the power to rule Sabah, the post of the
Chief Minister of Sabah will be rotated every two years between the Muslim Bumiputera from UMNO, the Chinese and the
non-Muslim Bumiputera from among the BN coalition parties. The promise was made during the election campaign.
Consequently, when the hopping incident led to the collapse of the PBS govemnment, Tan Sri Salleh Said Keruak was
appointed as the first UMNO Chief Minister before the post was handed over to Tan Sri Yong Teck Lee- the first Chinese
Chief Minister of Sabah two years later. The rotation system completed in May 1998 when Tan Sri Bernard Dompok-a
Kadazan, was appointed as the new Sabah Chief Minister until the next state election schedule in 1999. The PBS however
criticised the rotation system, and argued that it will result in the ineffeciency of the government administration. They intent
to do away with the system if the party is return to power. Remarkably, though the arrangement appeared rather odd, the
BN proved that the election promise made was being honoured accordingly. This is one of the uniqueness of contemporary
Sabah politics.
36 The verdict of March 1999 Sabah election gave the BN 31 seats, 29 of which won by UMNO, and the other 2 seats by
PDS, a Kadazan-based multi-ethnic party which a member of the BN coalition. The PBS won the remaing 16 seats. Clearly
ethnic polarisation was evident in that election, and this meant that the Kadazans communities still identify themselves with
the PBS who have still haboured on Kadazanism to win the election.
37 Interview with Professor H.M. Dahlan.
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government has to accept their demand with open heart. All they ask for was to have their language
and culture protected and promoted by allowing the national education system providing some space
for their language taught as an elective subject in schools in Sabah.38
Since this demand has not been properly met, while at the same time they saw the
growing threat of Muslim-Bumiputera domination would result in further erosion of
their cultural markers, political means seems to serve as the most effective ways to
translate the cultural and socio-economic vision of Kadazanism into reality. As a
political ideology, Kadazanism set out to rectify the socio-economic, cultural and
political position of ethnic Kadazan by challenging both the Bumiputera-Muslim
domination and the perceived Federal government excessive interventionist policies in
Sabah. By so doing, Kadazanism was opposed to the notion of the Malay dominant state
staunchly defended by Malay nationalists within UMNO. Despite the existing of several
other political parties representing the interests of the Kadazan-Dusun communities in
Sabah, the post 1985 period saw the PBS emerged as the main political party
championing the cause of Kadazanism. 39 As the Huguon Siou, Joseph Pairin Kitingan
who is also the leader of the PBS has been able to appeal to the Kadazan-Dusun
communities in Sabah to identify themselves with the party despite UMNO's
willingness to open the party to the non-Muslim Bumiputeras in Sabah. To what extent
UMNO could strengthen its power and hegemony in Sabah in face with the 'still
burning' Kadazan nationalism is an interesting development to be seen. UMNO
apparently is consolidating its position in Sabah, whilst the popularity of the PBS
among the Kadazans is still very much alive. Clearly, Kadazanism is still a force to be
reckoned with in Sabah. Given this continued trend, the objective of constructing the
Bangsa Malaysia would certainly be a problematic subject as far as Sabah is concerned.
" Ibid
39 Apart from UMNO and the PBS which are open to all Bumiputera communities in Sabah irrespective of religion, there are
three other political parties which are multi-ethnic in character but mainly dominated by the Kadazan-Dusun communities,
namely PDS, PBRS, and AKAR. The PDS led by Bernard Dompok, and PBRS led by Joseph Kurup, were established
following the hopping incident in 1994, while AKAR was established much earlier. Nevertheless, all the three parties were
established by former PBS senior leader.
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6.5.2 The Ibans and Dayakism
Sarawak politics is quite different from that of Sabah. Political development in
Sarawak prior to the emergence of the PBB saw no single very dominant political party
controlling the state politics. The cooperation between political parties that formed the
state government since the day of the Alliance to the BN was rather fragile. A member
of the government coalition in one legislative term may become an opposition party by
the next election. Therefore, an opposition party in Sarawak may not necessarily remain
in opposition for long. Indeed, there were instances in which a party was a member of
the BN only at the Federal level, but chose to be an opposition party at state level. This
is the background of Sarawak politics. What was rather obvious as far as Dayakism is
concerned is that it is mainly a sentiment leveled against the domination of Melayu-
Melanaus group (Malay-Melanau) in Sarawak politics and the quest to advance the
Iban and the Dayak communities' relative socio-economic underdevelopment, in
comparison to the Muslim-Bumiputeras and the Chinese. It was also an attempt to
revive the Ibans' political supremacy in the state as it previously enjoyed during the
reign of Stephen Kalong Ningkan. Dayakism has not yet exploded as an anti Federal
movement in contrast to Kadazanism. Nevertheless, there was a perception among the
Ibans that the Melayu-Melanaus domination of Sarawak, was supported by the UMNO
leadership in Kuala Lumpur. In short, any attempt to revive the Ibans' political
supremacy in Sarawak would be regarded by Kuala Lumpur as a very serious
development as far as the Federal arrangement and national integration are concerned.
Dayakism is somehow less effective than Kadazanism in terms of its ability as a
political movement to forge a solid political unity among the Dayak communities.
Politically, the Dayaks are less united in comparison to the Kadazans. Dr. Jayum A.
Jawan, an Iban political scientist argues that:
The Ibans and the Dayak communities in general are lacking a strong political culture. It is not easy
for an Iban to accept the leadership of another Iban unless you could proved yourself to be worth
followed. Since the end of Stephen Kalong Ningkan era in 1960's there was no one single Iban
leader who is regarded as the leader for the entire Dayak communities. We do not have the concept
of a 'paramount' leader as the Kadazans have in Sabah. The Dayaks are quite sectorial. Since they
are scattered geographically, this is also strongly reflected in their support to various political parties
in Sarawak. There is no single political party that can claim that it represent the entire Iban or Dayak
communities."
40 Interview with Dr. Jayum A. Jawan
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Apparently the Dayak communities are scattered around several political parties in
Sarawak such as the PBB, SNAP, SUPP and the PBDS. Some argue that this reflects a
deliberate policy to divide the Dayaks, especially the Ibans who constitute the majority
in Sarawak, so that political power can be shared mainly between the Melayu-Melanau
groups and the Chinese. 41
 The break up of SNAP in 1987 which led to the creation of
PBDS could be seen in this light, as Muslim leaders hoped that they could pull as many
Iban as possible into the PBB which was dominated by them. Indeed, most Muslim
Bumiputeras in Sarawak were supporters of the PBB led by Tan Sri Taib Mahmud, an
experienced political leader who has served in Sarawak and in the Federal government
eversince the formation of Malaysia. The Chinese are mainly supporters of either the
SUPP or SNAP. Only a small number of the Chinese were associated with the DAP,
whose political influence in Sarawak is not very much wide spread. Although the PBDS
wishes to be the party representing the Dayak communities, as reflected in its name as
'Para Bansa Dayak Sarawak' (The Dayak Nation Party of Sarawak), this objective has
not been so successful attained. Therefore, unlike the Kadazans in Sabah, the Dayak
communities have not yet been able to exert themselves as a strong political movement
to effect significant change in Sarawak politics. This could be attributed to the lack of
strong political leadership as well as limited financial resources to mobilize the Dayak
communities which are scattered across Sarawak which size is bigger than the size of
the entire Peninsular Malaysia.
Nevertheless, this does not means that politically the Ibans are weak. They have
a strong representation in both Sarawak and Federal government. Historically, it was the
Iban leader that was appointed as Sarawak first Chief Minister when Malaysia was
formed in 1963. In fact, an Iban leader namely, Temenggung Jugah, had also been made
Sarawak Governor when Abdul Rahman Yaacub, a Muslim-Melanau was appointed as
the Chief Minister. However, since the removal of Stephen Kalong Ningkan, a
charismatic leader of SNAP from power in 1966, after a crisis broke-up between him
and the Federal leader, there was no other strong political leadership that emerged from
among the Ibans that captured an overwhelming support from the communities.42
41 Ibid
42 Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Malaysia's Prime Minister was dissatisfied with Ningkan's government which he saw
pursuing several policies which did not benefits the Bumiputeras communities as well as not working towards fostering a
better integration between Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia. Ningkan was seen as helping the Chinese to gain more land
previously owned by the Bumiputeras through his new land policy and law. Apart from that, Ningkan was also very
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Although Ningkan was then, replaced by another Iban leader namely Penghulu Tawi Sli
from another political party, yet, he was regarded as a weak leader. Therefore, Sarawak
government then, was actually controlled by the Muslim-Bumiputeras. As Michael
Leigh put it, `...judging solely from the output of the Malaysian Information Service,
one might have concluded that Abdul Taib rather than Penghulu Tawi was Chief
Minister' (Michael Leigh, 1988:115). In 1970, Tawi Sli was replaced by Abdul Rahman
Yaacob who prior to that served as Federal Minister. Since then, Sarawak politics saw
the domination of the Melayu-Melanaus or the Muslim Bumiputeras group. Although
the Dayak communities had never been excluded from Sarawak government, and many
Iban politicians have been appointed to various post ranging from Deputy Chief
Minister to Junior Ministers, they still felt that the fruits of political and economic
development have been primarily shared between the Melayu-Melanaus and the
Chinese. 'The Sarawak political crisis in 1987 has exposed how the state wealth was
concentrated among family members belong to a specific ethnic groups. ,43 This is the
main issue as far as the Ibans and the Dayak communities are concerned.
Prior to the creation of the PBDS, the slogan 'Sarawak is for the Sarawakian'
was uttered by some Iban leaders in SNAP to woo the sentiments of anti Melayu-
Melanaus domination, which basically meant 'Sarawak is for the Ibans' (Milne &
Ratnam, 1974:106). However, in the 1960's and 1970's Iban nationalism was not as
strong as it was in the 1980's. The lack of an intelligentsia within the communities
could be one of the crucial factors. But, the situation in the 1980's was quite different.
Many professionals and highly educated figures in Sarawak came from among the Ibans
and Dayaks communities. This is one of the factors that led to the emerging of
Dayakism propelled by the PBDS in 1987. Those who established the PBDS were
originally came from among Iban politicians from SNAP. The birth of PBDS was
mainly due to the dissatisfaction of Iban leaders in the party who saw that SNAP should
relunctant to implement the national language policy of making Malay as the official language in Sarawak. Instead he
continuosly defended the use of English, Chinese and Iban languages in Sarawak. Tunku then asked the Sarawak Governor
to sack Ningkan as he was alleged of no longer having the majority of support from the State Legislative Asembly.
Following his dismissal, Ningkan successfully obtained court injunction which declared that his dismissal by the Governor
as unconstitutional which finally saw his return as Chief Minister. Upon his reappoitment as Chief Minister, he voiced out
that Sarawak participation in Malaysia should be reexamined. Tunku who saw that Ningkan's latest action as endangered
the Federation arrangement then, ordered the state of emergency to be declared in Sarawak. After emergency was declared,
Ningkan once again dismissed. Tawi Sli was then appointed as the new Chief Minister of Sarawak. (See: Roff, 1974; Milne
and Mauzy, 1982; Peter Searle, 1983; Michael Leigh, 1988; Jayum A. Jawan, 1994)
43 Interview with Dr. Jayum A. Jawan
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be led by an Iban instead of a Chinese, as the party's supporters were mainly drawn
from the Iban communities. They seek to return to the glory of Stephen Kalong
Ningkan's leadership in SNAP. Following the unsuccessful attempt by the Iban group
led by Leo Moggie to unseat James Wong, a Chinese tycoon who controlled the party
since 1981, the PBDS was formed and Dayakism was capitalized as a slogan to woo the
Dayaks to support the new party and its cause for the communities. Dayakism reached
its climax in 1987 when PBDS cooperated with Permas, a new party led by Abdul
Rahman Yaacub, the former Chief Minister and Sarawak Governor, to topple the Taib
Mahmud government.44
 However, the notions of politik pembangunan' (the politics of
development) adopted by Taib Malunud and the strong support he has been receiving
from the Federal government and the Chinese returned the latter to power, and the
Dayakist political aims fail to materialise. Since then, Dayakism championed by some
Iban leaders in Sarawak has submerged if not declining, as the PBDS has been accepted
into the Sarawak BN coalition government several years later. The 1996 Sarawak
election saw the calming of political situation in the state, which once again saw the BN
and Taib Mahmud's government retained power with a bigger mandate.
In sum, Dayakism mainly represents the dissatisfaction of the community of
their socio-economic underdevelopment in Sarawak in comparison with other
Bumiputera groups and the Chinese. Apart from that, as indicated by Jayum A. Jawan
(1994), there were perceptions among some Ibans in Sarawak that if the formula of
power sharing in terms of the rotation system of the post of the Chief Minister among
the major ethnic groups could be implemented in Sabah when UMNO came to power,
why a similar formula could not be adopted in Sarawak (p. 242-244). In this sense, it is
apparent that the Dayak communities who form the majority in Sarawak wished that
their sheer number alone be recognised by both the Federal leaders and the Muslim
Bumiputeras in the state. For them, at the very least, if the Chief Minister is not an
Iban, the state governor as a symbolic leader should be chosen from among them
(Jayum A. Jawan, 1994). Nevertheless, since the Dayak communities are rather
disunited and their resources limited, Dayakism has not been successfully mobilized,
hence failed to effectively materialized. In this respect, leadership is one of the crucial
44 Tun Abdul Rahaman Yaacub was a respected and experience political figure in Sarawak who was also an uncle to Taib
Mahmud. However, the political differences between the two importat Muslim figures in Sarawak was so wide which finally
saw the former return into Sarawak politics in an attempt to topple the latter's government.
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factor that the communities is lacking that hinder them to emerge as an effective
political movement, beside the fact that they are also disunited politically. For the
Federal leaders in Kuala Lumpur, any future attempts by the Ibans to move in a similar
direction as the Kadazans did in Sabah would certainly be closely monitored as this
could have a very serious repercussions for the notion of Bangsa Malaysia and national
integration in Malaysia.
In short, it has to be stated that, the federal structure provides adequate space for
state autonomy to be exercised in several areas, and beyond that the Kadazan and the
Dayak communities are represented in both state and Federal governments. They also
do not argue about the core elements that prevail within the federal system that are
inherently Malay in character. The position of the national language, Islam, and the
Royalty have never been seriously questioned by the Kadazans and the Ibans. By
articulating that they should constitute the 'definitive ethnic' in Sabah and Sarawak, the
Kadazans and the Ibans are actually asking that the system recognizes their position in
those states, as it recognizes the position of the Malays in the Peninsular. What they
actually opposed was the domination and the imposition of Malay-Muslim elements at
the expense of their own ethnic identities as this tended to be equated as assimilation.
Their main concern was to see that their ethnic identities co-existed with that of the
Malays within the larger framework of the national identity. Apart from that they
wanted the questions of socio-economic underdevelopment of the Kadazan and the
Dayak communities adequately addressed by the government as it does to the Malays in
the Peninsular.
6.6 Conclusion
The discussions in this chapter have demonstrated that there were at least four
notions of nation of intent circulating within the Malay and Bumiputeras communities
in the post 1990 period. It was evident that the notion of Malay as the basis of the
nation and Malay nationalism in general have been challenged by the notion of Islam as
a nation held by PAS, and in Sabah and Sarawak, it has to contain the challenges spring
from the development of Kadazanism and Ibanism. Since independence, elements of
Malay nationalism and Malay identity have been incorporated into the socio-political
structure of the country and accepted as national symbols. The institutions of the
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Werajaan' and the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers were consolidated within the
modern parliamentary democratic system established since 1957. In the Merdeka
Compromise' the leaders of the Malays, Chinese and Indians represented by UMNO,
MCA and the MIC reached an understanding, the essence of which was that Malays
would be dominant in government while the non-Malays were granted citizenship and
their economic position would not be disturbed. Harold Crouch (1996) notes that:
'Although unwritten, this informal bargain or social contract continues to be the basis
for Malay dominance in an essentially Malay state' (Crouch, 1996:157). This informal
bargain was then incorporated into the Constitution. As a result, the symbols of the
new state 'would be Malay- the Yang di Pertuan Agong (the King) as head of state,
Islam as the state religion, and Malay as the national language' (Crouch, 1996:157).
Obviously, these are the three important pillars of Malayness and Malay nationalism
which were accepted as the important basis for the establishment of a 'plural society
nation'. It is argued therefore that even in the context of crafting the characteristics for
the Ban gsa Malaysia, it is unlikely that this fundamental political basis of the nation is
going to be substantially altered or neglected. Nevertheless, as in demonstrated in this
chapter, the notion of Bangsa Melayu is changing under Mahathir and some Malays
perceived that his concept of a nation and national identity as problematic and poses a
danger to the very existence of three principle pillars of Malayness, namely bahasa,
agama dan raja.
Although the Islamic group represented by PAS argued that Islam should form
the basis for the nation, they do not abandon the idea of retaining elements of Malayness
within the system. As a party largely drawn its popular support from among the
Malays, it would be a grave error for PAS to denounce this idea, as it is unacceptable to
the interest of the Malays. For PAS, their political struggle is to achieve the
establishment of an Islamic system in Malaysia, in particular the implementation of the
Islamic Syariah law. Although PAS does not 'glorify' Malay nationalism, by virtue of
Malay domination in the party, both the non-Malays and the Malays have always
considered PAS as a party representing the interest of the Malay/Muslim communities.
Indeed, PAS since the leadership of Dr. Burhanuddin has recognised the importance of
the three pillar of Malayness and its significance for the survival of Malay identity.
Therefore, although the Ulamak leadership in PAS do not accept Malay nationalism as
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the basis of their political ideology, by defending the perpetuation of the three pillar of
Malayness within the superstructure of the state, the party do not appear to be less
nationalistic or less Malay than UMNO. Furthermore, PAS' leadership have constantly
maintained that the party is a better alternative to UMNO for protecting Islam and the
interests of the Malays. As a Malay-based political party, PAS will continues to carry
the baggage of Malay identity, despite its leadership attempts to dissociate the party
from the ideology of Malay nationalism.
It was also clear that even the Kadazans and the Ibans have never indicated that
they were against the idea of retaining elements of Malayness within the superstructure
of the system. Their main concern was merely wanting the system to recognize the
significant presence of their communities in Sabah and Sarawak. H.M. Dahlan argues
that, Kadazanism and Dayakism emerged because the system was late in responding to
their cultural demands. 45
 In this respect, Dahlan stresses that:
While the system has responded rather considerably to the social and cultural demands of the non-
Malays in the Peninsular, however a similar request from the Kadazans and the Ibans have not been
adequately addressed but instead was responded with prejudice. The Kadazans and the Ibans do not
want their own schools but rather to have their mother tongue taught as one of the subject at the
existing schools. After more than three decades of Sabah and Sarawak independence within
Malaysia, the native languages of Kadazan, Dusun, Murut, Bajau, Iban and so on have not been
taught as an elective subject in comparison with what the Chinese and the Indian had received. Yet
numerically, the Kadazans and the lbans are greater in comparison with the Chinese and Indians in
those two states.46
However, the Kadazans and the Dayaks accept the fact they are part of Malaysia and
recognize all the important national symbols that prevail thus far within the ,Federal
system. In this regard, Kadazanism and Dayakism may be regarded as political
expression of culture, more than anything else. However, given the fact that there
existed a strong correlation between cultural markers and geographical boundary in
Sabah and Sarawak, the threat of Kadazanism and Dayakism to national integration and
Malaysian Federal system cannot be underestimated. No one can be more than certain
that the present political expression of culture embodied in the notions of Kadazanism
and Dayakism will never go beyond cultural issues in the future.
By and large, the period of post independence Malaysian politics saw that the
three core ethnic identifiers of `Malayness' have been utilized by the Malay political
leadership both within the framework of public policies and in retaining Malay masses
45 Interview with Professor H.M. Dahlan
46 Ibid
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support for the nationalist agenda, to reflect Malay hegemonic status in Malaysian
polity. It is within this context that the non-Malays' political reaction needs to be seen,
since it has been a response to Malay hegemonic tendencies. In what manner did the
non-Malays responded to this matter and what constitute the basis of their pergeption of
the 'nation' to be established in Malaysia? These questions shall be examined in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
IMAGINING THE NATION II: THE NON-BUMIPUTERAS AND THE NOTION
OF CULTURAL PLURALISM
7.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to elucidate the contrasting perceptions of the non-Bumiputeras
on the idea of nation-of-intent, which arguably spring from their response to Malay
hegemonic tendencies. Whilst the Bumiputera communities were divided on their
perception of the 'ideal-type' of a nation to be established in Malaysia as indicated in the
previous chapter, to what extent similar situation exist within the non-Bumiputera
communities? Although the term `non-Bumiputera' implies all ethnic groups other than
the Malays and the Bumiputeras of Sabah and Sarawak, in reality it is the Chinese that
dominate non-Bumiputera's politics by virtue of their numerical strength and economic
superiority. Other ethnic groups such as the Indian and the Sikh communities constitute
only small minority, and their political attitudes and perceptions, to a large extent have
been influenced by Chinese political consciousness, whose political initiatives in many
respects have been shaped by their reaction to Malay political dominance. Besides, as
argued by Lee Kam Hing (1997:74),'many of the political and economic concerns
affecting the Chinese are shared by the Indians, and therefore unlike elsewhere, the issues
are not just Chinese but broad non-Malay ones'. Therefore, political development in
Malaysia since independence has always been dominated by Sino-Malay rivalry. The
analysis in this chapter therefore, while not neglecting the importance of other
communities, will however, focus more on the development of Chinese politics; Chinese
perception of being Chinese and being Malaysian; Chinese participation in the process of
nation-building; and Chinese responses to Malay hegemony.
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7.2 Exploring the non-Bumiputera identity and cultural orientations
Although the non-Bumiputeras owed their status as immigrant communities who
came to Malaya mostly in the mid nineteenth century, in contrast to the Malays, they did
not engage in the process of defining their identities, since they already had a strong sense
of ethnic identity inherited from the long established civilisations in China and India
(Heng Pek Koon, 1997). This strong sense of ethnic identity has not been very much
altered since then, since under the colonial administration the immigrant communities
were given considerable freedom by the authorities in running their internal social and
cultural affairs. Thus, in the colonial era, they tend to associate themselves more with
events that took place in their 'homeland', rather than being overly concerned about
Malayan affairs (see: Purcell, 1967; Heng Pek Khoon, 1996). It was only after the end of
Second World War that this perception began to change significantly as the prospect of
returning home, seem came to be a remote one. Even after independence their identity
has not been considerably transformed, since assimilation has never been the practiced in
Malaysia. Their political allegiance however, was shifted to the new homeland. Beyond
that, the non-Bumiputeras had also have to consolidate their position within the new
political arrangements at a time when Malay nationalism reached its peak. This was a
time when Malaya first saw a 'clash of nationalisms' between the Malays as the
indigenous community, and the mostly immigrants or their first generation descendants
who demanded equal status, both political and cultural. The political contestation
between the two groups (read Malay versus Chinese) continued in the post-independence
years, as the structural blueprint of colonial Malaya was not radically transformed upon
the departure of the British. Hence, the political arena was employed not only as a means
to sustain Chinese economic power but also to pursue the enhancement of their ethnic and
cultural identities in facing with the mounting Malay nationalism and its nation-building
project.
The ethnic Chinese in Malaysia are divided into various speech groups such as
Hokkien, HakIca, Cantonese, Teochiu, Hainanese, Hockchew, Kwongsai, Henghua,
Hockchia and others (Tan Chee Beng, 1988). However, this does not necessarily means
that the Chinese are sharply divided into several sub-ethnic communities, as reflected in
their dialect background. Looking from the perspective of acculturation, they can be
divided into two main categories: the Peranakan' Chinese or the 'Baba' (the Straits
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Chinese) and the 'pure' Chinese. The term peranakan Chinese refers to ethnic Chinese
who settled in Malaya long before mass immigration took place in the nineteenth century,
and are more acculturated by the Malays. They speak 'Baba-Malay' among themselves,
as well as showing many Malay influences in the way they dress and cook. . Many of
them do not speak any Chinese at all (Tan Chee Beng, 1988:140). However, their
numbers are small, and they are mainly found in certain places such as Melaka, Penang,
and Kelantan. The vast majority of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia are 'pure' Chinese, in the
sense that they have retained much of the Chinese identity inherited from China, though
the processes of acculturation over the years have made them somewhat distinct from
Chinese in mainland China or in other Southeast Asian countries.
Culturally, although the Chinese in Malaysia are not homogenous, their
`Chineseness' or ethnic identity is characterised by four important elements: (1)
Confucian values and other elements of the Chinese cultural heritage; (2) language; (3)
diet; and (4) adaptation to Malay hegemony (Heng Pek Koon, 1996:51). Whilst there are
Chinese who have embraced Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Islam, Heng (1996:51)
notes that, 'whatever the specific religious individual beliefs of Malaysian Chinese, their
Confucian heritage remains a core feature of their collective psyche'. Among the
cherished values and norms in the Confucian doctrine were patriarchal authority, filial
piety, ancestor worship, female subordination, self cultivation based on education and
ethical conduct, respect for hierarchy and deference to authority (Heng Pek Koon, 1996).
Although the Confucian tradition placed the intellectual at the top of the social hierarchy,
followed by the peasant and the artisan class, whilst merchants occupy the bottom rank,
the Chinese in Malaysia have become somewhat free from the constraints of Confucian
based governance. The Chinese in Malaysia positioned the merchant-entrepreneur group
at the top of the hierarchy. This can be attributed to the fact that commercial and
entrepreneurial activities have served as an important basis for survival in the emigrant
societies (see: Wang Gung Wu, 1966; Tan Chee Beng, 1983). Indeed, this was the most
widely opened avenue for the Chinese in pursuing their livelihoods and in accumulating
wealth, apart from initially worked in the colonial mining industry. Not suprisingly thus,
the early development of Chinese politics in Malaya saw those with wealth from among
the merchant class assume important leadership roles and status. The study by Clive J.
Christie (1996) on the participation of the Straits Chinese in Malaya has demonstrated
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that by virtue of their economic superiority, the Straits Chinese have been able to exercise
considerable influence in local government since 1920's. Indeed, the leading Chinese
political party in Malaysia, the MCA, was a merchant-entrepreneur organisation before
turning into a political party in 1949, and continued to be dominated by the business class
for many years that followed.
Heng (1996) also observes that the Chinese language or Mandarin is a major
cultural anchor, and of central importance for the communities, though they speak many
different dialects. Mandarin is seen as a symbol of Chinese unity. The constant effort
from both Chinese cultural and political organisations to promote and gain recognition for
Chinese education from the government as part of the national education policy
demonstrates this point. 'Even English-educated non-Mandarin speaking Chinese
political leaders must rigorously promote the cause of Chinese schools and Chinese
education in order to win Chinese vote' (Heng Pek Koon, 1996:52). The politics of
education in Malaysia over the past four decades has clearly demonstrated the importance
of Chinese language and education for the community, in as far as their ethnic identity is
concerned.
In respect to dietary practices, it is apparent that though Malaysians now enjoy
and appreciate multi-ethnic cuisine more than ever before, Malays strict adherence to the
Islamic faith has made the non-Malays more aware of their ethnic disposition, especially
the sensitivity of Muslims over 'non-halal' food such as pork, alcohol and animals not
slaughtered in accordance with Islamic rites. This has become more so in the light of
Islamic resurgence as Malaysian Muslims tended to become increasingly rigorous in
upholding Muslim dietary injunctions (Chandra Muzaffar, 1987; Heng Pek Koon, 1996).
The gap between the 'halal' and `non-halal' food has separated Malay/Muslims from
non-Muslims both culturally and ethnically.
Although politics has been the basis of Malay hegemony, nothing has been more
important than the three attributes of Malayness, namely, Malay Rulers, Malay language
and Islam to reflect the hegemonic characteristics of Malay power. Remarkably, of all
these important symbols, Heng (1996) notes that, only Islam has remained rather outside
the experience of most non-Malays. Many non-Malays perceive that accepting Islam or
rather embracing Islam is considered as `masuk Melayu' (literally means becoming a
Malay person). Apparently, Islam as the most important ethnic identifiers for the Malays,
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has made the non-Malays to have a perception that being a Muslim similarly implies that
one is becoming a Malay, despite the fact that the number of Chinese Muslim in China
far outnumbered the Muslims in Malaysia, yet they remained Chinese. Many non-Malays
have a perception that their ethnic identities would not be affected if they embraced a
religion other than Islam.' In other words, to many Chinese, conversion to Islam would
means abandoning their identity. This may explain why the number of Chinese
conversion to Islam in Malaysia were not significant as reflected in the 1991 census, there
were only an estimated of 15,000 Chinese Muslim in the country, or just about 0.4 per
cent of the total Chinese population (Lee Kam Hing, 1997:104). So strong Malay
identification with Islam has led many Chinese, to associate the phenomena of Islamic
resurgence in the country with rising Malay nationalism (Lee Kam Hing, 1997), though
this may not be so accurate as far as the Malays are concerned. Clearly, Malay strong
relationship with Islam, has had a significant influence in shaping the perception of the
non-Malays on the Malays and their religion.
With the exception of Islam, the non-Malays have made significant adaptations to
most of Malay cultural-politico hegemonic elements. Politically, they have shared power
in governing the country, though in subordination to Malay leadership since 1957. Malay
Rulers have accepted non-Malay as loyal subjects and confer honorific titles and awards
to many public figures of non-Malay background. It is a common phenomena nowadays
to see many public figures of Chinese and Indian origins proudly used titles such as
Datuk and Tan Sri conferred by Malay Sultans. Quite a number of member of royal
families have been involved as business partners and patrons in Chinese businesses.
Non-Malay fluency in Malay is widespread and a vast majority of the younger
generation can understand and communicate well in the national language. This has been
the most profound dimension of the manifestation of non-Malay acculturation and
evidence of their adaptation to Malay hegemony. Only inter-marriages have not been
widespread due to religious constraints.
In short, though people can be said as becoming more Malaysian in recent years,
in that the process of acculturation rather than assimilation has incorporated the non-
Malays into the 'mainstream' culture, Chinese ethnic identity remained distinctive from
the majority of the Malay population in as far as Confucian values, Chinese language and
'Many non-Malay respondents interviewed in this study confirmed this perception.
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dietary practices are concerned. Beyond that, Islam as the most important elements of
Malay cultural entity has led to social differences between Malay and non-Malay as two
separate ethnic groups. As it stands, Islam is seen as a contentious element in the Malay-
non-Malay social and political relationships. This perhaps explains why the n9n-Malays
have been rather disturbed with attempts by PAS to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia,
since many tend to regard such development if proceeded, would render them into further
subordination to the Malays. But this is not to say that it was the religious factor that
formed the thrust of non-Malay's ethnic political consciousness, but rather, the entire
cultural dimension is equally important so long Malay as cultural domination was
perceived as detrimental to non-Malay cultural identity. In short, the 'revolution of
cultural awareness' amongst the non-Malays has been the direct response to Malay
cultural-politico hegemony.
With respect to the question of Chinese identity, Leo Suryadinata (1997:12)
observes that there are three pillars which sustain Chinese society and identity in
Southeast Asian countries. The three Chinese ethnic identifiers are Chinese schools,
Chinese mass media (especially the press), and Chinese associations. Chinese schools
and the press have been important in promoting the Mandarin language, while Chinese
associations are tools for articulating Chinese political, economics and cultural interests.
According to Suryadinata (1997) among the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has
been the most radical in inducing assimilation by eliminating all these three pillar of
Chineseness. While there have been a high degree of assimilation in Thailand and the
Philippine, the Chinese language may still to be taught at national schools. Chinese press
and associations, despite low circulation and membership number, still enjoy relative
freedom and continuous existence in those two countries.
With the exception of Singapore, which is an 'immigrant state', and despite there
exist a strong phenomena of Malay political hegemony, Malaysia has seen the continuous
development of all the three pillars of Chineseness. 'Nowhere else can there be found a
Chinese-language education stream that is part of the public system' (Lee Kam Heng,
1997:99). Above all, the 1996 Education Act has recognised Chinese education as part of
the national education policy. Enrollment at these schools has always been high, which
figures in 1984 noted that 27 percent of total enrollment are in state-supported Chinese
primary schools (Kua Kia Soong, 1984). This means that about 80 percent of Chinese
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parent preferred their children to have primary education in Chinese. Ironically, there
have been some 35,000 Malay pupils enrolled at these schools in 1994 (Berita Harian, 7
October 1994). This has led Dr. Fong Chan Onn, the MCA Deputy Education Minister
to proudly assert that Chinese schools no longer belong to the Chinese, but rgher have
been making significant contribution towards nation-building (Berita Harian, 7 October
1994). To what extent Malay nationalists would agree with such view is a different
question. But the important point here is that Chinese schools in Malaysia have survived
most of its trial and tribulation, and have been making significant headway in the national
education system, despite the grave concerns from among Chinese educationists and
politicians alike about their future.
With the implementation of the 1996 Education Act, there are some sixty private
Chinese secondary schools which prior to that exist outside the national education system
were now gained recognition as part of the system (Zainal Abidin Wahid, 1997). In
1997 the Dong Jiao Zhong (the Chinese education movement) has established the Era
College, a Chinese medium private higher education, which was regarded by many Malay
nationalist as a manifestation of the success of The Merdeka University struggle in a
different name. 2
 Above all, as admitted by one Chinese academician: 'Chinese struggle
to promote and sustain their identity through Chinese language and education has been
fully achieved with the enforcement of the 1996 Education Act'. 3 Along side Era
College, there are growing numbers of other private colleges which have established
twinning programmes with universities from Taiwan and China to provide higher
education in Chinese medium. 4 Therefore, it is obvious that Chinese education can be
pursued in Malaysia from primary to tertiary level without restriction and beyond that is
considered as part of the national education policy.
As far as Chinese media and the press are concerned, 'there are nearly half a
dozen widely-circulated Chinese newspapers and Chinese TV and radio programmes
aired on state and private stations in Malaysia (Lee Kam Heng, 1997:100). In recent
years, many of the programes aired on TV which were imported from Hong Kong had
caused concerned among Malay nationalists as it was seen as not reflecting Malaysian
2 Interview with Professor Datuk Zainal Abidin Wahid
3 Interview with one Chinese academician from the National University of Malaysia who do not want his identity to be
disclosed.
4 Op cit
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multi-ethnic society and therefore arguably would not favour nation-building. Some
Malay nationalists have urged the Ministry of Information which monitor Malaysian
broadcasting to ensure that more local produced programmes are aired on state TV so that
to reflect a more Malaysian characteristics and thus promoting integration at the same
time.5
In terms of the third pillar which sustain Chinese identity, namely Chinese
associations, the Chinese community in Malaysia have hundreds organisations
representing a wide range of interests. Up to February 1996, it was reported that there
were 5762 registered Chinese-based organisation in Malaysia (Sin Chew Jit Poh, 24
February 1996, cited in Sia Keng Yaik, 1997:xx) Politically, the MCA has always seen
as the major political party representing the Chinese in the government since
independence. Apart from the MCA, there are another two more parties which adopted a
multi-ethnic approach but are actually Chinese-based political parties since they are
dominated by the Chinese. They are the Gerakan (Malaysian People's Solidarity
Movement) which originally was an opposition party but has been part of the BN
coalition since 1974, and the DAP, the most outstanding non-Malay opposition party.
Recent study by Sia Keng Yek (1996) on the role of Chinese social organisation in
Malaysian politics demonstrates that Chinese social organisation or known as Hua Tuan
has been very important in championing the course of Chinese interests in a wide range of
issues as well as in strengthening Chinese unity. She notes:
politically, the Hua Tuan has played a vital role in influencing government policy that involved
Chinese political, economic, social, cultural and educational interests.
(Sia Keng Yek, 1997:xxi)
The Hua Tuan worked very hard to promote 'two party system' in Malaysia in their effort
to weaken Malay political hegemony but this has not been successful due to the nature of
ethnic politics that prevails in the country (Sia Keng Yek, 1997).
Obviously, the Chinese have been very successful in maintaining and promoting
the components of their ethnic identifiers despite concerns about the erosion of Chinese
cultural values. Chinese schools; Chinese media and Chinese associations have grown
even stronger now as indicated in Sia Keng Yaik's study (1997), and their struggle to
maintain and promote Chinese language, culture and Chinese identity as a whole in
Malaysia had achieved many of its vital objectives. This success has been largely due to
5 Interview with Zainal Abidin Wahid and Rustam A. Sani.
201
two important factors. Firstly, since independence the Malays have been very
accommodative both politically and culturally in allowing cultural diversity to prevail in
the country despite some concerns about its implication in nation-building. Secondly, it
is also very clear that the Chinese community makes unceasing efforts through various
social and political organisations, facilitated by their economic superiority which funds
most of the Chinese cultural, education and political movements. These have profoundly
contributed to sustaining their identity. Besides, the political arrangements in Malaysia
had also made the struggle to promote Chinese identity possible in the sense that while
UMNO needs Chinese supports in order to form the government and sustain Malay
power, the Chinese tend to use their voting power to either support Chinese parties in the
BN or shift the vote to opposition parties such as the DAP, depending on which political
circumstances best serve their interests. This is the trend of urban Chinese electorates
voting behaviour in most general elections in Malaysia which led some political observer
to refer to it as 'the pendulum phenomena' (Aliran, vol. 10.no.4 1990). They know
exactly when and where to deliver their votes in order to promote their interests.
Although shifting their votes from the BN to Chinese opposition party such as the DAP
do not necessarily lead to the change of government, it does send important signal to the
government that the Chinese may not be satisfied with certain policies adopted by the
government which are seen as detrimental to their interests. Consequently, Malay
political elites in the government have had to reexamine their policies and make
necessary adjustments in order to win back Chinese support for the BN in the next
general election.
Although the Chinese are adapting well with Malay hegemonic tendencies over
the past four decades, they are still concerned about the degree to which they have to
accommodate to Malay culture. 'They generally distrust government policies which they
see as leading to the erosion of Chinese culture and the eventual assimilation of the
Chinese' (Tan Chee Beng, 1988:151). Tan Chee Beng (1988:152) notes that, `[N]o
Chinese Malaysian wants assimilation in the sense of losing Chinese identity and
adopting Malay identity, not even peranakan Chinese identity'. Although they
undoubtedly had since independence, accepted Malaysia as their country, they wish that
they could retain all the components of Chinese culture and are ever ready to fight for the
materialisation of this goal. The discussion in chapter four has pointed out this aspect
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rather clearly. This apparently has resulted in some Malays being suspicious about the
orientation and sometimes even questionioned the loyalty of the Chinese as depicted in
the 1960s political development. Shamsul AB (1996a) describes this as the competing
'second generation nationalism' which made the debate on identity in .Malaysia,
especially national identity, still wide open. The notion of Bangsa Malaysia therefore
could be seen as an attempt to reconcile this problem, but the crucial issue yet to be
resolved is the extent to which both Malays and non-Malays willing to accommodate to
each other interests, desires and expectations in order to construct or reconstruct the basic
characteristics to mould the national identity or the Bangsa Malaysia.
Meanwhile, ethnic Indians despite their position as a minority ethnic group had
also been able to retain their ethnic identity while adapting themselves to Malaysian
surroundings. Nevertheless, the significant differences between the Indian and the
Chinese in Malaysia is that, while the latter have financial and voting power to back up to
most of their demands, the former has languished economically, and cannot deliver the
votes the way the larger Chinese or Malay community can (see K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani,
1993; Chandra Muzaffar, 1993; K. Ramanathan, 1996). As a result, this led the Indian
community to perceive themselves as a 'political marginalized community' in Malaysian
plural society (Chandra Muzaffar, 1993; P. Ramasamy, 1994). This political marginality
was partly the baggage from the colonial past which was carried by the community into
post independence Malaysia. Indeed, under the NEP the Indian community felt that the
Bumiputera - non-Bumiputera dichotomy has unfairly lumped them together with the
more economically superior Chinese while the government social-engineering
programmes concentrated on the Malays (R. Karthigesu, 1993). As such, Indian socio-
economic backwardness has not been adequately addressed, thus leading to the
perpetuation of the economic deprivation of the community. Beyond that, they perceived
that most of the benefits received by the Indian community such as places at universities,
low-cost housing, funding for Tamil schools and so forth were akin to 'charity' or an
'acts of mercy' from the government, rather than a specific comprehensive programme to
address their socio-economic distress (R. Karthigesu, 1993).
Culturally, while there are Indian Muslim and Sri Lankan (Ceylonese)
communities in Malaysia, the vast majority of Indians in Malaysia are of Tamil origin.
Tamil is their mother tongue and most of them are Hindu. Hence, they tend to perceive
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the Tamil language and Hinduism as two most important ethnic Indian identifiers (see: K.
Ramanathan, 1996). As in India, the Tamil community in Malaysia inherited a divisive
caste hierarchy system which weakened their internal solidarity especially in the early
decades of immigration. Until the late 1920's, the Indian labourers in the rubber
plantations were divided on the basis of caste and village ties. The vast majority of the
Tamils occupied the lowest echelon as manual labourers, while the supervisory and
clerical staff were mainly Sri Lankan Tamils or Malayalees. Therefore, unlike the
Chinese, Indian cultural unity was a major problem within the community, which thus
hindered their political mobilisation and solidarity. That was the case during the British
rule. However, the post independence years especially during the 1960's and 1970's saw
that as communalism and Sino-Malay rivalry become more intense in both economic and
cultural spheres, issues concerning the Indian community were pushed to the periphery.
Hence, the marginalisation of the community continued until several important measures
were taken up by the government, especially the MIC (which emerged as the dominant
party for the community) in the 1980's to rectify problems affecting the Indian
community.
In contrast to the Chinese, the Indian communities are more concerned about their
progress and development in the economic and educational spheres rather than being
overly pre occupied with the struggle to retain and promote their cultural identity.6
Material progress is a central priority as the majority of the Indians are still an
economically backward community. The Indians owned only about 1 percent of the
country's economic stake (Malaysia, 1996). Therefore the economic participation of the
Indians and enhancing their educational opportunities are considered by their leaders as
among key issues affecting the vast majority the community. Nevertheless, this is not to
say that cultural matters do not concern them at all, but in their view the economic
deprivation of the Indians has not been adequately addressed, and thus constitutes a more
pressing agenda. 7
 As argued in chapter four, along with their Chinese counterparts,
several Indian social and cultural organisations had also submitted to the government a
memorandum in the 1980's representing the community's views and concerns on issues
6 Interview with Dr. P. Ramasamy
7 Ibid
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pertaining to the implementation National Cultural Policy. As the Chinese, the Indian
community have registered their opposition to the National Cultural Policy.
In recent years, the Indian press has voiced concerned about the declining number
of Indian pupils enrolled at Indian primary schools as more Indian parents preferred to
send their children to national schools which are better equipped in terms of manpower
and modern facilities. As a matter of fact, the condition of Tamil schools in the
plantation are generally poor and the number of these schools has also declined in recent
years. According to Datuk S. Samy Vellu, the MIC President, 'the number of Tamil
schools in Malaysia has fallen from 1050 to 530', and he urged the government not to
close anymore Tamil schools for whatever reason (Tamil Neesan, 29 April 1991).
However, some Tamil newspapers expressed relief when the 1996 Education Act was
introduced. The new Education Act provides more secure assurances to the position of
Tamil schools, in particular with regard to the abrogation of the power of Minister of
Education to convert vernacular school into national school as stipulated in the 1961
Education Act (Idhayam, 1 January 1996). The Indian press thus, urged the community
to support the 'Tamil language movement' and encourage their children to learn Tamil in
order to preserve and promote the language more effectively (Idhayam, 1 January 1996).
Nevertheless, one observer argues that whereas the post 1969 language policy continued
to provide for Tamil primary schools and have also made concession to Tamil language
champions, 'but it had the effect of entrapping a substantial segment of the Indian poor,
especially those from the plantations, in a dead-education system' as there was no Indian
language secondary education available in Malaysian education system (Chandra
Muzaffar, 1993:225). By and large, it could be argued that in spite of the fact that the
Indian community was engulfed with the challenging task of improving their economic
and educational conditions, together with the Chinese, they have similar concerned about
the perceived 'threat' to their cultural and ethnic identity from Malay hegemonic
tendencies. Therefore, in many respects, they tend to share with the Chinese in their
struggle to ensure that cultural pluralism prevails in Malaysia.
In sum, the non-Malay cultural orientation saw several important development
since the past four decades. If the situation before independence saw that their attachment
and orientation to the original homeland was rather strong, many of the present
generation felt that, that sort of relationship was a matter of historical past as many of
205
them were locally born, thus, considered Malaysia their homeland (Tan Chee Beng,
1988). Whereas their ethnic identity remained intact, they have made notable
adjustments to the Malaysian environment as well as developed a unique Malaysian
Chinese or Indian characteristics which significantly distinguished them from ethnic
Chinese or Indians living elsewhere. 8
 This was attributed to the processes of cultural
indigenization or `Malaysianization' that dynamically occurred over the years which saw
the non-Malays incorporated many natives cultural elements such as in food, costume,
language and social interactions.
Today, most non-Malays identify themselves with Malaysia as their country,
while remaining conscious of being Chinese or Indian. While most of them recognize the
need to integrate into the larger Malaysian society, however, assimilation appeared to be
unacceptable. Nevertheless, the big question is how they define and interpret the concept
of integration. To what extent do they have to accommodate to 'other' cultures in
achieving the objective of integration? Legally, the vast majority of ethnic Chinese and
Indian in Malaysia today are Malaysian as far as citizenship is concerned. But
citizenship does not connotes nationhood. Nation and citizen clearly are two different
concepts, though the latter was one of the crucial component that constitute the former.
In this regard, it is apparent that the non-Malay attitude towards integration and their
perception of what constitute the nation have led to competing interests between them and
the Malays as to what should constitute the national identity. It is this that make ethnic
politics a fertile ground in Malaysia, and as a result further complicates the process of
nation-building. It is argued therefore that the non-Malays' attitude towards nation-
building is shaped by their perception of being Chinese and/or Indian and at the same
time adapting and moulding themselves as Malaysian. It is this perception that strongly
influenced their ideas of nation-of-intent or 'imagined nation' that came to be in conflict
with Malay and the Bumiputera communities notions of nation-of-intent. And this is the
crucial challenge that the project of Bangsa Malaysia has to cope with.
7.3 The Chinese attitude towards nation-building
One of the most influential study on Chinese politics in Malaysia was the work
by Wang Gungwu (1970; 1978) who classified Chinese political orientations in Malaysia
8 Interview with Tan Dr. Koh Tsu Khoon
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into three categories (A, B, C) according to their attitudes towards China and Malaysia.
Type 'A' are those Chinese whose political outlook has remained distinctively 'Chinese'
and in many respect were influenced and inspired by political events and ideologies that
prevailed in China. Chinese politics in pre-war Malaya clearly manifested the presence of
this group, which, established local Kuomintang branches in Malaya and mobilized
support to assist the Chinese war against the Japanese. Clearly, their nationalism was
China based. After the war which saw Kuomintang defeated by the communist, another
group emerged, namely, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) who chose to indulge in
an armed-struggle against the British and later Malaysian government in their attempt to
establish a pro-China Malaysian communist state. Albeit the intensity of their armed-
struggle has been weakened much earlier, the peace deal with the government had only
been signed in 1989, which officially marked the dissolution of the MCP and the end of
their political and military struggle in Malaysian history.
Type B consisted of those Chinese who realized that the future of local Chinese
lay in Malaya, thus their participation and accommodation into local politics was
extremely important, though they remained anxious about their Chinese identity. This
group emerged after the Second World War and were very concerned about the position
of Chinese trade, commercial and communal associations in relation to the growing
intense of Malay nationalism. Type C emerged in the post independence period, and
consisted of those who believed that the communal struggle would only worsen ethnic
separateness, thus harming long-term Chinese political interests hence encouraging the
rise of Malay nationalism. Therefore, they called for a multi ethnic approach in politics
in an attempt to create a non-communal political system in Malaysia. According to
Wang's analysis most of the type A and type B were those Chinese who received Chinese
medium education or not formally educated, while those in type C were mainly English
educated Chinese.
While Wang Gungwu's classification was useful in terms of providing an
analytical framework to understand Chinese politics in Malaysia, Tan Chee Beng (1988)
argued that Wang's three categories may not totally represent the post 1970 political
development in Malaysia which saw the effects of post independence political
development significantly altered Chinese political orientation and attitude. The National
education system is one of the important dimension which has affected Chinese political
Chinese-educated	 Received Chinese-medium 	 Will persist
type 1
	 education only
Chinese-educated
	 Received both Chinese-medium	 Will disappear
type 2	 and English-medium education
Chinese-educated	 Received both Chinese-medium
	 Will become more
type 3	 and Malay-medium education 	 important
Chinese
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outlook in the post-independence era. Wang's analysis did not consider the effects of
national medium education in shaping political attitude of the Chinese towards nation-
building. As such, Tan Chee Beng (1988) suggested a modified typology based on the
post 1970 political development as depicted in Table 4 and 8 below.
Table 4
Classification of Chinese based on their educational background
Medium of education Type of Chinese Main Characteristics
	 Trend
English
	
English-educated	 Received English-medium education Will disappear but
type 1	 and socialized in English-speaking 	 the category of
family	 'English-speaking'
Chinese will persist
English-educated
	 Received English-medium education Will disappear
type 2
	 and grew up in Chinese-speaking home
environment
English-educated	 Peranakan Chinese who received
	
Will disappear but
type 3	 English-medium education 	 the category of
'English-speaking'
Chinese will persist
Malay Malay-educated	 Comprise the majority who grow up
	
Will become more
in a Chinese speaking home environment
	
important
and a small minority who grow up in a
Malay- speaking home environment
(peranakan Chinese) as well as those
from 'English-speaking' families.
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Table 5: Classification of Chinese based on their attitude towards nation-building
Type of
Chinese	 General Characteristics	 Education
Group A	 Want to preserve 'pure' Chinese culture and
	 Predominantly Chinese
'pure' Chinese identity. Totally concerned with
	 educated type 1
Chinese interests. Generally fail to relate to the
overall historical and political reality of the country.
Die-hard fighters for Chinese education and Chinese
culture in general. Some are Chinese chauvinists.
Group B
	
No clear stand on integration. Tend to lean towards	 Predominantly type 1
group A, but recognized the need to adapt to the social	 and type 2 Chinese-educated
and political environment in Malaysia.
Group C
	
Integrationists. More concern with socio-economic	 Mostly English-educated and
equality and justice than with the form of Chinese	 some peranakan Chinese.
culture or identity. 	 Some are from Chinese-educated
type 2
Source: Tan Chee Beng,1988:150
Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate the type of Chinese, their educational background and
the general characteristics of their political attitude towards nation-building. The key
point that distinguished Tan Che Beng's classification from that of Wang Gungwu is
simply this: while Wang's categorization pointed out that the relationship with either
China or Malaysia was a crucial criteria in differentiating one category of Chinese to the
other, Tan's classification instead stressed their attitude towards nation-building as the
most important determinant. Tan argues that though '[T]here may still be some China-
born Chinese who are proud of China and even identify with that country, but their
number is insignificant, and they are old and dying out' . He contended that, [Gine need
not question the loyalty of Chinese Malaysia today, be they peranakan Chinese or non-
peranakan Chinese' (p.151). For many of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia today, it is no
longer relevant to relate their orientation and political struggle to China, since China is
perceived as just another foreign country, despite their historical attachment with the
country (Tan Chee Beng, 1988; Lee Kam Hing, 1997). In recent years, as the government
relaxed most of its previous restrictions on people to people relationship between
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Malaysia and China, many Chinese have visited the country to see the home of their
ancestral. For Chinese businessmen in Malaysia, China is seen as a very attractive
destination for overseas investment, as the country is moving towards greater economic
liberalisation. However, this should be seen as an effort to enhance their, business
opportunities by using their cultural affinity and historical networking as an advantage
despite some concerned about this development among non-Chinese in Southeast Asian
countries (Leo Suryadinata, 1997).
Therefore, group A of Tan's classification does not consist of those Chinese who
relate to China in their political struggle, but rather are those who fail to relate themselves
to the overall historical and political reality of Malaysia. Their concern was only for
Chinese interests and they even today 'insist that Mandarin should be made an official
language too, and call the Chinese to send their children to Chinese-medium primary and
private secondary schools so as to preserve Chinese language and culture' (p.151). Tan's
group B Chinese are distinguished from Wang's group B in the sense that they are not
only concerned about the 'indirect politics of trade and communal associations', but are
'those who are politically very active, politically not so active, and a large number who
are not politically active but are politically very conscious of and are concerned with the
interests of the Chinese in the country' (Tan Chee Beng, 1988:155). Although those in
group C are described by Tan as the integrationists, they too would like to preserve
Chinese primary schools. Nevertheless, according to Tan they are 'more willing to
accommodate so as to improve the standard of Malay and English even if it means
reducing the subjects taught in Chinese'. Beyond that, 'some of them are willing to go to
the extent of giving up Chinese-medium education in the primary schools as long as
Chinese is taught as a mother tongue subject, and as long as they and their children can
remain Chinese and share equal rights and opportunities with all other citizens in the
country' (1988:152).
However, the liberal views of the integrationist group in terms of their non-
communal approach in politics and pursuing greater integration of the Chinese were not
endorsed by the majority of the Chinese. According to Tan, those in group B tend to
argue that 'if the Chinese take a non-communal stand now, they may lose out to the
Malays since Malay communal politics is so strong' (1988:152). Besides, the nature of
ethnic politics in Malaysia also 'puts the integrationists in a dilemma for they find it
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difficult to convince the others of their political vision' (p.153). There is still a strong
feeling of fear among the Chinese as to whether they are going to be accepted as equal
partners to the Malays if they pursue into deeper integration to Malay culture, let alone
losing out to Malays in terms of opportunities and resources in the country. Oiven this
circumstances, it is much easier for either group A or group B Chinese to promote their
vision, thus influencing the mainstream thinking and attitude of the Chinese community
in Malaysia.
With regard to educational background, it seems that those who constitute the
integrationists group are mostly English-educated Chinese, whilst group A and group B
are mainly drawn from Chinese-educated background. Although education thus to some
extent affects their attitude towards nation-building, it has to 'be taken as a rough
indication' as there are also 'some English-educated Chinese in group B and even group
A' (Tan Chee Beng, 1988:154). Nevertheless, the type of education received among the
Chinese has a significant effect in shaping their political attitude towards nation-building.
It is therefore understandable why the Chinese made considerable efforts through their
various guilds and associations including political parties to ensure Chinese education is
not affected in any form while the country is pursuing its nation-building agenda. The
continued survival of Chinese education fulfills two fundamental objectives of the
Chinese struggle, namely shaping the pattern of political thinking and attitude among
younger generation Chineses and at the same time help strengthening one of the
important pillar of Chineseness.
Another important point that was raised by Tan Chee Beng in his analysis was
that the majority of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia fall under group B category. In his view,
this group does not have a clear-cut attitude towards integration, but in many issues
involving the cultural and educational interests of the Chinese they tend to lean towards
group A, despite their recognition of the fact that it was important for the Chinese to
adapt and relate themselves to the socio-political reality that prevail in Malaysia which
group A Chinese fail to recognize. However, not having a clear stand on integration does
not mean that they do not have the notion of nation-of-intent to be constructed in the
country. Given the perception that they have upon the question of preserving and
promoting Chinese cultural identity in Malaysia, it is argued that it is the notion of
cultural pluralism that was actually in their mind, something which Tan was not quite
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willing to note. Cultural pluralism in this respect refers to their attitude towards
maintaining the co-existence of Chinese culture, Chinese language and Chinese education
alongside with the dominant Malay-Islamic culture. All these issues have been forming
the crux of their political struggle since independence. Indeed, some of thew struggle
have bore fruitful results as reflected in the implementation of the 1996 Education Act.
Therefore, though there are three main groups of Chinese in relation to their attitude
towards nation-building, the dominant attitude among the Chinese in Malaysia as far as
nation-building is concerned is arguably cultural pluralism. Besides, as indicated in Tan
Chee Beng (1988) analysis, most of the leaders in the Hua Tuan are predominantly came
from among group A and group B. Given the position of the Hua Tuan as an extremely
influential pressure group both on Chinese political leaders and in the national politics
alike, it is argued that the notion of cultural pluralism will remain prominent in shaping
the perception of the Chinese towards the notion of Bangsa Malaysia.
While Tan Chee Beng (1988) analysis of the relationship between educational
background and the classification of the Chinese was useful in elucidating their
orientation and attitudes towards nation-building, it is worth noting that his observation
made in 1988 may not be fully compatible with the development and change that has
been occurring in Malaysia in the post 1990. As a result of the 1996 Education Act, there
are growing numbers of private higher education institutions established in Malaysia.
While many of these institutions used English as their medium of instruction, there are
also a number of colleges that used Mandarin as the medium. Some had even established
joint-venture degree programmes with universities in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Whereas English medium primary and secondary schools have no longer exist in
Malaysia except the very small number of expatriate schools which operate to cater the
need for foreigners working in Malaysia, private colleges and universities that use
English as medium of instruction are allowed and recognised by the 1996 Education Act
as part of the national system. The implication of these development is that: while those
who receive only Chinese-education (Chinese-educated type 2) will persist, it will also
sustain the Chinese educated type 2., that is those who receive Chine and English
education. This clearly contradict Tan's assessment that Chinese-educated type 2 will
eventually disappear ( Table 4). Apart from that, since the end of 1970's up to until the
1997 economic crisis, there have been enormous number of Malaysians from various
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ethnic background obtained higher education overseas. The extent to which the
experience of attending overseas education would have made an impact in shaping the
orientations and attitudes of these graduates have not been explored in Tan's analysis.
Whether they will fit into any one of the three categories, namely Group A, B, r C is yet
to be ascertained. What is clear is that the presence of this group would certainly
contribute towards strengthening those who came from English educated or rather the
mix group category. Perhaps, a new category need to be considered as they may not
entirely fit into any of the existing categories. Moreover, although Tan Chee Beng
reckoned that those Chinese who received Malay medium education will become more
important as a result of the implementation of national education policy, recent
observation made by Lee Kam Ring (1997) however, suggest otherwise. In his word:
It is not possible yet to identify an essentially Malay-educated group that is large enough and
which in orientation is different from the Chinese and English-educated. The influence of the
present generation of Chinese and English-educated is still strong, while higher education
institutions will maintain the continued role of the two groups.
(Lee Kam Hing, 1997:101)
Lee Kam Ring (1997) suggests that this phenomena exist because of the strong presence
of the Chinese and English-educated Chinese who tend to dominate the mainstream
thinking within the Chinese community. In any case, not , many Chinese parents
preferred to send their children to Malay medium stream. Kua Kia Soong (1984) notes
that 80 per cent of Chinese parent preferred their children to have Chinese primary
education. This also explain the reasons behind the growing number of enrollment in
Chinese primary schools in recent years. The figure in 1997 stated that there were
580,000 pupils in 1290 Chinese primary schools throughout the country (Zainal Abidin
Wahid, 1996).
With full recognition given to Chinese secondary school to be part as the national
education system following the enforcement of the 1996 Education Act (something which
was denied before 1996), many Chinese students who receive primary education in
Chinese are likely to continue their secondary education in the same language, and later
may proceed with tertiary education either in the same language or in English, which are
also recognised as part of the national education policy by the new Act. This is the
phenomena that many Malay nationalist are concerned about as it will sustain the
situation of the association of ethnicity with education. That is, while many Malays may
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likely go to national schools which use Malay as medium of instruction and later proceed
to local universities which also use the national language, the majority of the Chinese
may receive Chinese and English medium education. As such, education as an effective
instrument for political socialisation and nation-building may not play its effective role as
far as Malaysia is concern. Therefore, one might ask: What is the prospect of
constructing the Bangsa Malaysia if people continue to be educated in a separate and
difference environment?
7.4 Political participation and the politics of identity
Having assessed the parameters of Chinese orientation and attitudes towards
nation-building, it is thus important to examine how these tend to affect the scenario of
party politics and political participation within the Chinese community. As discussed
somewhere earlier, Chinese interests are articulated through two type of political parties,
namely the exclusively Chinese parties and Chinese-based political parties. Indeed,
throughout the history of nation-building in Malaysia, these parties have mobilized the
views of the majority of the Chinese into the political system with the support of various
Chinese guilds and associations or the Hua Tuan .
To some extent the three varying perceptions of the Chinese towards nation-
building was reflected in the modus operandi of Chinese and Chinese-based political
parties that prevail in the country (see: Lee Kam Hing, 1988). Nevertheless it is worth
noting that these political parties whether as part of the ruling coalition or in opposition
'have sought to represent Chinese community's bedrock interests: rights of full
citizenships, unrestricted opportunity for economic advancement, preservation of the
Chinese language and Chinese schools, and outlets for public cultural expression' (Heng,
1996:38). Therefore, it is rather explicit that despite the different political platform and
the distinctive approaches adopted in politics, they stand united on issues affecting the
Chinese. The differing approaches and platforms they took politically would be
insignificant when it comes to issues involving the community's long term interests.
Therefore, one cannot adopt a simplistic approach to categorize Chinese political parties
according to the grouping of Chinese perception towards nation-building, as this may not
be so consistently accurate. However, as argued earlier, to a certain extent the varying
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orientation and perception of the Chinese towards nation building does in the end
influence the pattern of their political mobilisation and participation.
Since independence, 'the Chinese have been represented by at least one
government party (primarily the Malaysian Chinese Association, MCA) and one or more
Chinese-based opposition parties (primarily the Labour party until the early 1960's and
after that by the Democratic Action Party, or DAP)' (Heng, 1996:38). In the post 1970
development, several more Chinese-based parties have been incorporated into the
government to represent various factions within the Chinese community both from
Peninsular Malaysia and also that of Sabah and Sarawak. For the purpose of examining
Chinese political parties and its relationship with their attitude and perception towards
nation-building, the discussion will give special focus to the three major Chinese and
Chinese-based political parties, namely the MCA, the DAP and the Gerakan. Other
political parties will be examined only when it becomes necessary.
Heng (1996) argues that until 1969, the 'Chinese resisted accepting their status as
a minority subordinate to Malay rule' (p. 38). This view was largely reflected in the
struggle of most Chinese-based parties that operate outside the government, though, it
does not mean that the MCA do not share this view at all. In explaining this, Heng quotes
Lucian Pye's (1985) cultural interpretation of Chinese political behaviour. Pye (1985)
noted that Confucian culture provided no clue for Chinese leaders to function in non-
Confucian environment. Therefore,
[Tjhe Chinese concepts of authority are entirely premised on the assumption that both the omnipotent
leader and his dutiful subordinates are Chinese; that a Chinese leader should be the subordinate of a
'foreigner' is culturally unthinkable...any Chinese who acts as a leader must be an imposter, if he is
subservient to the Malay majority leadership.
(Pye, 1985:251, cited in Heng, 1996:38)
Despite the Confucian values, it may not be accurate to regard the Chinese in Malaysia as
a minority ethnic group per se. The Chinese alone constitute about 35 percent of the
population and together with other non-Malay ethnic groups, they form about 45 percent
of the total population of Malaysia (Malaysia, 1996). This numerical strength has to be
considered together with their economic and educational superiority which in the end
counter-balances with Malay political dominance. This would perhaps explained the
reason behind strong Chinese resistance to Malay rule prior to the 1969 era which by
contrast did not occur elsewhere in Southeast Asia where the Chinese constitute a tiny
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minority. Indeed, in comparison to Chinese Malaysian, ethnic Chinese in most
Southeast Asian countries have been effectively assimilating themselves into the
mainstream societies (Leo Suryadinata, 1997). Nevertheless, there are several sharp
contrasts between these countries and Malaysia. Leo Suryadinata (1997) notes that one
of the most outstanding factor which distinguished Malaysia and other Southeast Asian
countries is Islam. Suryadinata (1997) indicated that while it is much easier for the
Chinese to assimilate into a non-Muslim society such as in the Thais-Buddhist society or
the Philipino-Catholic society, it is not so when it involves Malay-Islam society as of in
Malaysia. Although Islam is also the main religion in Indonesia, the very tiny ethnic
Chinese (less than 10 per cent) in this country found it hard to resist the strong pressures
or rather 'suppression' towards assimilation that prevail in Indonesian socio-political
setting.
The MCA as the oldest Chinese political party and also the biggest Chinese
representative in the government while seeking to maintain Chinese political and cultural
separateness has been working closely with UMNO and the MIC as political partners on
the basis of consociational formula in governing Malaysian plural society. Its leadership
was made up of Western-educated professionals and successful Chinese businessmen. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the emergence of the MCA as a dominant Chinese
party until 1969 had to be seen in the light of the challenge and threat posed by another
Chinese dominated party, namely the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1948. In an
attempt to isolate the Chinese from the MCP struggle who chose to operate outside the
constitutional framework, the MCA was supported and encouraged by the British to
reconstitute its position, its original identity as representing Chinese trade and
commercial interests into a political party in 1949 (Means, 1976). This was the
background upon which the Allliance government was later established and led the
country into independence while at the same time trying to weaken Chinese support for
the MCP.
Since the day of its formation until the mid 1980's the MCA was seen as a party
controlled by Chinese businessmen. 9 Whilst the relationship with Chinese business
community still prevail, under the leadership of Dr. Ling Liong Sik, the party has been
9 Following the financial scandal which resulted in the imprisonment of Tan Koon Swan-then the MCA President in 1985,
the party has been trying hard to reshaping and transforming its image among the Chinese community as a party which place
greater concern on Chinese education and cultural affairs.
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able to transform its image from the one once dubbed as 'parti towkay' (lit, means
business' tycoon party) to a political party which place greater emphasis on Chinese
education and culture (al'. Daniel, 1995). In its fifty years history, the MCA has been
able to muddling through many trials and tribulations as a major Chinese political party
in the government. The party has played key role in securing citizenship rights for the
Chinese and has emerged as a viable political partner within the Alliance government.
However, the post independence period saw that many Chinese perceived that the MCA's
pro-UMNO constitutional deal was unacceptable to their long term interests, thus leading
to declining support for the party. The Chinese community in turn found that the more
vocal and radical approach adopted by other multi-ethnic parties dominated by the
Chinese such as the Labour Party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the DAP in
advocating non-Malay's interests more attractive.
In 1969 the MCA suffered a massive electoral defeat against several Chinese-
based opposition parties. It lost 20 seats out of 33 allocated to the party by the Alliance.
The defeat was largely attributed to Chinese dissatisfaction with the party which was seen
as failing to effectively represent Chinese interests within the government (Means, 1976).
Many Chinese were disenchanted with the MCA failure to exert its influence to safeguard
Chinese interests on several key issues such as the national language policy, Chinese
education and equal citizenship rights for all citizens vis-a-vis Malay special rights.
Instead they found that the Malaysian Malaysia campaign championed by the DAP and
supported by other non-Malay opposition parties more appealing.
After democracy was restored following the 1969 racial riots, the MCA sought to
reestablish its former position as the major Chinese party within the government.
However, this has not been so successful as a number of important development occurred
in the aftermath of the 1969 incident. The introduction of the NEP, the 1970 Education
Act amendment, and the unveiling of the National Cultural policy have put the MCA in a
more difficult situation in its appeal towards Chinese voters. All those policies were
viewed by many Chinese as leading towards the strengthening of Malay political pre-
eminence at the expense of Chinese interests. As part of the government, the MCA was
identified with those policies which clearly gave advantage for its opponents, namely
Chinese-based opposition parties to accuse the party of failing to protect Chinese
interests. Moreover, the inclusion of Gerakan into the BN in the 1970's in the expansion
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of the Alliance concept, has further weaken MCA's position in the government as the sole
representative of the Chinese. Gerakan, despite advocating a non-communal approach is
essentially a Chinese-based party. Therefore, MCA attempts to revitalize its position
within the Chinese community in the post 1970 Malaysian politics have been, somehow
hampered.
Consequently, upon confronting DAP's criticism of the government's pro-Malay
policies and in its attempt to distinguished itself from the Gerakan, the MCA has to
'revert temporarily to increased chauvinism' (Lee Kam Hing, 1987:86). The party Youth
wing in particular has on several occasions in the 1980's demonstrated Chinese
chauvinism, hence often clashed with UMNO Youth (Means, 1991). This was the pattern
of the MCA political struggle in the 1970's and 1980's when facing with election
difficulties pertaining to issues affecting Chinese community. In the 1990's the party
seems to regain its influence among the Chinese as the government was seen as adopting
a more liberal approach in several of its national policies towards economic development
and nation-building. The MCA won many of its seats including several urban
constituencies which were known as DAP's strong hold (Ghazali Mayudin, 1995). But
some analysts argued that this was attributed to the 'feel good factor' stemmed from
economic growth that Malaysia was experiencing since 1991, which benefited the BN as
a whole (Ghazali Mayudin, 1995; M.Mustafa Ishak, 1995; Lee Kam fling, 1995). To
what extent this sort of shift is going to last has yet to be seen. Furthermore, what is
equally interesting is to see the impact of the 1997/98 economic and political crisis on the
attitude of Chinese voters towards the MCA and the BN in the next general election.
By and large the MCA has survived many of its difficult challenge in representing
itself as a purely Chinese party in the country. In the late 1980's the party leadership
moved towards disassociating the party from the `towkay' or businessmen image and
insisted that MCA will from thereon focusing on Chinese education and cultural issues to
rebuild party support (G.P. Daniel, 1995). 1 ° In 1986, the party relinquished its business
connection with the conglomerate- Multi Purpose Holdings- its long time business
affiliate and instead put more attention in the development of its sponsored Kolej Tunku
I ° An analysis of the MCA membership structure shows that 25% of the party members are general workers, 17/o rubber
tapper, fisherman, farmers, hawkers, and shopkeepers, 7% businessmen, whilst others include salesman, teachers,
housewives and professionals. Hence the party insists that it is 'indeed a representative party with a good cross-section of
the Chinese community. It is no longer a towkay party but truly a democratic party of the people' (Dr. Ling Liong Sik, cited
in G.P. Daniel, 1995:32)
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Abdul Rahman (KTAR College)- the educational institution established in 1970 with the
aim of providing places for Chinese school leavers at tertiary level. In recent years the
KTAR College has been very successful in expanding its branches nation-wide and thus
continue to increase the number of student intake each year (Ling Liong Sik, 1996). The
MCA also has been successful in its so-called `Langkawi project'- a fund raising
programme to assist its educational mission (Ling Liong Sik, 1996).
This shift of approach from business oriented political party to the one
championing the Chinese cultural and educational visions to some extent could be
attributed to the perception that many of Chinese businessmen have that, it is UMNO and
not MCA is more important as 'broker of wealth' in the post 1970 era (Shamsul A.B.,
1996b; Heng, 1996; Lee Kam Hing, 1997; Gomez, 1998). As a political party, the MCA
espouses no ideological values but insist that it is primarily a party of the Chinese (Ling
Liong Sik, 1988). 'Its leader support the idea of a strong and exclusively Chinese party
but, equally important, believe that its survival and that of the Chinese community
depend on close co-operation with UMNO' (Lee Kam Hing, 1987:85-86). In its
Presidents words:
The MCA has always chosen partners who are moderates and are willing to discuss. Malaysia has no
room for extremists and religious fanatics. Moderation is the key to success for the country.
Moderation in demands and speech will create a conducive atmosphere for everybody. ...The MCA is
conscious of its role and responsibilities as the custodian for the legitimate interests of the Chinese
community....Pluralism and democracy should be the watchwords of politics for us in the 1990's... The
multi-racial and multi-religious character of our Malaysian society necessitates a fine balancing act to
reconcile the different interests of the various communities living in this country.
(Ling, Liong Sik, cited in G.P. Daniel, 1995:103, 138,140,141)
In this regard, the MCA could be seen as largely reflecting the aspiration of group B
Chinese, namely those who tend to lean towards group A (the die hard fighters for
Chinese education and culture) but recognize the need to adapt to the local social and
political environment. Throughout its development, the MCA's leadership was largely
made up of those who received English-medium education. However, at the grass-root
level the party derived its support from a wide ranging Chinese masses of various
educational backgrounds. Thus, contending with the aspirations and influence of its
Chinese-educated Chinese within and outside the party has always been one of the
biggest challenge its leadership has to cope with. Nevertheless, in recent years, the MCA
has shown greater success in this venture, thus has been able to portray its image as a
'custodian' of Chinese interests in the government.
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By contrast, the Gerakan as stated earlier is a party which adopted a non-
communal approach since its inception in 1969. Amid its early leadership which seems
to reflect this multi-ethnic image, the success of the party to date have been largely
attributed to the support it received mainly from the Chinese. In spite of the fact that
Gerakan was formed by a group of intellectuals of various ethnic background shortly
before the 1969 election, during the 1969 election campaign the party took a communal
stance not very dissimilar to that of the DAP (Means, 1976; Lee Kam Hing, 1988). The
party still fails to attract many Malays, and has thus remained a Chinese-based party
despite advocating a multi-ethnic philosophy. It also has no clear ideological inclination,
despite some socialist tendencies in its early years (Lee Kam Hing, 1988). However, its
leadership and the party's main concern is to achieve socio-economic equality and justice
regardless of ethnicity." Although the party base is not so widespread as compared to
the MCA, it has one state government under its control, that of the Penang state. Penang
was captured from the MCA led Alliance state government in 1969. Even after the party
joined the BN in 1974, the Gerakan was given a privilege to continue to lead the Penang
state government. Gerakan staunchly defended its dominant role in Penang despite
several attempts from MCA and even UMNO to take over the state leadership (Mohamed
Mustafa Ishak, 1987). Since then, Gerakan has had the advantage of presenting its image
and its political struggle in the form of leading the Penang state government, thus
strengthening its regional base influence.
According to Lee Kam Hing (1988), though there is no Chinese-based party
which has ever encouraged assimilation, Gerakan is probably the only one that has come
close to suggesting it. However, the main obstacle towards achieving this end is the
strong primordial sentiments that prevail in the Malaysian political arena which in the end
made Gerakan face difficulty in maintaining this vision. In the words of one of the party
vice-president, Dr. Goh Cheng Teik:
I admit that we still fail to attract many non-Chinese into our party. But this issue has to be looked in a
wider perspective. Malaysian politician always pledge that 'people should integrate, business
community should integrate, we must strive for a stronger national unity, we must erase the
identification of ethnicity with economic function', but we have not erase the identification of ethnicity
with political organisation. The question that I put forward is why ethnic based political organisations
stands as a liability or a drawback in the progress towards Bangsa Malaysia? Instead of marching
forward, ethnic-based political organisations are holding back people from marching towards the
realisation of Bangsa Malaysia. The reason for this is simply this. In the general election, the leaders
of all parties come together and talk to the public in a multi-racial tone (the BN leaders). But when
"Interview with Dr. Goh Cheng Teik, Deputy Minister of Land and Cooperative Development
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they are running for office in their own party, especially when there is a bitter fight, one find that the
same leader tend to be very racial in their appeal unlike what they did in the general election.I2
While accepting that, Professor Khoo Kay Kim however, added that:
Even a similar problem exists within the Gerakan as demonstrated during the party leadership election
campaign in 1995. In that year the party President Dr. Lim Keng Yaik was challenged by Joseph
Chong. During the campaign, Dr. Lim Keng Yaik has appealed to the Chinese members in the party
on issues pertaining to Chinese interests in a speech made in Mandarin which caused dissatisfaction
and dismay to many of the Indian members in the party."
Therefore, despite its multi-racial philosophy, Gerakan still could not dissociate its image
from Chinese characteristics, hence fail to project its non-ethnic political appeal. This
was rather apparent in 1985 when UMNO leaderships threaten to expel the MCA from
the BN for failing to resolve its bitter factional crisis, Gerakan President Dr Lim Keng
Yaik proposed that his party can take over the MCA role within the BN (Means,
1991:179).
Many of the Gerakan members came from English-educated Chinese and this is
also reflected in its leadership since 1974. 14 Therefore, the party arguably tend to reflect
as representing group C Chinese or the integrationists group. Indeed, the party seems to
be more receptive to the notion of Ban gsa Malaysia. I5 However the party has to face
several crucial challenge in its attempt to promote and expand its influence. Apparently
the key challenges came not from the masses but rather from MCA and UMNO. Lee Kam
Hing (1988:88) put this rather succinctly:
The MCA accusation is that the Gerakan seems prepared to take a pro-Malay position in order to
replace the MCA as the dominant component member in Government. ...with the present of another
Chinese-based party in the Barisan Nasional the bargaining position of the MCA is greatly weaken
since MCA can no longer present itself as indispensable. ...to some in UMNO, Gerakan call for the
evolution of parties that are 'Malaysian in identity' and non-racial appears as an implied criticism not
only of the MCA but also of UMNO. Logically the Gerakan should also be seeking Malay support in
order to further its non-racial character. However, on this issue the Gerakan is aware of UMNO's
concern and has on its own initiative scrupulously avoided Malay areas.
Therefore, while the Gerakan intend to pursue its non-ethnic approach in politics, the
party is fully awared that it cannot overly emphasize this move as this might offend
UMNO and the MCA which are partners in the BN coalition government. If the Gerakan
overly pursued this venture, it may in the end erode its existing influence among the
12 Interview with Dr. Goh Cheng Teik.
13 Interview with Professor Khoo Kay Kim
14 Interview with Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Khoon, Chief Minister of Penang
15 Dr. Goh Cheng Teik, one of Gerakan central committee even wrote a book to support the idea of Bangsa Malaysia and
call for the abandonment of ethnic based political parties to achieve the vision (see: Goh Cheng Teik, 1997).
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Chinese while it may not necessarily garnered many support from among the Malays.
Some Malays envisaged that to support a Chinese led multi-ethnic party would weaken
the Malays politically. I6
 For the Malays they would rather support PAS alternatively had
UMNO fails to deliver its responsibility. I7
 This is a political dilemma not for the
Gerakan alone, but rather for any multi-ethnic political party in Malaysia.
In short, the Gerakan ability to sustain its influence in Malaysian politics can be
attributed to several factors. First, it has one state government under its control since
1969. This has enable the party to demonstrate its ability in governing a state government
and implementing its political programmes, and thus has been able to make an impact in
national politics. Secondly, the party provide an alternative party in the government for
the Chinese apart from the MCA. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that throughout
its development, many of the Gerakan national leaders came from former MCA leaders.
Means (1991:179) notes that : 'When dissidents were discipline in either party, they often
emerged again in the other party as activists or even leaders.' Therefore, the Gerakan has
never short of having experience national Chinese leaders in its elite circle, an important
factor which help to sustain the party credibility amongst its members and the electorates.
The Gerakan has been able to contest the MCA claim as the primary spokesman for
Chinese interests in the government. Since the party draw its support mainly from among
the Chinese, the Gerakan on many occasions have shown concerns on issues affecting the
Chinese community, despite its non-racial philosophy. Therefore, as far the party's
attitude towards nation-building is concerns, the Gerakan has been rather cautious in
making an explicit stance for the reasons which are rather obvious. Although it may
indicates some of the integrationist tendencies, having relied upon Chinese support for its
political survival has thus making it hard for the party to make a stand which is very
dissimilar from the one held by the MCA.
The DAP on the other hand came into existence in Malaysian politics after the
PAP was disbanded following the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. The
party continue to promote the notion of Malaysian Malaysia once espoused by the PAP
even until today. I8 The concept of Malaysian Malaysia is basically challenging the notion
of Malay political supremacy and is also an attempt to redefine Malaysian politics to pave
16 Most Malay respondents interviewed have uttered a similar view on this aspect.
17 Ibid
18 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw- DAP Vice Chairman
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the way for the establishment of a true multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural
Malaysian society (Shamsul A.B, 1996). In other words, the concept call for cultural
laissez faire and the abolishment of Malay special rights and affirmative action, and
replace it with the notion of meritocracy, that is equal treatment to all Malaysian
regardless of ethnicity. Clearly, this is the most explicit articulation of the notion of
cultural pluralism, and something which many Malays found it difficult to swallow. The
DAP also incline towards socialism in the sense that it perceive the problems of
development in terms of class rather than ethnicity (Means, 1976). It also a member of
international socialist organisation. However, throughout its development as a dominant
opposition party, its approach and political campaign demonstrate a strong tendency
towards Chinese chauvinism (Means, 1976; Milne and Mauzy, 1981). For many Malays,
the DAP is more Chinese than the rest of Chinese parties that prevail in the country.I9
Although the party has been able to maintain its multi-ethnic character in its
leadership hierarchy, the vast majority of the support for the party come from urban
Chinese voters of middle class background. The party enjoyed good relationship with
the Hua Tuan throughout 1970's and 1980's because of its strong image as the defender
of Chinese educational and cultural rights (Sia Keng Yek, 1996). However, the 1995
election saw the party suffered the heaviest electoral defeat it ever experienced in its
history (Ghazali Mayudin, 1995; Gomez, 1996). It was argued by many analysts that
despite the economic factor, the government's liberal approaches in the post NEP national
development policies, especially in matters related to Chinese educational and cultural
interests, has put the MCA and the Gerakan in a more better position in appealing to
Chinese voters. In fact, DAP claimed that the government has been somehow liberal in
its policies in the post 1990 period should be attributed to the party long time campaign in
promoting the notion of Malaysia Malaysia was backfired (Ghazali Mayudin, 1995;
Mohamed Mustafa Ishak, 1995). Despite its massive electoral defeat in the 1995 general
election, this does not mean that the DAP's struggle has been irrelevant as far the Chinese
are concerned (Lee Kam Hing, 1995). The DAP will continue to exist and exert its
position as the major non-Malay or Chinese-based opposition party. It is argued therefore,
that despite its multi-ethnic character, the DAP has been successful in representing the
19 Interview with Zainal Abidin Wahid.
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aspiration of group A Chinese, namely those of the die-hard fighters of Chinese education
and culture.
Nevertheless, in the 1990's when the government embarked upon several
liberalisation policies in education and cultural which appeared to serve well the interests
of Chinese community, it is the MCA and to some extent the Gerakan that have been
gaining popularity amongst the Chinese at the expense of the DAP. The 1995 electoral
disaster for the DAP was a testimony to this point. Therefore, in order to exert its political
relevant, the DAP has instead focusing more on issues such as government
mismanagement, corruption, abuse of power, and so forth which are rather universal
issues and may attract a wider audience from both Malay and the non-Malay. This has
been the most obvious role that DAP MPs have been playing in the Parliament which
honoured Lim Kit Siang, the DAP Secretary General, with the status as the Opposition
Leader. As such, for the BN, the threat 'from the DAP came not only from its tireless
effort to expose discrimination against non-Malays, but also from its tenacious pursuit of
government mismanagement and its revelation of official corruption' (Means, 1991:181).
Although several shift have been occurring in Malaysian politics in the post 1990
period, the DAP still committed to the notion of creating a Malaysian Malaysia, which is
according to the DAP doctrine reflect a genuine pluralist Malaysian society. 2° As a party
which success in general election has been largely dependent on urban-working class
Chinese, the DAP despite claiming to be a multi-racial party, will continue to appeal on
Chinese issues. The advantage that the DAP has over the MCA and the Gerakan has been
its role as opposition party, and this thus allowed the party to articulate issues in a more
radical manner. Up to 1980's the radical approach adopted by the DAP in championing
Chinese issues had served well to the party advantage. Nevertheless, this in turn had also
seen the flowering Malay nationalist sentiments to counter Chinese chauvinistic demands.
The MCA under the leadership of Ling Liong Sik however saw that ethnic Chinese in
contemporary Malaysia need a clear break from their past political fumbling, a clean slate
to rewrite their future (G.P. Daniel, 1995). One Chinese academician saw that:
to achieve this end, the MCA has to make peace with UMNO while at the same time repudiating any
kind of link with racist political views. In the past whenever the DAP yelled out an issue, the MCA
would be scurrying around for solution. However, such scenario has changed in recent years. The
MCA will now tell to the Chinese community, the DAP may have their own agenda, but we have our
own constructive one. We shall work this out by virtue of our strong representation in the government.
20 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw
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The government liberalisation policies in language, education and culture in the post 1990 period
clearly stands as a testimony for the success of the MCA, and to some extent the Gerakan roles in the
government. 21
In short, it is clear that contrary to its professed ideology, the DAP since its formation in
1965 has been alternating between multi-racialism at one hand and a strong Chauvinistic
appeal to the Chinese community in Malaysia at the other. It has become one of the
strongest non-Malay based opposition parties with organised and active party machinery
throughout the Peninsular Malaysia and have made some breakthrough in Sabah and
Sarawak. The modus operandi of the party has been to seek the support of the non-
Malays, particular the Chinese community. It is also clear that the party has not been
successful in capturing substantial Malay votes over the past three decades, simply
because the Malays perceive the party as a Chinese chauvinist party. Nevertheless, what
is worth noting is that despite their political fragmentation, the Chinese stand united on
issues pertaining to Chinese interests. When it comes to issues such as Chinese
language, education, cultural and Chinese economic interests, it is rather hard to
distinguish the political stands of the MCA and the Gerakan from that of the DAP.
Obviously, their main concern has always been to retain Malaysia as a secular state with
its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural characteristics. Thus, it is not an over simplistic
approach to suggest that despite party fragmentation, the Chinese, and indeed the non-
Bumiputera communities in general tend to perceive that cultural pluralism should be the
basic characteristic for the envisage Malaysian nation.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that although the non-Bumiputera communities have
made significant adjustment in adapting and subordinating to Malay political dominance,
they are very critical and indeed skeptical of Malay hegemonic tendencies, which they
perceive as detrimental to their ethnic and cultural identities. Of the three Malay ethnic
identifiers, namely Bahasa, Islam dan Raja, it is the Islamic factor that they find it
difficult to adapt with. The discussion has also demonstrated that educational
background has had a strong impact in shaping Chinese attitude and perceptions towards
nation-building. Nevertheless, this has to be considered as a rough indication as the
21 Interview with one Chinese academician from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia who preferred to remain anonymous.
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Chinese in general are very concern about their Chineseness regardless of their
educational background and political affiliation, To a certain extent the varying
perceptions and orientations of the Chinese towards nation-building were reflected in the
way Chinese and Chinese-based political parties participated in Malaysian politics.
Whilst the MCA and the Gerakan might differ from the DAP in their utterances on
matters that affect Chinese interests, the leadership of those two BN component parties
were perfectly aware that to effectively solicit Chinese voters, they have to a certain
degree demonstrate their concerns and intentions to protect Chinese long term interests.
In other words, though they are part of the government which is dominated by Malay
leadership, like the DAP, they too are concerned with the promotion of the three Chinese
ethnic identifiers, namely Chinese schools, Chinese media and Chinese associations.
The majority of the Chinese would not accept a single ethnic-based polity and
culture as the basis of the nation, but rather are more inclined towards the multi-ethnic
and multi-cultural characteristics. The point that this chapter attempt to establish is that
the dominant perception among Chinese community in Malaysia towards nation-building
is cultural pluralism. It is not so accurate to regard some Chinese as having no clear
stand towards integration as argued by Tan Che Beng (1988), as there are very few
Chinese that are prepared to sacrifice their ethnic identity for the sake of achieving the
objective of national integration. Although they welcome efforts towards nation-
building, and wanted to be Malaysian, this should not in the final analysis lead them to be
perceived as less Chinese. For the Chinese, being a Malaysian nation should not denote
as being less Chinese. Neither do they prepared to accept the diminution or Chinese
cultural markers that are well preserved in Chinese language, Chinese schools, Chinese
media, and Chinese organisation. The question is how will they define the notion of
Bangsa Malaysia if this is the perception that they held with regard to their identity.
Equally interesting is how would the notion of Bangsa Malaysia reconcile this contrasting
perception of the Bumiputera and the non-Bumiputera communities? These are among
crucial questions which shall be examined in the following chapter.
PART III
FROM PLURAL SOCIETY TO BANGSA MALAYSIA:
THE TASK
OF MEDIATING IDENTITIES
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CHAPTER 8
IMAGINING THE NATION III:
THE BANGSA MALAYSIA
8.1 Introduction
The main task in this chapter is not to attempt to provide answers concerning
how Bangsa Malaysia is to be constructed, but rather to identify and examine the
problematic notion of Ban gsa Malaysia as a socio-political concept. The main concern
is to explore the meaning of the concept at two different levels, namely the
government's definition of the term (if one exists), and popular perceptions as to what
the concept should mean. Equally important is how this perception relates to the
existing notions of nation-of-intent in Malaysia. While the objectives of Vision 2020
and the idea of constructing a Bangsa Malaysia may well be understood by many
Malaysians, the relevant questions to ask are: To what extent would the idea of Ban gsa
Malaysia be able to reconcile the competing 'nationalisms' that are circulating in
Malaysia? Can it be a successful venture, or may it instead end-up as something
different, which could further complicate the politics of nation-building in the country?
These are among the important questions that this chapter attempts to investigate.
8.2 'Reinventing' the nation: Bangsa Malaysia as a political imagined community
It has been argued in previous discussions that before Vision 2020 was unveiled,
Malaysia was more concerned with a state-building agenda, while the objective of
nation-building transcending the framework of managing ethnicity and promoting
national integration was not pursued. A clear vision or concept of 'a nation' was not
formulated, thus resulting in the agenda for nation-building lacking a coherent direction.
This was the view expressed by several observers such as Shamsul A.B. (1992); Rustam
A. Sani (1993); M. Mustafa Ishak (1994); and Abdul Rahman Embong (1995). There
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were two major factors that can be identified as restraining the efforts of nation-building
from going beyond the framework of conflict management and promoting ethnic
harmony. The first was the pluralistic nature of Malaysian society, characterised by a
potent interplay between the forces of ethnicity and nationalism, which at times tended
to be very divisive. Ethnicity was institutionalized in the Malaysian political system
even before independence and continued to be so in the post-independence years.
Second, whilst Malay hegemony formed a crucial part of the polity, the ruling
government was based on a consociational formula. As a result, assimilationist policies
could not be implemented, as they would never be endorsed by the non-Malay
representatives in the ruling party, whose main responsibility was to protect and
safeguard the interests of their communities.
Many observers reckoned that the improved ethnic relations in Malaysia since
1969 can be largely attributed to economic growth, which allowed every ethnic group to
get their respective portion of the expanding economic cake.' According to Professor
Khoo Kay Kim,
as long as this principle is sustained, ethnicity will be moderated. But we cannot jump into
conclusion to suggest that communalism is diminishing because in terms of inter-ethnic
relations, polarisation still persist.2
It was argued that the greatest indicator of this successful formula was demonstrated in
the 1995 general election. The 1995 general election was held when Malaysia had
sustained an average of 7-8 per cent growth for seven consecutive years.
Unemployment was almost nil, while inflation was kept to its lowest level, of below 4
per cent (Utusan Malaysia, 1 May 1995). The 'feel good' factor was very apparent as
far as the electorates were concerned. In that election the BN under Mahathir's
leadership not only won a landslide victory, but of more significance was the 'changing'
voting behaviour of urban Chinese electorates. Many urban constituencies comprising
more than 60 per cent Chinese voters and traditionally known as DAP strongholds were
captured by the BN, a phenomenal success which had never occurred in Malaysian
electoral history. Thus, the local press concluded that this election marked 'the end of
'Interview with Professor Khoo Kay Kim.
2 'bid
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communalism' in Malaysian politics, a presumption which many social scientists regard
as rather too optimistic and perhaps premature. 3
On the contrary, some observers query to what extent the so-called 'the end of
communalism' constitute a permanent characteristic of the polity, and to what, extent it
was only a temporary phenomenon resulted from the constant growth and expanding
economic cake that allowed a redistribution exercise to be implemented rather
effectively.4
 What would happen if the economic cake shrunk in a time of recession,
thus forcing people to struggle over the scarce resources? The 1997 economic downturn
which led the country into recession the following year had already marked by political
crisis following the Anwar Ibrahim issue. Anwar's abrupt dismissal from the
government was a shocking moment for many Malaysians, as was his subsequent arrest
by the police commando unit, his beating at the hand of the Police Chief, his lengthy
trial, and later his six year jail conviction by the High Court. 5 The government,
especially Dr. Mahathir himself was placed under severe scrutiny by the people over the
handling of the Anwar Ibrahim affair. Obviously, the next general election due in June
2000 (though it could be held earlier) will be a great test for Dr. Mahathir and the BN,
as opposition parties have been gaining ground following the crisis and the economic
downturn. This aspect will be further examined in the next chapter.
The notion of Bangsa Malaysia embodied in Vision 2020 can be seen as an
attempt to bring together the diverse ethnic groups and their varying perceptions of
nation-of-intent into one united Malaysian nation. The introduction of the idea of
Bangsa Malaysia also signified Mahathir's view that the country needed to make a
significant departure from the framework of conflict management and maintaining
ethnic harmony of the past into a more 'robust' and futuristic venture of constructing a
'united Malaysian nation' under the banner of Vision 2020. It also reflects the
government's 'admission' that efforts at nation-building over the previous four decades
had not been all that successful. Bangsa Malaysia may not have been necessary if all
3 Interview with Professor Shamsul A.B., Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, Professor Khoo Kay Kim, Professor H.M.
Dahlan, Dr. P. Ramasamy, Rustam A. Sani and Chamil Wariya
4 Ibid
5 Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir's chosen heir apparent and the popular Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister was sacked on 2
September 1998 for allegedly committing sexual misconduct and corruption. Anwar argued that he was sacked because of
his criticism on the phenomena of rampant corruption, cronyism, and nepotism in the Mahathir led government. He claimed
that the charges leveled against him wer therefore essentially a political conspiracy to destroy his career. In fact, differences
between the two leaders had developed for several months before the sacking ranging from economic policy to matters
concerning UMNO and the government. (see Asiaweek, 30 October 1998).
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had been well with the government's previous nation-building programmes. Apart from
that it also indicates the government's confidence that as socio-economic imbalances
between ethnic groups continued to improve, a far-reaching framework for building a
united Malaysian nation could be put forward to the people. However, the big ,question
remains, what is the meaning of Bangsa Malaysia? Does it has a clear connotation, and
do the people share the same perception of what the notion should mean?
8.2.1 Bangsa Malaysia: Mahathir's perspective
The notion of Bangsa Malaysia has to be viewed in the context of Vision 2020.
Vision 2020, which was introduced in 1991 by Dr. Mahathir, outlined the government's
aspiration to turn Malaysia into an industrialised country within the period of one
generation, that is by the year 2020. Mahathir believes that this ambition can be
achieved provided the country can sustain economic growth of at least 7 per cent a year
from the time the Vision was unveiled until 2020. Nevertheless, he envisages that
Malaysia should not be a duplicate of any other developed country, but instead be 'a
developed country in our own mould' (Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a:2). In Mahathir's
words:
Malaysia should not be developed only in the economic sense. It must be a nation that is fully
developed along all the dimensions: economically, politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically
and culturally. We must be fully developed in terms of national unity and social cohesion, in terms
of our economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, system of government, quality of life,
social and spiritual values, national pride and confidence.
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a:2)
Nevertheless, Mahathir argued that Malaysia cannot be fully developed in its own
mould until and unless:
we have finally overcome the nine central strategic challenges that have confronted us from the
moment of our birth as an independent nation. The first of these is the challenge of establishing a
united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny. We must be a nation at peace
with itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full and fair partnership,
made up of one Tangsa Malaysia' with political loyalty and dedication to the nation.
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a:2-3)
The other eight strategic challenges involve: (1) creating a psychologically liberated
society, (2) fostering a mature democratic society, (3) establishing moral and ethical
society, (4) establishing a liberal and tolerant society, (5) creating a scientific and
progressive society, (6) creating a caring society, (7) the challenges of ensuring an
economically just society, (8) and finally the challenges of establishing a prosperous
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society, with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic robust and resilent
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1991a). Mahathir however asserts that the list of the challenges
need not be in order of priority, as the priorities of any moment in time must meet the
specific circumstances of that moment in time. But he argued that it would be
surprising if the first strategic challenge, 'the establishment of a united Malaysian
nation- is not likely to be the most fundamental, the most basic' (Mahathir Mohamad,
1991a:4).
As far as the notion of Bangsa Malaysia is concerned, neither Mahathir nor the
government has yet suggested a comprehensive account of what the concept should
mean, and how it is to be achieved. Thus far, the goverment has only outlined the
philosophy of the notion but the detailed characteristics of the 'nation-in-the making' is
yet to be decided. Thus the concept is still vague for many ordinary Malaysians. As it
stands, the notion is still very much a problematic and contested concept. In a speech
made in 1992 Mahathir attempted to elaborate how the process of nation-building
should be pursued in order to materialise the idea of constructing a Bangsa Malaysia.
He argued that managing nation-building towards achieving the vision of Ban gsa
Malaysia will entail:
honouring our respective obligations and responsibilities under the Constitution, whether it relates to
politics, citizenship, socio-economic opportunities, language, religion or the respective power of the
centre and the state. This was the solemn pledge that we all made when we worked out our
consensus. This pledge we must continue to fulfill, sincerely and fully. ...managing our nation-
building well will also entail we redress the socio-economic imbalances among the various ethnic
groups and then various regions in our country. [Thus] Grow, we no doubt must. If we do not grow
we will not have the resources to redress anything. ...we will also need peace and stability to pursue
and achieve our strategic goal of becoming a united nation without hindrance.
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1992:5)
There are two main points which Mahathir attempts to highlight here. The first is
peoples' obligation with regard to the 1957 consensus, or the Merdeka compromy which
he argued must be fulfilled, sincerely and fully. The second is redressing the socio-
economic imbalances amongst the various ethnic groups, the success of which is heavily
dependent on the extent to which economic growth and prosperity can be created and
sustained in the country. Obviously, these are not new issues, but rather something
which many Malaysian are familiar with, since they have formed the basic framework
of national integration since 1970.
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In relation to that statement, in 1995 the Premier stated that, `Bangsa Malaysia
means people who are able to identify themselves with the country, speak Bahasa
Malaysia and accept the Constitution' (The Star,11 September 1995). Although these
statements once again only outlined a general interpretation of what the notion should
be refer to, it did highlight three initial characteristics for the Bangsa Malaysia. First,
'identification with the country' may reflect the call for undivided loyalty and a sense of
patriotism towards Malaysia as the homeland. Second, 'speak Bahasa Malaysia' may
be referring to one common language as means of communication among Malaysians
which could also serve as a symbol of unity for the people.
Although the last characteristic, namely 'accept the Constitution' may not sound
very significant (as every citizen of Malaysia is expected to respect and accept the
country's constitution) it has a far-reaching implication, that is every single provision
embodied in the Constitution must be upheld and protected. This would inherently
include the democratic system of electing the government, the federal structure of the
political system, the democratic and citizenship rights of the people, the rule of law,
constitutional monarchy, Malay as the national language, Islam as the official religion,
and also Malay special rights. Although these aspects were not spelled out in detail by
Mahathir, the implications of the words 'accepting the Constitution' is very broad and
certainly connotes reference to those aspects which over times have constituted
contentious subjects in as far as ethnic relations and the politics of nation-building were
concerned.
In other words, this would also means that symbols of Malay hegemony that
was enshrined in the Constitution would remained unchanged despite the establishment
of the Ban gsa Malaysia. The symbols of Malay hegemony enshrined in the Constitution
are reflected in the provisions of Malay as the national language (article 152), Malay
special rights (article 153), the Monarch as the Head of State (article 32), and Islam as
the official religion (article 3). In fact these are the three pillar of Malayness (bahasa,
agama/Islam, and raja) which formed the basis of Malay nationalism. It is almost
inconceivable that those crucial provisions are to be reviewed let alone removed from
the Malaysian Constitution in the foreseeable future. Even to question them publicly is
forbidden by the Sedition Act 1948 which was further tightened after the May 1969
tragedy. For most Malays, the provisions of Malay special rights, Islam, Malay
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language and the position of the Malay Rulers inherent in the Federal Constitution are
non-negotiable. These provisions marked the 'sacred' unwritten social contract in
exchange of the citizenship rights for the non-Malays which was agreed upon before
independence was achieved (Abdullah Ahmad, cited in K. Das, 1987; Crouch, 1996).
There was, however, another speech made far back in 1988 which contained
several important remarks on Bangsa Malaysia. This speech indicated that the idea of
Bangsa Malaysia has been in Mahathir's mind long before it was officially introduced
as a government policy in 1991. In that speech Mahathir said:
...when we attained independence we made an agreement to accept Malaysia as the official name of
the country, a Malaysian nations as our nation, and Bahasa Malaysia as our national language. All
these terms originated from the name of the largest indigenous community in he country namely the
Malays. To accept Malaysia, to be called Malaysians and to use Bahasa Malaysia, does not make us
Malay. We ethnically remain as Chinese or Indians or Ibans or Kadazans or Muruts and so forth. We
are only a Malaysian nation in the sense of a political identity based on a specific country. There is
therefore no reason why we should be apprehensive about losing our ethnic identity. We do not even
lose our ethnic language or culture.
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1988)
In this speech Mahathir emphasized that Malayness shaped the political backdrop of the
country when the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1957, and later becoming
Malaysia in 1963. However, the speech also indicated that nobody is going to lose their
ethnic identity, their language, or culture by the creation of a Bangsa Malaysia. In
other words, Bangsa Malaysia is not going to make a non-Malay become a Malay, as
the concept was referring to a limited context, namely 'political identity'. The term
'political identity' used by Mahathir clearly indicates that the government refers to
Bangsa Malaysia not in an anthropological sense or as 'Malaysian race'. Whilst the
speech may indicate that Mahathir was still committed to Malayness and Malay
nationalism, it was also stressing that cultural pluralism should prevail. It was apparent
that Mahathir's line of thinking in the 1988 speech did not differ very much from the
ones he made in 1992 and 1995. Mahathir clearly relates the notion of Bangsa
Malaysia to the country's historical milieu which basically was Malay political history.
Yet he never suggested anything which would imply a tendency towards assimilation.
Rustam A. Sani argued that, 'It may take many more generations before the
entire society is moulded together through a evolutionary process to become one united
Malaysian nation in its true sense' •6 In other words, assimilation (if it ever occurs) will
6 Interview with Rustam A. Sani.
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take a very long time and emerge through a natural process of history instead of by
coercion. At this moment in time, if the notion was seen beyond the parameter of a
political concept, it might in turn cause a set back. 7 In fact, Mahathir reassured his
audience that ethnic languages and cultures would remain part of Malaysian traditions,
and thus no ethnic group should be too concerned about losing its own tradition and
heritage. In the 1995 speech, this reassurances was very clearly given. He reportedly
said that 'the people should start accepting each other as they are, regardless of
ethnicity' (The Star, 11 September 1995). He further said that
Previously, we tried to have a single entity but it caused a lot of tension and suspicions among
the people because they thought the government was trying to create a hybrid. There was fear
among the people that they may have to give up their own cultures, values, and religions. This
could not work, and we believe that Bangsa Malaysia is the answer.
(cited by The Star, 11 September 1995)
Clearly, Mahathir was advocating that the principle of multi-culturalism was to be
protected.
Nevertheless, the gist of the two speeches indicate that elements of Malayness
embodied within the polity were to be retained, despite the need to incorporate multi-
culturalism as part and parcel of Malaysian national identity. Obviously Mahathir was
offering Malay nationalism and cultural pluralism at the same time as the basis of the
construction of the Bangsa Malaysia. The big question is how these two opposite
ideologies could merge, thus leading towards the creation of the Ban gsa Malaysia? If
this is not clear enough, it would suggest that the concept is still rather vague, despite
Mahathir's insistence that both Malayness and cultural pluralism should co-exist. In
this regard, Shamsul AB (1996b) perceives that the notion of Bangsa Malaysia as the
nation-in-the-making could be interpreted in two ways. First, to mean a cultural
community, which integrates the rural and the urban; intra and inter ethnic; and inter-
class solidarity. Secondly, it is the construction of national identity, and hence of
national integration. Therefore, Shamsul (1996b) sees Bangsa Malaysia as an attempt
by Mahathir to shift Malaysian citizens' loyalty and identification from other social
collectives to the state and its institutions. But Shamsul did not quite explain what
would be the basis for the national identity, nor did he elaborate further how the people
would strongly identify themselves with the state and its institutions when they are
7 Ibid
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shifting their allegiance to the state from other social collectivities. Furthermore,
suggesting that people should shift their ethnic loyalty and identification to the state is
one thing, but actually to make it happen is something entirely different.
In an interview with Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, the Minister of Youth and
Sport, said that he sees the concept of 'unity in diversity' as probably best reflecting the
idea of Bangsa Malaysia. 8 'Unity in diversity' illustrates a nation made up of a plurality
of ethnic groups. According to him, the government and the majority of the people
accept the fact that Malaysia is a multi-cultural and multi-religious society and this
could never be modified, and thus will continue to prevail as a unique characteristic of
Malaysian society. To him, of more importance is that the pattern of thinking and the
spirit of nationalism that the people have must be Malaysian in character. Therefore he
sees that a common national language is crucial in the development of the notion of
Bangsa Malaysia. As he puts it:
a common language would allow people to understand national issues more accurately as the
national media are using Bahasa Malaysia to convey messages to the people. This is very important
in the sense that the people do not have to interpret issues in their own language as they can
understand the national language.9
Nonetheless, as no further explanation has yet given by the authority either on the
question of what should constitute the remaining characteristics of the Bangsa Malaysia
or of how the idea is going to be pursued, the concept has been left open to numerous
contending interpretations. 10 According to Wan Yaacob Hassan- the Director General
of National Unity Department:
As far as our Department is concerned, we still do not know what exactly is the definition of the
concept, except a very brief definition given by the Prime Minister. We still do not have a specific
agenda to address the concept of `Bangsa Malaysia'. We continue to be doing our usual task of
promoting national integration according to programmes that have been approved by the Ministry."
Whereas the idea of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia was regarded as the 'ultimate
Malaysian dream' and the overall reaction of the people to it has been rather 'positive'
as one newspaper's survey indicates (The Star, 31 August 1995), the basic problem
remains that the concept remain ambiguous, and it could means different things to
different people. Mahathir tends to offer two different things at the same time. Whether
8 Interview with Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin.
9 Ibid
I ° This was clearly reflected in the interviews conducted in conjunction with this study.
"Interview with Wan Yaacob Hassan, Director General of National Unity Department.
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this is intentional or otherwise, is something interesting to explore. Another equally
interesting to question is, to what extent this ambiguity has served to diffuse the
competing nationalisms that prevail in Malaysia?
•
8.2.2 Bangsa Malaysia : The peoples' perception
How do Malaysians perceive the notion of Bangsa Malaysia? Is there any
common ground in their perception as to what Bangsa Malaysia should mean? Dr.
Ranjit Singh agreed with Mahathir's view, that the notion of Bangsa Malaysia can be
attained if it is seen in purely political terms. As he puts it:
Bangsa Malaysia can only be achieved at a political level or at supra-level. Therefore, ethnic
identities, differing cultures and religions would remain as the basic multi-ethnic characteristics of
the society. In my view, there are three important integration processes that need to be resolved.
Malaysia has resolved the first one, namely the language aspect, or a common language for all
citizens. Malaysians have accepted the position and the role of Malay as the national language. The
second stage is economics. We have remarkably addressed problem of economic imbalances in the
past and this is continued to be rectified in the future. The last process which we have not yet
attempted is integration in the political sense. That is equal rights to all citizens and political
institution that is no longer ethnic in nature. Since 'Bangsa Malaysia' is a political concept, it is
imperative that the political dimension is also addressed adequately.I2
Dr.Ranjit's view implies that equal rights to all citizens should mean that Malaysians
should no longer be differentiated on the basis of ethnicity. 'The Bumiputera- non-
Bumiputera dichotomy has to go if Bangsa Malaysia is to be created.' 13 As far as
political institutions are concerned, he argued that the country should also gradually
move away from ethnic-based political parties and start working towards establishing a
non-communal party system. He argued that, 'if the country can resolved the national
language issue, addressed the economic imbalances between ethnic groups, I do not see
why we should not go one step further to change our party system and make them in
line with the notion of Bangsa Malaysia.' 14 He sees that UMNO as the backbone of the
goverment should take the first initiative to become a true multi-ethnic party, before
other political parties could follow suit. This view is shared by Dr. Goh Cheng Teik, the
Gerakan vice-president and Deputy Minister of Land and Regional Development. In his
words:
...at present the reward system is wrong. It pays to be a racist not otherwise. If you are too Malaysian
in UMNO or MCA or the MIC you are doomed to disaster. Politician are very practical people. They
14 ibid
12	 •
°pelt
13 ibid
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can be adored by the whole world, but if they lost a position in their own party, that is it. It is very
important therefore, we Malaysianize our political parties:8
He also proposed that, `UMNO should transform into United Malaysian National
Organisation instead of being a Malay organisation', a call similar to the one made by
Dato Onn in 1951, but was rejected by the party then. The question is, why UMNO?
Dr. Goh perceives that as the biggest political party in Malaysia, UMNO should take the
lead. Hence, all parties in the BN can dissolved and join one single Malaysian party.
He argues that although the country had made much progress in matters pertaining to
ethnic relations, still, he does not see Malaysians have made any major breakthrough as
far as political parties are concerned.16
However, those views of Dr. Ranjit and Dr. Goh Cheng Teik were not entirely
supported by Tan Sri Koh Tsu Khoon, the Chief Minister of Penang who is also another
Vice-president of the Gerakan party, and also by Professor Khoo Kay Kim. Professor
Khoo argued that:
I do not see that the time is now ripe for ethnic-based political parties to transform themselves into a
non-communal basis. Even to openly talk about this possibilities is still quite sensitive or rather too
early. The Gerakan and the DAP who claim to be a non-communal party, still rely on the support
from among ethnic Chinese."
Clearly, Professor Khoo was indicating that as long as ethnic groups feel their interests
are best served through ethnic-based parties, a shift to a non-ethnic party system may
not occur as it is hoped to be. For Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Khoon, the question of which
political party should be dissolved first, or the idea that every ethnic-based party must
be dissolved to remould BN into a true multi-ethnic party should not be raised. 'This
must be left to the people to decide. This is not as easy as it was thought to be', he
added. Tan Sri Koh, would rather perceives Ban gsa Malaysia in terms of,
...every Malaysian having a sense of loyalty to the nation, in which they could identify themselves as
orang Malaysia (lit, people of Malaysia). They must be loyal to the country, adhere to the
Constitution and the Rukunegara, have a sense of belonging and sense of togetherness. It has not to
be based on ethnicity, but rather based on sense of sharing future destiny:8
In his view a shared culture that is consistently developed within the society, illustrated
by having open-houses during the 'Hari Raya' celebration, Chinese New Year,
Deepavali and Christmas, where friends from other ethnic groups visit each other, is
15 Interview with Dr. Goh Cheng Teik.
16 Ibid
17 Interview with Professor Khoo Kay Kim.
18 Interview with Tan Sri Koh Tsu Khoon.
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peculiar to Malaysian society. Apart from that, aspects of religious and cultural
tolerance, such as Malaysians enjoying multi-ethnic cuisine, as well as the improved
communication skills in the national language among the non-Malays also constitute
among important ingredients in promoting the notion of Bangsa Malaysia.
In a view not very dissimilar from Dr. Koh's assertion, Professor Dr. Chandra
Muzaffar, insists that:
A multi-ethnic national identity rather than a mono-ethnic identity will be the norm. In the Malaysian
context, a common language, common values and common sense of destiny will be the ingredients
needed for a true Malaysian identity.
(The Star, 31 August 1995)
Chandra's insistence on multiculturalism and common values are shared by Dr. P.
Ramasamy, a political science lecturer from the National University of Malaysia, who
said that the question of assimilation and melting-pot theory should not be raised
anymore. He argues that:
It is clear that people are not willing to subordinate their culture, religion and be one race. But to be
less Indian or less Chinese is quite acceptable to some extent as long as people are not being forced
to dilute their ethnicity. A healthier way of looking at Bangsa Malaysia is the emergence of
multiculturalism with the ethnic groups retaining their identities. If multiculturalism is practiced, then
the rights of minority have to be respected and maintained. We must take heed from nations facing
civil strife because they emphasize one culture and race, such as Sri Lanka.°
His point clearly reflects the fact that Bangsa Malaysia has to be viewed in political
terms to avoid the question of assimilation. Forcing one culture to dominate the rest
would not go down well as far as the non-Malays are concerned. 'While they are
prepared to be 'less Chinese' or 'less Indian', they wanted their ethnic culture and
religion to be given the space it needed to flourish', he added. Nevertheless, by and
large he saw that Malaysia was now a more integrated society, and a sense of
Malaysianness was increasingly felt by the people. Tut when people express their
concern about ethnic matters this does not mean that they are less nationalistic.
Malaysians should be able to distinguish this aspect accordingly', he urged.
The DAP, however, equate the notion of Bangsa Malaysia to the concept of
Malaysian Malaysia2° which they have been advocating over the past thirty years.
19 Interview with Dr. P. Ramasamy
20 The concept of Malaysian Malaysia was introduced by Lee Kuan Yew, the PAP leader when Singapore was part of
Malaysia. Malaysian Malaysia reflected a total rejection of Malay political hegemony in which the proponents of the notion
called for the language and culture of the non-Malays to be given equal status to that of the Malays as well as equal
opportunities to scholarships and to government employment. It is a concept of cultural laissez-faire and envisages that the
nation will become less Malay and more representative of other ethnics groups. See: G.P. Means (1976); Noordin Sopiee
(1976).
238
According to Dr. Tan Seng Giaw, Member of Parliament for Kepong and the party
Vice-Chairman,
To me Bangsa Malaysia is similar to the concept of Malaysian Malaysia that the DAP have been
fighting for the last thirty years. Over the last decade we did not see that people talked about
assimilation of the non-Malays into the Malay culture especially after the 1990 general election.21
A similar view was echoed by the party leader Lim Kit Siang (who is also the
Malaysian Opposition Leader) when he said that:
...it should be a Malaysian centric concept as we have been advocating since the 1960's. What the
DAP have been trying to do all this while was to insist the government and the people to recognize
the plural basis of the nation. In the last few years there were certain admission to the principle by
the government especially by the statement from the Prime Minister that assimilation will not be the
case for nation-building in Malaysia. If the government was to accept this long time ago, we did not
have to waste so much of our energy and resources on those issues, but instead could have moved on
to address on how to strengthen and enrich the nation.22
Clearly the DAP believed that Bangsa Malaysia should be a Malaysian centric concept
not dissimilar to the concept of Malaysian Malaysia which they have been championing
since the 1960s. For the DAP, as long as the concept of Bangsa Malaysia did not
project the image of domination of one ethnic group over another, Malaysians would
accept and participate in the materialisation of the vision. Although the party tacitly
agreed that the position of the national language was important for integration, they
cautiously noted that the national language policy should not be pursued at the expense,
diminution, and the lessening of the importance of other languages.23 For them the
multilingual reality that existed in Malaysia had to be fully recognised. 24 As far as the
development of Malaysian culture is concerned, Lim Kit Siang saw that it should be left
to an evolutionary process, and not created by coercion. 'Malaysian culture must be a
manifestation of the totality of the different ethnic cultures', he insists. But of more
importance, the DAP saw that 'the country needs to strive towards meritocracy, in the
sense that whosoever needs help, they must be assisted and whosoever is good he has to
be rewarded regardless of ethnicity.' For the DAP the government should devise
policies that benefit those who are in the economically backward sector, rather than look
at things on an ethnic basis. Lim Kit Siang felt that if this is done, 'it will remove the
sense of alienation and deprivation that the people might have against the government.'
21 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw.
22 Interview with Lim Kit Siang
23 ibid
24 ibid
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Obviously, most of the views stated above, especially from the non-Malay
respondents, seem to agree on several common grounds. First, while they recognised
the importance of the national language as an instrument of unity and as a pre-requisite
for the creation of Ban gsa Malaysia, they maintained that multi-culturalism and multi-
lingualism must be respected as these reflected the reality of Malaysian plural society.
At the same time, while they do not overtly denounce the Bumiputeraism policy and
Malay special rights, they would like to see some steps taken towards the ending of the
Bumiputeras-non-Bumiputera dichotomy. Therefore, the relevant question to ask is,
were all these views by the non Malays not implicitly advocate a slight modification to
the notion of cultural pluralism, in place of a Malay-based Bangsa Malaysia? If so,
would the Malays not be infuriated by such ideas?
For Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid:
There are two important aspects that should be the basis of Bangsa Malaysia. First is the principle of
national cultural policy stipulated by the national cultural congress in 1971, and secondly is the
historical basis of the country. If the non-Malays wanted to be a true Malaysian they have to make
several sacrifices. One of it is the Chinese must be less Chinese and the Indians have to be less
Indian. We can accept differences, but that should be the premise.25
Clearly such views stress Malayness and Malay nationalism as the basis of the 'nation'.
In a similar tone, Datuk Salleh Majid, the Managing Director of the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange asserts that:
Bangsa Malaysia can be achieved without necessarily giving up all the ethnic heritage and identities
that one have. However, the position of Malay language as the official language of the country and
the language to identify with the 'nation' should not be questioned. Bangsa Malaysia is not
Malaysian Malaysia. It has to have a strong Malay characteristics as Malays are the dominant ethnic
group in the country. 26
For Rustam A. Sani, ' Bangsa Malaysia should not be equated with the DAP's concept
2 7
of Malaysian Malaysia. , To him,
Malaysian Malaysia is a notion of cultural laissez faire of maintaining ethnic separateness
which is to allow every ethnic group to live their own way without any bearing towards
common values which are needed to construct part of the characteristics for the national
identity.28
He further argued that
25 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
26 Interview with Datuk Salleh Majid.
22 Interview with Rustam A. Sani.
28 Ibid
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There is no such thing as national identity as far as the concept of Malaysian Malaysia was
concerned as it advocates a complete philosophy of cultural pluralism which people used to live
during colonial times.29
Therefore to Rustam,
if there is a clear recognition and acceptance to the national language policy and common
cultural values in Malaysia, the concept of Malaysian Malaysia is no longer relevant.
The concept of Malaysian Malaysia which the DAP was championing in the 1960's did
not recognise the principle of the national language (Means, 1976). Instead its proposed
that every ethnic language including English was to be given equal status. Rustam
argued that,
while the notion of Bangsa Malaysia is about nation-building, Malaysian Malaysia means
everybody is free to remain as they were and there is no question of nation-building. Bangsa
Malaysia is a concept of building national identity in a multi-ethnic Malaysia and it is therefore
not about a 'melting-pot' either."
However, he reckoned that :
In the context of Bangsa Malaysia, cultural pluralism can exist to a certain level where one can
remain as a Chinese or a Malay, but there is also an overarching national identity that we want to
create. It cannot be a scenario of multi-lingualism, one language has to dominate. As of in the United
States or United Kingdom, their citizens are entitled to speak whatever language they want but at the
national level, English is their national language?'
To start with, he believed that Malay as the national language would certainly form the
basic characteristic for Bangsa Malaysia. As the Malay language is one of the
important elements of Malay nationalism, Rustam suggest that Malay nationalism could
also form the basis for Malaysian nationalism which is instrumental for the development
of Ban gsa Malaysia. However, he insists that,
Malay nationalism in its original form that stress on Malayness ought to undergo some changes
to make it more accommodative to the multi-ethnic characteristics that prevail in Malaysian
society.
The next challenging task for Malaysian to cope with is 'to negotiate and renegotiate as
to what should constitute the remaining characteristics for Ban gsa Malaysia and to
promote the sense of shared culture among the peoples `, Rustam adds.
If Rustam's view could represent the views and aspirations of the majority of the
Malays, would not Ban gsa Malaysia reflects the domination of Malay nationalism and
Malay culture over the rest, which many non-Malays are very reluctant to accept? On
2° Ibid
3° Ibid
3 1 Ibid
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this point, Professor Dahlan a sociologist from National University of Malaysia
explains:
if we attempt to build a nation, it has to have a model of unity of one nation. We cannot have a
pluralistic nation but instead one nation in a plural society. There can be a situation of 'unity in
diversity', but the crucial question that one has to understand is that a 'nation' can be built out of a
plural society. It has to be a 'single nation' and not a plural nation.32
In Dahlan's opinion, from the very beginning Malaysians have to bear in mind that
when they attempt to create a nation, or Bangsa Malaysia, they have to have
nationalism. Although nationalism can emerge with or without a nation (as argued by
Smith (1986)), in Dahlan's view, it is difficult to conceive a nation without nationalism.
The question is do Malaysians already have nationalism? 'The only nationalism that
was apparent in the country is Malay nationalism', he insists. Therefore, he agreed with
Rustam that Malay nationalism can and should be the basis for the development of
Malaysian nationalism. He argues that in the theory of culture, every culture must have
a core or centre before it can develop. Furthermore, Dahlan adds that:
Before we have Malaysian nationalism we only have Malay nationalism. Even before we have
Malaysian culture, we only have Malay culture in this country. If we go back to the past we could
only find a Malay culture and Malay roots. And it was Malay cultural roots that form the 'corpus of
prime symbols' of this country such as Malay as the national language, Malay Raja as the Head of
State and Islam as the official religion. All these derived from Malay cultural roots which have long
established in this country.33
In his view the non-Malays will find it difficult to accept that elements of Malay
nationalism should be the basis of Malaysian nationalism and the construction of
Ban gsa Malaysia if they do not understand this background and the fact that the history
of Malaysia did not begin in 1957, but went back centuries and was essentially a Malay
history. Therefore, Dahlan cynically asked that, 'if a Chinese who want to be a Bangsa
Malaysia but rejects all those Malay symbols and the facts of history of the country,
then he or she probably does not want to be a Bangsa Malaysia in its true sense'. In
respect to this, Tan Sri A. Samad Ismail, a prominent Malaysian veteran journalist
however saw that Malay factors should not be used to imply domination. 'While the
Chinese have accepted the position of Malay as the national language, they do not want
the national language issue to be used as a political tool to dominate them'. He argued
that in the 1960's and 1970's certain rightwing Malay politicians capitalized on the
32 Interview with Professor Dahlan.
33 Ibid
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national language issue as a weapon to control the Chinese politically. 34 His view
reflects the fact that domination of one ethnic group over another will not be helpful in
promoting the vision of Bangsa Malaysia. Nevertheless, some Malays might argue that
this is not a question of Malay domination over the others, but rather reaffirming their
position and interests in accord with the fact of history of the country, as suggested by
Professor Zainal, Rustam A. Sani and the late Professor Dahlan.
Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the former Malaysian Foreign Minister who was also the
'architect' of the Rukunegara (the national ideology), argued that there are three criteria
for Bangsa Malaysia namely, a person who (1) Is a Malaysian citizen, (2) Practices a
lifestyle based on Malaysian culture, and (3) Uses Bahasa Malaysia as his everyday
language.35 To him all these criteria could be made legally binding via a constitutional
amendment. In other words, citizenship is equated with 'nation'. He argued that at the
moment the term 'Malaysian' connotes citizenship rather than nationhood. The logic
behind this suggestion is that the Malay race is itself is politically defined in the first
place. In the Constitution its parameters are set by three factors, namely, a person who
(1) Is a Muslim, (2) Uses the Malay language, and (3) Lives with Malay customs. He
argues that:
Chinese, English or indeed anyone can become a Malay as long as he fulfills the three
criteria.. .that is why the term `masuk Melayu' (become a Malay) is used when a non-Malay
conforms to the three criteria.36
Therefore, by the same token, a stroke of Parliament's pen could also write a
new definition for Bangsa Malaysia into the Constitution. But he cautioned that there
are many 'political obstacles' against this idea. Furthermore, 'Malaysian culture' itself
has not yet been really amalgamated from the various ethnic cultures of the society.
Nevertheless, he insists that what is more important if the vision of Bangsa Malaysia is
to be materialized does not so much depend on the legal or political definition of the
concept, but the inner self of all Malaysians. Yet he argues that, 'the inner self could
only be developed further if there exists a strong sense of nationhood or nationalism'.
But the question is: has Malaysian nationalism materialized? To him:
What the country might be seeing thus far was more of an expression of patriotism than
nationalism. Perhaps a sense of pride because of being a citizen of Malaysia. And this may not
be Malaysian nationalism as many understood. 37
34 Interview with Tan Sri A. Samad Ismail.
35 Interview with Tan Sri Ghazali Shafte.
36 Ibid
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While Malay ruling elite and most Malay intellectuals maintain that Malay
nationalism has to be the basis for the construction of Bangsa Malaysia, PAS as the
second largest Malay political party wanted Islam to be made the basis of 'the nation'.38
Although the party under the Ulamak's leadership rejects Malay nationalism, 8 it was
said to be 'contradictory with the true teaching of Islam', the opposition to Malay
nationalism was arguably made to distinguish the party's ideology and political struggle
from that of its arch rival, UMNO. Ironically, the three pillar of Malayness, `bahasa,
agama dan raja' that constitute the basis of Malay nationalism are still acceptable to
PAS.39 PAS, who staunchly opposed the 1996 Education Act, shared similar concerns
with Malay intellectuals on the need to strengthen the role and position of Malay
language for the benefits of nation-building. 49 The party had never questioned the
system of constitutional monarchy that is practised in Malaysia. In fact, PAS recognises
the significant role of Malay Rulers as a symbol of Malay political hegemony in the
country.41 Therefore the notion of an Islamic state or even Islamic nation if it is ever
accomplished would surely retain a 'Malay dominant-state', but with a stronger Islamic
fervour. However, PAS's 'Islamic nation' does not connote assimilation either, as the
Islamic system recognised the rights of non-Muslims to practise their religion, culture
and language.42 Perhaps the biggest question that PAS might need to answer is to what
extent the non-Muslims in Malaysia would accept replacing the Malay nationalist
agenda with their Islamic project.
Whilst Vision 2020 only outlined a general idea of the type of developed nation
that Malaysia should aspired, the notion of Ban gsa Malaysia remains an ambiguous
concept. It is perhaps the most ambiguous concept of the nine strategic challenges laid
in Vision 2020. The speeches of Dr. Mahathir examined in this chapter do seem to
conform to a 'tradition of political ambiguity'. This was also reflected in the people's
interpretation to the meaning of the concept. The politics of ambiguity means that a
particular issue which could potentially erupt into a row between segments of the
society is deliberately left ambiguous until there is a need for further clarification. In
37 Ibid
38 Interview with Fadhil Noor and Subky Latiff.
39 Ibid
4° Ibid
41 Ibid
42 Ibid
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other words, a clear definition is yet to be made 'only during times of crisis, and until
such a time, emotional issues are always kept on the periphery' (Ibrahim Saad,
1986:66). This arguably served well as a form of conflict regulation, in so far as the
government is concerned. In this respect, it seems that until the conceptual definition of
Bangsa Malaysia is adequately explained, detailed answers about how 'a united
Malaysian nation' is to be constructed would also remain ambiguous. The debates on
the Mahathir's so-called 'liberalisation' policies which began to take shape following
the introduction of Vision 2020 once again reflect the prevailing ambiguity concerning
the notion of Bangsa Malaysia.
8.3	 Mahathir's 'liberalisation' policy: Diffusing ethnicity or perpetuating
ambiguity?
Following the introduction of Vision 2020 and the notion of Bangsa Malaysia,
some changes in the government's approach to key national policies has emerged over
the past few years. For example, the government has begun to adopt more liberal
approaches in the implementation of the national language and education policy, and in
cultural affairs as well as in measures related to socio-economic development.
Although the government has never advocated an intention to do away with affirmative
action, what was known as the Bumiputeraism policy' or 'nationalist agenda' (Jomo,
1989) was seen by many observers as becoming more 'liberal' or 'toned down' in recent
years.43 While the government has never stated that it is liberalizing its policies, it was
the people or rather scholars who saw that several new policies which emerged in the
post 1990 period can be interpreted as reflecting the government's 'liberalisation
policy'.
To Lee Kam Hing (1997:80) the idea of Bangsa Malaysia and the perceived
'liberalisation' policies 'are significant to inter-ethnic relations and they certainly reflect
a very confident Malay leadership'. What makes the Malay leadership feel more
43 Interviews with Rustam A. Sani; Professor Lee Kam Hing; Dr. Ranjit Singh; Dr. P. Ramasamy, Chamil Wariya and Johan
Jaafar. They observed that the 1996 Education Act was a clear example of the government's new liberalism and
democratization in the field of education. In the economic sphere, it was argued that the government has been encouraging
Malay and Chinese businesses to jointly undertake huge government privatisation and high profile infrastructure
development programmes. The criteria that was used by Mahathir was whether those Malay and Chinese companies could
deliver the project, rather than a simple pro-Bumiputera policy. Both Malay and Chinese businesses benefited equally from
the government large scale privatisation programmes when the economy was booming before the July 1997 Asian economic
turmoil.
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confident in recent years, thus beginning to adopt a more liberal policies? Lee Kam
Hing felt that 'Malays are better-off now than ever before'. 44 Dr. Goh Cheng Teik,
Deputy Minister of Land and Regional Development asserts that:
the imbalances that we used to talk about before were corrected considerably over the past twenty
years. A sizable Malay business class has emerged in the country in all the different fields such as
education, professional, business and technical. Malays have proven that they are second to none. 45
This view was supported by Chamil Wariya, a senior journalist with the Utusan Melayu
Group. As he puts it:
The shift was largely attributed to the success of social engineering programmes under the NEP
which has produced a significant number of Malay entrepreneur and corporate class as well as
creating a new Malay middle class both in the public and private sectors."
In addition, Ahmad Nazeri Abdullah, the editor of the Berita Harian argued
some of Malay conglomerates and business figures are highly commended by their Malaysian
Chinese counterpart and have been making tremendous success in the international business.47
Therefore, assured of their political dominance and growing influence in the economy,
the Malay leadership 'is willing to adopt policies beneficial to the country even if these
at first appear to favour the non-Malays' (Lee Kam Hing, 1997:80). To Lee Kam Hing
`Mahathir's policies suggest that he sees the struggle of Malay nationalism as
broadening towards a more international framework (1997:80).' The success for
Malaysia in the global economy 'would be an achievement for Malay nationalism', he
adds. Or as Khoo Boo Teik puts it, 'Fin de siecle capitalism offers itself as the 'market
nationalism' of twenty-first-century Malaysia' (1995:331). However, there are others
who disagree that the perceived Malay leadership self-confidence reflected in several
so-called 'liberalisation' tendencies over crucial national policies can be considered as
bold steps towards constructing the Bangsa Malaysia. Apparently most the
disenchanted voices came from Malay intellectuals. Professor Khoo Kay Kim critically
observes that
while Dr. Mahathir was urging the Malays to prepare for the challenges of globalisation, Malay
intellectuals were organizing conferences on nationalism."
44 Interview with Professor Lee Kam
45 Interview with Dr. Goh Cheng Teik.
46 Interview with Chamil Wariya.
47 Interview with Datuk Ahmad Nazeri Abdullah.
48 Interview with Professor Khoo Kay Kim
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To him, this indicates their concern over the changes and its implications which might
affect the Malays. Some Malay intellectuals viewed 'liberalisation' as backward steps
which could be detrimental to the Malays and the process of nation-building at large.
With regard to 'liberalisation' in language policy and the implementation of the
1996 Education Act, Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid lamented:
Why do we need to move away from the national language policy and start giving priority for the
English language. The national language policy has contributed significantly in promoting national
integration over the past twenty years. Why should we go backward?49
Zainal's main concern was the implications of the move which could affect the position
of Malay as the national language and the language of unity which had been
institutionalized in the Federal Constitution. To him, the Malay language seems to be
facing serious threats from the government emphasis on the use of English in higher
education. He also observed that in recent years even official government functions
held locally and attended mostly by Malaysians have been using English as a medium of
communication. Furthermore, he sees that the very liberal policy adopted by the
government in the 1996 Education Act has allowed hundreds of private colleges to use
English and even Mandarin as medium of instructions.
The position of the national language as the language for integration will be at stake as English was
the official language in most of those colleges.5°
Moreover, he also pointed out that the new Education Act allowed people to obtained
education in either Chinese or English right from nursery to tertiary level. Therefore, he
asked rather cynically,
what is left then for Bahasa Melayu as the national language and language of unity as people could
skip learning the language and still be a Malaysian? Is this the way of constructing the 'Bangsa
Malaysia' as Mahathir envisaged?51
Furthermore the establishment of those private colleges might also affect the
imbalances that have been improved. Many Malays might not be able to pay for their
children to study in these colleges as these institutions are commercially run, and thus
the expensive fees incurred might hinder many poor Malays from gaining entry.
According to Professor Zainal:
the official statistics of student enrollment indicates that the percentage of Malay and Bumiputera
students in private colleges were only around 5 per cent-10 per cent of the total intake. As the quota
system was not practiced in the private run education institutions, then the imbalances that the NEP
49 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid
50 ibid
5 1 Ibid
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had corrected will inevitably be recreated. Would not this ultimately hamper the progress in nation-
building?52
A similar view was also shared by Rustam A. Sani (1993a; 1993b) who even wrote two
books to express his uncompromising views over the question of the liberalisations of
•
Malay language and Ban gsa Malaysia. He feels unsure whether the country is heading
in the right direction or perhaps the government was adopting a strategy which could
resulted in inhibiting nation-building. 53 Rustam strongly argues that:
...one has to look at the experience of most of the developed nations to gain some insight on how to
consolidate the position of the national language in the nation-building agenda. Most of these
countries advanced as industrialised nations through education system that is conducted in the native
language which was made the national language of their respective country. Education should not be
viewed as an amount of information as Maiyatilir once saVi that if you van get it. Sasta Euglis'n
you just do it that way'. Education has to be seen as an important process of developing 'cultural
literacy'. If we do not build our own cultural literacy as the English, the French, the German, or the
Japanese did in their own languages which were consolidated in their education system from the
lowest level up to tertiary education, you will never built characteristics or the basis of national
identity for the 'Bangsa Malaysia'. That was how the English, the French, the German, the Japanese
and so on developed cultural literacy within their society and emerged as developed nations. By
contrast, most countries who used English or other foreign languages as their national language and
the language of their educational system such as India, Philippines and many African countries are
still struggling both politically and economically. These countries have yet to prove that they can be
successful faster than any other countries in the developing world. To me, Malay as the national
language has to be made the basic component of the Bangsa Malaysia ....you cannot start to 'mould'
a nation out of nowhere without some basic characteristic or identity or you risk becoming
`Creolized'.54
Rustam's opinion reflects concerns about the erosion of Malayness in the construction
of national identity, and he calls on the government to revise some of the 'wrong'
approaches which it has adopted pertaining to nation-building.
The strongest organised criticism came from a group of Malay intellectuals who
called themselves `Kongres Cendekiawan Melayu' (Congress of Malay Intellectuals).
The group held seminars and conferences on nationalism and nation-building, and
passed resolutions which demanded that the government should observe the position of
the national language as stipulated by the Constitution, and stressed that Malay and
Bum iputera communities still need goverment assistance in many strategic areas.
'Their education and economic development would be jeopardized without government
assistance, as Malay socio-economic well-being is still far behind the non-Malays'
(Utusan Malaysia, 1 August 1995). They were concerned that without 'a level playing
" 'bid
53 Rustam was referring to the notion of 'Cultural Literacy' espoused by E.D. Hirch (1987), when he argues about the
relationship between national language and nation-building. This was clarified in the interview with him.
54 'bid
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field' the Malays might not be able to participate as effectively as they hoped in the fast
growing modern economy as their 'mental, physical and psychological preparations are
somewhat questionable in coping with such a drastic change in government policies'
(Utusan Malaysia, 1 August 1995). For them articles 152 and 153 of the Constitution
on the position of Malay as the national language and Malay special rights are non-
negotiable as they were agreed upon when independence was achieved. Thus, they
urged the government 'to continue to assist the Malays improve their educational and
economic gains until they are capable to compete freely with the non-Malays on the
basis of meritocracy (Utusan Malaysia, 1 August 1995).55
Whilst most of the Malays agreed that the NEP had brought significant changes
to their community, which have led them to have better self-confidence than ever
before, they believed that ethnic imbalances were still apparent, and thus wanted the
government to observe the implications of such 'liberalisation' policies, so as not to
hamper the objective of creating a united Malaysian nation. Malay intellectuals
insisted that Malay as the national language must be made a core component for the
characteristics of the Bangsa Malaysia. 56 Therefore, public policies that could seriously
affect the role and position of the language must be reviewed. They even rejected the
government decision to change the name of the 'Bahasa Melayu' ( Malay language) to
'Bahasa Malaysia' (Malaysian language). For them, the Federal Constitution clearly
stated that 'Bahasa Melayu' is the name of the national language and there was no such
language as 'Bahasa Malaysia'. They argued that even the English language is still
called the same name and not 'British language' though the country is known as Great
Britain or United Kingdom. Even in the United States, English is still called English,
and not the American language. According to Professor Wan Hashim, the Secretary of
Malay Intellectual Congress:
In my opinion we do not have to move backward and surrender or move one step forward but
eventually reverse two steps backward simply because there were some pressure from certain groups.
That was not the attitude of the Melayu Baru' (the New Malay). Remember the axiom of 'Bahasa
Jiwa Bangsa' (Language is the soul of a nation); without the 'Bahasa Melayu' the soul of the Malay
nation would be easily eroded.
(Utusan Malaysia, 1 August 1995)
55 Interview with Zainal Abidin Wahid; Rustam A. Sani; Chamil Wariya and Johan Jaafar.
56 Virtually all Malay respondents interviewed subscribe to this view. Even the non-Malay respondents did not object to the
fact that Malay as the national language has to be a basis to form the characteristics of the 'Bangsa Malaysia'.
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Such a statement clearly demonstrates that despite support for the idea of
Bangsa Malaysia', the reaction from Malay intellectuals reflects the fact that the 'fire
of Malay nationalism is still burning'. For these intellectuals, the Tumiputeraism
policy' should not be abandoned simply because the country wanted to have the
Tangsa Malaysia'. PAS also joined the chorus of criticism against 'liberalisation'
policies. 57
 The criticisms over the government's 'liberalisation' on language and
education policy heightened after the 1995 Education Bill was unveiled. However, it
was apparent that the media (both printing and electronic) which were very much
controlled by the government tended not to highlight the real issues, but instead
'praised' the importance of the new Education Bill, which they claimed could turn
Malaysia into a centre of academic excellence in Asia for the next century as envisaged
by Mahathir. 58
 What concerned many Malay intellectuals most was the far-reaching
implication of such 'liberalisation', as it might led to the creation of dualism in the
education system which could further divide Malay and the non-Malay communities.
Moreover, further 'liberalisation' might also invite the non-Malays to call for Chinese
and Tamil to be made national languages as they had demanded in the 1960's. 59 Thus,
this could result in re-opening the debate on the national language issue which has been
successfully resolved many years ago.
To some extent, such tendencies seem to be re-emerging as demonstrated in
letters to editors of English newspapers in recent years (Rustam A. Sani, 1993). Many
pro-English language readers (mostly non-Malays) wrote to the newspapers to express
their support for the move and urged the government to go further in promoting the use
of English in a more wider spectrum in connection with globalisation. This
subsequently resulted in several Malay intellectuals countering their arguments,
insisting that English should not be promoted at the expense of the national language.
In short, the grievances of Malay intellectuals over these issues probably is best
reflected in two letters to the editor of the New Straits Times (NST) written separately
57 Interview with PAS President, and Haji Subky Latiff member of PAS Central Committee.
58 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
59 When the debates on this issue started in 1991, Utusan Malaysia was very supportive to the view shared by many Malay
intellectuals. The paper even criticised the government for its new attitude and policy towards the national language vis-a-
vis English. Nevertheless, as the paper was controlled by UMNO, in 1992 which saw the height of the polemic on the issue,
the Chief Editor of the paper Zainuddin Maidin was asked to resign. Since then the tone of the paper on the question of the
national language was different and the coverage it made on the amendment of the 1995 Education Act changed
considerably from its previous stand on the issue. Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
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by two Malay intellectuals, Rustam A. Sani and Kassim Ahmad. Here is the gist of the
points they made:
...the underlying, implied proposal from supporters of the English language for some kind of a
'national second language policy' aimed at the exclusive enhancement of the English language to a
role of equal importance with the National Language Instead of a relentless effort to see that all areas
of our social life -including corporate life-undergo changes to bring themselves into line with the
national language policy which is considered very important for our nation-building, we are in fact
being told to compromise the national language policy in order to meet demands of the corporate
world.
(Rustam A. Sani, NST, 2 June 1990, cited in Rustam A. Sani, 1993:133-4)
...to be a nation we must have a sense of patriotism, a love for the country, the people, its culture and
its language; a love not born out of hatred for other nations, but a love that is complimentary to the
love of all mankind....The content of education is the important thing; the language of that education
must be in the language of the people. That's how it is done everywhere. This is what our nation has
been trying to do since we formulated our national education policy. If the result have been not as
good as we would like to see, we must eliminate defects, not only in education policy, but also in
other areas of life. But one thing we know for certain. The defects cannot be because of language,
because of a nation ipso facto must have its own language.
(Kassim Ahmad, NST 23 June 1990, cited in Rustam A. Sani, 1993:142-3)
Whilst the Malays are concerned about the position of the Malay language and
the implications of the 1996 Education Act, other Bum iputera communities were more
concerned about their position in comparison to either the Malays or the non-Malays.
There have even been calls made by certain political leaders from among the Iban and
the Kadazan communities for the government to intensify the application of the NEP
like policy for the Bumiputeras in Sabah and Sarawak. According to Datuk Leo
Moggie, Energy, Telecommunications and Post Minister who is also leader of the Parti
Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS), although affirmative-action programmes to give Malays
a larger share of the economy had been generally successful, 'the policy had not been
successful in giving the Iban and other Bumiputera communities a leg up' (Strait Times
Singapore, 27 October 1998). Some even asked:
...while the NEP has successfully created a handful of Malay millionaires, who were the millionaires
among the Iban and the Dayak communities? 60
Apparently, a sense of marginalisation is still felt by the Bumiputeras in Sabah and
Sarawak. Thus, neither the Ibans nor the Kadazans would praise 'liberalisation' rather
enthusiastically.61
60 Interview with Jayum A. Jawan.
61 This was reflected in the interview held with lban and Kadazan respondents.
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By contrast, most of the non-Malays welcomed the government's
liberalisations', especially the policy on the use of English in higher education
including that in the private colleges. 62 For them Malaysians should be encouraged to
be proficient in English, since the importance of the language is widely acknowledged.
•
They disagreed with the view that the government emphasis on English would seriously
affect the position of Malay as the national language, which was clearly recognised and
accepted by all Malaysians. 63
 One Chinese student from Universiti Utara Malaysia
expressed that:
English is not a threat to the national language. We could learn more things if we know English. The
position of the national language is very strong now to be threatened by any other languages. To me,
despite some liberal policies practiced by the government, many Chinese students feel dissatisfied
with the government on the issue of the quota system to enter into public institutions of higher
learning, and the pro-Bumiputera policy in the granting of government's scholarship. I think the
present policy is still by and large a continuation of the NEP. It still enforced the unwritten law. The
Chinese had to help themselves, yet the Malays continued to get the government's support and aid in
many ways. The government should rather assist those who are in need rather than based on one
ethnic background. The perpetuation of this sort of policy would not help in the reduction of
communalism among younger generations."
Dr. Tan Seng Giaw, the DAP Vice-Chairman, articulated a similar view:
...why must we continue to have quotas system for admission which is based on ethnic merit and not
achievement? Now we have enough universities and private colleges to accommodate with the need
for higher education in the country. Therefore, we should do away with the quota system. But I
accept the fact that if we used meritocracy rigidly there will be some quarters of the citizens who
would suffer. Take the `Orang Ash' (the aborigines) for example; they are the group who will suffer
the most if a strict meritocracy system is practiced in the country. Therefore, I would say that we
need some discretion in practicing meritocracy.65
Dr. Ranjit Singh, Associate Professor of history at the University Malaya argued that as
far as 'liberalisation' is concerns,
the question of English superseding the Malay language is not related to 'Bangsa Malaysia'. English
is not the Indian or Chinese national language. So if the government want English, it is not because
the Chinese of Indian are fighting for it. Therefore it does not affect the basic bloc of various ethnic
communities. This is a separate issue and it does not arouse any inter-ethnic conflict. Malay still
remain the national language, even at school level there is no change in that policy.66
For Ranjit, the question of the national language has been resolved. For the DAP what
is more important is that while the government is promoting the national language or
even when emphasize is place upon English, that in turn 'should not in any form affect
62 This sentiment was clearly expressed by most of non-Malay respondents interviewed in this study
63 Most of non-Malay respondent interviewed shared this view.
64 Interview with a third year Chinese student from Universiti Utara Malaysia
65 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw.
66 Interview with Dr. Ranjit Singh.
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the position of the mother-tongue of other ethnic groups'. 67 Echoing, a similar view, Dr.
Kua Kia Soong, a prominent Chinese educationist and social activist, declared, 'what's
wrong with having differing language and culture to co-exist as this reflect the socio-
political reality of Malaysian society'.68
Professor Khoo Kay Kim, however saw a new problem emerging in as far as the
language issue and the question of dualism in the education system were concerned. He
asserts that what concerned him more was that:
...in the end Malaysia is going to have two types of university graduates. Those who graduated from
private colleges and universities normally are quite good in English but they are not necessarily bad
in Malay as they have learned the language up to form five. On the contrary, many of local or public
universities' graduates who had learned English from primary schools up to university level still
could not master the language. The standard of 'working' English among local or public universities
graduate was declining in recent years. Many cannot even read and understand English reference
books. I am worry about the future if this trend continues.'69
However, Professor Khoo insists that education remain the best means to achieve the
idea of Tangsa Malaysia', and thus hoped that the government will looked into the
matter more seriously. By and large, he observed that many Malay intellectuals
disagreed with their ruling elites on 'liberalisation'. As he puts it:
the Malays are very concerned if a more liberal and open policy were adopted by the government as
this might once again put them in a situation similar to the pre- 1970 era. Even now, the Chinese are
far ahead of them in terms of educational achievement. This could be seen if comparison is made
between art and science disciplines in which the latter was dominated by Chinese students and the
former mostly full of Malay students. The Malays do not want to lose their special rights. Although
there are some new generation of Malays who are quite liberal in their stance on many inter-ethnic
issues, the large majority are those who are very concerned about the state of their identity. For the
Chinese all they want is to preserve their language and culture. They are very liberal on religion as
they do not have a unified religion as the Malays or the Indian do. They only believe in Chinese
traditions and culture.'
Obviously, there were conflicting views on how the Malays and the non-Malays
perceived and reacted to the goverment so-called liberalisations' in the post 1990's.
Whilst the notion of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia tend to be overwhelmingly
supported by both sides (probably because it is still rather a vague concept), no
consensus has yet to be found between them on whether the perceived `liberalisations'
policies should be regarded as bold steps towards constructing the Rangsa Malaysia'.
The controversies on liberalisations' also reflects the fact that there were sharp
differences between the Malays and the non-Malays on what should constitute the
67 Interview with Lim Kit Siang.
68 Interview with Dr. Kua Kia Soong.
69 Interview with Professor Khoo Kay Kim.
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identity of the Bangsa Malaysia. The government itself never overtly stated that it has
been implementing 'liberalisation policies', neither did it say that the policies were
meant to create favourable conditions for the construction of the Tangsa Malaysia'.
Instead, 'liberalisation' was related to globalisation and the objective of making
Malaysia a centre for educational excellence in Asia. This was evident in the statement
made by the Najib Tun Razak the Education Minister on 19 January 1996 (Utusan
Malaysia, 20 January 1996) as discussed in chapter 4.
By and large, the row over liberalisations' has only focused on issues related to
the position of Malay language vis-a-vis English, and the 1996 Education Act, which
resulted in the flourishing of hundreds of private institutions of higher learning, and to
the official recognition for Chinese and Indian education as part of the national
education policy. Even when the DAP leaders called for a meritocracy to replace the
quota system for entry into public universities, that does not however suggest that the
issue has taken on a new dimension. This was an old issue which emerged long ago and
continued to be contentious as far as the Bumzputera - non-Bumiputera relationship was
concerned. With the new Education Act that allowed hundreds of private colleges and
institutions of higher learning to be established in Malaysia, many non-Malays felt that
they had an alternative to send their children to those institutions which did not practice
the quota system as the public universities do. This as a result could reduce the sense of
being alienated by the quota system which was part of the affirmative agenda. As far as
the Malays and the government are concerned, affirmative action programmes have
neither terminated nor been reviewed, despite the fact that the official time frame for the
NEP has long since ended. Malay and Bumiputera communities seem to receive
broadly the same privileges as before. These clearly reflect the fact that the
' Bumiputeraism policy' still prevails in the post-NEP era. By contrast, although the
non-Malays feel that pro-Bumiputera policies have not been significantly changed, they
feel that they are getting a much better share now. In Professor Khoo Kay Kim's words:
the sentiments of the Chinese on the NEP and the new policy that replaced it has been improved
since 1990 because they feel that their opportunity to develop and advance in Malaysia has never
been deniee
70 Interview with Professor Khoo Kay Kim.
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On cultural matters, the government has demonstrated a more flexible approach
in its treatment to various ethnic cultures. Cultural performances of other ethnic groups
have been given equal time to the Malay cultural performances both domestically and
internationally. 71 For example, Malay traditional dance and the silat (Malay martial art)
were promoted together with the Chinese 'Lion Dance' and the Wu Shu (Chinese
martial arts), Indian classical dance and the Kalari Payyatt (Indian martial arts). The
Sumazau and Ngajat dances of the Kadazans and the Ibans are considered as part and
parcel of Malaysian culture and are always being promoted by various government
cultural agencies. Even the Bhagra Dance which belongs to the Sikh community (one
of the smallest ethnic minority group in Malaysia) has been given space on various
national occasions.
Clearly, although 'liberalisation' was seen by many non-Malays as a positive
step towards the materialisation of the Ban gsa Malaysia, Malays feel that it should not
be pursued at the expense of their constitutional rights and privileges. To them,
affirmative action should continue so long there are socio-economic imbalances
between ethnic groups. There will be no Ban gsa Malaysia until the disparate socio-
economic landscape of Malaysian society is adequately transformed. Since this agenda
has not been scrapped by the government, liberalisations' perhaps can be seen as an
attempt to diffuse non-Bum iputera communities' grievances by means of creating more
space for their needs and interests to be articulated and fulfilled. But there was a
paradox in this move as the Malays perceived that Malayness would be diluted if the
project of nation-building was pursued in that direction.
8.4 Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that, despite its 'noble' objective
to create a united Malaysia nation in line with Vision 2020, the notion of Ban gsa
Malaysia remains a problematic concept. While Dr. Mahathir in his attempts to define
the concept, tends to balance Malay nationalism with ideas of cultural pluralism, this
does not significantly help to elucidate what the concept should actually mean. Instead,
Mahathir arguably inclines towards promoting both the notions of Malay nationalism
and cultural pluralism at the same time. Whether this inclination could serve to
71 Interview with Director General of National Unity Department.
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consolidate Malay nationalism and cultural pluralism, thus laying down the basis for the
construction of the Malaysian 'nation', has yet to be seen. However, what is also rather
clear was that while such a tendency might be seen as promoting the project of nation-
formation in the country, it may also simultaneously serve the purpose of diffusing the
competing ethnic ideologies of nation-of-intent through appearances of an ambiguity,
while presenting itself as representing the interests of the various ethnic communities.
The 'confusion' amongst the people on the actual definition of the concept may well
reflect the 'success' of such attempts. If Mahathir's idea of simultaneously promoting
these two opposite notions could gain some followers, what could probably emerge is a
'new' notion of nation-of-intent, which would add to and compete with the existing
established 'nationalisms'. What is rather obvious is that the differing perceptions of
what Ban gsa Malaysia should mean are very much related to the varying notions of
nation-of-intent which were already circulating and well established in the society.
While Malay nationalism articulates and tends to protect Malay interests, cultural
pluralism on the other hand envisages the protection of the non-Malays collective
interests. The big question which remains yet to be answered is what Bangsa Malaysia
really represents? At this juncture Ban gsa Malaysia tends to protect elements of both
Malay nationalism and cultural pluralism. However, if this is the case, then, what sort
of 'nation' will be created as its end product?
As far as aspects of tangible characteristics of the Ban gsa Malaysia are
concerned, the language aspect appeared to be the most important common ground that
could unite the views of the Bum iputera and the non-Bumiputera communities. The
contribution of the national language policy in promoting a common language amongst
Malaysians over the years and its role in enabling better interaction to take place within
the society was widely acknowledged by many Malaysians. Nevertheless, it is also
apparent that most of the non-Bumiputeras' views explored in this chapter wanted multi
culturalism to continue to form the basis of Malaysian society. In other words, if
Malaysian culture is to be developed, it has to do so through natural evolutionary
processes, and should not be induced by forced assimilation. Even for some Malays,
while they envisaged that some semblance of Malay claims to 'pre-eminence' should be
maintained, the fact that Malaysian society is really a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society is generally recognised. Although Dr. Mahathir proposed that Ban gsa Malaysia
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should only be viewed in terms of political identity, his interpretation of the meaning of
the concept remained vague. This vagueness or ambiguity has resulted in the concept
being interpreted in various ways according to the peoples' own perception. Indeed, the
notion has been left open to all sorts of interpretations from all parties, and thus means
different things to different people.
Many Malays, believe that the 'unfinished agenda of Malay nationalism' must
continue, and Malayness should be made the 'definitive' element in the construction of
the Bangsa Malaysia. As far as they are concerned the notion of Ban gsa Malaysia
should embark from this vital premise. This means that the basic parameters have not
and should not be altered. Some section of the Malays on the other hand, even
envisaged that Islam should be made the most salient feature for the 'nation' when they
propose the notion of an 'Islamic nation', instead of a Malay-based Malaysian nation.
This has been particularly true of PAS, and would constitute their main political agenda,
should they ever obtain political power. For the non-Bunnputera communities, the
introduction of the notion of Bangsa Malaysia at least, seems to bring new hope and
promises that they will ultimately be regarded as equal citizens with the Malays. That
is, Ban gsa Malaysia could mark a step towards a resolution of the Bumiputera-non
Bumzputera's dichotomy, an aspiration which they perceived as long overdue. Thus, to
them, the perceived government's 'liberalisation' tendencies in the post 1990 period
reflect a transition towards a more liberal and multi-cultural Malaysian society which
could ultimately pave the way towards achieving that end. However, the reality is that
this may not be too easily attained, so long as the Malays still feel that any move in that
direction may eventually put them in a very vulnerable situation. Furthermore, many
Malays tend to believe that the issue of Malay special rights and their position as
Bum iputera is non-negotiable, and therefore should not be raised.
Therefore, the daunting task that lies ahead for the vision of Bangsa Malaysia to
be successful is to mediate identities so as to construct characteristics for this vital
political identity. This certainly will call for a fine balancing act, given the complexities
of the ideological contestation on nation formation and national identity between the
Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera communities that still prevails. The question is, how
is the compromise to be forged? Does the basis of the middle ground already existed, or
is it yet to be found?
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CHAPTER 9
MEDIATING IDENTITIES AND BUILDING THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS
9.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to examine the extent to which a compromise can be reached
in order to materialize the project of nation-building in Malaysia, despite the pulls in
different directions between the competing notions of nation-of-intent that currently
prevail, as well as the ambiguity surrounding the concept of Ban gsa Malaysia. What
other crucial obstacles and challenges still need to be overcome? To explore these
issues, this chapter investigates the impact of Dr. Mahathir's stewardship, in order to
gauge the changing and the unchanging landscape of Malaysian polity during his
eighteen year premiership. In addition, the discussion also briefly examines the impact
of the 1997 economic downturn, which a year later produced political turmoil that
challenged the project of nation formation in Malaysia. It is argued that whereas some
of the building blocks of a 'new' national consensus in Malaysia may have emerged, the
potent interplay between the forces of ethnicity and nationalism continues to pose
various threats to the project of constructing a 'united Malaysian nation' or the Bangsa
Malaysia.
9.2 Mahathirism and the changing landscape of Malaysian polity
In so far as nation-building is concerned, the crux of the problem that Malaysia
faced was the conflicting perceptions of nation-of-intent that prevailed within and across
the major ethnic groups, amounting to 'one state with several nations' (Shamsul
A.B.,1992). It is within this context of varying perceptions or competing 'nationalisms'
that political parties in Malaysia were organized and fought their political battles.
Mainstream politics had always been pursued along ethnic lines. Even political parties
which purportedly advocated non-racial approaches, or those which espoused the notion
of 'class struggle', found it difficult to compete in the political arena without some
recourse to ethnic appeals. For Shamsul A.B. (1996a) even writings on Malaysian
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political affairs and social scientific studies in general have been influenced by the so-
called 'ethnicisation of knowledge' which reflects these competing 'nationalisms'. In
short, ethnicity as the very basis of Malaysian politics will remain decisive in any
attempt to reconstruct or reformulate the structure of the Malaysian polity towards
attaining the project of nation formation. The art of managing this complex mix of
ethnicity and politics, therefore, lies in ruling, 'so that the interests and feelings of
various ethnic groups are not unduly wounded' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 80).
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad who became Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister in 1981,
rose to power at a time when Malay society just coming to terms with the phenomenon
of global Islamic resurgence following the success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in
1979. During this period, various Islamic social, religious, and political organizations
such as PAS, ABIM, Al-Arqam, and the Tabliqh groups which had existed in the
country for quite some time began consolidating their influence within the Malay
community so challenging UMNO, whose power base had always been the Malays
(Zainah Anwar, 1987; Chandra Muzaffar, 1987; Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Indeed,
UMNO as the backbone of the goverment, had to check such developments as they
could also affect the social fabric of the society. At the same time, the non-Bunnputera
communities felt very threatened by the government's pro-Bumiputera policies, which
had been strongly pursued since 1970. The non-Bumiputera felt that all these
developments tend to subordinate them deeper beneath Malay hegemonic power.
Indeed, the country's nation-building agenda was perceived by them as an ethnic project
which could result in the encapsulation of the non-Malays into Malay society.
Given his credentials as a fierce Malay nationalist', the rise of Mahathir to
power, raised concerns among many non-Malays about the prospects for a multi-ethnic
Malaysia under his leadership. Nevertheless, Mahathir was quick to detect these, and
responded effectively in order to consolidate his position as the country's new leader.
Mahathir might have well realized that the label of 'ultra Malay nationalist' given to him
1 Dr. Mahathir had a `colourful' history before becoming Malaysian Prime Minister. In the 1969 general election he
lost his Parliamentary seat to Haji Yusof Rawa (who became PAS's President not long after he assumed the
premiership). His defeat in the general election also coincided with the outbreak of racial riots in May 1969.
Following these riots, he openly criticized the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, and blamed the Alliance
government for the rioting. He accused Tunku Abdul Rahman of being too accommodating to the Chinese, and
called on him to step down as Prime Minister for failing to improve the position of the Malays. As a result, he was
sacked from UMNO. In the political wilderness, he wrote a book called 'The Malay Dilemma' expressing his
thoughts on various issues concerning the Malays, the weaknesses of the Tunku led Alliance government, and also
on Sino-Malay relations. The book published in 1970 was banned by the government only to be lifted after he
became the Prime Minister.
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by his critics since 1969 might not be too convenient upon becoming Malaysian Prime
Minister. Thus not long after assuming office, he shifted the target of his Malay
nationalism from 'the Chinese' in Malaysia to 'the West' (Khoo Boo Teik, 1995:48).
Anti-western rhetoric has been one of his notorious political 'trademarks' since then,
making him increasingly unpopular with the West. 2
 At the same time he also launched
the government's Islamisation policy, which can be seen as an attempt to consolidate
UMNO's position among the Malays in the wake of the phenomenon of Islamic
resurgence. In this way, Mahathir was able to convince Anwar Ibrahim (who was then
serving as the President of ABIM) to join the party, thus boosting UMNO's Islamic
image.
Apart from that, Khoo Boo Teik (1995:333) argued that, with the 'exception' of
Islam, Mahathir was willing to 'sacrifice' other attributes of Malayness (especially the
Bahasa and Raja) in order to reconstruct the Melayu Baru and his Vision 2020. This
was especially so in the post 1990 period. While he was rather hard-line in his attempts
to 'reconstruct' the Malay perspective on the Bahasa and the Raja (as demonstrated in
his 'clashes' with Malay intellectuals on the language and education policy, and his
constitutional confrontation with the Malay Rulers in 1983 and 1992), Mahathir's
attitude towards Islam is rather more 'subtle'. Although he has never explicitly
advocated changing the Malays' relationship with Islam, he constantly attacked the
traditional Ulamak and the so-called 'political Ulamak' (read PAS's cleric leadership)
over their 'orthodox' interpretation of Islam, which he saw as contributing to the
Muslim underdevelopment (see: Mahathir Mohamad, 1986:18-22). He also called for a
'reinterpretation' of the Quran and Islamic teachings to suit modern needs (Mahathir
Mohamad, 1986:18-22). In his second book entitled The Challenge (1987), he set out
his ideas on Islam at greater length; according to Khoo Boo Teik (1997:162) these ideas
formed his 'Islamization' policy in the 1980s. However, Mahathir tended to be seen
more as challenging the religious authority and the credentials of the traditional ulamak,
who according to Islamic teaching are 'the inheritors of the Prophee. 3
 As a result, he
2 Mahathir's 'Look East Policy' and 'Buy British Last Policy' which emerged in 1982 were early signs of his `anti-
Western' attitudes. In 1993 he refused to attend the first APEC Summit meeting in Seattle, United States following
the US hostile reaction to his EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus) idea. Perhaps his most adverse reaction to the
West came following the Asian economic crisis, in which he blamed on Globalisation and Western hedge fund
Managers, and also his notorious criticism of George Soros, all of which were accused of 'representing neo-
imperialism' and being responsible for 'wrecking' the Asian economies and 'impoverishing' several Asian nations.
He also adversely criticized the Western media for constantly 'running down' his government and highlighting
negative images about Malaysia. (see: Milne and Mauzy, 1999; 76, 177)
3 Interview with Haji. Fadhil Noor and Haji Subky Latiff.
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has become increasingly unpopular with many Muslim scholars at home and was
regarded as a 'secular' leader than as a persuasive Islamic 'reformer'. 4 As Khoo Boo
Teik (1995:173) puts it:
It is legitimate to ask if Mahathir had not, consciously or otherwise, 'secularized' Islam, in the
very process of urging the correct- which some would read as 'selected' - injunctions upon the
Muslims.
Looking from this perspective, was Mahathir actually seeking to 'reconstruct' the whole
attribute of Malayness (Bahasa, Agama dan Raja) in order to suit his ideals and vision
for the Malays and the country?
By redirecting his nationalism towards the West, and 'softening' his nationalist
leanings, Mahathir has been able to portray himself as a moderate leader in the eye of
many non Malays. Yet, through the government's Islamization programmes such as the
assimilation of Islamic values into the government administration, the establishment of
Islamic banking institutions, the Islamic University, the Takaful (Islamic Insurance), Ar
Rahnu (the Islamic Pawnshop), and especially the participation of Anwar Ibrahim in
UMNO, he has been able to demonstrate the commitment of UMNO and the
government towards Islam, thus responding effectively to the Islamic resurgence
phenomenon. Mahathir's ability to offer two opposite tendencies at the same time has
been the hallmark of his leadership over the past eighteen years, was described as the
'paradoxes of Mahathirism' by Khoo Boo Teik (1997). Mahathir's idea of Bangsa
Malaysia should also be seen from this perspective. By the use of increasing
authoritarianism from the outset, Mahathir has been able to subdue many of his critics
from both Malay and non-Malay communities, thus effectively managing ethnicity in
Malaysia's plural society.
Until mid 1997, Mahathir was able to forge a cohesive social fabric, and lead
Malaysia to achieve tremendous economic success. Lee Kam Hing (1997) observes that
most of the Chinese community in Malaysia are quite comfortable with Mahathir's
leadership, as his strong grip on UMNO has enabled him to check any inter-ethnic
tension that might lead to instability. He was regarded by many observers as a visionary
and a man who had accomplished a great deal for Malaysia (see Michael Backman,
1999, Khoo Boo Teik, 1995; Jayasankaran, 1998). Mahathir had successfully 'invented'
a quasi-ideology of Mahathirism, at the core of which lies his ideas concerning
4 This point was raised by Rustam A. Sani and Dr. Ranjit Singh in separate interviews with them.
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nationalism, capitalism, Islam, populism, and authoritarianism (Khoo Boo Teik, 1995).5
The impact of his eighteen years in power was enormous, transcending a wide spectrum
of areas ranging from politics, economics, and society to Malaysia's international
relations (Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Perhaps, the clearest impact of Mahathirism can be
seen in the economic sphere. Mahathir's economic policies transformed the country
from an agricultural (or rather mixed) economy to one that is industrially-based (see:
Jomo, K.S., ed. 1989; Kanapathy, et.al , 1989; Means, 1991). He has changed the image
of Malaysia from being the world biggest commodities exporter of rubber, tin and palm
oil, to the world's biggest producer of air-conditioners and microchips. The strength of
the economy lies in the manufacturing sector, and no longer depends on commodities.
The cornerstone of his economic development program was privatization, the outcome
of which was not only the creation of a sizeable Malay business and corporate class, but
also the phenomenon of 'political patronage and money politics within UMNO' (Gomez
and Jomo, 1997). The same privatization ventures, and his close connection with a
number of multi-ethnic business elite, were also seen to have led to the growing
phenomenon of 'corruption and crony capitalism' in Malaysia. This has been the most
severe criticism leveled against him by both his local and international critics, in the
midst of the 1997 economic crisis.
The NEP, which was initiated long before Mahathir assumed his premiership,
was aggressively pursued under his administration. When the policy ended in 1990, the
New Development Policy (NDP) that replaced it envisaged a more 'ambitious' project
for Malaysia. Vision 2020 was unveiled together with the NDP in 1991. Under this
policy. Malaysia's aspired to achieve the status of a fully industrialized country within
the span of one generation. With that also came the notion of Bangsa Malaysia. After
two decades of the NEP, some impressive gains in restructuring society had emerged.
Under Mahathir's administration, the proportion of people living in the poverty was
reduced from 49 per cent in 1970 to 8.9 per cent in 1990 (Malaysia, 1996). Bumiputera
ownership of share capital of limited companies rose to nearly 25 per cent, compared to
under 3 per cent in 1970. Bumiputera stakes in the commercial banking sector
constitute more than 50 per cent equity in 10 out of 22 commercial banks — something
which was almost non-existent in 1970. More than a million children of farmers, clerks,
5 In this discussion however, only aspects of Mahathirism that have a bearing on the question of nation-building will
be explored. See Khoo Boo Teik (1995) for an eloquent discussion on Mahathirism.
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teachers and civil servants have been put through eight local universities, and many
other institutions in the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Japan and Korea,
with the help of both government and statutory agency scholarships. The quota system
had also partly contributed to this achievement. In an attempt to spread .wealth to
Bum iputera individuals, the government launched Amanah Saham Nasional, unit trusts
which have rewarded more than four million investors with double digit growth, even
during the recession years of the 1980's (Strait Times Singapore, 12 November 1998).
Despite the various criticisms and the disenchantment over the NEP pro-Bumiputera
tendencies, the non-Bumiputera had also gained from rapid economic growth and the
enlargement of the economic pie, which was large enough for every group to receive an
increased share.
The middle class is constantly growing within both Malay and non-Malay
communities. According to parliamentary reports, almost half (47.1 per cent) of the
household inhabitants in Malaysia fall under the 'middle class' category, based on
having a monthly income of between RM1,000-RM3,000 (Utusan Malaysia, 5
November 1998). This transformation of class strata since 1970 cut across ethnic
borders. Of more importance was the emergence of a sizeable Malay corporate class or
upper middle class, which formed one component of a 'new rich' culture in Malaysia, a
phenomenon which was also apparent in several other Asian countries. 6 The
significance of this group is that any interpretation on the interplay of ethnicity and
identity politics in Malaysia 'must include looking at the production and consumption of
cultural representations among the middle class...' (Kahn, 1996:71). Moreover, as one
writer argues, `..the emergence of the Malay middle class and the corporate class could
lead to problems in UMNO's use of Malay ethnicity as an ideology of rule' (Jesudason,
1996:156). According to Jesudason (1996:156):
[t]here are indications that ethnicity has become less salient for the Malay corporate class ... and
...UMNO's role in giving Malays greater self confidence in their abilities seems to have made the
well-off among them see the party as less of an ethnic protector over time.
In retrospect, the post 1990 period has seen several important shifts within the
Malay community. For UMNO, these shifts are due to the presence of an influential
6 Robison, R. and Goodman, D. (eds.) in The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald and Middle-Class
Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996) demonstrate the growing significance of the new middle class in social and
political transformation in several Asian countries, including Malaysia. See also Gomez and Jomo (1997), Malaysia's
Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) for a detailed account
of UMNO and the 'new rich' culture.
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representation of the corporate class within the party, a benchmark of the success of the
social engineering programme carried out under the NEP. The changing demographics
of UMNO leaders bear this out. By the 1990's the large majority of UMNO divisional
leaders throughout the country were either full time politicians or full time businessmen-
cum-politicians. By contrast, in 1981 teachers made up of 41 per cent of delegates to
the party's general assembly. The remaining delegates came from the civil service and
the business class. Now, teachers' representation is down to around 15 per cent (Straits
Times Singapore, 12 July 1998). They were largely replaced by businessmen, while the
number of civil servants also sharply declined. Since Mahathir came to power, a Public
Service general order has excluded its managerial and professional workforce from
holding office in political parties, leaving only support staff the right to be actively
involved in politics. Clearly this group is not in a strong position to compete with
highly educated and wealthy businessmen within UMNO.
Throughout its history, UMNO developed as a mass movement whose
membership among the Malays by 1997 has reached 2.2 millions. Members came from
all sorts of background, from rural folk to corporate figures (Utusan Malaysia, 8 June,
1998). It has divisions and branches throughout Malaysia (except for Sarawak) even in
remote Malay villages. Having a mass membership however does not stop a party from
becoming elitist. The changing nature and structure of UMNO elite in the post 1990
period bears this out. The old dominance of teachers and civil servants within UMNO
has virtually ended. History has shown that early development of Malay nationalism
was anchored by Malay intellectuals and teachers before the leading role was taken over
by the `administocrats' after the Second World War. The strength of UMNO as a
political vehicle of Malay nationalism in the past was largely derived from these two
groups (see Ahmad Fawzi Basri, 1992).
The changing demographics of UMNO from a party controlled by teachers and
civil servants to the one dominated by business elite, yet still supported by many rural
Malays has a bearing on the changing attitudes of the party. The softening stance of
UMNO on issues pertaining to Malay language and the perceived liberalisation in the
education policy marked this transition. UMNO in the post-NEP era appeared to be
more accommodative and responsive to the needs and demands of the non-Malays.
This trend was clearly reflected in Mahathir's policies in the post-1990's. In short, it
seems that:
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[the] emergence of a new breed of Malay political elite whose economic base and educational
background are different from the political leaders of the fifties and sixties, has brought changes
not only to the political culture of UMNO but also given birth to new perspectives on ideas of
nation building of which the Chinese are part and parcel.
(Ahmat Adam, 1997:112)
Hence, as argued by Lee Kam Hing (1997) and supported by Ahmat Mani (1997),
Malay political elite within UMNO in the 1990's have demonstrated their willingness to
accept multi-culturalism and multi-ethnic dimensions as the basis and perhaps the only
alternative for the success of the nation-building project in Malaysia. Clearly, many of
these changes can be attributed to Mahathir's eighteen year in power. Therefore, it is
important to ask whether all these shifts represent a wider dimension of the meaning of
the Melayu Baru' envisaged by Mahathir to fit the project of Bangsa Malaysia. This
envisages a situation where the Malays have a new self-confidence, adopt competitive
achievement norms, and are able to stand own their own two feet, not rely on
government handouts, and not overly preoccupied or over sentimental about the dilution
of Malay attributes.
Although there is no clear evidence thus far to suggest that UMNO is attempting
to dissociate itself completely from the ideology of Malay nationalism, Mahathir
seemingly wanted the Malays to concern themselves more with the economic
development of the country than with questions of Malay linguistic and political
nationalism. Mahathir saw that while the government constantly improved and
strengthened the position of the Malays in the socio-economic spheres, this served to
sustain Malay political hegemony. Hence, assured of their position, the UMNO
leadership under Mahathir began to adopt a more multi-cultural perspective on nation-
building, concomitant with the idea of creating the Bangsa Malaysia. Whether this
occured by design or just by coincidence is not yet clear. Nevertheless, it is important to
ask whether such a transition can be seen as moving towards setting up a 'new' basis for
the formulation of the 'middle ground' to construct a national consensus towards the
project of Bangsa Malaysia? While these changes tend to be lauded by many non-
Malays, they have not been well received by some Malay intellectuals. While a few
Malays questioned the logic of Mahathir's economic nationalism, it was the perceived
dilution of other attributes of Malayness that mattered most to some others. As
demonstrated in previous chapters, some of Mahathir's critics among the Malays do not
want Bangsa Malaysia to be created at the expense of the three principal pillars of
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Malayness. To many Malay intellectuals the corpus of prime symbols which are
inherently Malay in character and already ingrained in the system have to be retained in
the project of nation formation. In fact, these factions of the Malays, many of whom
formed part of the larger Malay middle class group, were also very critical of the
phenomena of corruption and crony capitalism involving the ruling elite and Malay
business and corporate class, whose interests were seen as taking precedence over the
well-being of the people.7 It is argued that Malay middle class are divided in terms of
their orientation and socio-political attitudes with regard to the idea of of nation
building. While ethnicity may seemingly appear less salient for many Malay middle
class of the corporate background (Jesudason, 1996), a similar situation may not be true
as far as the intellectuals are concerned.
On another point, it was ironic that Vision 2020 (which introduced the notion of
Ban gsa Malaysia) was neither unveiled in Parliament nor at the UMNO general
assembly, but instead in front of the Malaysian Business Council, which represents a
group of prominent multi-ethnic Malaysian business and administrative elite. Whether
this was a coincidence or a deliberate action was not very clear. What was significant
was that it reflected the vital role that the government was expecting from 'the new rich
elite' and the institutions that they represent for the realization of the country's biggest
agenda for the next millennium. Related to this was Mahathir's idea of encouraging
genuine economic joint ventures between Malay and Chinese businesses to enhance
inter-ethnic cooperation in conjunction with the objective of making Malaysia an
industrialized country. Moreover, this can also be seen as an attempt to alleviate the
phenomena of Ali-Baba' which was long associated with some Malay 'entrepreneurs'
who only acted as `frontman', yet subcontracted their business opportunities created by
the government to gain quick profits.
Datuk Salleh Majid the Managing Director of the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange perceived that:
A genuine Malay-Chinese or even Malay-Indian business partnerships have constantly developed
in recent years, despite it was still small in number. Multi-ethnic cooperation in business is
perhaps much easier to develop in contrast to cooperation in other social aspects since business
has a clear common denominator, that is profit making. This trend should be encouraged as the
experience of the Chinese in doing business can be shared by their Bumiputera's counterpart.
Indeed, this has been the policy of Dr. Mahathir to encourage 'smart-partnership' within the
business community. Perhaps this would give a new interpretation to the notion of 'Ali-Baba',
and thus redefined the concept.8
7 Interview with Rustam A. Sani.
8 Ibid
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The relevant point here is that these attempts indicate Mahathir's vision to redirect the
nature of business operations and cooperation in the country from the influence of
ethnicity, to one which reflects genuinely Malaysian characteristics. Nevertheless, its
success remains unproven. What was rather obvious is that whereas to some extent
Malay-Chinese business cooperation may have developed, it is hard to imagine how
Malay businessmen would be able to penetrate into Chinese business networking which
was traditionally based on family ties and clan connections.
Returning to aspects of the 'new rich' culture in the context of the project of
nation formation, Rustam A. Sani argued that the 'new rich' culture has created a 'new
type' of people within Malaysian society who are quite separate from the majority of the
Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. 9 This group of people, however, has to be
properly distinguished from the rest of the new middle class created by the NEP.
According to Rustam, the new type of people that he meant was:
a group of multi-ethnic upper middle class elite who have their own way of thought; skeptical
about Malay language and doing things in Malaysian way; staunchly defends the use of English in
the education system; only read English newspapers and magazines; and of more important very
critical of any move to making Malay nationalism as the basis of Malaysia nationalism. This
group is quite influential within the government because they mainly comprises of powerful
Malay, Chinese and Indian corporate and business elite.10
Rustam's observation on this new development in Malaysian society relates to the
competing notions of nation-of-intent, especially if the group concerned continued to
gain stronger momentum in the future. If Rustam's observation was accurate it will
inevitably further complicate the existing notions of the nation, since he argued that this
group comprised some very influential business figures who enjoyed close affiliation
with the ruling elite in the government. Nevertheless, at this stage the so-called 'multi-
ethnic new rich perceptions of a nation' have not been very clearly articulated, and thus
are rather difficult to construct. Although the emergence of the 'new rich' culture tends
to indicate that ethnicity is becoming less salient as far as the group is concerned, yet it
could pose a new challenge for the society in the form of the widening gap between the
rich and the poor within each ethnic community. If the trend continues, it might
revitalize the question of class in Malaysia.
9 Opcit
19 Ibid
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Another interesting feature of Mahathirism is his constant efforts to develop and
promote a sense of pride and patriotism among Malaysians. This could also be seen as
an attempt to eradicate the 'inferiority complex' that might exist within the society.
Since he came to power, Mahathir has embarked upon a number of high profile ventures
which could be seen as 'national ego-boosting' projects. These include the national car
industry, the Proton; the Petronas Twin Tower, the tallest building in the world; the new
Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA); the Multi-media Supercorridor (MSC),
dubbed as 'Malaysia's Silicon Valley'; and the development of Putrajaya, Malaysia's
new administrative capital, which is located in the MSC area and to be known for its
high-tech characteristics, leading towards the implementation of a so-called 'electronic
government' for the next century. All these have been designed to boost the country's
image and simultaneously win plaudits for Mahathir's administration. Moreover, using
'nationalistic slogans' like 'Malaysia Boleh! ' (Malaysia Can!), Mahathir has attempted
to instill a sense of patriotism among Malaysians (Strait Times Singapore, 21 November
1998). A number of projects were envisaged to propagate such a slogan. These
included 'the Everest project' in which multi-ethnic Malaysian mountain climbers
successfully set the national flag on the peak of Mount Everest in 1997. Next was
parachuting the national car, the Proton onto the North Pole. Both events were given
massive publicity by local media, and covered live by national television stations. In
addition, numerous international events were hosted by Malaysia, ranging from
international conferences to international sporting events. Kuala Lumpur is now bidding
to host the 2006 Asian Games and the 2008 Olympic Games, after successfully hosting
the Commonwealth Games in 1998 in the midst of economic and political crises. Since
Mahathir came to power, Malaysia has twice secured a non-permanent member seat in
the United Nations' Security Council. Obviously, a sense of pride in being Malaysian
has been effectively consolidated as a result of those achievements. Subsequently, these
achievements have `...pushed, cajoled and browbeaten Malaysia's ethnic communities to
think of themselves as Malaysians first' (Jayasankaran, 12 November 1998).
Whether all these developments have a bearing towards promoting Malaysia
nationalism and the sense of being 'a nation' among its people is quite difficult to
ascertain. Perhaps, they may have instilled some sense of pride or even patriotism
among the people, but to suggest that this would enhance a sense of Malaysian
nationalism among the people would be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, some local
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newspapers suggest that based on the people's reactions to the 1997 and 1998 disputes
with Singapore on several bilateral issues, Malaysian nationalism is growing (The Star,
31 August 1998)." In those two events, people of all ethnic backgrounds (including
oppositions party) were united behind the government in defending the country's
national interests. In the past many non-Malays would rather have some sort of
reservations when it came to controversial issues pertaining to Malaysia-Singapore
relationships. I2
 Problems with Singapore were often viewed by many non-Malays as
'Malay vis-a-vis Chinese', by virtue of Singapore being a neighbouring state dominated
by the Chinese. I3
 Thus, it was suggested that the overwhelming support from the people
might illustrate a strengthening Malaysian nationalism which seems to bode well for the
move towards Bangsa Malaysia (The Star, 31 August 1998).
In sum, the impact of Mahathirism upon the changing landscape of Malaysian
polity has been quite enormous. In the economic sphere, the country's rapid economic
growth has contributed to a significant modification of the class structure of the society.
The strengthening of the middle class base, in particular within Malay society, has been
apparent. The social engineering programme triggered by the NEP can be attributed as
the major factor underlying such shift. The shift also affected UMNO, which seems to
have undergone several important changes. As a mass organization led by Malay
administocrat elite, strengthened by teachers and civil servants at the second echelon,
UMNO under Mahathir, while still maintaining its grass-root base, has been dominated
by Malay corporate and business class. Given the new Malay self confidence, the 'new
rich' culture, and the growing influence of the corporate class representation in the
party, UMNO's nationalist leanings seem to have been diluted. UMNO, the 'defender'
of the Malay dominant thesis, has indicated its willingness to compromise Malay
nationalism with the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural realities of the society. This, serves
to illustrate UMNO's pragmatism, it is an essentially non-ideological party rather than a
party of Malay nationalism.
Without entirely abandoning the Malay dominant ideology, UMNO is apparently
prepared to accommodate the aspirations of cultural pluralism of the non-Malays. But
II Malaysia-Singapore relationship has been experiencing numerous disturbances since the separation of Singapore
from the Federation in 1965. Until today there are still several unresolved bilateral issues between the two
neighbouring country. Quite often, it was the comments made by the politicians and the media from both sides that
tend to offend one another, thus produce a row in their diplomatic relations.
12 Interview with Rustam A. Sani and Tan Sri A. Samad Ismail.
13 Ibid
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such a transition in the attitudes of the Malay leadership, in particular those of Dr.
Mahathir, was not universally welcomed in Malay circles. PAS remains committed to
the notion of an Islamic state and is quite adamant in its criticism of several of the
government's policies which affect the Malays and Islamic interests. The Bumiputera
communities in Sabah and Sarawak still felt that their position needs a further boost
from the government to level with the achievements of other ethnic groups in the
peninsula. But the non-Malays tend to be strongly attracted to Mahathir's leadership on
account of the continued political stability and economic prosperity which the country
has attained. They respond positively to the perceived softening of the UMNO stance
on Malay nationalism. Whereas these development can be regarded as the paradoxes of
Mahathirism, they also constitute the real paradox of nation-building in Malaysia.
Whilst continual economic growth, prosperity and continued political stability
submerged many of Mahathir's critics, things abruptly changed when the economic
crisis hit Malaysia in July 1997. The paradoxes of Mahathirism has since then, became
the 'enigma' of Mahathirism in Malaysian politics. The contending criticism and
support for Mahathir and the government that divided the Malays and non-Malays
following the crisis ought to be seen in this context, that is in the perspective of the
competing 'nationalisms'. While the economic crisis and the Anwar Ibrahim affair
which resulted in a political crisis may have significantly influenced the peoples'
perception and reaction to Mahathir and the government, the root causes probably lies
beyond the economy and the topical issues involving Anwar Ibrahim. The following
discussion will assess these issues.
9.3 From economic crisis to political turmoil: The greatest challenge for
Mahathirism, or a threat to the project of nation formation?
When Thailand's economy began to collapse in July 1997, not many people
thought that the crisis would swiftly spread to the entire South East Asian region. A few
months later, the crisis began to wreck the 'miracle' of the 'Asian Economic Tigers' and
reduce them to 'whimpering kittens'. The rest is history. Nevertheless, it is beyond the
scope of the present study to offer on in-depth analysis of the crisis. The more salient
issue is to explore its impact on the project of nation formation in the country. There are
two fundamental questions here. First, what implications did the economic and political
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crisis have for ethnic socio-political parameters in Malaysia? Second, and of more
importance, to what extent was the project of nation formation hampered by the crises?
The crisis has already tainted Mahathir's political legacy, both at home and
abroad (Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Only if he proved able to turn around the country's
economy and convincingly win the next general election for the BN would some of the
damage to his legacy be repaired. As far as the economy is concerned, the most obvious
impact of the crisis was on the inter-ethnic economic imbalances that had been
significantly altered during the NEP period and in the years that followed. Many
businesses suffered badly because of the meltdown of the stock market and the Ringgit,
thus created a huge number of non-performing loans which threatened the banking and
financial system with collapse. 14
 It was reported that 191 Bumiputera owned companies
went bankrupt between July 1997 to March 1998 for failing to service their debt, a
figure said to be much higher than that for the non-Bumiputera businesses (Utusan
Malaysia, 21 April 1997).
According to the Mid-Term Review of the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000),
the 21 per cent Bumiputera ownership in the economy recorded in 1995 was down to 19
per cent as a result of the economic meltdown, whereas the Chinese share was down to
39 per cent from 41 per cent held previously (Jayasankaran, 1999). FEER journalist,
Jayasankaran notes that,
Bumputera businesses are faring much worse than their Chinese counterparts in coping with
the downturn.... In two to three years, the productivity gap between the Malays and Chinese
will become wide, because the Chinese will be in a position to rebound the fastest during
recovery.
(Jayasankaran, 1999)
According to him, this can be attributed to the fact that while many small Bunfiputera
companies are waiting for government help, Chinese businesses have slashed cost and
closed unprofitable operations. Whether the government will be able to help and rescue
most of the ailing Bum iputera companies has yet to be seen. However, what is clear is
that the crisis had already affected the economic imbalances that were corrected by the
14 Almost 60 per cent of the value of the stock market has been wiped out as a result of the crisis. At it worst, the
value of the Ringgit plunged 40 per cent in comparison to the US Dollar. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(KLSE) composite index which recorded 1200 points at its peak (before the crisis) plunged to below 250 points at its
lowest in early 1998. In total, the crisis caused Malaysia to lose about US 140 billion in terms of the value of the
stock market and the Ringgit. Income per capita was reduced from US$5,000 in 1997 to about US$1,500. From
more than 7 per cent growth recorded for several years before the crisis, the 1998 economic growth has contracted to
6.8 per cent. Although the 1999 growth rate is expected to be positive, it is still not clear when the country could
actually register the pre-crisis growth of 7-8 % per year, in order to put Vision 2020 back on track. (See Utusan
Malaysia 21 April 1998)
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NEP. If the trend continues, as noted by Jayasankaran (1999), the Bum iputera-non
Bum iputera economic gap could widen in the future, and thus the inter-ethnic equity
redistribution attained through the NEP could be significantly affected, if not revert to
the pre-NEP position. Inevitably, this would affect the project of nation-building in the
country. The economic crisis has clearly indicated that the NEP-created Bumiputera's
companies were akin to 'Lilliputians in the Gulliver-like globalised economy (Shamsul
A.B., 1998).
The political crisis that erupted in September 1998 was partly related to the
goverment attempts to save those Bumiputera companies from further losses. While
both Mahathir and Anwar agreed that the government had to swiftly react to save these
companies, the failure of which would result in massive unemployment and the
worsening of the crisis, Anwar was said to have been critical of Mahathir's 'selective'
bailout policy. Among companies said to have been involved in Mahathir's bailout
were companies owned by his son, Mirzan Mahathir and a few others owned by his
close associates. Anwar also was said to have disagreed with Mahathir's decision to use
public fund money obtained from the Employee Provident Fund (EPF), the Tabung Haji
Fund (LUTH or the Haj Saving Fund), and Petronas (the country's giant petroleum
company) in saving the ailing Bumt'putera companies. Anwar however, also has his
own business cronies, who turned to him to saving their affected business. The politics
of cronyism apparently engulfed the two leaders into a bitter political nit in ffie party
and the government. Worse still, Dr. Mahathir and his deputy (who was also the
Finance Minister) appeared to have differed on the policy approach to tackling the
crisis. 15
As the economic crisis worsening, the differences between the Premier and his
Deputy had also widening. The term 'nepotism' and 'cronyism' (widely used in
Indonesia during the demise of the Suharto regime), were widely echoed during UMNO
general assembly held in June 1998. Mahathir, however, argued that such allegations
and the criticisms against the so-called 'selective bailout policy' (made by several
15 The differences between Mahathir and Anwar who was also the Finance Minister, ranged from the factors that
caused the economic crisis to the approaches to managing the crisis. While Anwar was more keen to adopt the IMF
and World Bank prescriptions of higher interest rates and austerity measures and market liberalisation; Mahathir
believed in lowering interest rates and an expansionary policy, more government interference in the market and
insulating the currency against external influences. Mahathir in the end resorted to selective capital controls to
protect the Ringgit. The Ringgit was pegged to the US Dollar at 1RM=US$3.80 on I September 1998, in an attempt
to protect the currency from further collapse. The following day, Anwar was sacked from the government and
UMNO. Mahathir himself took over the post as Finance Minister, before handed it over to Daim Zainuddin, the
former Finance Minister and UMNO Treasury, known as one of his close confidantes.
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members known as Anwar's staunch allies) were politically motivated (Asiaweek, 30
October 1998). Their aim was to taint his leadership, and to force him to step down in a
way similar to the fate of President Suharto of Indonesia. Mahathir dismissed Anwar on
2 September 1998 after tension between the two political leaders had reached breaking
point. Anwar refused to resign as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister,
prompting Mahathir to sack him. Mahathir called Anwar morally unfit to succeed him,
for having extra-marital affairs with several women and being involved in indecent
sexual activities. Political tensions built up when Anwar, in response to his ouster
launched the so-called Reformasi movement (Reform Movement) attacking Mahathir
and the government over allegations of corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, and
demanded that the premier step down.16
This turn of events, which saw growing support for Anwar among the Malays,
clearly threatened Mahathir's leadership, and seriously affected the country's political
stability. Mass demonstrations, which had not seen for many years were organized by
Anwar's reform movement and supported by opposition parties and many NG0s. The
country seemed to be on the verge of political chaos when demonstrations by the pro-
reform movement turned violent. After some 30,000 of Anwar's supporters chanting
`reformasi' took to the street of the capital, Mahathir accused his erstwhile deputy of
trying to foment Indonesia-style riots to force him to resign. 17
 Anwar was then arrested
under the repressive Internal Security Act (ISA) and later tried in court for corruption.
Numerous foreign governments and civil rights groups expressed outrage over Anwar's
arrest and subsequent beating by the Police Chief while in custody. The infamous
'black eye' incident damaged Mahathir's international reputation, especially since he
was also the Home Minister, who was responsible for the Police Force. In short,
Anwar's abrupt dismissal, arrest, beating by the Police Chief while in custody, trial and
subsequent sentencing to six years imprisonment have outraged many Malays, who felt
that Mahathir's harsh treatment to his former deputy was against Malay traditional
16 The Reformasi movement seems to echo a similar movement in Indonesia which resulted in the downfall of the
Suharto's 32 year rule in Indonesia
17 According to newspaper reports Anwar's supporters were planning to set ablaze the Prime Minister official
residence after marching through the capital. There were also rumours that they intended to disrupt the closing
ceremony of the Commonwealth Games the following day. The situation in Kuala Lumpur was tense, and many
began to compare the situation to that of the May 1969 incident (Utusan Malaysia, 25 September 1998)
)
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protocols. 18
 Perhaps, this once again reflected the extent to which Mahathir was willing
to reconstruct, or indeed 'sacrifice' Malayness to serve his political objectives.
The call for a more transparent government, freedom and democracy was not
only heard from Anwar's reform movement but was also echoed by opposition parties
and many influential NGOs which cut across ethnic lines. These groups formed two
opposition alliances: Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat or Gerak (Malaysian People's
Movement for Justice) and Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat or Gagasan (People's
Democracy Movement) the objectives of which were to oppose what were seen as
injustices in Mahathir's government (Suh S., and Oorjitham S., 1998). Indeed, the
opposition parties also seriously considered forming an electoral pact to face the BN in
the next general election. This became more apparent after Anwar's wife Dr. Wan
Azizah formed a new multi-ethnic political party in April 1999. The party was called
the National Justice Party or KeAdilan, in its Malay acronym. While the twin crises
have yet to culminate in ethnic tensions, the unprecedented development was seen as the
greatest test not only for Mahathir and UMNO, but also of the resilience of Malaysia's
political system and its fragile 'nation'. Perhaps, it is Mahathir's very success at
instilling national pride in his countrymen that has given them the self-confidence to
question his authority-especially among the young (Jayasankaran, 1998).
The political turbulence caused by the Anwar Ibrahim ouster has divided the
Malays. Many tend to be very sympathetic to the former Deputy Prime Minister. While
the division also affect the non-Malays, Jayasankaran (1998) argues that they are largely
more supportive of Mahathir, the Chinese more so than the Indians. For many Chinese,
the experience of the similar Reformasi movement which had earlier took place in
Indonesia and resulted in massive aggressions against ethnic Chinese was something
they did not want to see repeated in Malaysia (Wong Chun Wai, 1998). This could be
the reason why Anwar's reform movement was not widely supported by the Chinese,
despite being backed by the DAP and several non-Malay-led NGO. The fact that only a
small minority of non-Malays attended Anwar's reform movement demonstrations
perhaps reflects their attitude towards and perception of the so-called Reformasi.
Another concern was its possible consequences for the country's continued political
18 In Malay legend, the ruler is told by his subjects that, however grave their offences, they should not be shamed in
public. When a ruler ignores this precept, his subjects cease to be loyal. Because he violated the codes of the
community embodies in its political culture, Mahathir's moral legitimacy has weakened considerably among the
Malays. (see: Chandra Muzaffar, in Time Magazine 26 April 1999)
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stability, something which is so important for the many Chinese businesses which were
badly affected by the economic and the political crises.
At the peak of the political crisis, the Federation of Chinese Associations
(FCAM) or the biggest organization representing the Hua Tuan, voiced its qupport for
Mahathir. This was later followed unanimously by major Chinese guilds and
associations, which resolved openly to support the leadership of Dr. Mahathir and the
BN government (The Star, 4 December 1998). The FCAM executive secretary Lai
Kuan Fook was reported as saying
The Indonesian tragedy is very scary. We don't want it to spread here, so our vote will be for
political stability.
(The Star, 29 November 1998)
According to Wong Choon Wai, a seniour journalist with the Star newspaper, for the
Chinese, 'Ming Chu' (democracy) is fine but when it degenerates into 'Ming Khoo
(people's suffering), it is bad (The Star, 29 November 1998).
While the Chinese supported Mahathir's leadership, many Malays switched their
support to PAS to show their displeasure with Mahathir. It was reported that there was
a growing number of Malays joining PAS in the months following Anwar's dismissal
from the government (Hiebert, M.,1998). Among them were some grassroots UMNO
members said to be among staunch Anwar's supporters. Murray Hiebert of the Far
Eastern Economic Review reported that, between the time Anwar was fired and mid-
November 1998, 22,000 people had joined PAS, boosting its membership to around
half a million. The figure was also reported in the PAS weekly newspaper Harakah (4
December 1998). 'Many of the new recruits are young, educated professionals' angered
by the economic and political development which have rocked the country (Hiebert, M.,
1998). UMNO now faces its greatest test since 1969, especially in the Malay-Muslim
heartland in Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis which form the core power-base of
UMNO's political legitimacy. PAS seems to have gained stronger momentum in these
Malay states.
In short, Mahathir's strong leadership, which was seen as an important factor
that helped forge a cohesive 'nation' out of the different ethnic groups over the past
decades, became the very same factor that divided them as a result of the economic and
political upheaval. While democracy and good governance are universal aspirations
shared by many Malaysians regardless of ethnicity, the main issue that divided the
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Malays from the Chinese was the question of Mahathir's leadership. While the Chinese
believed that his leadership was important for stability, many Malays however felt that a
new leadership was inevitable to restore the people's confidence in UMNO and the
government. The growing support for PAS clearly demonstrates this divide.
Over the past decade, economic factors seem to be a major contributor towards
maintaining ethnic harmony in the country. Economic prosperity was not only
important for wealth redistribution programmes, but also important to diffuse ethnic
conflict. It is perhaps too early to assess whether ethnic blocs will or will not be
seriously affected as a result of the crisis. Should ethnic harmony not be seriously
affected despite the economic and political upheavals, the relevant question to ask is:
does this reflect another dimension of post-NEP ethnic politics in Malaysia? However,
given the growing support for PAS from among the Malays, and the fact that many non-
Malays were rather suspicious of the party's Islamic leanings, this would possibly affect
ethnic parameters in the future if PAS managed to pose a serious threat to UMNO in the
next election. PAS had already make a significant breakthrough when the party
captured Arau constituency, UMNO's stronghold since independence, in the first
parliamentary by-election held in August 1997, shortly after the economic crisis hit the
country.
PAS is also attempting to reflect a more accommodative stance towards the non-
Malays by dramatically declaring that it is willing to open its door to non-Malays to join
in as 'associate members' (The Star, 4 December 1998). Associate membership,
however, will not make them eligible to vote in the party and thus would not allow them
to influence the selection of the party's office bearers, or its policies. Nonetheless, the
Chinese seemed not to be impressed by PAS's 'dramatic' shift in its attitude, which they
viewed as an election ploy (The Star, 4 December 1998). Whether PAS is going to be
successful in persuading the non-Malays to support the party, and to what extent
KeAdilan led by Anwar's wife will be able to convince the people to support its multi-
ethnic cause, is yet to be seen. However, judging from the failure of the DAP, the
Gerakan, and the PRM to attract multi-ethnic support for their struggles, despite their
non-communal basis, it is difficult to imagine how KeAdilan as a new party and without
having a strong and experienced leadership would be able to make significant headway
in Malaysian politics. Anwar himself is not a member of the party, and for the next few
years he will be outside mainstream politics. For PAS, it is hard to imagine how the
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non-Malays would support its 'multi-ethnic' appeal and the associate membership
policy given the party's strong Islamic and Malay characters. Realistically, the BN is
still a strong political force to be reckoned with, in spite of the economic and political
crises. It is also hard to imagine what would follow if there was an abrupt .change of
government in the next election, as Malaysia had never experienced this at the Federal
level since achieving independence in 1957.
Nevertheless, if PAS managed to capture many of UMNO's seats in the next
election, this would result in weaker Malay representation in the government, which
could lead to the weakening of UMNO's bargaining power within the BN coalition.
Consequently, it would significantly affect various government policies, including the
nation-building project. Whatever the election, the project of nation formation will very
much depend on the state of the economy and the type of government that is formed
after the next election. What is perhaps rather difficult to predict is whether the
implications will have a positive or negative impact on the nation-building agenda and
the vision of Bangsa Malaysia.
It is argued therefore that even if the country managed to come out of the twin
crises without serious damage to its ethnic parameters, the twists and turns that began to
emerge between UMNO and PAS on one hand, and between the Malays and the Chinese
on the other would might affect the project of Bangsa Malaysia. Whether ethnicity is an
issue in the run up to the general election remains a possibility, as UMNO once
reminded the Malays that a stronger Malay opposition would not help enhance Malay
power in the government, let alone Malay political domination in the country. And for
the Chinese, Mahathir reportedly pointed out that:
...a weakened UMNO would not be to the advantage of the Chinese community,...if UMNO was
weakened, there would not be another political party in the country capable of taking overall
control to maintain racial harmony.
(The Star, 11 November 1998)
According to the report, that statement was made in Mahathir's exclusive meeting with
editors of Chinese newspapers following the growing support for PAS and the prospect
of the establishment of opposition coalitions to challenge the BN. However, there is
also a possibility that neither PAS nor UMNO would resort to ethnic appeals in the run
up to the general election, as both parties require non-Malay votes to consolidate their
position. Whichever is the case, it is obvious that the excesses of Mahathirism and the
twin crises have caused UMNO considerable political repercussions, judging from the
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growing support for PAS. Although on the surface the issue at stake is not particularly
ethnic in character but rather one of democracy and good governance, yet the Chinese
support for Mahathir, and the Malays' adverse reaction to his leadership, probably
reflects wider ethnic issues. It is legitimate to ask if these developments do not also
reflect the competing 'nationalisms' of the Malays and the non-Malays. Would not the
Malays' strong support for PAS and sympathy for Anwar's struggle also reflect their
frustration over some of Mahathir's policies over the years, in particular the perceived
dilution of the three principal pillars of Malayness? In contrast, does not Chinese
support for Mahathir illustrate that they are rather satisfied with his multi-ethnic
policies?
Another interesting point is the way Mahathir and the government have handled
the crisis and inter-ethnic relations, with the Indonesian experience in the background.
While the Indonesians resorted to ethnic violence, where the minority ethnic Chinese
were made 'scapegoats' for popular anger and displeasure arising from the economic
and political crises, the situation in Malaysia is rather different. Mahathir used his
political 'skills' swiftly to redirect the frustration at home towards the West, and the
'threat' of globalisation and neo-colonialism, particularly that of currency speculators.
In so doing, he successfully 'checked' any potential threat resulting from the crisis from
turning into ethnic conflict. Thus, the ethnic parameters in Malaysia have not been
seriously affected, despite the scale of the crisis. About the same time, several
unresolved disputes with Singapore were also being highlighted, thus making people
looking at external threats instead of domestic problems. This mission was rather
successfully carried out, with a supporting role being played by the government
controlled media. While some of the issues involving the currency speculators might
have a bearing on the economic crisis, Mahathir however, successfully 'created' a
foreign bogeyman to diffuse and eliminate the real threat at home. Apart from that, the
crisis that hit Malaysia has not reached a point similar to the Indonesian situation.
Despite the hardship faced by most businesses, both Bunnputera and non-Bumiputera
companies, the people at large have been able to continue their normal daily activities.
The number of retrenchments have been rather low and inflation has been kept under
control. In short, the situation in the country as a result of the economic and political
turmoil did not bear any resemblance to the 1969 situation, where frustrations among the
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Malays reached breaking point. Perhaps this can be attributed to the outcome of the
social engineering programmes and the NEP.
In sum, it was clear that despite the disruption to economic growth, the system
thus far has been able to absorb most of its difficult challenges resulting from the twin
crises. Nevertheless, growth is still instrumental for the continuing wealth redistribution
exercise to redress imbalances in the society, both in terms of ethnic groups and between
the various regions in the country. Therefore, a speedy economic recovery is crucial to
put the project of nation-building back on track. The crisis also created a few scenarios
which may still pose several difficult challenges to the government, especially UMNO.
One of these is the leadership successor in the post Mahathir era: the problem that faces
UMNO is that Mahathir has 'eliminated from the political scene just about any possible
successor approaching the caliber of the best...' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999:186). Anwar
was his third deputy since he came to power in 1981. Although in January 1999,
Mahathir appointed Abdullah Badawi who was then the Foreign Minister as his new
deputy as well as the Home Minister, the new Deputy Prime Minister is yet to be tested
before he could actually succeed the 74 years old premier. Beyond that, the next general
election is crucial as it will seriously test Mahathir and the BN in the wake of the
economic crisis and the Anwar Ibrahim saga. The scale of the test is dependent on the
extent to which Mahathir can turn around the economy, and also lies in the capability of
opposition parties to effect a serious electoral threat to the BN. In one way or another
all these would have some impacts upon ethnic parameters and national policies, and
thus inevitably affect the project of nation-building in the post crisis and indeed in the
post-Mahathir era.
9.4 Ban gsa Malaysia and the prospect for reformulating the national consensus
Given the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of Bangsa Malaysia, and the
twists and turns that have resulted from the economic and political turmoil, the most
basic question to ask is: To what extent can a kind of middle ground be reached in order
to resolve the potent interplay of ethnicity and nationalism that still engulfs the project
of nation building in Malaysia? There are several ways in looking at this problem.
First, although the notion of Bangsa Malaysia is still rather vague in terms of its
meaning, several of Mahathir's speeches, as well as some policy changes that the
government has embarked upon in the post 1990s, seem to indicate the direction in
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which the project of Bangsa Malaysia might be heading. Second, despite the critics,
'new shifts' generated by the government in terms of changes in several national
policies and approaches in nation-building, as well as the shift that has been occurring
within UMNO and the society at large, may well form the basis for national compromise
towards attaining the vision.
It is argued that the notion of Bangsa Malaysia is heading towards the
framework of 'unity in diversity'. This reflect a situation of a 'non-ethnic nation' or 'a
supra-ethnic variety of national identity', a concept used by Eriksen (1993) in his
observation of the Mauritian nationalism. The concept seems quite similar to the
concept of 'social nationalism' defined by Kellas (1991) in referring to a type of
nationalism which is not ethnically based but rather stresses aspects of a shared sense of
national identity, community and culture in which any citizens of a country can be
considered as a member of a particular nation as long as they adopt its social
characteristics. The two concepts of 'supra-ethnic nation' or 'social nation' reflect a
type of nation which is not based on ethnicity, but rather based on shared values in the
political, social and cultural spheres. Although the concept of 'unity in diversity' itself
may not necessarily provide a viable basis for the 'nation in-the-making', and has its
own flaws, the concept probably best reflects the real-politik of Malaysian society in the
post 1990s.
This is not to say that Malaysians of all ethnic groups have demonstrated a clear
inclination towards the concept, but instead Mahathir and the government were
apparently attempting to promote it as a basis of Bangsa Malaysia, thus making it the
foundation for reformulating national consensus or national identity. As far as the
government is concerned, the concept of 'unity in diversity' has been reflected in the so-
called 'liberalisation' tendencies in the implementation of several national policies, and
also in several of Mahathir's speeches pertaining to Bangsa Malaysia, despite some
resentment from among Malay intellectuals and PAS. According to Ahmat Adam
(1997:114) some quarters of Malay intellectuals and cultural activists perceived that `...
their vision of creating a Malaysian nation built on Malay polity and culture is no longer
acceptable to the present Malay political elite' (Ahmat Adam, 1997:114). He notes that
the winds of change were not only due to a shift that was occurring within UMNO and
which consequently affected its policy, but also to a large extent was attributed to
Chinese steadfastness in the struggle to assert their ethnic rights. PAS MP and Central
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Committee member Haji Mohamed Sabu was reported to have said that, `... the Chinese
are very satisfied now... .and the liberalisation of education is definitely an MCA
achievement' (The Star, 29 November 1998).
For the non-Malays, the notion of 'unity in diversity' may appear not to be very
dissimilar to the notion of cultural pluralism to which many of them subscribe. But
since the basic structure of the polity which is inherently Malay in character is unlikely
to change (this was also clearly spelt out in most of the policy speeches made by
Mahathir as explored in this study), Bangsa Malaysia as a political imagined community
or the 'supra-ethnic' national identity, can be visibly distinguished from the original
concept of cultural pluralism or even the concept of Malaysian Malaysia. If Bikhu
Parekh's (1995:257) definition of national identity is brought into this schema, it seems
that national identity refers to 'the way a polity is constituted, to what makes it the kind
of community it is'. The concept of 'unity in diversity' thus, would just reflect the
reality of the Malaysian polity.
Therefore, the project can be seen as neither an ethnic project nor a cultural
laissez faire policy (as embodied in the Malaysian Malaysia concept) but rather appears
to be an amalgamation of Malay nationalism and cultural pluralism to construct a
'supra-ethnic' or 'non-ethnic' political imagined community. As such, Malaysian
nationalism, if it ever emerged would be a non-ethnic nationalism based on a nation
which is depicted as a 'mosaic of ethnic groups' in which Malays constitute the core
ethnic group. This is the general conclusion that can be drawn upon based on evidence
gathered in this study. If this is what the notion of Bangsa Malaysia is all about: the
next crucial task for the country is perhaps to negotiate and renegotiate as to what should
constitute Malaysian culture, as the non-Malays are clearly very reluctant to accept the
basis of the National Cultural Policy, which to them implied the domination of a single
ethnic culture over the others.
Having said that, it does not means that the project of Bangsa Malaysia can thus
be comfortably pursued. There are several potential threats in such an approach, as the
project of nation-building appeared to be based on diversity which stresses differences
instead of similarities. In simple terms, can a genuine unity be created out of diversity?
Depicting the 'nation' as 'a mosaic of cultures' is one thing, but to suggest that this
would mean eliminating the political salience of ethnicity is simply inaccurate. The
most crucial question to ask is: does this constitute a viable nation to envisage? Does it
281
not reflect a paradox in the project of nation formation? To build a nation based on a
single ethnic polity would risk social and political unrest, and thus further disintegrate
the social fabric. On the other hand, to construct a nation in the form of a 'mosaic of
ethnic groups', may threaten to undermine the project of nation-building itself since it
focuses on differences instead of similarities (Eriksen, 1991). But given the ethnic
parameters and the competing notions of nation-of-intent that prevail, the choices that
Malaysia has are rather limited. Perhaps, the other alternative scenario for Bangsa
Malaysia is just to manage ethnicity within the present framework of power sharing
between ethnic groups, while simultaneously pursue economic development with equity,
and leave other issues alone. This also suggests the perpetuation of the present
framework of nation-building which the government has been working on for some
decades. But this would still not guarantee that the question of a potent interplay
between the forces of ethnicity and nationalism will be sufficiently resolved.
The biggest threat for Malaysia may perhaps derive from extremism in the form
of ethnic, cultural and religious revitalization. Extremism has had some awful
repercussions in many parts in the country in the past, and it will continue to re-emerge
if the forces of ethnicity are not properly managed. 19
 For example in March 1997,
tension erupted in Penang, a northern state in the Peninsula, when Malay and Indian
youths clashed in Kampung Rawa over the issue of a Hindu temple which was extended
closer to the premise of a mosque. The temple activities were said to have distracted the
tranquillity of prayers in the mosque, thus infuriating the mosque community (Utusan
Malaysia, 27 March 1998). For three weeks the people in the state were living in fear
of a potential ethnic riot. Anwar Ibrahim, then the Deputy Prime Minister, was
assigned to find a solution for the conflict which was later resolved when a new location
was granted to the Hindu temple. The incident shocked the entire country, and tension
was high until the issue was resolved.
19 Ethnic clashes based on religious extremism are not new in Malaysia. In 1976 there was the incident of an Islamic
religious cult attacking the police station in Batu Pahat Johore, killing several policemen and civilians. 1978, a group
of Malay youth, attacked Hindu temple in Kerling Selangor because of their Islamic fanaticism. Many clashes
between PAS and UMNO supporters were reported in the 1980's in Terengganu and Kelantan, two Malay heartlands
in Peninsula Malaysia. The worst was the Memali incident in December 1986 when a number of PAS fanatics and
policemen were killed in a bloody battle in Kampung Memali, in Baling Kedah. In 1997, the issue of a Muslim
woman being forced to convert to Christianity and marry her Christian boyfriend angered many Malays. About the
same time, a family of Hindu professionals was killed in Selangor after they converted to Islam. (See: Chandra
Muzaffar, 1987; Zainah Anwar, 1987; Shamsul AB, 1994, and also Government White Paper on the Memali
Incident; Utusan Malaysia 20 August 1997)
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In short, Malaysia as a country is still in one stage of the ethnogenesis of a
nation. At this point the sense of shared history, a shared cultural values and also
religious tolerance are constantly being developed. Therefore, the process of
homogenization of cultural practices is apparently still under way. In this respect, it is
crucially important that the process of mediating identities so as to reconstruct a national
identity or collective identity for the nation is perpetually pursued. Not least is the
importance of the continuing process of correcting ethnic disparities and resolving
divisions in the economic sphere. It has to be reiterated that it is not possible for the
forces of ethnicity to be eliminated. However, their salience for political mobilization
and confrontational politics can be gradually eradicated (see Horowitz, 1985, for his
various conflict reduction strategies in deeply divided societies).
As far as the question of identity formation is concerned, it is argued that
identities are negotiable and situational (see Eriksen, 1991). This means that identity
changes as a result of rapid social and cultural change, yet ethnicity, in contrast, does not
vanish, but rather may emerge in a new, often more powerful and more clearly
articulated form (Epstein, 1978). In this regard, although acculturation in terms of
values and general orientation may occur in second and third generation immigrants, it
does not necessarily prevent the revitalization of ethnic movements from emerging.
Ethnic revitalization usually emerges when there is an element of fear and threat of
'invasion' by the rival ethnic group in political, economic or cultural life (see Geertz,
1963; Epstein, 1978). However, if second and third generation immigrants could
identify themselves more strongly with the values of the host society or a shared culture
and values are strongly developed, the possibility of the diminution in the social
importance of ethnicity exists. This is what research on identity processes has so far
indicated (Eriksen, 1991). Living in dual or multiple identities in a given political entity
is not an unusual phenomenon in today's world (see: Hirsch, 1987; Kellas, 1991;
Eriksen, 1993). It does not necessarily lead towards irresolvable conflict. However, the
ambiguity that is created as a result of multiple identities may occasionally be difficult
to handle in an environment where one is expected to have a more clearly delineated
identity (Eriksen, 1993:138). Furthermore, and in a general sense, nations are
communities where citizens are expected to be integrated with respect to culture and
identity. Since a community's identity is subject to constant change, national identity or
collective political identity therefore is also neither fixed nor alterable at will. Instead,	 1
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identity needs to be periodically redefined in the light of historically inherited
characteristics, present needs, and future aspirations(Parelch, B., 1995).
9.5 Conclusion	 .
This chapter argues that mediating identities is an arduous task that the notion of
Bangsa Malaysia has to cope with. However, the discussion indicates that the basis for
the national compromise or the middle ground for mediating identity has indeed begun
to be attempted by the ruling elite. Such important attempts were generated by the
government not long after the notion of Bangsa Malaysia was officially unveiled. This
seems to have been possible because the social, and economic landscape of Malaysian
polity has gone several significant shifts as a result of the NEP and the constant
economic development that the country experienced. Apart from that, the shift can also
be attributed to the eighteen year impact of `Mahathirism'. With strong popular support
at the outset, `Mahathirism' has generated the changing social, economic and political
landscape of Malaysian society.
If communalism appeared to be declining in the post 1990's, it was not because
ethnicity has been eliminated, but rather because of its salience for political mobilization
and confrontational politics was diffused due to the rapid economic progress which
allowed every ethnic group to gain portions of the economic cake. Thus, a 'feel good
factor' was created, which served well for the advantage of the ruling party. This was
the major factor behind the BN landslide electoral victory in the 1995 general election.
The new self-confidence of Malay elite generated by economic factors was the key
element that prompted the government to experiment with the new basis for the nation-
in-the-making. The vision of Bangsa Malaysia seems not to have been pursued as an
ethnic project, or an extension of the Malay nationalist agenda in-toto, but rather as a
compromise or a consolidation of Malay nationalism, and the notion of cultural
pluralism supported by non-Malays. The notion of Bangsa Malaysia as the government
perceived it, seems to be moving towards a supra-ethnic political identity. And as such,
it reflects a supra-ethnic political imagined nation. However, Malay political hegemony
would remain unchanged. This is how Mahathir perceived the notion of Ban gsa
Malaysia.
This is not to say that the said compromise has been effectively sealed. It was
put forward by the government, and has yet to be endorsed by the people. Although
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many non-Malays appeared to be overwhelmed by such a dramatic shift in the
government approach to nation-building (since it indicated a clear departure from the
assimilation tendencies of the past), some sections of the Malay community were
dismayed that their vision of creating a Malaysian nation based on the Malay polity and
culture is no longer acceptable to the present Malay elite. How the nationalist and the
Islamic factions of the Malay community is to be convinced of such a shift remains
another crucial challenge for the Malay ruling elite to deal with. This could be a
potential explosive issue if it is not properly managed, as PAS offers another political
alternative for the Malays, and so will capitalize on the issue as an effective weapon to
undermine UMNO's position. Some of this potential has indeed emerged following the
severe economic crisis that hit the country in 1997, and which later culminated into the
political crisis of September 1998, when Mahathir's chosen heir apparent, Anwar
Ibrahim, was sacked from the government and the party.
Although the sacking of Anwar from the government and the party was not
directly linked to ideological differences between the two Malay leaders on the question
of nation-building, but rather on economic policies and that of the alleged sexual
misconduct committed by Anwar, some Malay intellectuals believe that Anwar had a
different view to that of Mahathir concerning the nation-building project. 2° Many of the
so-called 'nationalist faction' of Malay and bureaucratic intellectuals apparently were
closely associated with Anwar (see Shamsul AB, 1996b). Anwar was seen as having a
strong commitment to the idealism of Malay nationalism, particularly in matters related
to Islam and the Malay language. Indeed, his track record as a social activist, and as a
champion of the Malay language (even while he was in the government) speaks for itself
(see Morais, 1983; Chandra Muzaffar, 1987; Zainah Anwar, 1987; and Muhamad Abu
Bakar, 1987).
As a populist, Anwar seems to be more successful than Mahathir. 21
 The wide-
ranging support that he received from the ordinary Malay masses following his
dismissal from the government bears this out. Therefore, as it emerged, the
disenchantment that many Malays have with Mahathir and his policies (including that of
his nation-building vision) added to the support and sympathy for Anwar, led Anwar's
call for the reformasi agenda to culminate in immense anti-Mahathir sentiment among
2° Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
21 See Khoo Boo Teik (1995) for his eloquent account of Mahathir as a populist.
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the Malays. It was PAS that has been benefited from the anti-Mahathir sentiments
triggered by the economic and political crisis. The successes of Mahathirism was
eclipsed by the twin crises that hit the country. To what extent will the formula of
national consensus for nation-building which Mahathir has attempted to .create be
seriously affected if UMNO's political base is eroded by an apparent increase in support
for PAS among the Malays? To what extent will UMNO and government policies on
nation-building be affected if the party has to depend on the non-Malay vote for its
political survival? Are further concessions for the non-Malays under way, and what
would be the Malays reaction if such concessions were made? As a party that
practices pragmatism rather than ideological orientation, UMNO is capable of
responding to change. This has proven to be UMNO's strength in the past, and may
continue to be so in the future. UMNO has embarked on radical reforms following the
1969 incident to respond to the Malay nationalist revitalization, and is therefore capable
of reforming anew in response to the 1997 and 1998 crises.
The politics of identity construction and nation formation in Malaysia therefore
as eloquently argued by Shamsul A.B. (1996b) indicate the conflict between 'two-social
realities' of the 'authority-defined' social reality against 'everyday-defined' social
reality culminating in competing notions of nation-of-intent. To Shamsul the origins
and social roots of the plurality of nations-of-intent can be traced from a historical
perspective. Whereas the importance of the historical factor must be recognized, this
study has gone further and contended that ethnicity was the key factor in the creation of
the competing nations-of-intent in Malaysia. The root of the politics of nation-building
in Malaysia may not be completely uncovered unless the question of ethnicity in
Malaysian society is fully understood. While Shamsul argued that the real challenge for
Malaysia in nation building was to seek a middle ground or a compromise between the
competing notions of nation-of-intent, this study argues that the basis for the middle
ground has been sought by the government, but has yet to be endorsed by the people,
especially from the Malay nationalist faction and from the Islamic group. It has been
indicated in the discussion that the non-Malays (especially the Chinese community)
seem to be attracted to the basis of the compromise that the government has advanced as
it fits in with the notions of cultural pluralism which they have been advocated since
1957.
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It has been argued that economic factors were crucial in promoting ethnic
harmony and national integration in the past, and it will continue to be so in the future.
Indeed, the economy was a key factor in the success of Mahathirism before the 1997
crisis. Therefore, economic performance in the post-economic crisis and also the post-
Mahathir era will certainly be another critical factor which could shape and determine
the direction of the project of nation-building in Malaysia. Indeed, economic factors
may largely determine whether Bangsa Malaysia will survive beyond Mahathir.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
10.1 Prologue
Although since the 1969 racial riots Malaysian plural society has been able to
absorb various threats to its political stability, nation-building continues to be the
greatest challenge for the country and continually dominates its poiitical agenda. This
study has been conducted to examine the delicate process of nation-building in Malaysia
in the post 1970 period. It focussed on one area, the politics of nation-building in the
context of the project of constructing the Bangsa Malaysia, as envisaged in Vision 2020
introduced by Dr. Mahathir in 1991. While the importance of historical factors has been
acknowledged, this study embarked from the premise that the dialectic between
ethnicity and nationalism was crucial to apprehend the politics of nation-building in
Malaysia. This concluding chapter returns to the research objectives raised in the first
chapter, and presents the major arguments and findings of the thesis.
10.2 Ethnicity and nationalism in Malaysia
The principal objective of this study has been to examine the underlying socio-
political parameters that shaped and influenced the politics of nation-building in
Malaysia in the post 1970 period. The focus of the investigation has been to uncover the
perceptions amongst the major ethnic communities concerning the idea of a nation or
the 'political imagined community', in the context of the project of constructing the
Bangsa Malaysia. It also set out to examine the impact of key national policies and the
impact of the changes that took place under Mahathir's administration concerning the
process of nation formation in Malaysia. In the final analysis, the thesis aimed to
construct the meaning of the concept of Bangsa Malaysia, and examined its viability as
a means of redressing the problems of ethnicity and nation-building in Malaysia.
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The key argument of this study is that the potent interplay between the forces of
ethnicity and nationalism was the key factor behind the 'competing ethnic ideologies of
a nation' to be created in Malaysia. It has also been argued that this was .the most
prominent element that has complicated the project of nation-building in the country
over the past four decades. The politics of nation-building in Malaysia reflects the pulls
in different directions of the competing ethnic ideologies of nation-of-intent, both within
and across ethnic groups. Not surprisingly, Vision 2020 which outlined the Mahathir's
government aim to turn Malaysia into an industrialized country, identified that "the most
fundamental, the most basic challenge" for the country was creating a 'united Malaysian
nation' or the Bangsa Malaysia (Mahathir Mohamad, 1992: 2). This study has
demonstrated that despite the ambiguity concerning its meaning, the project of Bangsa
Malaysia can be seen as a crucial attempt by the state to renegotiate, reconcile, and
reformulate the basis of nation formation in the country.
To achieve this, the study traced the way in which the government has been
attempting to appeal to elements of 'the past' embodied in Malay nationalism, while
simultaneously consolidating the contemporary reality of cultural pluralism that prevails
in Malaysian society, thus depicting 'the nation' as a supra-ethnic political imagined
community, or a non-ethnic nation. Nevertheless, depicting the 'nation' as a 'mosaic of
cultures' is easier than living in such a mosaic. Creating a united 'nation' out of distinct
ethnic cultures is a difficult matter. The problem for this framework lies in its emphasis
on differences rather than similarities. Since the notion of Bangsa Malaysia remains
rather vague to the people at large, and the debates over what should constitute the core
characteristics of the envisaged 'nation' are still very much alive, the project remains
both conceptually and practically problematic. Bangsa Malaysia can therefore only be
envisaged in political terms rather than in cultural terms.
In a wider context, Vision 2020 the ultimatel goal of which was to create 'a
united and an industrialized Malaysian nation in its own mould', can also be seen as an
attempt to construct Malaysian nationalism on the basis of 'secular-materialist'
components. By so doing, it tacitly sought to downplay the 'ethno-cultural dialectic'
that strongly prevails in Malaysian society. However, given the dominance of
competing ethnic ideas of a nation within Malaysia's pluralistic socio-political settings,
the notion of Bangsa Malaysia may simply prove the latest in a series of different
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nations-of-intent which have been articulated in post-independence Malaysia. Looking
from this perspective, it has been argued that the forces of ethnicity and nationalism will
remain crucial in shaping and influencing the mechanics and the dynamics of the
politics of nation-building in Malaysia for many years to come.
Whereas sustainable economic development and democracy may to some extent
diffuse the political salience of ethnicity, it is wrong to suggest they will lead to the
elimination of ethnicity. Eriksen (1993:158) argued that ethnic revitalization has been
an inherent feature of modernity, thus 'the eventual disappearance of ethnicity is no less
certain than its appearance' (Eriksen, 1993:160). To him, 'ethnicity does not necessarily
arise from modernity, and it is not necessarily an end-produce CSCl. Exerefov..,
although people tend to share many modern and cosmopolitan cultural values as a result
of modernization, industrialization, and democratization, they have simultaneously
becoming socially more diversified. Ethnicity, without doubt, is one prevalent
expressions of that diversification. Clearly, as Gellner put it, 'modern society is both
more homogeneous and more diversified...'(Gellner, 1978:141).
What make ethnicity and nationalism politically salient as far as nation-building
in divided societies is concerned? It has been argued that the significance of ethnicity
lies in its salience for group consciousness and collective political actions. People are
willing to die for their collective 'nation', simply because of the powerful appeal and
persistence of ethnic identity and sentiment (Anderson, 1996a). Ethnic identity provides
a tangible set of common identifications— language, food, music, names— when other
social collectivities become more abstract and impersonal (Bell, 1975). Therefore,
psychologically, it has one advantage over the other modes of personal identity and
social linkages, that is its capacity to arouse and to engage the most intense, deep, and
private emotional sentiments of the people (see: Portz, 1974:105). In this regard, it has
been demonstrated that, the moment ethnic identity is perceived as being driven into a
situation of threat, there is a strong tendency for ethnic revitalization movements to
emerge.
Identity as a crucial mark of distinctiveness is the force behind ethnic
consciousness and in many instances ethnic groups enter into politics purportedly to
protect themselves from or rather to resist the perceived threat of domination from other
ethnic groups which might result in the dilution of their ethnic identity (the very mark of
distinctiveness). As ethnic groups transform themselves into political conflict groups
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for the purpose of interest articulation, the emotional intensity of their internal ethnic
cohesion arises, and ethnic solidarity and consciousness will be enhanced. From this
premise, it appears that ethnicity does not exist in isolation but rather is a consequence
of contact and conflict. It has been demonstrated that 'the ethnicists paradigm' (Smith,
1986) viewed ethnicity as something 'mythic' and 'symbolic' in character and derived
its powerful appeal from aspects of a 'common past'. However, the relevant aspect of
'common past' here refers to 'older collective ties' (Smith, 1986) and not necessary or
exclusively to a product of history (Nash, 1989; Shamsul AB, 1996a), or modernization
and industrialization (Gellner, 1983). In short, the politics of ethnicity that emerged in
Malaysia was a product of contact and conflict that occurred in wider socio-political
circumstances. Therefore, whereas ethnic groups are characterized by a multiplicity of
attributes, namely common descent, shared history, language, religion, race, colour,
culture, sect, caste and so on, ethnicity is basically an aspect of social relationships
between one or more ethnic groups in a given socio-political setting.
By the same token, whereas cultural peculiarities have a direct bearing on the
emergence of ethnic consciousness, it has been argued that only when cultural
differences make a social difference do they lead to the creation of ethnicity. The
question of protecting one's cultural traits may not wise. unlesst CwIt exist eitmttNts o-C
cultural domination and threat from another culture. It has also been argued that living
with dual or multiple identities does not always constitute a problem. Nevertheless, it
does create some difficulties when one is expected to have a clearly delineated identity.
This is part of the problem that prevails in plural societies, which consequently makes
the project of nation-formation a difficult task. The problem lies in the conflict between
protecting ethnic distinctiveness or identity vis-a-vis subscribing to national identity.
Ethnic identities, and the belief in shared culture and history, however, are not perpetual.
Instead, they are creations which may result from specific historical circumstances,
strategic actors or as unintended consequences of political projects (Eriksen, 1993:92).
Identity, in this regard, is not static but rather is dynamic, and is prone to constant
changes in accordance with changes in social and political environments. Identity is
fluid and situational. The problem for Malaysia was that while ethnic identities may
constantly change, the people are still strongly attached to their collective ethnic
identities, in contrast to national identity which has yet to be developed. The crucial
linkages between ethnicity and nationalism lie in the state. That is, nationalism emerges
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when there is an `...institutionalization of one particular ethnic identity by attaching it to
the state' (Worsley, 1984:247). This is particularly true as far as Malay nationalism is
concern, and that explains why it has been constantly challenged by the non-Malays.
Whereas a state in contemporary politics is defined as having (a) a geographical
area endowed with political sovereignty; (b) a monopoly on the use of force; and (c)
consisting of citizens with terminal loyalties (Oommen, 1994:26), a nation derives from
the people's relationship to and identification with the state. Where there exists a
relatively strong, cohesive and common identification between the people and the state,
then a nation-state is arguably created. In this regard, national identity or collective
culture links together the people and the state to create a nation-state. The most
common feature of a modern nation-state can be seen in Europe, where a nation (a
cultural entity) co-exists with the state (a political entity) thus creating many distinctive
European nation-states (Oommen, 1994). These states are basically a composition of
both cultural and political nations which emerge through a long process of ethnogenesis
of the nation.
However, many developing countries have been formed as a consequence of
deco lonisation. They are largely independent states created out of territories which were
under European colonial administration. Their boundaries were drawu, Hobsbaws‘
(1990:171) explains, without any reference to, and sometimes without the knowledge of
their peoples, except perhaps for some Westernized aristocrats and indigenous elites.
For Malaysia, its geographical boundaries were delineated by common consent through
a process of negotiations. In the Peninsula, the common factor is provided by
recognition of the federation of the Malay states as the basis for the 'new state'. After
the departure of the colonial masters, the ruling elites inherited the state, but without
having 'a united nation'. Instead, they had to grapple with the problems of governing a
state in which the society was multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. By the time of
independence, the Malay states had already been changed through linkages instituted by
the British. Above all, the composition of the population had also changed, so that
common descent could not be the basis of national identity and unity. The presence of
citizens of differing ethnic and cultural origins requires the formulation of a new basis
for national identity. The basic problem with which Malaysia (and many other states
with similar characteristics) have to cope has been the prevalence of strong and
conspicuous identification of its people with other social collectivities (especially ethnic
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and tribal groups) in contrast to common identification with the state. In other words,
their national identity is still weak in comparison to their ethnic identities. This also
implies that whereas the citizens can identify with the state politically because of their
citizenship status, they may however, not strongly identify with it culturally. This is a
major problem in the development of national culture and national identity in Malaysia.
Hence, if the 'nation' is envisaged by Malaysians, it will tend to be a 'political
nation' rather than a 'cultural nation'. This is a possible alternative to avoid the
controversy of being an ethnic nation, while awaiting the long process of ethnogenesis
of the nation to bring about the creation of the 'ethno-cultural nation'. This is the
significant contrast between these 'nations' and other nation-states such as those of
many European nation-states. Therefore, countries such as Malaysia can be regarded as
states with 'several nations' (Shamsul A.B., 1992) or 'plural society nations' because of
their multinational or multi-ethnic composition. Thus, there was a suggestion that these
states be called 'state-nations' rather than nation-states (Leo Suryadinata,1997). What
tends to constitute a persistent problem in these states has been the assertion of ethnic
identities in national terms, thus signifying a 'danger' to the state and often posing a
similar threat to other ethnic communities.
Quite often, the state itself is not a neutral entity, as it may have been 'seized' to
serve the specific motives and agendas of a particular political elite or ethnic group.
Political life in the state thus sometimes reflecting the struggle of various social
groupings 'against' the state, which was perceived as attempting to hinder their
legitimate interest, a persistent phenomenon likened to the 'Hobbesian state'. With such
a backdrop, the state-nation itself tends to be a very fragile institution. Although
political violence or anarchy may not necessarily be a persistent phenomenon, these
societies probably can be best described as 'states in stable tension' (Shamsul AB,
1996a). Hence, in a conscious attempt to preserve the sovereignty and the integrity of
the state, political regimes in divided societies tend to succumb into political
authoritarianism or make use of 'quasi-democratic' systems as an alternative to western
style liberal democracy (see: Crouch, 1996; Zalcaria Ahmad, 1989).
Starting with an authoritarian system, those who control or dominate the state
tend to manipulate its apparatus to propagate nation-building as an ethnic project or
present the nation-state in ethnic terms. In other words, the country's nation formation
is to be based on a particular ethnic identity, which consequently implies that other
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ethnic communities will inevitably have to accept a predetermined national identity at
the expense of their own ethnic identities. This inevitably encourages ethnic and
cultural revitalization on the part of the affected groups to resist the cultural and political
hegemony of the dominant ethnic group. For some other states whose internal political
structures have been established on the framework of consociational democracy, the
persistent dilemma has been to maintain cultural pluralism while simultaneously moving
towards the construction of national identity, and hence nation formation. Malaysia has
had to face most of these problems since its inception as a modern independent state in
1957.
Moving to the question of nationalism, it has been maintained that nationalism
emerged as a form of ethnicity or rather as Smith (1986) perceives, 'ethnicity is a
precursor of nationalism'. Although Smith (1983) argues that nationalism may emerge
with or without a nation, Gellner (1983) believes that nationalism 'invents nations where
they do not exist'. This score implies that without nationalism, the nation is perhaps
much more difficult to conceive. Therefore, in the context of countries in which their
'nations' are in-the-making, it is crucial that nationalism is constantly developed to
promote a sense of nationhood amongst its citizens. But since nationalism is deeply
embedded in an 'ethno-symbolic' base, the question is which ethnic identity should
constitute the basis for nationalism in a divided societies? In Malaysia, the Malays felt
that Malay nationalism that matured in 1957 should be the basis for the country's
nationalism, as other nationalisms were externally oriented (the pre-independence
Chinese and Indian nationalisms in Malaya). However, the non-Malays were sceptical
about this view, as they saw that accepting Malay nationalism and its hegemonic
tendencies might result in the encapsulation of other ethnic communities into Malay
society. This is something which would ultimately undermine the culturally pluralist
basis of the polity that was established in 1957. For the Malays, their intention to
subordinate other ethnic communities into the framework of Malay nation-state was
obstructed by the consociational framework that anchored the political system. In fact,
this might be the same factor that 'saved' Malaysia from plummeting into endless ethnic
confrontations, as the system provide adequate space for conflict regulation, despite
being severely challenged in 1969.
While consociational democracy may provide certain tangible mechanisms for
conflict management, it has, however, certain outstanding flaws. The dangers for this
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system may lie in (a) the failure of multi-ethnic national elite to reach political
accommodation or compromise; (b) the failure of ethnic elite at the national level to
gain adequate or continuous support from ethnic groups that they represent; and (c) the
threat of moderate national ethnic elites being severely challenged by extremist and
radical forces within and outside their own ethnic groups (see Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz,
1985). These challenges have posed serious threats to Malaysian consociationalism
which brought the system to near-collapse in the 1969 racial riots. However, the system
was revived in 1974 with the establishment of the BN grand coalition which is a bigger,
more representative and thus a more stable consociational structure. Nevertheless, to
provide a more lasting stability, the country still needs to find a permanent solution
through the nation-building agenda. The biggest challenge is to formulate the most
acceptable framework for mediating identities, so that it can accommodate all the
essential interests of the major ethnic groups in the society.
10.3 Nation-building and the competing ethnic ideologies in Malaysia
It has been illustrated that the politics of nation-building in Malaysia is basically
the politics of mediating identities. This phenomenon, however, has not culminated in
a conflict between rival ethnic nationalisms seeking autonomy or political self-rule in
any real real sense, but rather in terms of the varying perceptions of nation-of-intent,
both inter and intra ethnic groups. Despite some tensions between the federal
government and several state governments, the ethnic struggle in Malaysia has largely
taken place within existing political boundaries, whereby each ethnic group has sought
maximum power to protect its interests. PAS, which ruled the state of Kelantan from
1959-1978, and from 1990 to present, has confined itselt to attempting to portray the
Islamic 'holier than thou' approach to governing the state vis-a-vis the perceived
UMNO secular-nationalist ideology. Although PAS has been propagating the notion of
an 'Islamic nation-state', it has not been able to achieve its goal, due to constitutional
limitations. PAS needs to amend the Federal Constitution in order to allow Kelantan to
become a 'model' Islamic state, a legislative battle which it has been unable to win
given the BN domination of the Federal Parliament. In Sabah, the PBS regime from
1985-1991 only attempted to reconstruct the notion of Malay-based Bumiputeraism into
a Kadazan-based Bumiputeraism in that state. Kadazan nationalism is more of a
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political expression of culture than a political nationalism per se. Likewise, Ibanism or
Dayakism in Sarawak have a similar characteristics.
Historically, the conflicting notions of nation-of-intent in Malaysia had emerged
even before independence was achieved. At that time conflict centred on the intra-
Malay community conflicts embodied in the Malay Left's Melayu Raya/Indonesia Raya
aspiration vis-a-vis the Malay dominant ideology led by the `administocrats'. However
after Indonesia and Malaya became separate political entities, the Melayu Raya
aspiration ended in abject failure. Although the Malay dominant thesis which at its
initial stage claimed that 'Malaya is for the Malays' appeared similar to a form of
'ethnic nationalism', it has been argued that it is not really accurate to regard Malay
nationalism in this light. Throughout its development, Malay nationalism has shown its
exclusiveness and inclusiveness tendencies, thus emerged as both an ethnic nationalism
and as a social nationalism.
The inclusiveness and the flexibility of Malay nationalism became more
apparent in the post-war period. When the Malayan Union project failed as a result of
Malay resistance, it did not culminate in the creation of a Malay Malayan nation-state.
Instead, the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement that replaced the Malayan Union
unitary system only restored Malay dominance ideology within the framework of a
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity. Malay nationalism thus had to accommodate to
this new political arrangement of multi-culturalism. When Malaya obtained
independence in 1957, the structure of the government was based on the formula of
consociational democracy which officially recognized Malay political primacy while
simultaneously established the framework of multi-culturalism which served as a core
characteristic of the new state. Later, when Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaysia in
1963, the basic structure of the state persisted.
The perpetual attempt to materialize the unfinished agenda of Malay nationalism
has not been succeeded, since it has been consistently challenged by the non-Malays
notions of cultural pluralism. Ethnic prejudices continued to grow as the Malays and the
Chinese engaged in persistent conflicts on several crucial issues pertaining to the
national language and education policies, and on Malay special rights vis-a-vis the
notion of Malaysian Malaysia which was championed by the PAP and later continued
by the DAP. At the same time, the Malay leadership in UMNO was severely criticized
by PAS for not being being bold enough to redress Malay backwardness in education
296
and economy, but instead was perceived as being too accommodative to the non-
Malays. The politicization of ethnicity in the political arena was very apparent. The
revolution of rising expectations culminated in a revolution of rising frustrations left an
appalling remark on Malaysian plural society when the racial riots occurred in the May
1969 tragedy. In short, the period between 1957-1970 saw that Malaysia was not able to
make substantive efforts towards promoting national integration. Indeed, the project of
nation formation was in disarray in the period prior to the 1969 tragedy.
The 1969 riots however were seen by some Malay nationalists as a 'blessing in
disguise' since they created an opportunity to complete the unfinished agenda of Malay
nationalism, namely its economic and cultural dimensions (Wan Hashim, 1983). It has
been argued that Malay nationalism was centred on the notions of the Malay Kerajaan
and the Ban gsa Melayu. For the Malays, colonialism has not only created a plural
society in Malaysia, but of more importance had reduced their status from Bangsa
Melayu (Malay nation) to a mere ethnic group not very dissimilar to other ethnic groups
which had only started their settlement in Malaya in the late nineteenth century. For the
Malays the introduction of the NEP, the National Cultural Policy and the more assertive
implementation of the national language and education policies in the post 1970s
symbolized the reassertion of an unfinished agenda of Malay nationalism. For the non-
Malays all these were clear expressions of Malay cultural-politico domination and a
deliberate attempt on the part of Malay nationalist political elite to turn nation-building
into an ethnic project. For two decades the political arena was marked by the clashes
between Malay nationalism and the non-Malays notion of cultural pluralism inherent in
their criticisms concerning the implementation of the NEP, the national education and
language policies, and the unresolved debates on the national cultural policy.
Despite some improvement achieved in terms of rectifying socio-economic
disparities between the Bumiputera and the non-Burniputera communities, the
framework of nation formation still operates on the premise of conflict management and
racial harmony. Still, a clear direction towards nation formation has not been found. On
the contrary, the Bumiputera-non Bumiputera dichotomy that was created during the
NEP period has further deepened ethnic differentiation in the society. For the non-
Bumiputera the question was why the new Malaysian generation- who were supposed to
have equal citizenship rights and status- had to carry the burden of the historical
baggage of previous generations which was clearly affecting their current position. In
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turn, the Malays argued that, the compromise was based on a 'sacred social contract'
between the founding fathers of the country in 1957 which had set the basis of every
citizen's constitutional rights. Obviously, the institutionalization of ethnicity seems to
be the core factor in such a debate, and will inevitably continue to be so, as long as the
debate on national identity and nation formation is not resolved.
This was the backdrop against which the politics of nation-building in Malaysia
was established, prior to the introduction of the notion of Bangsa Malaysia in 1991.
Whereas the Malays were concerned about sustaining Malayness and Malay hegemony
as well as advancing their economic gains, the Chinese fear was the perceived threat to
Chinese culture and Chinese language- the defining features of Chineseness- from the
exertion of the Malay dominant ideology. Although Wang Gung Wu (1988:4) asserts
that, 'the Chinese have never had a concept of identity, only a concept of Chineseness',
the perceived threats to aspects of their `Chineseness' such as Chinese language and
culture- be it real or imaginary- that came from Malay nationalism had resulted in the
revitalization of Chinese cultural movements to project Chinese identity. For the
Chinese, the symbols of their identity lies in Chinese schools, the Chinese mass media
(especially the press), and Chinese associations. The main function of all these
institutions are to promote Chinese language and culture, thus sustaining Chineseness.
Therefore, as long as the basis of cultural pluralism is maintained in Malaysia, the
Chinese and the other non-Malays' aspirations to sustain their distinctive ethnic
identities will be guaranteed. Within the Bumiputera communities, Malay nationalism
had to face with PAS 's notion of an Islamic nation, especially in the early eighties when
the ulamak's leadership took over the party from the old guards. In addition, in Sabah
and Sarawak, the political expressions of Kadazanism and Dayakism have further
complicated the aspiration of national integration. Until the notion of Bangsa Malaysia
and Vision 2020 were officially unveiled, Malaysia only had the concept of national
unity, but not a true concept of a 'nation'. Moreover, the project of nation-building was
pursued in the form of conflict management and promoting ethnic harmony.
10.4 The prospects for Bangsa Malaysia
It has been argued that the notion of Bangsa Malaysia has not been a clear cut
concept. It means different things to different people. This clearly reflects the
conflicting perception of what 'Malaysian nation' should represent. For the large
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majority of Malaysians, the concept is still a vague and perhaps an ambiguous notion.
The debate on what should constitute the Bangsa Malaysia clearly indicates the
complexities that have entangled the project of nation-building in Malaysia. Every
ethnic community hoped that their social, cultural and political aspirations would be
embedded in the concept of Bangsa Malaysia. Although it has been argued that with the
introduction of the idea of Bangsa Malaysia, the government was attempting to
formulate the middle ground through the consolidation of Malay nationalism and
cultural pluralism, thus depicting the nation as 'a mosaic of different cultures' and
creating a supra-ethnic national identity, there are still several fundamental question yet
to be addressed. The first and foremost is, is this going to be a viable basis for creating
a 'united Malaysian nation'? The second is, before this venture can be endorsed,
Malaysians may need to know what criteria are to be used to balance Malay nationalism
with the notion of cultural pluralism in the formation of the characteristics of the Bangsa
Malaysia? Answering these questions may trigger another political battle between the
major ethnic groups. The battle is likely to be a multi-dimensional one, that is a struggle
between Malay nationalism, Islam, Bumiputeraism (Kadazanism and Dayakism), and
cultural pluralism.
In one way or another, Bangsa Malaysia is a product of Mahathirism. The
notion is tied to Mahathir and UMNO secularist politics. UMNO is fully aware that
based on the non-Muslims' difficulties in adapting to Islam in comparison to their
willingness to adapt to the Malay language, the Raja and some elements of Malay
culture, Islam will always constitute a sensitive subject as far as the Malay-non-Muslim
relationship is concerned. Therefore, although UMNO has claimed that the party is
committed to Islam, the party has never proposed transforming the Malaysian secular
polity into an Islamic-theocratic state. This has been the crux of the conflict between
UMNO and PAS which does envisage an Islamic state. Bangsa Malaysia has been part
of Mahathir's grand vision of what a secular Malaysian state should be in the year
2020. Until July 1997 the government, in particular Mahathir's leadership, seemed to
enjoy a strong popular mandate given the continued stability and rapid economic
development the country has been experiencing. Every ethnic community generally felt
that it had been getting its respective portion of the country's economic prosperity. The
landslide electoral victory secured by the BN in the 1995 general election illustrated this
widespread support backed by continuous economic growth, political stability, and
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strong popular support. Mahathir's leadership and his grandiose visions seemed
unaffected despite various criticisms leveled against his policies, and the government's
authoritarian tendencies. For more than a decade, Mahathir has been able to subdue his
critics with Malaysia's economic success, internal cohesion and his high profile
international reputation. Several attempts to challenge his power grip within UMNO
ended in abject failure.
However, when the country was severely hit by the 1997 economic crisis which
later turned into a political one, things began to change. The most serious criticisms of
his economic policies and grandiose projects were those of 'crony capitalism' and the
widespread of corruption in his government. Even, the new middle-class Malays who
were basically the product of Mahathir's economic policies begin to challenge his
leadership, especially with regard to the shocking dismissal of his popular deputy arid
heir-apparent Anwar Ibrahim, and above all the ill-treatment that he received thereafter.
Mahathir's eighteen year grip on power has been seriously questioned and the calls for
his resignation were no longer loud enough to be simply ignored. Mahathir's leadership
in the midst of the economic and political turmoil has divided Malaysian along ethnic
lines. While the non-Malays, (particularly the Chinese) believed that retaining
Mahathir's leadership and UMNO led government was crucial to prevent Malaysia from
succumbing to a grim scenario similar to that of the Indonesian crisis, many Malays
(especially from amongst the middle class and the younger generation) tended to see
PAS as a serious political alternative to UMNO. Indeed, support for PAS has been
growing significantly since Anwar's dismissal, especially in Malay heartland states of
Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis. Clearly, opposition parties have been gaining
huge advantage from the incident, and PAS seems to have been the greatest beneficiary.
In fact, opposition parties seem to have been brought much closer to forming an
electoral pact as a result of the twin crises. Given the continued economic uncertainty,
and the tainted image of Mahathir's leadership among the Malays, the next general
election will certainly be crucial in determining Mahathir's legacy. More crucially, it
could emerge as another serious test for Malaysian consociationalism, as moderate
national elite are faced with the daunting task of regaining their influence following the
economic crisis and the Anwar Ibrahim issue. To what extent Mahathir will be able to
survive all these critical challenges has yet to be seen. If Mahathir is seen as a liability
for his party to return to power in the next election, he will certainly struggle to retain
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his position. Even if UMNO still want him to be its leader, his future very much
depends on his ability to steer the economic recovery, and on the outcome of the next
general election. At seventy four years old, it will not be too long before he is replaced
by someone else. If the BN manages to maintain its two thirds majority in• the next
Parliament, even with a reduced number of seats, Mahathir's position may still be
tenable. If this does not happen, it will mean an immediate end to Mahathir's legacy.
The relevant question to ask is: to what extent is the idea of Bangsa Malaysia going to
survive Mahathir's political reign?
The immediate departure of Mahathir from power before his successor was able
to consolidate his position might result in an intense power struggle within UMNO, as at
present there is no particular figure in the party who commands popular support similar
to that which Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim have been able to secure. Although
Mahathir's new deputy, Abdullah Badawi may succeed him, his position will only be
secured if he is endorsed by the party to assume the post of Deputy President of
UMNO, which has been vacant since Anwar's dismissal. The UMNO party election is
expected to be held after the general election. At present, Abdullah is just one of the
three UMNO vice-presidents. Whether he will be challenged by any other leader such
as Najib Tun Razak (another Vice President who is also the Education Minister), and
Tengku Razaleigh, who has returned to the party in 1996 and may plan to make a
comeback to UMNO's hierarchy has yet to be seen. All these developments will have a
very significant bearing on the progress and the prospects for the projects of Bangsa
Malaysia and Vision 2020. The important question here is to what extent Mahathir's
successor will be inclined to retain the notions of Bangsa Malaysia and Vision 2020? In
what manner Malaysian politics will evolve in the post Mahathir era is yet another
crucial question which will have a significant bearing on the project of nation-building
in the country. What is perhaps more or less certain is that ethnicity and nationalism
will still be socially and politically salient in shaping and influencing the politics of
nation-building in Malaysia for many years to come.
In sum, it has been argued that as far as the project of nation-building in
Malaysia is concerned, many of the shift have been occurring in the system over the past
four decades have been generated by the state. The socio-economic landscape of the
Malaysian polity has undergone several significant shifts since 1970. Although
ethnicity still forms the very basis of Malaysian politics, its political salience in the post
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1990 period has been rather different to the situation that prevailed in the 1960's and
1970's. The key factor was the prevalence of a relatively strong and stable
consociational political regime with Malay leadership as its backbone. With that came
the notion of Malay political hegemony, though the government since independence
comprised representatives of a multi-ethnic political coalition. A relatively strong
government and stable political base has enabled efforts at generating economic
development to yield many fruitful outcomes. Constant economic growth has enabled
the government to embark on attempts at redressing ethnic imbalances in various fields.
Ethnic harmony has been built through the sharing of economic wealth. In short, over
the past four decades, sustainable economic development was seen as vital in promoting
improved ethnic relations in the country. This will certainly remain the case in the
future.
The notion of Bangsa Malaysia illustrated that the project of nation formation
was advanced as part of a package of economic development inherent in Vision 2020,
that is, a plan to turn Malaysia into a fully industrialized country. Although the
symbiotic relationship between economic development and the political salience of
ethnicity is acknowledged, this study has constantly argued that the success of the
project of nation formation in Malaysia needs more than economic measures.
Nationalism and national identity is not only about the economy, but beyond that
embedded in a strong sense of shared culture and emotional ties. Establishing these ties
is perhaps much more difficult than generating economic development. In Mahathir's
words:
...building a nation out of a diverse people with differing historical, ethnic, linguistic, religious,
cultural and geographical backgrounds is something more than just fosterMg consensus on the
basic character of a state or nation. It involves the fostering of shared historical experiences;
shared values; a feeling of common identity and shared destiny that transcends ethnic bounds
without undermining ethnic identity; loyalty, commitment and an emotional attachment to the
nation; and the flowering of distinctly national ethos...
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1992:2)
Until and unless a strong sense of shared national culture and national identity are
effectively developed within its plural society, the ultimate Mahathir dream of
constructing the project of Bangsa Malaysia will remain a vision yet to be
accomplished. Gellner (1983) asserts that nationalism invents nations where they do not
exist. By the same token, the emergence of Malaysian nationalism would certainly help
Malaysians to envisage Bangsa Malaysia as their political imagined nation. The
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question is, is it possible to talk about Malaysian nationalism given the competing ethnic
ideologies of nation that are actively circulating in Malaysian plural society?
10.5 The Epilogue: Agenda for further research
	 •
Studies on ethnicity and nationalism have been growing significantly in recent
years despite the new interests in social science concerning ideas of postmodernism,
globalisation, and market liberalisation, as well as on regional political and economic
cooperations. Ethnicity continues to be crucial, and to constitute one of the most
prominent features of modern society. As Horowitz (1985:13) puts it:
The increasing prominence of ethnic loyalties is a development for which neither statesmen nor
social scientists were adequately prepared.
In many divided societies, managing ethnic conflict continues to be at the centre of
politics. This is bound to be true as far as Malaysia is concerned. This study has
examined the principal aspects of the country's past and contemporary developments
through the frameworks of ethnicity and nationalism in an attempt to uncover the social
origins of the politics of nation-building. The present study has made a number of
important and original contributions to the body of knowledge in this area by examining
the problematic notion of Bangsa Malaysia, particularly with regard to the obstacles that
impede the project of nation formation in the country.
Nevertheless, far more research needs to be carried out in this area. One further
area is a more focused examination of the generational differences between the old and
new generation of Malaysians, especially with regard to their behavioural styles,
attitudes, aspirations and perceptions concerning the type of nation that. te.y NNis
created in Malaysia. The present study has not specifically focused on these aspects, but
rather investigated the problem in general terms. Therefore, it is suggested that this
dimension is further pursued in order to establish the extent to which significant
differences exist between the old and new generations of Malaysians on the aspects
concerned.
It is also imperative that the differences and the impacts of educational
background between the new or younger Malaysian generation of differing ethnic
backgrounds are investigated, in particular, differences between those who attended
national language schools, and those from Chinese and Tamil schools. In addition, the
impact of tertiary education is also a crucial area of research as over the past several
303
years there have been increasing numbers of Malaysians obtaining higher education
from either overseas universities or from local universities, both public and private.
Such research would perhaps help to ascertain the extent to which liberalisation in
language and education have had any important impact in shaping the perceplions of
this younger generation of Malaysians on the notions of nation-of-intent. It would be
useful to examine the extent to which generational differences on the one hand, and the
socialization process on the other hand, affect their political attitudes and perceptions
pertaining to nation-building. Another area which perhaps requires further investigation
is the development of the sense of Malaysian nationalism and Malaysian culture as a
result of the economic development and socialization processes. Again it is important
that cross-generational gap research is undertaken to examine the extent to which
changing patterns of employment (as a result of social engineering and industrialization)
have made an impact towards the development of a stronger sense of shared culture
amongst people of various ethnic backgrounds.
Moreover, since UMNO has also undergone several important changes, it would
be useful to investigate the modes of behaviour and attitude pertaining to nationalism in
the young generation in the party. This would perhaps reveal important information
about the sense of Malay nationalism within the party vis-a-vis Malaysian nationalism.
It would be a much more valuable piece of research if the behavioural pattern and the
attitudes profiles of UMNO youth could be compared and contrasted to a similar age
group of PAS, MCA, MIC and DAP members. This would provide valuable insights
concerning the extent to which a vision of the Malaysian 'nation' is shared by
prospective leaders of Malaysia.
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Informal discussion, at his office in UKM, Bangi, 11 April 1993.
13. Professor Datuk Zainal Abidin Wahid, Retired Professor of History.
Formal interview at his house in Petaling Jaya, 11 March 1997.
14. Professor H.M. Dahlan, the Dean Faculty of Development Science, UKM.
Formal interview at his office in UKM, 31 March 1997, two months before his
untimely demise.
15. Dr. Ranjit Singh, Associate Professor of History, University of Malaya.
Formal interview at University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 30 April 1997.
16. Dr. P. Ramasamy, Associate Professor of Political Science, UKM.
Formal interview at UICM, Bangi, 31 March 1997.
17. Dr. Jayum A. Jawan, Dean, Faculty of Human Ecology, Universiti Putra Malaysia
(UPM).
Formal interview, at UPM, Serdang, 7 April 1997.
18. Dr. Ahmad Fawzi Basri, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM-
The Northern University of Malaysia).
Series of informal discussions, at his office in UUM, Sintok, between March-
April 1997.
19. Dr. Kua Kia Soong, Director of the Dong Jiao Zhong (Chinese Education
Association), at his office in Kajang, 2 April 1997.
20. Mr. Rustam A. Sani, Freelance Writer.
Formal Interview at his house in Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 1997.
III. Key Opinion Formers
21. Datuk Mohamad Salleh Majid, Managing Director Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
Formal interview at his office in Kuala Lumpur, 28 March 1997.
22. Datuk Johan Jaafar, Editor-in-Chief, the Utusan Melayu Group.
Formal interview at his office in Kuala Lumpur, 7 May 1997.
23. Datuk Ahmad Nazri Abdullah, Editor-in-Chief, Berita Harian Press.
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Formal interview at his office in Kuala Lumpur, 12 May 1997.
24. Mr. Chamil Wariya, Editor, Magazine Division, Utusan Melayu Group.
Formal interview, at his office in Kuala Lumpur, 10 April 1997.
25. Tan Sri A. Samad Ismail, Veteran Journalist.
Formal interview at his house in Petaling Jaya, 27 March 1997.
26. Mr. Wong Chun Wai, Senior Journalist, The Star Newspaper.
Informal Discussion, 2 May 1997.
IV. The Community
27. Series of informal interviews with 13 University Utara Malaysia (UUM) students of
various ethnic background and gender from 1 March 997-21 May 1997, at UUM
campus in Sintok.
28. Series of informal discussion with Malaysian students in Leeds from June 1997-July
1997.
29. Series of informal interviews with 7 public sector respondents of different ethnic
background, gender, and age, from 1 March 1997-21 May 1997 in Malaysia.
30. Series of informal interviews with 6 private sector respondents of different ethnic
background, gender, and age, from 1 March 1997-21 May 1997 in Malaysia.
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